[pt] Justiça Constitucional: fundamentos nas teorias de Kant e de Rawls tem por objeto a investigação dos principais elementos conceituais das teorias de Kant e de Rawls e sua contribuição para uma proposta de justiça em nível constitucional. Pretende-se a compreensão das principais categorias moralfilosóficas destes pensadores de maneira a se correlacionar as teses universalista e procedimental em contextos da modernidade e da contemporaneidade. Busca-se, pois, enfrentar as perspectivas teóricas sobre justiça e constitucionalidade de maneira complementar, enfocando a necessidade da teoria constitucional discutir, precipuamente na visão do neo- constitucionalismo, as teorias da moral, base para a dimensão dos valores sócio-políticos. Destacam-se, em especial, alguns valores, pré-normativos, que devem ser apontados e difundidos como imperativos para uma sociedade constitucionalmente organizada, de vias democrática e cooperativa e moralmente sustentável. A hipótese, ora pretendida, baseia-se na demonstração teórica de que a justiça, conceitualmente compreendida, se funda numa dimensão de valores categóricos, moralmente aceita pelos agentes sociais, e possibilita a fundamentação de um Estado constitucional. Este é o ponto central da pesquisa ora desenvolvida. / [en] A doctorate thesis proposal about the basis of constitutional justice in Kant and Rawls demands one investigation of the basilar premises and concepts of the theories of the philosophies of Kant and Rawls and its contribution to justice in constitutional level. This research intend to comprehend the main moral and philosophical concepts of these philosophers in the way of their universalistic and procedural theories in the contemporary constitutional context. We try to focus on the necessity of the constitutional theory discuss, as the new proposal of the neoconstitutionalism, the moral theories as a social and political values. The hypothesis is based on the theoretical demonstration that justice has its foundation in categorical values, morally accepted by the social agents, and assure the possibility of a constitutional state, in fair terms of social cooperation and moral values.

This thesis examines the idea of desert as expounded in the work of John Rawls, and some of the implications of this conception of desert for moral and political philosophy. In this work, I analyse a series of arguments against retaining this particular conception of desert.I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently diminishes the force of Rawls’ argument for desert, while many of them do state, and I argue that they are correct in doing so, that this conception of desert is dangerous for political or moral philosophy to maintain. I argue that the moral, political and legal implications of accepting this account of desert severely undermine various institutions of differential treatment, and indeed, moral assessment. I regard it as obvious that societies must, on occasion, treat members of those societies differently, for moral, as well as practical reasons. The Rawlsian account of desert, and the account of responsibility on which it rests, however, will endanger the legitimacy of such procedures. I argue further that the Rawlsian account of desert requires that differences in wealth, and inheritance of wealth, influence and privilege be diminished, if not abolished, if we are to talk of any form of desert meaningfully. I argue that this is a strength of Rawls’ account, and further that any account of desert that is true to the philosophical tradition of the concept will require similar steps to be taken. The primary aim of this thesis is to show that Rawls’ arguments against desert are serious ones, both in terms of strength and scope, and that they must be addressed. I intend to show that these arguments are founded on strong moral intuitions, and that it is plausible that these intuitions may need revision. Finally,I intend to show that desert is an important moral and political concept, and that the disciplines of moral and political philosophy will be impoverished by the absence this concept. This absence, I will argue, is a natural consequence of the acceptance of the Rawlsian arguments.

