The general topic of this research is scientific success and the form it might take in sociology. The recent resurgence of evolutionary thinking across the social sciences has potentially positive implications for sociology and its understanding of social change. To evaluate this evolutionary turn in relation to sociology, I focus on David Hull's evolutionary analysis of scientific change and success, which claims that a social mechanism lies at the heart of the selection processes that occur in science. What is good for the individual is what is good for science as a whole, he argues, and it is descent that matters more in analyzing this process than conceptual similarity. Hull believes such an evolutionary account makes sense of both success and failure, though he doubts that sociology can be considered a science. My contention is that by applying his evolutionary analysis to evolutionary sociology, not only can his claims be tested and modified, but also that insights into the sociology of knowledge will be generated. To achieve this, I examine a large range of texts and commentary on evolutionary theory and sociology from the early nineteenth century until the recent present. All of these theories of evolution exhibit a pattern of problematic conceptualization, which includes special categories of human action, developmentalism, and inadequate methods. Despite each generation of evolutionary sociology recognizing the pattern as producing invalid theory, these flaws are consistently replicated. I conclude that such findings suggest, first of all, that sociology is not organized collectively but is an individualistic discipline; secondly, that Hull's evolutionary framework needs major reconstruction around the areas of fitness (mere reproductive success, as in evolutionary sociology's case) and fit (of theory to evidence, accompanied by the reconstruction of concepts that do not fit the empirical findings -a process that tends not to happen in evolutionary sociology); and thirdly, that the evolutionary turn in the social sciences offers an opportunity for a reorganization of approach in sociology and its interdisciplinary engagements.

Cognitive abilities have been invoked to do much work in externalist epistemology. An ability condition (sometimes in conjunction with a separate, anti-luck condition) is seen to be key in satisfying direction-of-fit and modal stability intuitions which attach to the accrual of positive epistemic status to doxastic attitudes. While the notion of ability has been given some extensive treatment in the literature (especially John Greco, Alan Millar and Ernest Sosa), the implications for these abilities being particularly cognitive ones has been given less attention. To rectify this oversight, I examine the debate over the nature of cognition from philosophy of cognitive science, paying particular attention to the debate between defenders of internalist theories (Fred Adams, Kenneth Aizawa and Rob Rupert) and externalist theories (so-called “extended mind” positions). Armed with substantive accounts of cognition, I argue that the epistemological externalist’s obligation to repudiate epistemological internalism forces her to adopt some sort of externalist account of cognition.

Scientific communities have established social mechanisms for proposing explanations, questioning evidence, and validating claims. Opportunities like these are often not a given in science classrooms (Vellom, Anderson, & Palincsar, 1993) even though the National Science Education Standards (NSES, 1996) state that a scientifically literate person should be able to “engage intelligently in public discourse and debate about important issues in science and technology” (National Research Council [NRC], 1996). Research further documents that students’ science conceptions undergo little modification with the traditional teaching experienced in many high school science classrooms (Duit, 2003, Dykstra, 2005). This case study is an examination of the discourse that occurred as four high school physics students collaborated on solutions to three physics lab problems during which the students made predictions and experimentally generated data to support their predictions. The discourse patterns were initially examined for instances of concept negotiations. Selected instances were further examined using Toulmin’s (2003) pattern for characterizing argumentation in order to understand the students’ scientific reasoning strategies and to document the role of collaboration in facilitating conceptual modifications and changes. Audio recordings of the students’ conversations during the labs, written problems turned in to the teacher, interviews of the students, and observations and field notes taken during student collaboration were used to document and describe the students’ challenges and successes encountered during their collaborative work. The findings of the study indicate that collaboration engaged the students and generated two types of productive science discourse: concept negotiations and procedure negotiations. Further analysis of the conceptual and procedure negotiations revealed that the students viewed science as sensible and plausible but not as a tool they could employ to answer their questions. The students’ conceptual growth was inhibited by their allegiance to the authority of the science laws as learned in their school classroom. Thus, collaboration did not insure conceptual change. Describing student discourse in situ contributes to science education research about teaching practices that facilitate conceptual understandings in the science classroom.

Die Arbeit fragt zunächst nach der Existenz von Wissenschaftsphilosophie in Hegels System, da sie traditionellerweise von denjenigen geleugnet wird, die fest an den naturalistischen Wissenschaftsbegriff glauben. Es wird zwischen zwei Konzeptionen von epistemologischen Untersuchungen unterschieden, nämlich einer positivistischen-objektorientierten und einer selbstreflexiven. Hegels Wissenschaftslehre entspricht der letzteren, d.h. einer Art noesis noeseos, denn Wissenschaft ist für ihn das Selbstwissen des kollektiv verstandenen Geistes. In diesem Sinne kann Hegel als Mitbegründer der modernen Wissenschaftsphilosophie avant la lettre angesehen werden. Die Kernbestimmung von Hegels Metawissenschaft wird dann im Lichte der vor kurzem entfachten Debatte um seinen angeblichen Naturalismus des Geistes untersucht, weil auch diejenigen neueren angelsächsischen Hegelinterpretatoren, die einen epistemologischen Diskurs in Hegels System durchaus anerkennen, irreführend behaupten, dass Hegel die Geistaktivitäten und Geistentäußerungen naturalistisch auffasst. Es folgt die kritische Analyse von vier exemplarischen naturalistischen Hegellektüren und die Rekonstruktion von Hegels Argumentation für einen nichtnaturalistischen Geistbegriff sowie Naturbegriff. Im Gegensatz zu diesen Auslegungen, welche vom Menschen als bloßem Bedürfniswesen ausgehen, macht die Analyse der Hegelschen Texte deutlich, dass für Hegel der Geist nicht durch irgendein biologisches Interesse oder Organ allein bedingt ist, sondern vielmehr durch eine sozialkulturelle Seinsweise und dabei besonders durch sprachlich vermittelte generische Formen eines Wir-Subjekts. Hegel nimmt die Aufgabe auf sich, der Philosophie zu einer selbstbewussten Wissenschaft zu verhelfen, da er die gravierenden Probleme von rein empirischen, rein rationalistischen sowie romantischen „unmittelbaren“ Wissenskonzepten identifiziert und beheben will. Es wird gezeigt, dass trotz massiver Kritik der posthegelianischen Philosophie, sowohl der analytischen als auch der kontinentalen, Hegels Idee von Philosophie als Wissen des Wissens keinesfalls blinde Orientierung an der Methodologie gegebener Sach-Wissenschaften bedeutet. Vielmehr entwickelt Hegel eine allgemeine, begriffsorientierte und nichtformalistische Logik, die als innovative Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften verstanden werden soll.

