Non-state armed groups are often countered by military means but non-state armed groups have in many cases proven their resilience and endurance, and they continue to challenge central governments in their efforts to build a peaceful and stable society in many post-conflict societies. We fail to understand why non-state armed actors may supersede central governments in their ability to provide effective governance structures and enjoy legitimacy. This thesis builds on the existing literature on rebel and insurgency governance and aims to explore the drivers that legitimize non-state armed actors from the perspective of the civilian population. Exploring the factors that contribute to the legitimacy of non-state armed groups reveals the local dynamics that underpin the relationship between non-state armed groups and civilians living in the areas under their control. I argue that non-state armed groups, by capitalizing on the failed expectations that civilians have towards the state, and subsequently meeting these expectations by providing essential security and public services, can achieve public legitimacy. Using the method of structured focused comparison, South-West State and Galmudug State in Somalia are compared to test the hypotheses. Fieldwork was conducted to collect data and document analysis was used. The main finding of this study is that the ability of an actor to provide services and security plays an important role when explaining variation in levels of perceived legitimacy.

This comparative study analyzes two rebel groups that ended their respective civil wars through negotiations and came to power in the first post-war elections. The two cases being the African National Congress in South Africa and the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe. Specifically the thesis examines rebel institutions and behaviors during armed conflict to assess in what ways they were tolerant or intolerant. The reason for the focus on tolerance and intolerance is that it is viewed as an important factor in how these two parties have related to political opposition after the war. This study shows that there are several similarities in terms of the presence of intolerance in the two cases, which leads to the conclusion that levels of tolerance during the armed conflict can not, on its own, explain the diverging paths of the two cases in the post-war period.

In modern history governments have had an active role in responding and influencing the economic circumstances of the state. Whether by allocating resources or administering reforms, peacetime economic policies have traditionally impacted actor's public support as the choice of policy can impact the perception of actor's legitimacy. Despite the plethora of competing definitions, political scientists agree on considering legitimacy as a basic condition of governance -as it entails the acceptance and commitment of a people to a political authority. Rather than a unique characteristic of the state, governance becomes an attribute belonging to any social arrangement that exercises "function of statehood". By focusing on the comparison between the Syrian, the Libyan, and the Yemeni civil war this thesis aim is to enquire whether a positive relationship can be assessed between government economic choices and rebel's legitimacy. Given the neopatrimonial character of the three states this dissertation will focus on the actor's economic behavior to assess legitimacy. For the purpose of this analysis, I have chosen to adopt an Elitist framework as it focuses on bargain dynamics between political actors and elites (or constituencies). The methodological approach utilized is that of a comparative case study.

Rebel governance and rebel violence against civilians are two closely related fields within peace and conflict research that have gained increased interest amongst scholars during recent years. Still, there is a gap within current research that concerns how variation in one field may influence variation in the other. This paper aims to fill this gap by applying a theory on rebel violence in the context of rebel governance to hypothesize that a high level of rebel governance will decrease the intensity of rebel violence against civilians. The hypothesis is tested through linear regression, using data from the UCDP One-Sided Violence dataset, Rebel Governance Dataset and a replication dataset by Huang and Sullivan (2021). The findings from the regression analysis suggest a negative relationship between a high level of rebel governance and decreased intensity of rebel violence against civilians which supports the hypothesis. However, these results are not statistically significant and therefore only provides indications of a relationship. Yet, this thesis contributes by interlinking two fields that are highly relevant in modern civil wars and thereby provides a small but important building block for future research.

What is the impact of civil society on rebel governance? The field of rebel governance has gained increased attention recently, but few researchers highlight the interactive relationship between rebels and local communities. As the principal organisational tool for civilian populations, civil society has been largely overlooked. In this thesis I present a theoretical argument that rebels are likely to cooperate with civil society in establishing governance institutions. Civil society will utilise its expertise, legitimacy, and mobilisation capacity to pressure the rebels to commit to governance, as well as to aid them in this effort. I test this theory by conducting a quantitative study using zero-inflated negative binomial models with data from VDEM and RQSI, with 4800 observations of conflict-years between 1946 and 2012. I find that civil society has a positive relationship with the scope of rebel governance, but only if initial institutions are present. When none are present, civil society decreases the likelihood of new institutions being established. It has become increasingly clear that local civilian actors have agency and can significantly affect the decisions made by rebels. Understanding the effect of civil society helps us to deeper understand this dynamic and helps explain why and how rebels decide to govern.

This thesis addresses an identified gap in the field of rebel governance and rebel funding, by theorizing and investigating how differences in rebel group funding sources affect a group’s engagement in rebel governance, distinguishing funding through natural resources from funding through non-natural resources. It is highlighted that these sources differ in three fundamental ways: their necessity for civilian labor and cooperation, the extent to which equipment, technology and infrastructure are required, and the expected time of pay-off. It is hypothesized that the degree to which a rebel group depends on natural resources determines the likelihood to which it engages in rebel governance - i.e. intervenes in all security, political, social, health and educational spheres of civilian life. This hypothesis is investigated through a comparative case study of two rebel groups from 2003 to 2018: the Taliban in Afghanistan, which generated its funding primarily through Afghanistan’s opium economy, and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, later known as Al-Qaeda in Maghreb, which generated its funding through ‘criminal activities’ such as kidnappings for ransom. The findings suggest some level of support for the hypothesis. Inconsistencies in the findings limiting generalizability and the need for further investigations are discussed.

