Diese Arbeit enthält drei unabhängige Kapitel, jedes davon im Bereich der Dynamischen Vertragstheorie. Kapitel I zeigt, dass deterministische dynamische Prinzipal-Agenten-Verträge immer mindestens so ertragreich sind wie stochastische, falls die sogenannte Methode erster Ordnung des dynamischen Mechanismus-Designs erfüllt ist. Meine Ergebnisse legen dar, dass die in der Literatur übliche Einschränkung auf deterministische Verträge zulässig ist, so lange die Methode erster Ordnung gültig ist. Kapitel II basiert auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Ilia Krasikov und Rohit Lamba. Ein Großanbieter (Prinzipal) handelt mit einer kleinen Firma (Agent) einen wiederkehrenden Geschäftsvertrag aus, wobei sich der Agent als ungeduldiger erweist. Der optimale Vertrag wird durch zwei Schlüsseleigenschaften beschrieben: Neustart und Abbruch, die vielerlei Eigenschaften der angebotenen Verträge darlegen. Kapitel III basiert schließlich auf einer gemeinsamen Arbeit mit Rohit Lamba. Darin besitzt der Agent dynamische private Information, die einem Markovprozess folgt. Ein monopolistischer Prinzipal verkauft dem Agenten ein nicht-dauerhaftes Gut und er verpflichtet sich in jeder Periode an den ursprünglich ausgehandelten Vertrag. Die entstehenden Informationskosten verhindern erst-beste Verträge bei auftretender Persistenz im Typ des Agenten. Diese Arbeit stellt einen Weg bereit, wie man den optimalen deterministischen Vertrag in dynamischen Prinzipal-Agenten-Modellen erhält. Der gewöhnliche Weg mit lediglich lokal nach unten bindenden Anreizverträglichkeitsbedingungen misslingt bei hoher Persistenz der Typrealisierungen und bei stark differenzierender Diskontierung. Zudem zeigt die Arbeit wann mit Gewissheit stochastische Verträge ausgeschlossen werden können. / This dissertation consists of three independent chapters, each in the field of dynamic contracting. Chapter I shows that deterministic dynamic contracts between a principal and an agent are always at least as profitable to the principal as stochastic ones, if the so-called first-order approach in dynamic mechanism design is satisfied. My results demonstrate that the usual restriction in the literature to deterministic contracts is admissible, as long as the first-order approach is valid. Chapter II is based on joint work with Ilia Krasikov and Rohit Lamba. We consider a large supplier (principal) who contracts with a small firm (agent) to repeatedly provide working capital in return for payments. The agent is less patient than the principal. The optimal contract is characterized by two key properties: restart and shutdown, which capture various aspects of contracts offered in the marketplace. Finally, Chapter III is based on joint work with Rohit Lamba. We consider the problem of optimal contracting where the agent has dynamic private information, which follows a Markov process. In each period, a monopolistic principal sells a nondurable good to the agent and she commits to the contract she made in the initial period. The emerging information costs prevent first-best contracts whenever there is persistency in the agent’s type. This thesis provides a strategy on how to obtain the optimal deterministic contract in dynamic principal-agent models with Markovian type realizations. We see that the usual approach with only local downward binding incentive compatibility constraints does not work for highly persistent type realizations and for large differences in discounting. Furthermore, I show in which situations we with certainty can exclude stochastic contracts.

In the decade following the ten-plus percent stockmarket collapse of 2000, regulators enacted a myriad of regulations in response to increasing angst experienced by U.S. capital market retail investors. Systemic asymmetric disclosures have fractured investor confidence prompting many commentators to characterize the relationship between Wall Street and the investment community on main street as dire. Though copious works exist on the phenomenon of corporate behaviors, especially matters of shareholder welfare, weak boards, pervious governance mechanisms, and managerial excess, current literature has revealed a dearth in corporate governance praxis specific to the question and effects of asymmetric disseminations and its principal impact on the retail/noninstitutional accredited investor's (NIAI) confidence and decision-making propensities. This phenomenological study is purposed to bridging the gap between the effects of governance disclosure and the confidence and decision-making inclinations of NIAIs. Conceptual frameworks of Akerlof's information theory and Verstegen Ryan and Buchholtz's trust/risk decision making model undergirded the study. A nonrandom purposive sampling method was used to select 21 NIAI informants. Analysis of interview data revealed epistemological patterns/themes confirming the deleterious effects of asymmetrical disseminations on participants' investment decision-making and trust behaviors. Findings may help academicians, investors, policy makers, and practitioners better comprehend the phenomenon and possibly contribute to operating efficiencies in the capital markets. Proaction and greater assertiveness in the investor/activist community may provide an impetus for continued regulatory reforms, improved transparency, and a revitalization of public trust as positive social change outcomes.