Partindo da hipótese básica de que o discurso do campo informacional no Brasil dominantemente aborda as atuais condições políticas, econômicas e culturais das práticas de informação nos marcos da 'Era' ou 'Sociedade da Informação', 'Pós-industrialismo', 'Pós-modernidade' etc., o estudo, via Análise do Discurso, busca seus efeitos de sentido, os fundamentos teóricos destas hipóteses histórico-sociológicas e suas articulações epistemológicas. / Starting from the basic hypothesis that in the discourse of Information Science in Brazil the predominant approach to current cultural, economic and political conditions of information practices lies within the framework of the 'Information Society' or 'Age', 'Post-industrialism', 'Post-modernism etc., this study, using Discourse Analysis, seeks the effects of the meaning, the theoretical foundatins of these socio-historical hypotheses and their epistemological articulations.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T14:36:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ZanoneTSS.pdf: 2624254 bytes, checksum: b96fc528c5547a8fae1ece8fad20a92e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-10 / The rational construction necessary to systematize scientific knowledge in physics, introduces difficulties of understanding in some of its concepts. One of these concepts which exemplify properly this difficulty in learning or teaching is entropy. This thesis propose the construction of a didactic route which constitute itself a historical and epistemological course to entropy, intending to contribute for teaching this concept as well as other physics concepts. The basic assumption to build this route is that through the historical review of the development of this concept in the way suggested by Bachelard s (1884-1962) epistemology it is possible to make subjects, to be taught and learned, more meaningful. Initially I composed a brief biographical note to give the reader an idea about the issues, interests and reflections, related to science, and how I dealt with them in my private and professional life, as well as the role they played to lead me to write this thesis. The strategy to construct the route to entropy was to split the usual contents of basic thermodynamics in three moments in a way they can constitute epistemological units , which can be identified by the way of thinking in the corresponding moments of scientific knowledge production: a technical and empiricist moment, a rationalist and positivist moment and a post-positivist rationalist one. The transition between each moment is characterized by a rupture with the former way of thinking; however the progress in the construction of knowledge in the area is evident. As the final part of this work I present an analysis based on elements of Bachelard s epistemology that are present in each moment. This analysis is the basic component of the didactic route that I propose myself to build. The way I made this route guide to entropy could contribute to the construction of other didactic routes in physics and other sciences, in a way to unveil hidden meanings and as a tool to humanize scientific knowledge. / A constru??o racional necess?ria ? sistematiza??o do conhecimento cient?fico na f?sica acarreta dificuldades de entendimento de alguns dos seus conceitos. Um conceito que apresenta, de forma exemplar, esta dificuldade - tanto de aprender quanto de ensinar - ? o conceito de entropia. Esta tese prop?e a constru??o de um roteiro did?tico que se constitui num percurso hist?rico e epistemol?gico para a entropia, com a inten??o de contribuir para o ensino deste conceito e, de maneira geral, para o ensino da f?sica. A premissa b?sica para a constru??o do roteiro ? que, atrav?s de uma revis?o hist?rica do desenvolvimento do conceito, nos moldes sugeridos pela epistemologia de Bachelard (1884-1962), ? poss?vel tornar mais significativo o conhecimento a ser ensinado e aprendido. Inicialmente fiz um pequeno memorial com o objetivo de dar ao leitor um panorama das inquieta??es, interesses e reflex?es que teci em minha vida pessoal e profissional com rela??o ? ci?ncia e seu papel e que me levaram a construir esta tese. A estrat?gia para a constru??o do roteiro foi dividir o conte?do usual da termodin?mica b?sica em tr?s momentos de modo que estes se constituam em "unidades epistemol?gicas", ou seja, momentos que possam ser identificados a partir do pensamento predominante na constru??o do conhecimento cient?fico: Um momento t?cnico empirista, um momento racionalista positivista e um momento racionalista p?s-positivista. A transi??o de um momento para outro implica uma ruptura com o pensamento anterior. Entretanto, o progresso na constru??o do conhecimento na ?rea ? evidente. Como parte final do trabalho, apresento uma an?lise de elementos da epistemologia de Bachelard presentes em cada momento. Esta an?lise ? o componente fundamental do roteiro did?tico que me propus a construir. A forma como constru? este percurso para a entropia pode contribuir para a constru??o de percursos outros, na f?sica ou em outras ci?ncias, com vistas a desvelar significados e humanizar o conhecimento cient?fico.

Integration of knowledge has become a contentious issue in an age where increasing specialisation creates boundaries and division. Yet, there is an identifiable need for integration across social, ecological and economic understandings if we are to address ever more threatening crises and alarming potential scenarios. This paper relates to the work of K. William Kapp and in so doing raises questions about how integration might be achieved. A core idea that arises is the role of common denominator concepts. (author's abstract) / Series: SRE - Discussion Papers