Specialförband nyttjas allt mer i dagens konflikter och det organisatoriska innehållet i specialförbandssystem skiljer sig åt, där vissa länder har utökat sitt system med lätt infanteri i en understödjande roll. Detta skapar ett behov för Sverige att analysera andras erfarenheter avseende nyttjande av understödjande infanteriet. Syftet med denna studie är att bidra med ökad förståelse avseende de för- och nackdelar som uppkommer på taktisk nivå när understödjande infanteri nyttjas vid specialoperationer. Denna studie använder ett teoretiskt analysramverk bestående av McRavens teori och de principer han har utvecklat kring specialoperationer. Undersökningen visar sammanfattningsvis att understödjande infanteriet bidrar till en in-satsstyrkas samlade effekt och förmåga, samt att de möjliggör för kärnförbanden att lyckas med huvuduppgiften. Resultatet i en specialoperation påverkas genom samtliga prestationer av den personal och de förbandsenheter som ingår i specialoperationen.

Since the 1980s there has been an increase in the use of  special operations  and special forces. Although some theorists would say that the use of special operation is as old as the art of war, the scientific study in this subject is not extensive. The author of this dissertation have identified that the concept special operations is defined in different ways and that there seems to be a discrepancy in how the concept is understood among theorists. Harry Yarger, who has written a theory of American special operations states that there is a difference in how other countries conduct special operations. If that is true, definitions of special operations should vary according to nation. The first purpose of this study is to examine chosen definitions of special operations and to identify what differs and what is similar. The second purpose is to see if there is a connection between how the concept is defined and a which category it belongs to. The studied definitions are here categorized according to studies of cases and/or doctrines from one specified nation or several nations. At least two different definitions were chosen in each category, that way the author could compare the definitions within a category to see if they are consistent with each other. By identifying differences and similarities the authors intent was also to find what traits links the three different categories in order to be able to develop a more uniform definition of the concept special operation. The analysis has shown that there are many differences between categories as well as within categories and therefore the conclusion is indecisive – the author has not been able to establish if or not the there is a connection between how the concept is defined and a category. However, those similarities found in every category has been used to make a suggestion to a more uniform definition of special operations: Special operations are of an unorthodox nature. The purpose of these operations are to solve significant political and military problems. Missions can include time limited attacks aiming to destroy, seize, recover or exploit chosen objects. Special operations are conducted by special forces.

This study examines William H. McRaven's theory of why special operations succeed. The theory is tested on Operation Nimrod which took place after the theory was published and carried out against a non-state actor. Operation Nimrod was a special operation in which the British special forces SAS conducted a hostage rescue operation against six terrorists on the Iranian embassy in London 1980. McRaven's theory contains six principles that need to be utilized to achieve relative superiority. The theory is one of few used in research at the tactical level of special operations and the principles can also be found in the Swedish doctrine. The study aims to test the generalizability of the theory to modern cases since few studies have tried this before. The result of this case study shows that all six principles in McRaven's theory of special operations have been used in Operation Nimrod where relative superiority arose. This shows a connection between the theory and a successful special operation which results in the generalizability of the theory being strengthened through this study.

<p>Denna uppsats är skriven som en studie i fyra delar. Första delen består utav redogörelser för syfte, metod och källmaterial samt hur jag skapat det analysverktyg som används i arbetet. I andra delen belyses krigföringens grundprinciper såsom de är definierade i litteraturen. Här redogörs även för de faktorer som kommer att användas vid identifikationen. Tredje delen av min studie inleds utav en historisk återblick, där jag återberättar händelserna som utspelar sig i Norge under 1942-1943. Detta case som ligger till grund för min studie är en av andra världskrigets mest kända specialoperationer, som trots sin berömmelse väldigt få har djupare information om. Operationerna är kantade av motgångar och dödsfall, men framförallt av målmedvetenhet och stor vilja. Genom att använda mitt analysverktyg mot detta case vill jag se huruvida samtliga av krigföringens grundprinciper kan identifieras. Slutsatserna som är dragna är att samtliga av krigföringens grundprinciper kan identifieras med hjälpav de faktorer jag använt.</p> / <p>This paper is written as a study in four parts. The first part consists of statements of purpose, methodology and source materials, and how I created the analysis tools used at work. The second section highlights the basic principles of warfare as defined in the literature. This also presents the factors that will be used for identification. The third part of my study starts out a historical review, which I am recounting the events that take place in Norway during 1942-1943. This case, which is the basis for my study is one of WWII's most famous Special Operations, who, despite its fame, very few have deeper information. These operations are marked by misfortune and death, but above all the determination and eagerness. By using my analysis tool of this case I want to see whether all of the basic principles of warfare can be identified. The conclusions that are drawn are that all of the basic principles of warfare can be identified by the factors I used.</p>