Pour de nombreux architectes du libéralisme politique contemporain, la neutralité constitue une caractéristique définitionnelle du libéralisme politique. Il est pourtant clair que ces nouvelles formulations du libéralisme ne sont pas exemptes de tout présupposé substantiel. Le libéralisme politique de Rawls, par exemple, accorde de la valeur aux notions de liberté, d'égalité et d'équité. Comment la présence de tels présupposés substantiels est-elle conciliable avec la prétention à la neutralité ? Tel est le problème qui est à l'origine de ce travail de recherche. Pour le résoudre, un vaste travail d'explicitation des présupposés du libéralisme, et plus particulièrement du libéralisme politique de John Rawls, ainsi qu'une étude critique du terme « neutralité » ont été réalisés. Avec Rawls, contre une conception procédurale de la neutralité, je défends la neutralité des justifications et démontre qu'elle constitue la conception de la neutralité la plus plausible. Une justification neutre est définie comme justification fondée sur des conceptions communes, c'est-à-dire partagées. Se pose alors la question de la justification de ces présupposés substantiels tenus pour communs. J'indique comment, chez Rawls, la question de la justification reçoit une réponse conceptuelle. Rawls résout cette question en soutenant une conception cohérentiste de la justification et en développant un certain nombre de concepts innovants, au premier rang desquels l'équilibre réfléchi, dont je défends une conception extensive. Si puissants que soient ces outils conceptuels, dans la mesure où les présupposés du libéralisme sont considérés comme étant implicites dans la culture politique publique, ces présupposés semblent néanmoins appeler une autre forme de justification : une justification herméneutique. Si les présupposés du libéralisme sont le résultat d'une interprétation, il faut être capable de rendre raison de cette interprétation. La deuxième partie de ce travail se met en quête d'une telle justification herméneutique, en se fondant sur l'hypothèse qu'elle est disponible dans les travaux que Rawls consacre à l'histoire de la philosophie : les Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy et les Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. / Many supporters of political liberalism consider that neutrality is part of the definition of liberalism. Yet, it is obvious that these new forms of liberalism are not free from substantive presuppositions. Rawls's political liberalism, as an example, values freedom, equality and fairness. But how can such substantive commitments be compatible with the claim for neutrality? This problem is the starting point of this thesis. To solve it, I work to make the presuppositions of liberalism explicit, especially those of Rawls's political liberalism, and I carry out a critical study of the word “neutrality”. With Rawls and against a procedural conception of neutrality, I support a conception of neutrality as justificatory neutrality, which I consider the most believable conception of neutrality. A neutral justification is defined as a justification which is based on shared conceptions. So, the question to be answered is the question of the justification of these substantive presuppositions, which are taken for shared. I study how Rawls gives a conceptual answer to the question of justification. Rawls answers this question supporting a coherentist conception of justification and developing innovative concepts, such as the concept of reflective equilibrium, of which I support an extensive conception. However convincing these concepts may be and because Rawls considers that the liberal presuppositions are implicit in the public political culture, it seems to me that these presuppositions call for another form of justification: a hermeneutic justification. If the presuppositions are the final result of an interpretation, this interpretation has to be justified. The second part of this thesis looks for such a hermeneutic justification. Its main assumption is that such a justification can be found in Rawls's works on the history of philosophy: the Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy and the Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy.

Univ., Habil.-Schr.-1998--Regensburg, 1997.

John Rawls‟s stated intergenerational justice scheme, known as the just-savings principle, does not include an institutional concern for the environment and is therefore incomplete and incapable of maintaining meaningfully just relations between generations. The theory‟s emphasis on economic theory and capital accumulation demonstrates a misinterpretation of environmental issues and concerns as well as their underlying causes and repercussions. This lapse in Rawls‟s intergenerational scheme exposes flaws in his larger theory of justice by leaving the stability of society in question and placing arbitrary burdens on generations and peoples without institutional recourse. However, by supplementing justice as fairness (JAF) with Rawls‟s other writings, such as The Law of Peoples, a more satisfactory outline for justice between generations can be achieved and a more comprehensive scheme of intergenerational justice can be incorporated into Rawls‟s theory of justice

G.A. Cohen argues that John Rawls' method of political philosophy--in particular his sensitivity to the facts of human nature--leads him inexorably to producing a nonideal conception of justice. In this thesis I defend Rawls against this accusation by demonstrating that the facts of human nature that he shows deference towards are a product of the "free development" of his ideal conception of the person. The result is that Rawls' conception of justice has the power and status that Rawls affords it, and that Cohen's critique fails to cause internal damage to Rawls' theory. My thesis is thus what the subtitle says it is: an essay in defence of John Rawls' deference to "human nature" from the "concessionary criticism" of G.A. Cohen.