The fragmentation of rebel groups has received extensive attention from scholars and policy-makers alike. Fragmentation has been linked to an increase in civilian deaths, prolonged conflicts, and difficult peace negotiations. Despite the deliberation given to this field, this study argues that rebel governance serves as an explanatory variable that has been overlooked in the literature. This study aims to close this research gap by examining the influence of rebel governance on rebel fragmentation. The thesis suggests that rebel governance intervenes with the opportunity for rebel lieutenants to find the support of networks to create a splinter, and is successful in preventing rebel lieutenants from forming potential splinters. Therefore, it is hypothesized that rebel governance reduces the likelihood of rebel fragmentation. Using data on rebel groups active between 1946-2012, this thesis finds quantitative evidence in support of the hypothesis across all models. Furthermore, support is found that suggests that the more rebel institutions are present, the less likely it is that the rebel group fragments. Additionally, this study employs a survival model of which the results suggest that rebel groups who employ governance take longer to fragment compared to rebel groups without governance.

Although a relatively new research field, many quantitative studies have over the past decade been undertaken examining rebel governance as an insurgent practice in intrastate conflicts around the globe. Nevertheless, gaps persist in the understanding of how common aspects of rebel governance, such as inclusive service provision, affect competing non-state actors in multi-rebel group conflict landscapes. Hitherto, this is the research puzzle of interest. This study asks the question: how is rebel group violence against civilians affected by a rival rebel group practising inclusive service provision? The hypothesis is that the level of violence against civilians practised by a rebel group decreases if a rival rebel group engages in inclusive service provision. The applied research method is a qualitative structured focused comparison between ELN in Colombia and GIA in Algeria from 1994 to 1999. The study does not find support for the hypothesised causal relationship, although forms of attempted emulation and outbidding of rival actors seem present in both studied cases. Further research is needed to fully dismiss the possibility of rival rebel group inclusive service provision sharing a negative variable relationship with rebel group violence against civilians.

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Existe-t-il un lien entre le degré de publicité du soutien fourni par des États à des groupes rebelles et les relations entre les insurgés soutenus et les civils durant les guerres internes ? Les études sur les conflits examinent de plus en plus la manière dont un soutien étatique externe à des insurgés locaux façonne le comportement de ces derniers. Cependant, la littérature néglige l’influence de la décision des États-soutiens de nier ou reconnaître leur aide sur la conduite des rebelles. Divisée en trois parties, ma thèse de doctorat utilise une méthodologie mixte alliant analyses quantitatives et études de cas qualitatives pour combler cette lacune dans la littérature. L’Article 1 présente de nouvelles données sur le degré de publicité du soutien étatique aux rebelles durant les guerres civiles entre 1989 et 2018. Il montre ensuite que cette variable est négativement corrélée à la propension des insurgés à user de la violence envers les non-combattants. L’Article 2 commence par présenter une théorie expliquant comment, pourquoi et dans quelles circonstances les États-soutiens tentent-ils de superviser les interactions avec les non-combattants des insurgés qu’ils appuient lors des guerres civiles. Il applique ensuite ce cadre théorique au soutien des États-Unis aux Unités de protection du peuple (YPG) et aux Forces démocratiques syriennes (FDS) dans le nord-est de la Syrie entre 2014 et 2020. L’Article 3 montre qu’en plus d’être corrélé négativement à la violence rebelle envers les civils, le degré de publicité du soutien étatique aux insurgés est corrélé positivement à la propension de ces derniers à fournir des services à la population. Il nuance ensuite les résultats statistiques en montrant que l’existence d’institutions formelles de fourniture de services n’équivaut pas nécessairement à une participation effective des civils à l’exercice du pouvoir en zones rebelles. Ainsi, la thèse met en évidence le lien critique entre le degré de publicité du soutien étatique aux rebelles et les interactions entre insurgés soutenus et civils. Les résultats de recherche montrent dès lors que les expériences des non-combattants au cours de conflits qualifiés d’internes à un espace sont corrélés à des facteurs et intérêts liés à des acteurs externes à ce même territoire. / What is the relationship between the overtness of state support to rebels and the nature of insurgent-civilian interactions during civil wars? Conflict studies increasingly examine how external support to local insurgents influences rebel behavior. However, the literature neglects the link between the state sponsors’ decisions to acknowledge or deny their support and insurgent behavior. My three-part doctoral dissertation uses a mixed-methods research design combining quantitative analyses and qualitative case studies to address this gap in the literature. Article 1 introduces new data on the overtness of external support to rebels during civil wars between 1989 and 2018. The paper then shows that this variable negatively correlates with the propensity of the insurgents to target civilians. Article 2 begins by outlining a theory of how, why, and when the state sponsors monitor the interactions with civilians of the insurgents they support. The paper then applies this theoretical framework to the United States’ (US) support for the People’s Defense Units (YPG) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Northeast Syria between 2014 and 2020. Article 3 shows that in addition to negatively correlating with civilian targeting, the overtness of external support to rebels positively correlates with the propensity of the insurgents to provide social services during civil wars. The paper then qualifies the statistical results by showing that the creation of formal social service institutions by the rebels does not necessarily lead to effective civilian participation in decision-making in insurgent areas. The dissertation thus highlights the critical link between the overtness of state support to rebels and the insurgent-civilian interactions. In this way, I show that civilian experiences during conflicts we characterize as internal to a territory correlate with factors and interests linked to external actors.