La théorie de l'agence a offert une analyse approfondie des conditions sous lesquelles les incitations parviennent à réconcilier les intérêts divergents du principal et de l'agent. Les essais présentés dans cette thèse évaluent la pertinence empirique de ces résultats face à l'intervention d'une tierce partie dans trois situations-types : le comportement de corruption, les choix de pratique des médecins spécialistes et la demande de travail au noir

In this dissertation I study corruption in the public sector in Sweden, a country which the literature regards as having few corruption problems. Sweden is therefore classified as a “least corrupt” case, and such countries are seldom studied in corruption research. My work is thus an effort to fill a gap in the literature. This research is also motivated by a conviction that such a case provides a fertile ground for studying danger zones for corruption. For example, this work allows me to explore how institutional and contextual changes impact on corruption and danger zones. Though the main focus of this work is on Sweden, I also have comparative ambitions. First, I locate Sweden in a cross-national context. I then study corruption in Sweden using a comparative methodology and with an eye to international comparisons. I apply a combined theoretical approach and a multi-method investigation based on several empirical sources and both quantitative and qualitative techniques. This research strategy enables me to capture a phenomenon (corruption) that is more difficult to identify in countries with relatively few obvious corruption scandals than it is in countries in which the phenomenon has traditionally been studied. Regarding danger zones for corruption, the results show that some of the zones identified in the international literature, such as public procurement, are also important in Sweden. For the Swedish case, my empirical research also identifies the types of corruption that occur, perceptions of danger zones and corruption, how corruption changes over time, and how corruption is fought. With regard to the latter, one conclusion is that ingrained (male) sub-cultures can be problematic and may need to be opened up using a combination of measures like promoting a more heterogeneous group of politicians, creating more transparent proceedings in decision groups and conducting more effective audits. The research also highlights the importance of adapting control measures to existing structures of delegation. For example, if delegation arrangements are changed to improve efficiency and cut costs, new accountability measures may be necessary. In general, delegation and control structures should be structured in such a way as to make the cost of shirking quite high. Finally, based on the results of this multi-method investigation, I conclude that one avenue for further corruption research is to connect our knowledge of danger zones to what we know about mechanisms effecting corrupt behaviour, and then to apply this to discussions of new models of the politics of management in multi-level governance.

Questa tesi è una raccolta di tre articoli riguardanti l’economia dell’informazione. Il primo articolo riguarda i possibili effetti negativi delle elezioni sul benessere degli elettori. Infatti, il controllo ottimo nei confronti di un politico dipende in modo non banale dalla relazione tra effetto disciplinante, effetto di selezione e effetto di riduzione della rendita. Il risultato è che un eccessivo controllo nei confronti di un politico può ridurre il benessere sociale. Il secondo articolo analizza un modello di competizione elettorale nel quale l’abilità del politico è sconosciuta anche al politico stesso oltre che agli elettori. L’analisi è in tempo continuo e sviluppata mediante tecniche di programmazione dinamica e di filtraggio. Le credenze sull’abilità vengono aggiornate secondo la regola di Bayes tramite l’osservazione del processo diffusivo che descrive il valore del settore pubblico. Il politico trae utilità da una rendita che è però inferiore in presenza di una scadenza elettorale. Il terzo articolo descrive una relazione principale-agente in tempo continuo dove l’output è rappresentato da un processo diffusivo il cui drift è determinato dallo sforzo dell’agente, che il principale non osserva, e dall’abilità dell’agente, che non è osservata nemmeno dall’agente stesso. Vengono analizzati sia gli incentivi espliciti dati dal contratto che gli incentivi impliciti legati ai career-concerns. L’analisi è sviluppata in tempo continuo; vengono applicate tecniche di programmazione dinamica e di filtraggio. / This thesis is a collection of three essays about information economics. The first essay studies the possible negative effects of elections on voters’ welfare. In fact, the optimal control of politicians depends on the interplay of disciplining, selection and rent-shrinking effects in a non-trivial way. We show that too much control on the politician may reduce social welfare. The second essay studies an agency model of electoral competition where the incumbent’s ability is unknown to the voters as well as to the politician herself. The analysis is developed in a continuous-time stochastic framework using dynamic programming techniques. Competence is unobservable to everyone and learned over time in a Bayesian fashion through the observation of the value of the public sector. Politicians can divert resources being in office thus reducing the economy wealth but this rent is lower (all other things the same) with an electoral constraint. The third essay describes a continuous-time principal-agent model in which the output is a diffusion process whose drift is determined by the agent’s unobserved effort and by manager’s competence (it is assumed symmetric information about it). We study separately both explicit incentives arising from the contract and implicit incentives arising from career concerns.. All the analysis is developed in a continuous-time stochastic framework; we apply dynamic programming and filtering techniques.