Liberal neutrality – as understood in current legal and political debates – has two underlying intuitions and therefore two distinct elements. On the one hand it refers to the intuition that there are matters the state has no business getting involved in (hands-off element). On the other hand it is motivated by the idea that the state ought to treat citizens as equals and show equal respect and for their different conceptions of the good life (equality element). This thesis defends this two-fold understanding of neutrality with reference to Rawls’ conception of society as a fair system of cooperation and the idea of citizens as free and equal persons. In particular, the idea that citizens are to be treated as free justifies the hands-off element and argues that the state must be involved in nothing but justice. In the context of political decision making this requires the state to be justificatorily neutral. Treating citizens as equals requires the state to grant its citizens equal political rights and also to ensure that these rights have “fair value.” Given the danger that cultural bias undermines the equal standing of citizens the state has to ensure procedures of political decision making that are able to take citizens’ different conceptions into account. Treating citizens as free and equal therefore requires that the state bans all considerations of the good from being part of the justification of state action while at the same time taking these considerations into account when deliberating the way how these regulations are to be implemented.

John Rawls was a political philosopher who proposed a theory centered around the idea of justice as fairness. His primary concern was social justice, so more specifically, he proposed a basic structure for society that ensures major social institutions like the government fairly distribute fundamental rights and duties and optimally divide advantages brought about by social cooperation. His theory is based on the idea that the correct principles to use for the basic structure of society are those that free and rational people would agree to in attempt to advance their own self-interest from a fair and equal starting position. Rawls proposes three principles that he believes people would agree to in this situation and describes what a society based on these principles would look like. Throughout this paper, I will attempt to explain Rawls’s “Theory of Justice” and defend various aspect of the theory against common objections.

The primary focus of this dissertation is the problem of the roles of the moral and the political in political philosophy as exemplified in the philosophies of Kant and Rawls. The research question which intrigues me in the subject matter is whether and to what extent morality has a role in political philosophy. As I argue in this dissertation, while Kant's political philosophy is grounded by his moral philosophy, Rawls holds the opposite view that a political conception of justice should not be derived from any specific moral doctrine. Their contrasting views are further complicated by the fact that Rawls is often regarded as a Kantian due to his partial assimilation of Kant in his theory of justice. A comparative study of their views on the roles of the moral and the political in philosophy is thus particularly instructive in answering the above research question. This dissertation therefore approaches the subject matter from four different angles. In the first chapter, I start with a holistic interpretive account of Kant's moral and political philosophy that is quite different from those in the current literature. Not only do I argue that Kant's moral philosophy is unmistakably an indispensable ground of his political philosophy, but I also argue for a positive duty in politics that is moral by nature. In the second chapter, I shift my focus to Rawls and examine his understanding of morality as reflected in his moral conception of the person in his political philosophy. I argue that the conception is the result of an intended reformulation of Kant's notion of autonomy that is in turn based on an unintended misreading of the same. I go on to relate several weaknesses in Rawls's theory to his understanding of morality and argue that their resolutions require an accurate understanding of the relationship between the moral and the political. The third chapter is a Kantian appraisal of the four roles of political philosophy proposed by Rawls. It is relevant to the subject of this dissertation because the four roles are designed with a strict separation between the political and the moral in mind. If the four roles turn out to be defensible, it would amount to an important defense for such a separation. The fourth chapter offers an alternative for those who are more accustomed to the political than to the moral by proposing a new interpretive approach to Kant's philosophy starting from the political and ending with the moral. By ending this dissertation with this alternative, I hope my research is not merely a comparative study but can also offer a new perspective for a more in-depth understanding of the relationship between the moral and the political in philosophy.

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