No description available.

Univ., Diss.--Bern, 2004.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-23T14:00:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Victor Nunes Toscano.pdf: 1372273 bytes, checksum: b1225f480a9d20cfb441ba38b50536b9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-03-31 / O presente trabalho busca estudar os efeitos da alocação de talento sobre o crescimento econômico dos estados brasileiros. As análises foram baseadas nas contribuições seminais de Murphy, Shleifer e Vishny (1991) sobre o tema, onde apresentam argumentos teóricos e empíricos de que a alocação de talentos em atividades empreendedoras afeta positivamente o crescimento econômico, ao passo que a alocação de talento em atividades rent seeking o afeta negativamente. Para verificar empiricamente essa hipótese, utilizamos dados anuais de 1999 a 2007, de crescimento do PIB per capita, bem como o número de engenheiros e advogados empregados formalmente em cada Unidade da Federação para representar as atividades empreendedoras e de rent seeking, respectivamente. Aplicamos os estimadores tradicionais de cross section, de painel empilhado (pooling) e o método proposto por Arellano e Bond para estimar a equação de convergência de renda para os estados brasileiros. Os resultados apresentados demonstram que há convergência de renda, a 1% de confiança, para os estados brasileiros com as estimativas utilizando dados em painel alcançando velocidades de convergência nitidamente superiores. Quando controlamos as estimativas pelas variáveis de número de engenheiros e advogados a cada 100 mil habitantes, há um aumento de três pontos percentuais na velocidade de convergência dos estados e uma estabilidade ao utilizar o método de Arellano e Bond. Importante ressaltar que os coeficientes estimados para a variável de engenheiros apresentou sinal positivo e estatisticamente significante indicando, à princípio uma relação positiva com o processo de crescimento econômico dos estados, ao passo que os coeficientes relacionados à variável de advogados não apresentaram resultados robustos / This work studies the effects of the allocation of talent on the economic growth of states. Analyses were based on the seminal contributions of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) on the theme, where they present theoretical and empirical arguments that the allocation of talent in entrepreneurial activities affects positively the economic growth, while the allocation of talent in rent seeking activities affect it negatively. To empirically test this hypothesis, we used annual data from 1999 to 2007, GDP growth per capita and the number of engineers and lawyers formally employed in each state to represent the entrepreneurial activities and rent seeking, respectively. We apply the traditional estimators of cross section of pooling and the method proposed by Arellano and Bond s equation to estimate income convergence for the states. The results show that there is convergence of income, 1% confidence for the Brazilian states with the estimates using panel data reaching speeds of convergence significantly higher. When we control the estimates for the variables of the number of engineers and lawyers for each 100 thousand habitants, there is an increase of three percentage points in the convergence speed and stability of states using the method of Arellano and Bond. Importantly, the estimated coefficients for the variable of engineers showed statistically significant and positive sign indicating, at first a positive relationship with the process of economic growth of states, while the coefficients related to the variable of lawyers did not show robust results

Univ., Diss.--Marburg, 2002.

Why is there significant variation in rent extraction amongst high-income democracies? A large number of political economy investigations into this research question have found that a long period of democratic rule and high per capita income are associated with less rent extraction amongst public policy-makers. However, attempts to explain the residual, yet significant, variation in rent extraction amongst countries that possess both these characteristics have been significantly more circumspect and disputed. The thesis explores how the distribution of policy-making responsibilities between electorally accountable decision-makers (EDD) and their electorally unaccountable (NEDD) public policy-making counterparts, determines the optimal level of rents extracted in any given high-income democracy context. Specifically, the thesis formally models how: (1) variation in the EDD/NEDD ratio, by altering (2) voters’ evaluation of incumbent competency, changes (3) the incentives that policy-makers, wishing to remain in office, have to minimize their short term level of rent extraction in order to signal their competency and hopefully retain office. Given these ‘career concerns’ the theoretical model predicts that an increase or decrease in the EDD/NEDD ratio will be associated with more or less rent extraction. This hypothesis is then tested empirically, primarily using an augmented version of Persson and Tabellini’s (2003) dataset. Specifically, the thesis tests whether (1) the EDD/NEDD ratio can predict variation in rent extraction only amongst high-income democracies; (2) whether voters, and not just elites, use the EDD/NEDD ratio to update their beliefs regarding the determinants of rent extraction; and (3) whether the EDD/NEDD ratio affects the level of rent extraction, once controlling for other institutional variables (Efficacy of Elections) also associated with variation in voter evaluation of incumbents’ competency. Establishing that the EDD/NEDD ratio does robustly predict variation in rent extraction is a significant finding, as it can enable analysts to predict how changes in policy-making contexts may affect the incentive for good governance in this sub-set of countries. However, the results are (1) exploratory in nature, and also (2) contingent on other factors (regime type and institutional variation), meaning that while significant, they cannot be generalized to non-democratic contexts.

