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When faced with a new design problem, Engineers most often tend to rely on their accumulated knowledge of science, mathematics, and appropriate experience to reach suitable solutions. Case-Based Reasoning is a new engineering paradigm that reflects this fact by suggesting solutions to novel problems based on the recall and reuse of specific experiences. Such a paradigm relies on previous successful design solutions that are stored in the form of separate cases in a database. / The aim of this thesis is to develop a process that will provide examples which can be used to set up a database of optimized designs for various electromagnetic devices such as loudspeakers and actuators. Each stored design will represent an optimum solution to a specific set of requirements for an electromagnetic device. These designs will eventually be used by a case-based reasoning system to reach a solution for possible requested future designs. The process will also involve developing a parameterization of a particular class of devices as well as testing optimization processes to be applied to the initial designs in order to ensure that the solutions stored in the case database represent effective and realistic devices which satisfy the requirements. This thesis also presents test results that illustrate how each optimized design conforms to certain requirements set as an input objective.

This thesis reports the results of both normative and empirical investigations into human conditional reasoning, i.e. reasoning using if ... then and related constructions. Previous empirical investigations have concentrated on experimental paradigms like Wason's Selection Task, where subjects must assess evidence relevant to the truth or falsity of a conditional rule. Popperian falsification provided the normative theory by which to assess errorful behaviour on these tasks. However, it is doubtful whether this is an appropriate normative theory from which to derive a competence model of human reasoning abilities. The relationship between normative theory and competence model need not be direct, no more than the relationship between competence model and performance needs to be. However, research in this area has imported a theory directly into individual psychology from the philosophy of science. On the apparently orthodox assumption of directness, continued adherence to this import may stand in need of re-assessment in the light of the quite radical descriptive inadequacy of falsification as a model of rational scientific inquiry. However, this model also possesses the virtue of relating the interpretation of the rule directly to the normative task strategy. Hence, this thesis has two aims: first, to retain the virtue of a direct relation between normative task strategy and interpretation while simultaneously offering a competence model which is consistent with more recent and descriptively adequate accounts of the process of scientific inquiry. In Part I, this will involve introducing a semantic theory (situation semantics) and showing that the process of inquiry implicit in this semantic theory is consistent with recent normative conceptions in the philosophy of science. The second aim is to show that the competence model derived in Part I can provide a sound rational basis for subjects' observed patterns of reasoning in conditional reasoning tasks. In Part II, chapter 5, the data obtained from the Wason Selection Task using only affirmative rules is discussed and the behaviour observed rationally reconstructed in terms of the competence model of Part I. A central concept of that model is partial interpretation (motivated by concerns of context sensitivity). Prima facie evidence for partial interpretation is provided by the observation of defective truth tables. However, in conditional reasoning experiments using negated constituents, this evidence has been interpreted differently. A subsidiary aim of Part II (which will constitute the largest section of this thesis) therefore concerns the empirical demonstration of the consistency of this data with the competence model.

The purpose of this study is to re-analyze existing findings in order to demonstrate and summarize relationships between criteria and the sub-scales/dimensions of the Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT-A): Externalizing, Internalizing, and Powerlessness. A CRT-A sub-scale was expected to relate more strongly with criteria categorized as being more relevant to the dimension that is represented by that sub-scale. For criteria that were categorized as relevant to only a subset of the dimensions represented by CRT-A sub-scales, the regression of a criterion on all three sub-scales was expected to create a better fitting model than the regression of a criterion on the CRT-A total score alone. Scales were also expected to interact to predict criteria. This was expected to be most likely when multiple dimensions of implicit aggression were activated by environmental factors to influence specific behaviors. Support was found for all expectations

A reasoner’s beliefs can compromise or inflate the accuracy of their syllogistic judgments when syllogistic content and structure are incongruent or congruent, respectively. An integrated approach to the study of syllogistic reasoning led to the investigation of premise-based belief-content conflict and its impact on belief bias. The belief-content conflict cue attenuated belief bias in incongruent valid and invalid trials, as well as congruent invalid trials. Its efficacy was found to depend on the difficulty level of the syllogism in which it was embedded and the location of its placement. Reaction time analyses were used to guide interpretations about the relative engagement of Systems 1 and 2. The key findings suggested that belief-content conflict activated System 2 for invalid incongruent trials which would otherwise have been processed using low-cost heuristic means due to their inherent difficulty. In contrast, it appeared that in valid trials the cue led to a redirection of System 2 resources such that specialized analytic strategies were applied in incongruent trials preceded by belief-content conflict compared to those lacking this cue. Finally, belief bias was successfully offset by belief-content conflict even in cases of congruency. In congruent invalid trials without this cue participants’ intuitive awareness of the content-structure match appeared to lead to low-cost, belief-based guesses; yet when presented as the major premise this conflict cue appeared to shift System 1 processing away from content and towards structure. Albeit less diligent than System 2 analysis, the shallow consideration of structural features may have been viewed as a safer bet than any shortcut aiming to capitalize on syllogistic content. This set of findings cannot be fully accounted for by the selective scrutiny, misinterpreted necessity, mental models, verbal reasoning, selective processing, or Receiver Operating Characteristics accounts thereby highlighting the need for considering belief-content conflict in future models of belief bias.