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Thesis advisor: John Sallis / The power and the problem of trust, πίστις, is nearly central to Plato’s Republic – in at least two senses. In the first sense, trust receives its most explicit consideration and treatment by Socrates in the central images of the Republic, specifically in the divided line image of Book VI, which Socrates uses to lay out the various powers and affections of knowing and opining in the soul and their corresponding objects. The line is divided into two proportional segments, both of which are divided again in turn. Trust, in its relation to the relative truth and clarity of objects of knowledge, is situated above imagination (εἰκασία), which relates to images, and by which Socrates means “first shadows, then appearances produced in water and in all close-grained, smooth, bright things, and everything of the sort.” Trust comes next in line, in the third place in relation to the truth itself. According to Socrates, trust, as a kind of power and affection of the soul, is related to “the animals around us, and everything that grows, and the whole class of artifacts (σκευαστὸν).” These are the things, Socrates says, that the objects of imagination are related to by way of likeness. Trust then, in this most basic sense, indicates the power of the soul by which human beings are primarily related to the objects in their environment – the everyday sorts of things which human beings encounter as they navigate their daily lives within the πόλις and the broader horizon of the κόσμος. They are the sorts of things that human beings generally take for granted. We are generally of the opinion that such things are what they are, as they appear. In another sense, trust is nearly central to the narrative of the Republic as it is situated within the divided line image itself. It is one of the two powers of the human soul that share a common border with the center of the divided line – the main division between the powers that relate to matters of opinion in the visible realm and the powers that are related to the intelligible realm, which is situated beyond the visible. On the other side of this major line of division lies the power of thought, διάνοια. Trust then, given where Socrates situates it along the divided line, although it is a lesser power in terms of its relationship to intelligible truths, still by way of its position and the border that it shares with thought, points to the very limit of the visible – perhaps the very limits of the κόσμος itself – the place where the visible gives way to the order of the intelligible. The power of trust, I will show by way of this work, is the power of the soul which can stretch opinion all the way out to its very limit – to the border of the visible and the intelligible which it shares with the power of thought. However, I argue that the power of trust is not only manifest in the nearly central treatment it receives in the central images of the Republic, it is also very much front and center, albeit often times implicitly, in the periphery of the Republic’s narrative, on either side of the central books. Much of this work constitutes an attempt draw out the power and the problem of trust as it arises in the periphery so that it may be seen not only in its tertiary relationship to truth in the divided line, but also in the immense import it holds for human beings in their lives within the πόλις and in the greater context of the κόσμος itself. Indeed, the power of trust may seem somewhat small in relation matters of the intelligible as they arise along the divided line; however, it will appear rather large when it is considered in relation to the lives of human beings as they find themselves born into a κόσμος and situated within a πόλις. By way of this situation, human beings find themselves fundamentally related to one another. Although trust, according to the divided line, is not strictly a matter of intelligence or that which is knowable in relation to truth in the intelligible realm, it is very much a matter of learning and coming to know – to the extent that this is possible – within the realm of becoming. The power of trust is critically important insofar as it informs our relation to our surroundings, the πόλις, and the κόσμος itself. Moreover, trust has an enormous impact on the kinds of lives that we choose to lead, that we find worth choosing, and it helps us determine in whom and in what we can ultimately place our trust. As such, the question of trust seems to, quite naturally, raise problem of judgment (κρίσις) in its turn. The question of judgment will run parallel to the theme of trust throughout this work. For, in many ways the two, trust and judgment, are inseparable. The two will arise quite frequently alongside one another, joined together as if in a kind of partnership. This is because, it seems, that in the order of the intelligible, and according to the power of knowing (νόησις) as it is developed in the divided line image, things that are known are simply known. Once a person, in the strictest sense, comes to know that something or other is true, he or she can take it for granted as something that is known – whatever it may be; however, in the realm of appearances and becoming, on the side of opinion, imagination, and trust, it is often the case that things must be judged, judgments must be made, and opinions must be formed on the basis of appearances alone – in the absence of any definitive sort of knowledge. And although trust constitutes a way of taking something for granted on the side of appearances, it is a kind of taking for granted that is at the same time held open – in a kind of suspension – provided that one does not confuse one’s judgments and opinions in accordance with trust with matters of knowing. That is, judgments which are made according to the power of trust, judgments that determine that something may or may not be taken for granted as it appears, are left decidedly unsettled in the way that matters of knowing and of knowledge are not. If we do not mistake the judgments that we make on the basis of trust with a certain kind of knowing, then the question of judgment as it relates to trust proves, by nature, to always be something of an open question. Trust in its relation to judgment, and the opinions that we form on the basis of this relation, can potentially become an opening onto the order of the intelligible. By way of its most basic operation, trust can be that power by which human beings can be made open to questions and inquiries that reach beyond the order of the visible and into the realm of the intelligible, questions concerning the truth of what is and not what merely appears; however, if matters of trust are mistaken for knowledge, then trust becomes a matter of enclosure. If one mistakes the opinions that one forms on the