In this thesis we prove several results on the structure of solutions to optimal transportation problems. The second chapter represents joint work with Robert McCann and Micah Warren; the main result is that, under a non-degeneracy condition on the cost function, the optimal is concentrated on a $n$-dimensional Lipschitz submanifold of the product space. As a consequence, we provide a simple, new proof that the optimal map satisfies a Jacobian equation almost everywhere. In the third chapter, we prove an analogous result for the multi-marginal optimal transportation problem; in this context, the dimension of the support of the solution depends on the signatures of a $2^{m-1}$ vertex convex polytope of semi-Riemannian metrics on the product space, induce by the cost function. In the fourth chapter, we identify sufficient conditions under which the solution to the multi-marginal problem is concentrated on the graph of a function over one of the marginals. In the fifth chapter, we investigate the regularity of the optimal map when the dimensions of the two spaces fail to coincide. We prove that a regularity theory can be developed only for very special cost functions, in which case a quotient construction can be used to reduce the problem to an optimal transport problem between spaces of equal dimension. The final chapter applies the results of chapter 5 to the principal-agent problem in mathematical economics when the space of types and the space of available goods differ. When the dimension of the space of types exceeds the dimension of the space of goods, we show if the problem can be formulated as a maximization over a convex set, a quotient procedure can reduce the problem to one where the two dimensions coincide. Analogous conditions are investigated when the dimension of the space of goods exceeds that of the space of types.

In this thesis we prove several results on the structure of solutions to optimal transportation problems. The second chapter represents joint work with Robert McCann and Micah Warren; the main result is that, under a non-degeneracy condition on the cost function, the optimal is concentrated on a $n$-dimensional Lipschitz submanifold of the product space. As a consequence, we provide a simple, new proof that the optimal map satisfies a Jacobian equation almost everywhere. In the third chapter, we prove an analogous result for the multi-marginal optimal transportation problem; in this context, the dimension of the support of the solution depends on the signatures of a $2^{m-1}$ vertex convex polytope of semi-Riemannian metrics on the product space, induce by the cost function. In the fourth chapter, we identify sufficient conditions under which the solution to the multi-marginal problem is concentrated on the graph of a function over one of the marginals. In the fifth chapter, we investigate the regularity of the optimal map when the dimensions of the two spaces fail to coincide. We prove that a regularity theory can be developed only for very special cost functions, in which case a quotient construction can be used to reduce the problem to an optimal transport problem between spaces of equal dimension. The final chapter applies the results of chapter 5 to the principal-agent problem in mathematical economics when the space of types and the space of available goods differ. When the dimension of the space of types exceeds the dimension of the space of goods, we show if the problem can be formulated as a maximization over a convex set, a quotient procedure can reduce the problem to one where the two dimensions coincide. Analogous conditions are investigated when the dimension of the space of goods exceeds that of the space of types.

