Manöverkrigföring är idag ett centralt begrepp inom den konceptuella delen av krigföringsförmåganför många västländer. Luftmaktens betydelse i väpnade konflikter är också aktuell i dagensmilitärteoretiska debatt. Men vad innebär då manöverkrig för luftmakt? Ett land som ibland lyftsfram som skickliga på manöverkrigföring, och som dessutom traditionellt sett använt luftmaktflitigt, är Israel. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka i vilken omfattning Israel använt sig avmanöverkrigföring vid nyttjandet av luftmakt. Inledningsvis besvaras frågan: Vad innebär manöverkrigföringför luftmakt? Därefter studerar jag Yom-Kippur kriget. Syftet är att avgöra i vilkenutsträckning Israel använt sig av manöverkrigföring med luftmakt. Slutligen identifierar jag israeliskaframgångsfaktorer för nyttjandet av luftmakt samt försöker generalisera dessa till modernluftmakt. Uppsatsen visar att med ett luftmaktsperspektiv på manöverkrigföring framträder detoperativa målet Systemchock som viktigt, samt koordinering av striden i gemensamma operationersom central. Under Yom-Kippur kriget visade Israels agerande inledningsvis få tecken på manöverkrig.Efter hand ökade emellertid inslagen bl a genom ett effektivt utövande av operationskonstoch samordning av luft- och markstridskrafter. De israeliska framgångsfaktorerna från krigetpåminner i flera avseenden om de brittiska erfarenheterna från Irakkriget 2003. Min slutsats ärändå att dessa framgångsfaktorer inte kan generaliseras till modern luftmakt. Jag formulerar iställetföljande hypotes: Kontroll av luftrummet, samordning, tempo samt luftmaktens autonoma rollär centrala faktorer för luftmaktens nyttjande vid konventionell krigföring. / Among western countries Maneuver Warfare is currently an important conceptconcerning the conceptual aspects of warfighting. However, a great deal of theliterature in the field is written from a land-warfare perspective. The importanceof Air Power in modern warfighting is also a subject in current thoughtsof military theory, as is the idea of joint operations.Then what is the implication of Maneuver Warfare for Air Power? A countrysometimes associated with Maneuver Warfare is Israel. Analysing Israeli AirPower can achieve an increased understanding of the relations between AirPower, joint operations and Maneuver Warfare. The purpose of this thesis istherefore to explore to which extent Israel has used Maneuver Warfare whenemploying its Air Power. Initially I answer the question: What is the implicationof Maneuver Warfare for Air Power? This is done by analysing militarytheory relevant to the subject. Next I study the Yom-Kippur War in order toestablish to what extent Israel used Maneuver Warfare in an Air Power sense.Finally, I identify Israeli success-factors concerning the application of AirPower and try to generalize these to modern Air Power. In this case modernAir Power application is limited to British experiences of the Iraq-War in 2003.The overall conclusion of the thesis is that with an Air Power perspective onManeuver Warfare the operational objective of System Paralysis is of vitalimportance and that coordination of the Joint-Battle is essential. During theYom-Kippur War the action of the Israel Air Force initially showed few indicationsof Maneuver Warfare. As the war proceeded the application of ManeuverWarfare increased. This is evident from the successful application of OperationalArt and from increased coordination between Air- and Ground Forces. Itbrought about an Israeli control of the air followed by a dominance of all flanksof the battlespace, which could be utilized with an ever increasing tempo. Inseveral aspects the Israeli success-factors resemble the British experiences ofthe Iraq-War. However, my conclusion is that due to the nature of warfarethese success-factors cannot be generalized to the application of modern AirPower. Still, I conclude that certain factors are important to consider regardingAir Power in conventional warfare. My final conclusion, therefore, ends withthe following hypothesis:Control of the air, coordination, tempo and the autonomous role of AirPower are vital to consider regarding the application of Air Power in conventionalwarfare.Finally, I suggest that further research concerning the above stated hypothesisis done. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-uppsHylla: Upps. ChP 02-04

This master thesis examines the Swedish part of the UN-operation after the October war, UNEF II, and how they portrait the local cultures and ethnic groups, both belligerent and the civilian population. The thesis uses two battalion newspapers. Sandpappret which was published ones a month between November 1973 and December 1979 and Ökenkuriren which was published semi-daily between November 27th 1978 and June 18th 1979. The thesis also uses two books written by participants of the operation, Eld upphör! By Hallqvist and Ökenvägen by Agrell. The thesis reaches the conclusion that both newspapers and books use a very orientalistic language and while positive comments do exist, like comments about the mysterious and wise orient, negative comments are more prevalent. This applies to both the belligerent and the civilian population. The books are more negative, and can be more negative, because they do not have a UN led editorial staff and the UN rules to think about. The arab culture is a lot more prevalent in the texts than the culture in Israel. The culture in Israel does not get the same orientalistic treatment as the arab culture. Time does not seem to affect the opinions shown neither does most big events. The only big event that seems to have a lasting effect on the written opinions are when the buffer zone was extended and a lot of bedouins suddenly found themselves in the Swedish part of the zone.

Theory of the use of air power in defensive operations is not as developed as in offensive operations. The purpose of this study is to examine if Papes strategies of air power and coercion can be used to analyze the use of air power and its effects in a defensive operation. The result shows that Papes strategies can explain the use of air power in the cases of the study but have difficulties in explaining the outcome of the conflict in a distinct and clear way. Papes Denial-strategy has the best explanatory power of the four (Punishment, Risk, Denial and Decapitation) for the outcome of the conflict. The result shows that the use of air power could not be used isolated to reach decisive effect. Only during joint operations was the decisive effects reached. The conclusions, however, are to be seen in the light of the interests of USA and the Soviet Union and their roles before, during and their influence in ending the conflict.