basis of trust for a kind of knowledge, then one mistakenly closes off the possibility of any further inquiry and further questioning into that which lies beyond appearance. And so, as I argue in this work, trust is both a source of great potential for the human being and a source of great risk. In Chapter I, I examine Socrates’ exchanges with Cephalus and Polemarchus respectively, as they occur in Book I. I argue that, even in these initial exchanges surrounding the question of justice, the question of trust in relation to judgment is already made manifest within the narrative of the Republic. I also discuss the way in which each interlocutor’s opinion about justice somehow mediates and informs his character in turn, especially in relation to the question of trust. Both Cephalus’ and Polemarchus’ formulations of justice, I argue, are somehow reflective of the trust each places in himself and in others. The way in which one relates to trust, then, will deeply inform the kind of person one becomes. In Chapter II, I continue this discussion of trust as it relates to issues of character, judgment, and justice in the context of Socrates’ exchange with Thrasymachus in Book I. I show how the tyrant is characterized and plagued by a fundamental sense of mistrust in others. This pervasive distrust is that which both propels the tyrant into a position of power over the πόλις, and it is also that which leads to his or her seemingly inevitable decline. I also make the case that this attitude is reflected by Thrasymachus in his own conduct in Book I, especially in the way in which he thinks about λόγος and the way in which he engages in dialogue with others. In Chapter III, I begin with a consideration of the various challenges that Glaucon and Adeimantus raise surrounding the question of justice, particularly as it relates to the themes of trust and judgment. I consider Glaucon’s depiction of the perfectly unjust individual. Then, I examine Adeimantus’ claim that in a πόλις, justice is either praised merely for its appearance, for the reputation it provides, or justice is simply forgone in favor of a conventional kind of injustice. I also examine the way in which the first πόλις that is constructed by Socrates in λόγος – the one that he calls the true and healthy πόλις but Glaucon calls a “πόλις of sows” – is characterized and made possible by the sense of trust that prevails within it. The citizens of this πόλις seem to have an unquestioning sense of trust in one another insofar as they each can be trusted to provide for the basic needs of each other without taking more than is needed in return. This sense of trust is extended beyond the boundaries of the healthy πόλις in its relations with its neighbors. Socrates initial account of the origin of the πόλις, I argue, gives way to what I call a “cosmopolis of trust.” In Chapter IV, I examine the πόλις in λόγος as it passes into the unhealthy πόλις of the relishes, which are introduced by Glaucon in Book II. I consider the various lines that need to be drawn within the πόλις, in addition to the various laws and programs of education that are instituted, so as to restore a sense of trust amongst the citizens of the πόλις – especially the guardians – in the face of the temptation and the threat posed by the relishes themselves. I argue that a similar gesture is made for the same underlying reasons in Book V in relation to ἔρος. I conclude with a detailed consideration of trust as it is treated by Socrates in the divided line image and how this informs trust’s relationship to judgment. In Chapter V, by way of conclusion, I consider the issues of trust and judgment as they relate to the central figure of the philosopher-king. For, as Socrates says in Book V, in order for the πόλις in λόγος to become a reality, a philosopher must come to rule in the πόλις. I reflect upon the way in which, in relation to trust and to judgment, the philosopher-king comes to constitute at once the highest aspiration of the πόλις and perhaps its greatest risk. I then consider what I take to be two separate attempts to situate the πόλις in λόγος within the boundaries of the κόσμος. The first of these takes place in Books VIII-IX of the Republic, in which the πόλις ruled by philosophical monarchy or aristocracy inevitably declines into timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and down into tyranny itself. I examine in outline, the way in which this decline is set underway by way of mistrust and various failures in judgment along the way. I then situate this discussion in relation to the narrative of the Timaeus, in which, at least as far as it seems, a separate attempt to situate the πόλις of the Republic within the boundary of the κόσμος is made. I argue that, in the face of the decline of the πόλις that we see in the Republic, the Timaeus might provide us with a model of soul and of κόσμος which, when placed in relation to the πόλις of the republic, resists the seeming inevitability of this decline and thereby vindicates the power of trust. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Throughout the history of the Dominican Republic, theater has played an instrumental role in the cultural life its people, one which transcends purely artistic and cultural dimensions extending its influence into the political and social fabric of the nation. In spite of Spanish colonization and later Haitian occupation, a nascent national identity began forming early on. The staging of certain plays exposed latent conflicts and revealed sectorial, class interests. Theater provided a means of expression for popular sentiments, thus revealing an urge by the people to manifest their concerns, usually under the heavy weight of censorship. This thesis focuses on key moments of the first 140 years of Dominican Republic theater. It is organized into three chapters: "Historical Antecedents", "Theater of the Dictatorship" and "Theater of the Post-Dictatorship." The first chapter deals with the struggle for independence through 1844; the next focuses on the theatrical plays and political climate of bloody Rafael Leonidas Trujillo dictatorship which spanned from 1930 to his assassination in 1961, and the third presents the theater that appeared in the subsequent years of the equally repressive Joaquin Balaguer presidency (1966-1978). The analysis of these key historical moments, in conjunction with the dramaturgy of playwrights such as Franklin Domínguez, Marcio Veloz Maggiolo and Héctor Incháustegui Cabral, maps the function of theater as a tool of raising awareness, transmitting ideologies, and unifying a nation, in spite of despotism and oppression often disguised as democracy. As such, it documents the role that theatre played during a nation-building process that stages the history of political repression, lack of freedom of expression as well as social and political injustice.

