This master thesis examines the Swedish part of the UN-operation after the October war, UNEF II, and how they portrait the local cultures and ethnic groups, both belligerent and the civilian population. The thesis uses two battalion newspapers. Sandpappret which was published ones a month between November 1973 and December 1979 and Ökenkuriren which was published semi-daily between November 27th 1978 and June 18th 1979. The thesis also uses two books written by participants of the operation, Eld upphör! By Hallqvist and Ökenvägen by Agrell. The thesis reaches the conclusion that both newspapers and books use a very orientalistic language and while positive comments do exist, like comments about the mysterious and wise orient, negative comments are more prevalent. This applies to both the belligerent and the civilian population. The books are more negative, and can be more negative, because they do not have a UN led editorial staff and the UN rules to think about. The arab culture is a lot more prevalent in the texts than the culture in Israel. The culture in Israel does not get the same orientalistic treatment as the arab culture. Time does not seem to affect the opinions shown neither does most big events. The only big event that seems to have a lasting effect on the written opinions are when the buffer zone was extended and a lot of bedouins suddenly found themselves in the Swedish part of the zone.

Theory of the use of air power in defensive operations is not as developed as in offensive operations. The purpose of this study is to examine if Papes strategies of air power and coercion can be used to analyze the use of air power and its effects in a defensive operation. The result shows that Papes strategies can explain the use of air power in the cases of the study but have difficulties in explaining the outcome of the conflict in a distinct and clear way. Papes Denial-strategy has the best explanatory power of the four (Punishment, Risk, Denial and Decapitation) for the outcome of the conflict. The result shows that the use of air power could not be used isolated to reach decisive effect. Only during joint operations was the decisive effects reached. The conclusions, however, are to be seen in the light of the interests of USA and the Soviet Union and their roles before, during and their influence in ending the conflict.