Ought we to enhance our cognitive capacities beyond the normal human range? There is no denying that it might be a good idea to level out differences between people with respect to cognitive capacities, and there is no denying that some persons' reaching beyond normal capacities may have some good side-effects on society at large (but also bad side-effects, of course). But is there any direct gain to be made by having ones cognitive capacities enhanced? Will this as such make our lives go better? No, I argue, or, at least, there doesn't seem to exist any evidence suggesting that it would. And it doesn't matter whether we consider the question from a narrow hedonistic perspective, from a more refined hedonistic perspective, from a desire-satisfaction view, or if we adopt some reasonable objective list view of what makes a life go well. Only on an extremely perfectionist — and implausible —view of what makes our lives go well could any direct value in cognitive enhancement find support. Finally, there are no good reasons to do with our sense of identity to enhance even our capacity to remember. So, cognitive enhancement as such would not make our lives go any better. / <p>Author count: 1</p>

Literature regarding the Supreme Court's holdings in Establishment Clause cases suggests the Court's jurisprudence has been inconsistent. Because the Court had both upheld and invalidated challenged governmental actions that relate to religious practices or institutions, a broad overview of the Court's holdings in Establishment Clause cases seems to support that notion. But where does the inconsistency lie: in the tests and criteria used by court members or in the holdings themselves? This thesis suggests that when comparing categories and subsets of the Court's holdings in Establishment Clause cases to one another, the jurisprudence is in fact consistent. This thesis demonstrates where the consistency can be identified and measured in the Court's jurisprudence by analyzing the holdings. The thesis employs three models, Strict-Separationism, Non-Preferentialism, and Accommodationism, to create standardized categories of Supreme Court's holdings, as independent as possible of the reasoning, criteria, or tests applied to the case by the Court members. I grouped the cases included in this study into one or more categories based on which model(s) the Court's actual holding matched. Then I compared cases within each category of holdings to one another across variables (such as actual holding and case types) to measure consistency between the cases. I conclude with an examination of the measured consistency and explanation of identified patterns in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause holdings. The data indicated that the Court's actual holdings matched the same projected holdings consistently when compared to cases with similar variables. / Master of Arts

This thesis starts by describing the legal foundation of religious liberty in the United States and the evolvement of the religion clause jurisprudence. Then follows an outline of the main legal theories on religious liberty. It continues to describe a case study conducted on how Americans citizens perceive the protection of their religious liberty. Upon this there is a chapter where the detailed findings from the case study are described in juxtaposition to the relevant jurisprudence and how this can be applied to the overall legal framework protecting religious liberty.  The final chapter is a discussion on what conclusions that can be drawn.