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Introduction: The Dominican Ranks 79th in the world for high rates of under five year mortality at 33 deaths per 1000 live births. The Ninos Primeros en Salud (NPS) in Consuelo, DR has an extensive Nutrition Program for children 0-5 years to address food insecurity and malnutrition with nutrition education, regular weight checks, home visits, micronutrient supplementation and supplemental food packages in an attempt to decrease mortality amount 0-5 year olds. Objectives: The primary aim of this study was to compare the two groups (nutrition intervention group and healthy reference group) to determine if there were differences in demographic characteristics among children receiving care at NPS. The secondary aim was to evaluate the Nutrition Program at NPS during the first nine months of the program by observing changes in wasting, weight for height z-score (WHZ), weight for age z-score (WAZ) and height for age z-score (HAZ) in children participating in the nutrition intervention program compared to the healthy reference group. The tertiary aim was to determine if there were differences in outcomes of wasting and WAZ in the Nutrition intervention group in relation to household size. Study Design: Observational study with propensity score frequency matching in healthy reference group. Baseline and up to nine months follow up data were examined on all patients being seen at NPS (n=75) consisting of age, weight, height and birth weight.. Baseline and monthly follow up was also collected on patients enrolled in the nutrition program (n=53) with monthly data consisting of weight, height, age and number living in household. All data were de-identified. Results: The intervention group and healthy reference group differed only in age and birth weight at baseline after matching. The intervention group showed statistically significant improvement in all three areas of weight anthropometric measurements (i.e. wasting, WAZ and WHZ) from pre intervention to post intervention when compared to the healthy reference group. Both the intervention and reference group showed statistically significant decreases in HAZ, with the intervention group showing a decrease in HAZ compared to the healthy reference group. The intervention group also showed significant worsening in measure of stunting over the follow up period. Outcomes measurements of wasting and WAZ did not differ based on household size. Conclusions: The intervention was successful in increasing the weight of malnourished children. However, it appears that the intervention had no positive effect on increasing linear growth. Further investigation is needed to determine the impact of the nutrition intervention on malnutrition, specifically linear growth. / Public Health

This dissertation is a cultural biography of merchant banker Stephen Girard that explores the origins of the mythology as well as the mechanics of capitalism as it functioned on the streets and in the homes of early national Philadelphia. By tracing changes in Stephen Girard's family, both traditional and improvisational, from the 1770s to his death in 1831 and beyond, this project examines how Girard repeatedly capitalized on his family to take commercial risks, reinventing what family meant in a transforming economy. Telling overlapping stories of Girard's family and businesses, including trade networks reaching from Europe, the Caribbean, and China to the United States, I argue that an Atlantic-American culture of capitalism developed at the intersection of the family and the market. Episodes that show the salience and limits of familial bonds in a turbulent economy include Girard's risky commercial strategies during the American Revolution that relied on his brother in Saint-Domingue, and tenuous rationalities of the market and marriage that collided when his wife supposedly went insane. After his public involvement in Philadelphia's yellow fever epidemics of the 1790s, Girard learned that institutions could do the work of families. Applying this lesson to the national political economy, Girard refashioned the Bank of the United States into the Bank of Stephen Girard and lent the U.S. Treasury over one million dollars to help fund the War of 1812. Well before his death in 1831, Girard was one of the wealthiest men in the nation. His will altered the shape and flow of Philadelphia, with repercussions for inheritance and corporate law through the twentieth century. By juxtaposing Girard's personal and public lives, this dissertation integrates scholarship on the market economy with that on gender and the family to better understand the expansion of a culture of capitalism in the early American Republic. Under capitalism, people and relationships were fungible in new and important ways. In telling the story of Stephen Girard, this dissertation follows a central, but overlooked, player in the early American and Atlantic economy in order to explain the paradoxical relationship between capitalism and liberty. / History