<p>Abstract:</p><p>The aim of this study has been to investigate (theoretically as well as empirically) the problematic notions of state neutrality and political perfectionism and, in particular, the potentially vast continuum existing between these concepts both in theory and in actual political practice. In order to accomplish this, a conceptual analysis has examined (some of) the arguments for and against state neutrality and political perfectionism, different aspects of neutralism and perfectionism as well as the exact definition of the concepts of “neutrality of justification” and “conceptions of the good”. Using a specific (though not entirely uncontested) definition of these concepts, an empirical analysis was made of Swedish parliamentary parties and their cultural policies. The empirical part of the study seemed to confirm one of the basic premises of this study; that state neutrality and perfectionism are often (as has indeed been recognized by critics of state neutrality) intertwined in the business of everyday politics.</p>

Abstract: The aim of this study has been to investigate (theoretically as well as empirically) the problematic notions of state neutrality and political perfectionism and, in particular, the potentially vast continuum existing between these concepts both in theory and in actual political practice. In order to accomplish this, a conceptual analysis has examined (some of) the arguments for and against state neutrality and political perfectionism, different aspects of neutralism and perfectionism as well as the exact definition of the concepts of “neutrality of justification” and “conceptions of the good”. Using a specific (though not entirely uncontested) definition of these concepts, an empirical analysis was made of Swedish parliamentary parties and their cultural policies. The empirical part of the study seemed to confirm one of the basic premises of this study; that state neutrality and perfectionism are often (as has indeed been recognized by critics of state neutrality) intertwined in the business of everyday politics.

A liberdade religiosa é o direito fundamental que tutela a crença, o culto e as demais atividades religiosas, dos indivíduos e das organizações religiosas, e consagra neutralidade estatal. A religião deve ser entendida em termos amplíssimos. Abrange toda atividade ligada ao sobrenatural. A religião não se confunde com ideologia, filosofia, sociologia. O Estado neutro não pode se posicionar a respeito do acerto ou desacerto de uma determinada crença religiosa. No entanto, pode controlar a sinceridade. Há três aspectos: individual (indivíduos), coletivo (organizações religiosas) e institucional (Estado). Em relação aos indivíduos, destacam-se o direito de isonomia (tratamento diferenciado), de crença e de privacidade religiosa. Em relação às organizações religiosas, destacam-se seus aspectos societários, cíveis, trabalhistas e tributários; a liberdade de culto e de proselitismo. Em seu aspecto institucional, a neutralidade impõe que o Estado não tome partido em favor de nenhuma religião; reconhece um valor positivo geral à religião. Temas analisados: direito penal; abuso de direito; transfusão de sangue; tratamento de saúde diferenciado; sacrifícios de animais; curas espirituais; proselitismo, pregação contrária ao homossexualismo e a crenças afro-brasileiras; rádios comunitárias; desconto e pagamento de dízimos e ofertas; direito urbanístico e de vizinhança; uso de símbolos religiosos por particulares e pelo Estado; ensino e casamento religiosos, entre outros. / Religious freedom is a fundamental right that protects beliefs, worship and other religious activities from individuals and religious organizations and ensures state neutrality. Religion ought to be widely comprehended. It comprehends all sorts of activities related to the supernatural. Religion should not be confused with ideology, philosophy and sociology. A neutral state must not take a stand about the strengths or weaknesses of a certain religious belief. Nonetheless, it can control sincerity. Religious freedom has three aspects: an individual one (regarding individuals), a collective one (regarding religious organizations) and an institutional one (regarding the state). In terms of individuals, the right to isonomy (equal treatment), religious belief and privacy is to be pointed out. In terms of religious organizations, social, civil, tributary and labor aspects are to be pointed out as well as freedom of worship and proselytism. As for the institutional aspect of religious freedom, the neutrality principle prevents the state from taking any stand concerning any religion and generally recognizes religion as something positive. Topics discussed: penal law; abuse of rights; blood transfusion; privileged health treatment; animal sacrifice; spiritual healing; proselytism; preaching against homosexuality and African Brazilian beliefs; community radio stations; withholding tithes and offerings; urban and neighborhood law; use of religious symbols by individuals and the state; religious teaching and weddings, etc.