Master of Arts / Department of Economics / Yang-Ming Chang / This report examines the role of the privatization in Sri Lanka and assesses its effectiveness. The focus was given for the evolution of privatization and how socio-political factors such as rent-seeking, inconsistency policy making, market competition, political uncertainty and role of supporting institutions have affected the privatization process. After the independence in 1948, several reforms have been taken place in Sri Lanka. In 1977, a market oriented policy package which brought huge amount of foreign aids into the country was introduced. Further the privatization in Sri Lanka can be addressed as: Sporadic attempt, Systematic approach and Structured approach. The appointment of short-term governments and changing of the leadership has always been a hurdle for a successful privatization in Sri Lanka. In order to establish a successful privatization, it requires having the changing of ownership from public sector to private sector, creating a competitive market environment and forming a proper institutional framework. Unfortunately, due to less emphasis was given to the latter two factors: the privatization has always given undesirable outcomes. In the whole history of privatization in Sri Lanka, the highest value for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was recorded in 2008. It is clear that the reason for the FDI value escalation in 2008 is the improved confidence of foreign investors by addressing security concerns. In conclusion, it is time to investigate whether the current regulatory model is the most appropriate arrangement for the prevailing economic, social and cultural circumstances in Sri Lanka.

This thesis deals with the question whether a state public enterprise is the source of political capital in the conception of the theory of rent-seeking on the example of the Czechoslovak state spa. The theoretical part explains the concept of political capital and the concept of rent-seeking theory from the view of Public Choice Theory. The analytical part is concerned with the fate of state spas in Czechoslovakia. The probe into the historical period of the First Republic is examined what happens to these spas, what is their place in the state budget, what is their fulfillment of stated objectives and which characters of rent-seeking in the form of political capital are observed at this state company. Based on this analysis it is concluded that the state spa enterprise is practical example of the theory of rent seeking and the source of political capital.

No Brasil, o ponto de vista de que a competição tributária (sempre retratada como "guerra fiscal") é algo conflituoso faz com que seja difundida uma visão negativa sobre um fenômeno que nem sempre é visto como tal na literatura econômica internacional. Muitos economistas veem essa competição como algo que, sendo capaz de coibir o comportamento rent-seeking por parte dos governantes, seria benéfico para a sociedade. Com base nessa ideia, usando o modelo de Eggert e Sorensen (2008), foi testado se variáveis proxy relativas à intensidade da competição tributária e ao comportamento rent-seeking de políticos no poder eram correlacionadas. Usou-se dados dos 26 estados brasileiros e do Distrito Federal para os anos de 2001 a 2009. Os resultados mostraram que, embora essas variáveis proxy não fossem correlacionadas para os níveis de escolaridade mais baixos, no nível mais alto, havia correlação entre essas duas variáveis, embora ela fosse positiva, o que rejeitava a hipótese de que uma maior competição tributária seria capaz de diminuir o comportamento rent-seeking dos políticos. / In Brazil, the point of view that tax competition (commonly referred to as a “fiscal war”) is something conflictive spreads a negative perspective on a phenomenon that is not always seen as such in the international economic literature. Many economists see this competition as something that, in being able to reduce rent-seeking behavior by politicians, would be beneficial to society. Stemming from this idea, and using the model from Eggert and Sorensen (2008), it was tested if proxy variables relating to the intensity of tax competition and to the rent-seeking behavior of politicians in office were correlated. Data from all the 26 Brazilian states and also Distrito Federal, from 2001 to 2009, were used. The results showed that, although the proxy variables were not correlated for the less skilled groups of workers considered, at the high skilled group, there was correlation between the two variables, but it was positive, which rejected the hypothesis that a more intense tax competition would be able to repress rent-seeking behavior by politicians.

Práce se zabývá problematikou dobývání renty. Konkrétně vymezuje teoretická východiska dobývání renty a analyzuje jednotlivé způsoby ovlivňování vládních představitelů, převážně lobbying a korupci. Odpovídá na otázku, v čem spočívají neefektivnosti při ovlivňování vládních představitelů zájmovými skupinami a jak je možné tyto činnosti eliminovat nebo minimalizovat jejich negativní dopad na společnost. Analytická část práce vymezuje hlavní příčiny odlišných měr korupce v České republice a na Slovensku na počátku 90. let a porovnává úspěšnost provádění antikorupčních politik v těchto zemích.

國家的強制權力創造了龐大的租利(rent)。個人或團體往往投入時間、金 錢或其他努力以獲取這些租利；這些追逐爭利的過程，稱為「競租活動 」。研究這些租利的形成、尋求、防禦、規避及它對社會產生的成本、效 益的一些理論及實證分析，統稱為「競租理論」(theory of rent-seek- ing)。本文將運用「利益團體模型」及「競租理論模型」將利益團體－管 制政策－社會福利成本三者之間的關係串聯起來。最後以Mohammad與 Walley對印度競租成本估計模式為架構，以台灣現有資料做一估計，探究 台灣因管制活動造成社會福利成本究竟有多大。本文共分五章。第一章緒 論；第二章為政治決策與競租活動；第三章為競租理論與福利成本之估計 （一）；第四章為競租成本的衡量（二）；第五章為結論及建議。