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The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is
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Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
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Showing 1 to 3 of 3 (0.079 seconds)| 1 |
Not just "Harper's Rules": the problem with responsible government as critical moralitySmith, Michael Edward 30 August 2010 (has links)
The Canadian constitutional crisis of 2008 triggered a renewed interest in the structure and workings of Canada’s institutions of government. Particular controversy was generated by Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s assertion that only the political party with the most seats in the House of Commons has the right to form a government and that it is illegitimate for the opposition parties to form a coalition with a legislative majority. Peter Russell terms these contentions “Harper’s New Rules”, and is one of a large group of scholars who deride the rules as being undemocratic and in violation of the traditional practice of parliamentary democracy and responsible government (which holds that the House of Commons is the final arbiter on the viability of potential governments). This thesis investigates the quick rejection of Harper’s Rules and determines that their attempt to enforce a critical moral standard on Harper is problematic because for a constitutional convention to be binding on political actors, it requires a consensus on how a convention promotes constitutional principle--a consensus that does not exist about how a party receives a mandate to govern. Throughout Canada’s history with minority government transitions, there has been a subtle discourse that implies many political actors have operated under the norm that the largest party in the House of Commons does indeed have a right to form the government. As well, many of the claims that are made about the democratic origin and purpose of the structure of responsible government are difficult to substantiate and can be challenged. The resulting disagreement makes it difficult to declare a constitutional interpretation to be wrong, given the malleable character of conventions, and that these constitutional disputes can generate into crisis and be exploited for partisan gain. This is the situation the federal party system may soon find itself in, as likely future minority governments will continuously bring the opposing conceptions of a mandate into conflict. This thesis concludes that determining constitutional conventions based on how they defend principle is a hazardous approach because political actors can always frame their actions in the rhetoric of democratic legitimacy, and if the actor can avoid serious political repercussions or find support in the public, then the interpretation becomes viable.
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Societal cleavages and institutional change in Canada : retention, reform and removal of nominee councilsHicks, Bruce M. 12 1900 (has links)
En concevant que toute société a deux clivages dominants, l’un social et l’autre partisan, cette thèse développe une théorie sur le changement institutionnel. L’hypothèse initiale, selon laquelle les groupes sociaux créés par le premier clivage agiront pour restreindre le changement institutionnel et que le changement aura lieu lors de l’émergence d’un groupe partisan capable de croiser le clivage social, fut testée par les processus traçant les changements qui furent proposés et qui ont eu lieu au sein des conseils nominés en Amérique du Nord britannique. Ces conseils furent modifiés un bon nombre de fois, devenant les chambres secondaires de législatures provinciales avant d’être éventuellement abolies. La preuve supporte l’hypothèse, bien qu’il ne soit pas suffisant d’avoir un groupe partisan qui puisse croiser le clivage qui mène le changement : un débat partisan sur le changement est nécessaire. Ceci remet aussi en cause la théorie prédominante selon laquelle les clivages sociaux mènent à la formation de partis politiques, suggérant qu’il est plus bénéfique d’utiliser ces deux clivages pour l’étude des institutions. / By conceiving of any society as having two dominant cleavages, one ‘social’ and one ‘partisan’, this dissertation develops a theory on institutional change. The initial hypothesis that social groups created by the former will act to restrain institutional change and that change will occur when a partisan group emerges that can cross the social cleavage was tested by processes tracing the changes which were proposed and which occurred to the appointed councils established in British North America. These councils were modified a number of times, becoming second chambers in the provincial legislatures, and were eventually each abolished. The evidence found supports the hypothesis, though it is not sufficient to have a partisan group that can cross the cleavage drive change, a partisan debate over the change was necessary. This also challenges the prevailing theory that social cleavages lead to political party formation, suggesting the benefit of using these two cleavages for the study of institutions.
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Societal cleavages and institutional change in Canada : retention, reform and removal of nominee councilsHicks, Bruce M. 12 1900 (has links)
En concevant que toute société a deux clivages dominants, l’un social et l’autre partisan, cette thèse développe une théorie sur le changement institutionnel. L’hypothèse initiale, selon laquelle les groupes sociaux créés par le premier clivage agiront pour restreindre le changement institutionnel et que le changement aura lieu lors de l’émergence d’un groupe partisan capable de croiser le clivage social, fut testée par les processus traçant les changements qui furent proposés et qui ont eu lieu au sein des conseils nominés en Amérique du Nord britannique. Ces conseils furent modifiés un bon nombre de fois, devenant les chambres secondaires de législatures provinciales avant d’être éventuellement abolies. La preuve supporte l’hypothèse, bien qu’il ne soit pas suffisant d’avoir un groupe partisan qui puisse croiser le clivage qui mène le changement : un débat partisan sur le changement est nécessaire. Ceci remet aussi en cause la théorie prédominante selon laquelle les clivages sociaux mènent à la formation de partis politiques, suggérant qu’il est plus bénéfique d’utiliser ces deux clivages pour l’étude des institutions. / By conceiving of any society as having two dominant cleavages, one ‘social’ and one ‘partisan’, this dissertation develops a theory on institutional change. The initial hypothesis that social groups created by the former will act to restrain institutional change and that change will occur when a partisan group emerges that can cross the social cleavage was tested by processes tracing the changes which were proposed and which occurred to the appointed councils established in British North America. These councils were modified a number of times, becoming second chambers in the provincial legislatures, and were eventually each abolished. The evidence found supports the hypothesis, though it is not sufficient to have a partisan group that can cross the cleavage drive change, a partisan debate over the change was necessary. This also challenges the prevailing theory that social cleavages lead to political party formation, suggesting the benefit of using these two cleavages for the study of institutions.
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