This is an essay about reasons for action. It begins with two rather ordinary observations. The first is that these two uses of the term ‘reason’ roughly correspond with the two main roles that a reason can play: the role of favoring a prospective course of action, and the role of explaining action. Each of these roles seems crucial to a philosophical account of reasons, and it is not obvious that either has claim to priority. The second observation is that accommodating each of these roles seems to place restrictions on what we can say about reasons for action, and those who lean toward giving priority to one role rather than the other tend also to give priority to the corresponding set of restrictions. They take that set as given, and then focus their efforts on finding a way to meet the other set if they can. Accommodating the explanatory role has seemed to many to require that a reason bear some relation to the motivations of the agent for whom it is reason. One might wonder: what sense could there be in calling something a reason for me to act if it were not in any way capable of explaining my being moved to act? I argue, however, that accepting this sort of internalist condition on something’s being a reason to act precludes accepting a condition of objectivity that is imposed on us if we wish to accommodate the favoring role: sometimes, at least, when we have a reason to act, we could not cease to have that reason simply by having a (perhaps radically) different set of attitudes. I then consider whether the reverse might be true of externalist theories. Does taking the favoring role as one’s starting point preclude a full account of the explanatory role of reasons? I argue that it does not. I show that an Anscombean conception of intentional action allows for a fairly clean solution to a pair of puzzles that motivate this worry. This approach relieves much of the pressure to think of reasons as being tied to motivational attitudes. / text

The most important questions we ask are normative questions. And the most fundamental normative questions are couched in terms of reasons: What do I have reason to do? and What do I have reason to believe? Although not always explicitly about reasons, I take it that much of normative philosophy at least implicitly offers first order normative answers to such questions. But stepping back, we can ask what these questions and answers are about - what are reasons anyway? This dissertation addresses those meta-normative questions, questions about the conceptual structure, semantics, ontology and epistemology of reasons. In the inquiry to come, chapters 1 and 2 consider the conceptual structure and core semantics of reasons. I argue that all reasons-internal reasons grounded in motivational states, external reasons connected to morality, epistemic reasons for belief, whatever--share the same conceptual structure and core semantics, so they all will stand or fall together when it comes to questions of reason truths and facts. In chapters 3-5 I argue that reason discourse has realist purport because reason judgments feature cognitive and belief-like attitudes about the way the world is, normatively speaking. To vindicate normativity's realist purport would require an ontology of favoring relations flowing from considerations in the world to actions and attitudes of various agents. So in chapters 6 and 7 I consider such an ontology. Unfortunately, favoring relations do not fit into the emerging naturalized view of the world. To make matters worse, based on the kinds of reasons we accept, there are no good reasons for admitting non-natural favoring relations in to the ontology. Reasons cannot bear their own survey. As a result, this dissertation culminates in a revisionary semantics, discussed in chapter 8, whereby I suggest we all adopt a fictive stance toward propositions about any kind of reason. In the end, we can preserve reason discourse and its characteristic roles in our lives so long as we are disposed to avow irrealism about reasons in critical contexts.

Work subject: conflict reasons among directors and subordinates of organizers of Kaunas city travel. Work object: conflict reasons. Scientific problem: intercommunication between director and subordinates and possible reasons of arising conflicts. Work purpose: to analyze conflict reasons among directors and subordinates of organizers of Kaunas city travel. Broached tasks to reach the purpose: 1. To analyze director’s roles and theoretic aspects of raised requirements for director. 2. To provide a conflict’s conceptions and mostly encountered sorts of it. 3. To provide reasons of arising conflicts and possible variants of a solution. 4. In accordance with an anonymous questionnaire, main conflict reasons among directors and subordinates of Organizers of Kaunas city travel were analyzed. Hypothesis: conflict reasons among directors and subordinates of organizers of Kaunas city travel are more influenced by women. In accordance with the analysis of most literary sources, we could maintain that conflicts at work between directors and subordinates influence work quality, atmosphere in an organization and subordinates’ satisfaction of their work. Mainly director’s features such as disputability, communication skills, capability to run conflicts and his personal interests at work influence the comfort of work atmosphere. Conflicts at work are sorted very differently by intensity, by reasons of arising, by conflicting forces and so on. It is hard to name all conflict reasons, but we... [to full text]

In this paper, I defend Rawlsian Political Liberalism from the integrity objection. Integrity objectors claim that political liberals unjustifiably exclude certain religious citizens from making use of their religious values when voting upon basic principles of justice and constitutional essentials. I argue, first, that the integrity objection does not apply to political liberalism. Second, I claim that there is a place in the public, political culture for citizens to make use of their comprehensive values. Third, I argue that attempts to reformulate political liberalism to avoid the integrity objection are ultimately unsuccessful.