Denna uppsats är skriven som en studie i fyra delar. Första delen består utav redogörelser för syfte, metod och källmaterial samt hur jag skapat det analysverktyg som används i arbetet. I andra delen belyses krigföringens grundprinciper såsom de är definierade i litteraturen. Här redogörs även för de faktorer som kommer att användas vid identifikationen. Tredje delen av min studie inleds utav en historisk återblick, där jag återberättar händelserna som utspelar sig i Norge under 1942-1943. Detta case som ligger till grund för min studie är en av andra världskrigets mest kända specialoperationer, som trots sin berömmelse väldigt få har djupare information om. Operationerna är kantade av motgångar och dödsfall, men framförallt av målmedvetenhet och stor vilja. Genom att använda mitt analysverktyg mot detta case vill jag se huruvida samtliga av krigföringens grundprinciper kan identifieras. Slutsatserna som är dragna är att samtliga av krigföringens grundprinciper kan identifieras med hjälpav de faktorer jag använt. / This paper is written as a study in four parts. The first part consists of statements of purpose, methodology and source materials, and how I created the analysis tools used at work. The second section highlights the basic principles of warfare as defined in the literature. This also presents the factors that will be used for identification. The third part of my study starts out a historical review, which I am recounting the events that take place in Norway during 1942-1943. This case, which is the basis for my study is one of WWII's most famous Special Operations, who, despite its fame, very few have deeper information. These operations are marked by misfortune and death, but above all the determination and eagerness. By using my analysis tool of this case I want to see whether all of the basic principles of warfare can be identified. The conclusions that are drawn are that all of the basic principles of warfare can be identified by the factors I used.

Den moderna vapenutvecklingen har skapat möjligheter, som rätt exploaterat, skapar dilemman för försvararen. Som motmedel har en utvecklad version av Biddles (2006) tre principer: reducera motståndarens vapenverkan, reducera motståndarens rörlighet och säkerställa egen rörlighet, prövats ur ett försvarsperspektiv gentemot specialoperationer. Resultatet visar att principerna har god passning på taktisk nivå. Studien fokuserar på inverkan av de immateriella faktorerna, i motsats till numerisk och teknologisk spets. Arbetet tydliggör att förmågan att använda, organisera och leda sina militära förband är en viktig framgångsfaktor. Arbetet visar att tillämpningen av immateriella faktorer kan förklara, variationen, varför försvaret i vissa fall segrar och i andra fall lider nederlag. Arbetet ger ny kunskap till forskningen om försvar mot specialoperationer likväl som den kan vara ett embryo till en intresseväckande debatt om defensiva markoperationer. / Modern weapon development has created opportunities, which, properly exploited, create dilemmas for the defender. As a countermeasure, a developed version of Biddle's (2006) three principles: avoid the opponent's weapon effect, delay the opponent's mobility, and, create their own mobility, has been tested from a defense perspective against attacking special operations. The result shows that the principles have good fit even at the tactical level. The study focuses on the influence of intangible factors, as opposed to numerical and technological cutting-edge. The work makes it clear that the ability to use, organize and lead their military units is an important factor, for success. The work shows that the application of intangible factors can explain, the variety, why in some cases defense triumphs and in other cases suffers defeat. The work provides new knowledge to research on defense against special operations as well as it can be an embryo of an interesting debate about defensive ground operations.