In dieser Dissertation argumentiere ich (gegen John Rawls und andere) erstens dafür, dass perfektionistische Gründe gute Gründe für Gesetze sind, die ein Staat erlässt, ohne, zweitens, die These zu teilen, die Joseph Raz in The Morality of Freedom vertritt, dass nur die Gesetze eines Staates legitim sind, die mit perfektionistischen Gründen gerechtfertigt werden können – weil alle anderen die Autonomie der Bürger notwendig verletzen würden. Im ersten Punkt halte ich den Perfektionismus für die Standardposition, und die gängigen liberalen Argumente für einen neutralen Staat überzeugen nicht, egal ob sie als ökumenische oder nicht-neutrale vertreten werden. Die ökumenischen Argumente, wie sie etwa bei Rawls und Bruce Ackerman zu finden sind, überzeugen nicht, weil sich ihre behauptete Neutralität letztlich als schädlich parteiisch erweist. Die nicht-neutralen Argumente, die unter anderem von Rawls und Charles Larmore angeführt werden, reichen nicht aus, um die Notwendigkeit eines Prinzips der staatlichen Neutralität zu begründen. Und zwar aus verschiedenen Gründen: Einer dieser Gründe ist, dass die Berufung der Konsequenzialisten auf den Wert der Autonomie übersieht, dass der Wert der Autonomie in Wertkonflikten anderen Werten nicht überlegen ist, und ein zweiter Grund wäre, dass Rawls in seinem Appell an die „Bürden des Urteils“, etwa in seinem Buch Political Liberalism, eher voraussetzt als zeigt, dass Respekt vor der Autonomie der Bürger die staatliche Förderung des Guten ausschließt. Zu dem zweiten Punkt mache ich geltend, dass es unerheblich ist, ob die These von Raz, dass Autonomie wertlos wird, wenn den Bürgern nicht ausreichend gute Optionen an Lebensformen zur Verfügung stehen, zwischen denen sie wählen können, überzeugend ist oder nicht, weil daraus nicht folgt, dass der Staat das Gute in jedem möglichen politischen System fördern muss. Es ist einfach nicht der Fall, dass die Zahl der den Staatsbürgern offenstehenden wertvollen Lebensformen unter eine Schwelle fällt, die den Wert der Autonomie erst möglich macht, sobald der Staat das Gute nicht fördert. / I argue, in this dissertation, first, that, contrary to the views of John Rawls and others, governments are entitled to make policy on the basis of perfectionist judgements, but second, that the claim, in particular as it is argued for in Joseph Raz’s The Morality of Freedom, that governments must make policy on a perfectionist basis, failing which the autonomy of citizens will be damaged, cannot be sustained. I argue the first point on the grounds that perfectionism is the default position, and that standard liberal arguments, which I categorise as either ecumenical or non-neutral, for a principle of state neutrality fail. The ecumenical arguments, which I discover in the writings of Rawls and Bruce Ackerman, fail because their purported neutrality turns out to be damagingly partisan. The non-neutral arguments, which I discover in the writings of, amongst others, Rawls and Charles Larmore, fall short of establishing the necessity of a principle of state neutrality for a number of widely-differing reasons, which include, for example, that a consequentialist appeal to the good of autonomy cannot establish that the good of autonomy trumps all other goods, or any other combination of goods, in all conflicts of goods which might arise, and that Rawls’s appeal to the burdens of judgement, founds in his Political Liberalism, assumes rather than shows that respect for the autonomy of citizens rules out state promotion of the good. I argue the second point on the grounds that although Raz is correct in arguing that autonomy is of no value unless the options between which citizens can choose are worthwhile forms of life, it does not follow that the state must promote the good in any and every possible political dispensation, as it is simply not the case that, in general, unless the state promotes the good, the number of valuable forms of life available to citizens will fall below the threshold which is necessary for their autonomy to be worth having.

A liberdade religiosa é o direito fundamental que tutela a crença, o culto e as demais atividades religiosas, dos indivíduos e das organizações religiosas, e consagra neutralidade estatal. A religião deve ser entendida em termos amplíssimos. Abrange toda atividade ligada ao sobrenatural. A religião não se confunde com ideologia, filosofia, sociologia. O Estado neutro não pode se posicionar a respeito do acerto ou desacerto de uma determinada crença religiosa. No entanto, pode controlar a sinceridade. Há três aspectos: individual (indivíduos), coletivo (organizações religiosas) e institucional (Estado). Em relação aos indivíduos, destacam-se o direito de isonomia (tratamento diferenciado), de crença e de privacidade religiosa. Em relação às organizações religiosas, destacam-se seus aspectos societários, cíveis, trabalhistas e tributários; a liberdade de culto e de proselitismo. Em seu aspecto institucional, a neutralidade impõe que o Estado não tome partido em favor de nenhuma religião; reconhece um valor positivo geral à religião. Temas analisados: direito penal; abuso de direito; transfusão de sangue; tratamento de saúde diferenciado; sacrifícios de animais; curas espirituais; proselitismo, pregação contrária ao homossexualismo e a crenças afro-brasileiras; rádios comunitárias; desconto e pagamento de dízimos e ofertas; direito urbanístico e de vizinhança; uso de símbolos religiosos por particulares e pelo Estado; ensino e casamento religiosos, entre outros. / Religious freedom is a fundamental right that protects beliefs, worship and other religious activities from individuals and religious organizations and ensures state neutrality. Religion ought to be widely comprehended. It comprehends all sorts of activities related to the supernatural. Religion should not be confused with ideology, philosophy and sociology. A neutral state must not take a stand about the strengths or weaknesses of a certain religious belief. Nonetheless, it can control sincerity. Religious freedom has three aspects: an individual one (regarding individuals), a collective one (regarding religious organizations) and an institutional one (regarding the state). In terms of individuals, the right to isonomy (equal treatment), religious belief and privacy is to be pointed out. In terms of religious organizations, social, civil, tributary and labor aspects are to be pointed out as well as freedom of worship and proselytism. As for the institutional aspect of religious freedom, the neutrality principle prevents the state from taking any stand concerning any religion and generally recognizes religion as something positive. Topics discussed: penal law; abuse of rights; blood transfusion; privileged health treatment; animal sacrifice; spiritual healing; proselytism; preaching against homosexuality and African Brazilian beliefs; community radio stations; withholding tithes and offerings; urban and neighborhood law; use of religious symbols by individuals and the state; religious teaching and weddings, etc.