This thesis analyses theories of practical reason. In particular I compare desire theories of reasons with value theories of reasons. Desire theories of reasons, as I define them, claim that it is a necessary condition of A having a reason to ф that A’s reason depend on A’s antecedent desires. In contrast, I define value theories of reasons as those theories that claim that it is a necessary condition of A having a reason to ф that A’s ф-ing be valuable. In this thesis my main concern lies with those value theorists who accept the motivational requirement: the claim that if an agent is to have a reason to ф, then it must be possible for the agent to ф on the basis of this reason. In particular, I concentrate on those value theorists who claim that A has a reason to ф iff a) A’s ф-ing is valuable; b) it is possible for A to ф on the basis of this reason. I reject desire theories of reasons on the basis of several criticisms. I claim that our desires are normatively arbitrary, and that according to desire theories of reasons, some of our desires ought to be eradicated. I argue instead for a value theory of reasons that adopts a particular interpretation of the motivational requirement. I distinguish three different interpretations of the motivational requirement, each offering a connection between reasons and motivations that differs in strength. The first, strongest requirement claims that in order for A to have a normative reason to ф, it must be possible for A to ф on the basis of this reason given certain qualities that A possesses (where I take the sense of ‘possible’ relevant to these interpretations to be one that reflects an agent’s capacities). The second and weakest requirement claims that in order for A to have a normative reason to ф, it must be possible for A to ф on the basis of this reason if A possessed certain qualities. The last and moderate requirement claims that in order for A to have a normative reason to ф, it must be possible for A to ф on the basis of this reason if A possessed certain qualities and A either has these qualities, or it is possible for her to get herself into a state where she has them. I argue for a value theory of reasons that employs this last, moderate motivational requirement. I argue that a value theory that adopts the moderate motivational requirement is best, as it allows the theory to be practically useful; reasons on this account have a role in deterrence, encouragement and praise- and blame-worthiness. The theory also aligns with a plausible account of eligible candidates for reasons. While the employment of the moderate motivational requirement in a value theory of reasons likens the theory, in some respects, to a desire theory, it avoids the objections raised against desire theories of reasons. In this way, a value theory of reasons that employs the moderate motivational requirement combines the attractive features of a desire theory and a value theory. Specifically, it generates reasons that are both dependent on an individual’s qualities, and also aligned with an account of value. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 2008

Please read the abstract in the dissertation Copyright / Dissertation (MA(Theol))--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Practical Theology / unrestricted

Many people chose to start the education to become a teacher at Umeå University and other universities in Sweden. But statistics show that only half of all those who started the program finally graduate. There is a shortage of teachers in many municipalities and the fact that so many students do not pass through the education is a big problem for the future generations in school. It is an interesting phenomenon that I have chosen to write my essay about.

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The current study was conducted with a sample of 253 college undergraduates to extend the findings in the existing research on motivational models of alcohol and marijuana use. Specifically it was intended to evaluate the relative benefits of assessing motives for using these drugs during a specific episode rather than in the dispositional fashion utilized in virtually every existing study on the subject. Affect regulation aspects of the motivational model were further explored by measuring state (rather than trait) affect immediately preceding a use episode. A timeline follow-back method was used to identify the most recent use episode and to assess recent quantity of use and negative consequences in greater detail. The similarity of the types of motives derived from episodic assessment to those seen dispositionally lends further credence to the validity of DUM subtypes, their distinct pathways to use and related problems, and the affective-motivational model as a whole. Affective states (rather than just traits) played a significant role in the motives endorsed and outcomes. Previous findings on the direct effects of drinking to cope on the development of problems were confirmed on an episodic level. Finally, episodic assessment appeared to have some utility above and beyond that of dispositional assessment when examining specific episodes of use. / Ph. D.

Would it be irrational of you to love an inanimate object? Or would it be misguided to dedicate yourself to a random stranger on the street as opposed to, say, your partner or your child? I take it that such attitudes and actions are irrational. In this dissertation, I explore what considerations provide love with a rational basis. I call these considerations reasons for love. These are the reasons that make love make sense. I argue that the valuable qualities of the beloved are reasons for love. Moreover, I argue that to give a complete account of such reasons, one must reflect on the nature and value of love. In Chapter One, I argue that love’s nature includes valuing a relationship with the beloved and valuing them as a bearer of valuable qualities. In these ways, love is a unique way of engaging with a person’s value, and love’s relational component distinguishes it from other pro-attitudes, like respect or admiration. In Chapter Two, I argue that love, like knowledge, virtue, pleasure, and achievement, is non-instrumentally good for the person in love. Moreover, love is a virtue because it is the right kind of response to the valuable qualities of another person. In Chapter Three, I refine the qualities view by arguing that such qualities do not need to be maximally valuable. Instead, love is grounded in qualities that are good enough. Finally, in Chapter Four, I explore reasons of love, which are reasons for actions that justify the special treatment we reserve for those whom we love. Reasons of love are often treated as a problem for moral theory because morality demands impartiality, and love demands partiality. I address this problem by defending an altruistic, as opposed to impartialist, view of morality. On the altruistic view, facts about an individual’s personal identity can be the ground for morally right actions. I make this case by considering self-sacrifice’s central role in both morality and love.