The major difference between venture capital-firms and other financiers is that their business idea is not only providing capital but also knowledge in business development. The ownership structure of an venture capital-firm can be private as well as public. The Swedish government is today one of the major actors in the Swedish venture capital-industry. The purpose of this study is to shed light on how venture capital-firms involve itself in its portfolio firm and if this contributes to an increased value of the portfolio firm. We also try to shed light on differences in how a public and a private venture capital-firm gets involved in its portfolio firm and if there is any difference in how they can contribute to added value. We have chosen to interview two public and two private venture capital-firms and one of their portfolio firms. To answer the essay’s purpose we used qualitative case studies with semi-structured interviews. The theoretical framework consists of principal-agent theory, knowledge-based view of the firm and social capital and previous studies of venture capital-firms involvement and value-added in their portfolio firms. This essay is limited only to venture capital-firms and portfolio firms located in Stockholm. It is the perceptions of the Venture capital-firm and the portfolio firm we are interested in, regarding the venture capital-firms involvement and value-added. Our study shows that venture capital-firm’s level of involvement in their portfolio firms varies depending on the development stage in the portfolio firm. The portfolio firm’s network increases with the venture capital firm’s entry and it also provides knowledge in business development. The study did not find any difference in the way which the public or private venture capital-firm involve itself in its portfolio firm. Nor is there any difference in how they contribute to value-added in their portfolio firm. / Skillnaden mellan venture capital-företagen och andra finansiärer är att de har som affärsidé att förutom tillförandet av kapital även tillföra kunskaper i affärsutveckling till de företag de investerar i. Venture capital-företag investerar i onoterade företag som befinner sig i ett tidigt utvecklingsskede med tillväxtpotential. Venture capital-företagens ägarstruktur kan vara såväl privat som statlig. I dagsläget är den svenska staten en stor aktör på den svenska venture capital-marknaden. Syftet med uppsatsen är att belysa hur venture capital-företag involverar sig samt hur det kan bidra till ett ökat värde i sitt portföljföretag. Vi försöker även belysa om det finns skillnad i hur ett statligt och ett privat venture capital-företag involverar sig i sitt portföljföretag samt om det finns en skillnad i hur de kan bidra till ett ökat värde i sitt portföljföretag. Undersökningsobjekten för vår studie är två privata och två statliga VC-företag och ett av deras respektive portföljföretag. Vi har använt oss av kvalitativa fallstudier med semistrukturerade intervjuer för att kunna besvara våra frågeställningar. Den teoretiska referensramen består av principal-agent teorin, ”knowledge-based view of the firm” och socialt kapital, samt tidigare studier om venture capital-företagens involvering och värdetillförsel. Vi har avgränsat oss till venture capital-företag och dess respektive portföljföretag belägna i Stockholm. Uppsatsen har sin utgångpunkt i venture capital-företagets och portföljföretagets uppfattningar avseende involvering och värdetillförsel. Vår studie visar att venture capital-företagens involveringsgrad i sina portföljföretag varierar beroende av portföljföretagets utvecklingsfas. Portföljföretagets nätverk ökar i samband med venture capital-företagets inträde och de tillför även deras kunskap i affärsutveckling. Studien visar också att det inte finns en skillnad i hur det statliga och det privata venture capital-företaget involverar sig i sitt portföljföretag. Det finns inte heller någon skillnad i hur de bidrar till ett ökat värde i sitt portföljföretag.

Although the future socio-economic benefits of a new fibre-based ("next generation access", NGA) telecommunications infrastructure seem to be uncontroversial, most countries have to date only undertaken NGA investments on a small scale. Accordingly, a universal NGA coverage appears to be a rather unrealistic objective without government intervention. Indeed, many governments have already initiated diverse subsidy programs in order to stimulate NGA infrastructure deployment. We contend, however, that the current contract practice of fixing ex ante targets for network expansion is inefficient given the uncertainty about future returns on NGA infrastructure-based services and the public authorities' incomplete information about the capital costs of the network provider. This paper puts forward to delegate the choice of the network expansion to the NGA provider. Simple linear profit-sharing contracts can be designed to control the NGA provider's incentives and to put in balance the public objectives of network expansion and limitation of public expenditure. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers / Research Institute for Regulatory Economics

We consider a risk averse entrepreneur who approaches a diversified venture capitalist (VC) for financing of a project with positive potential return. We develop several models that capture key features of the venture financing, including staged investment, VC oversight costs and agency conflicts. The contract between the VC and the EN includes risk-free and pay-performance sensitive compensation. Moral hazard arises because the EN must exert effort for the project to succeed. Our model is novel in that it also allows for asymmetric beliefs about project quality due to the EN's optimism even when the VC and EN face symmetric information. We first analyze the VC-EN relationship when the VC has bargaining power. We characterize the equilibrium levels for the pay-performance sensitivities, investment and effort over time and show they can be either increasing or decreasing or initially increasing and then decreasing. We find that asymmetric beliefs and risk aversion have opposite effects on the VC-EN relationship. When the EN is moderately more optimistic than the VC, he accepts more risk and exerts more effort and the VC responds with more investment. In contrast, risk aversion reduces effort and investment. Our model predicts a performance-sensitive investment policy where critical milestones must be achieved for investment to continue. These milestones increase with the risk aversion and decrease with the asymmetry in beliefs. Consequently, project duration increases with asymmetric beliefs and decreases with risk aversion. We calibrate this core model to empirical data and use numerical analysis to demonstrate that the technical and systematic risks have opposite effects. The VC's payoff and the project's value and duration increase with technical risk and decrease with systematic risk. We analyze the relationship when the EN has bargaining power, and find that the equilibrium and the corresponding implications for venture financing do change. In this setting, the negative effects due to risk aversion are more pronounced. We also find that if the EN's effort cannot be observed by the VC, then the pay-performance sensitivities, investment and effort all increase.