In this thesis, Seneca&rsquo / s notion of self as self-love and the problem of self-deception are analyzed. In examining three types of self-love, &ndash / ignorant, progressing selves,&ndash / three models of self-deception are discussed. Self-deception is related to the problem of self-knowledge. I discuss the nature of self-love as self-esteem and self-preservation and self-shaping all of which are innate qualities and develop into more complex forms of knowing. Passions are concrete examples of the representations of deceived self / central to the overestimation of indifferents, the deceived self displays a pattern of reasoning that creates a paradox between what the self intends to do and what it actually appears or what the self wants to see himself as and what it actually is. In discussing various types of self-deception, it is argued that problem of deception can hardly be overcome practically even by education, although it is naturally possible. While the ignorant deceive themselves beyond their recognition, in the case of the educated selves, the tension between the knowledge of ignorance and the desire to be the person play an important role in self-deception. No one except the sage is free from self-deception. The thesis deals with the issue of self-knowing as a scarce possibility.

Teilw. zugl.: Diss. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [229]-239) and indexes.

Habilitationsschrift. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [309]-334) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1947. / Includes index. Bibliography: p. 267-269.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1947. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 267-269) and index.

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No description available.

Luke's record of Paul in Athens is among the most interesting and widely studied topics in the life of the Apostle Paul. Luke recorded that Paul taught in the Athenian marketplace, where he was asked to present his doctrines before the Areopagus. Many have commented on the controversial aspects of Paul's speech before the council as recounted by Luke. Much of this scholarly commentary has been centered on the speech itself and the historical authenticity of the account. The purpose of this thesis is to reexamine the context and the setting of the speech as recorded by Luke in the biblical text. By reexamining the context of the speech, this thesis will help clarify Paul's purpose in engaging in philosophical dialogue with his audience while omitting the profound Christocentric doctrines as found in the Pauline Epistles. This thesis argues that an understanding of the setting and the audience played a pivotal role in the content of the Areopagus speech. Paul's audience was very different than the one he was writing to in his Epistles; therefore, the speech matches the setting and the audience. This thesis demonstrates the significance of the audience by examining Paul's education before his conversion to Christianity, whether Paul was taken before the Areopagus on trial, what the functions of the Areopagus were over its history, where Paul was taken to explain his doctrine, and what role the audience played in how and what Paul taught on that occasion.

Le but de cette étude est de tirer profit de la contribution de Ludwig Wittgenstein à la question de la fonction éthico-thérapeutique du discours philosophique à la lumière du modèle de la vie philosophique de Pierre Hadot, dont le modèle stoïcien nous sert de cas de figure, et au sein duquel cette fonction occupe une place centrale. L’ensemble de l’étude est composé de quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre vise à faire ressortir et analyser les cinq composantes fondamentales de la conception hellénistique et romaine de la vie philosophique tirée de l’interprétation de Hadot qui serviront par la suite de lignes directrices pour l’exploration de ces thèmes chez Wittgenstein : la subordination du discours philosophique au mode de vie éthique, la conversion philosophique comme transformation individuelle, l’askesis comme méthode de conversion philosophique, l’idéal de sagesse comme visée éthique de la conversion philosophique et le modèle analogique de la thérapeutique philosophique. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous examinons comment Wittgenstein peut nous aider à penser la question de la subordination du discours philosophique au mode de vie éthique. En premier lieu, il apparaît que le discours philosophique peut avoir la fonction éthique d’exprimer un certain vouloir. Plus précisément, les valeurs fondamentales, en relation avec un contre-vouloir (besoins, tendances, désirs, sentiments) à la base de préconceptions cristallisées dans des images captivantes, forment un caractère philosophique particulier et orientent implicitement les différentes conceptions que le philosophe, par l’usage de sa volonté, fait le choix d’exprimer par le biais du discours philosophique. En second lieu, le discours philosophique peut avoir la fonction éthique de générer de bonnes habitudes de vie, c’est-à-dire de produire un effet éthique sur les comportements que nous adoptons et les actions que nous posons de façon répétée. En effet, certains arrangements conceptuels, s’ils sont en accord avec l’éthique telle qu’elle est vécue dans les pratiques effectives de la forme de vie humaine, jettent un éclairage sur notre mode de vie éthique, en fonction de la conception du bonheur que nous valorisons, de façon à ce que nous puissions orienter nos actions habituelles en ce sens. Le troisième chapitre vise à mettre à profit la contribution de Wittgenstein à la question du discours philosophique comme outil de transformation individuelle conçue selon le modèle de la conversion philosophique. En premier lieu, il semble que le discours philosophique peut opérer une conversion de la volonté, synonyme d’une conversion à soi, et qui désigne l’arrachement à l’égard d’un certain vouloir inauthentique, indissociable d’un contre-vouloir au fondement de la pensée exprimée par le langage, pour revenir à un vouloir authentique qui coïncide avec le domaine qui est propre au sujet éthique que nous sommes. En second lieu, la fonction éthique du discours philosophique peut également s’exprimer à travers la visée éthique de la conversion qui peut être conçue comme un idéal asymptotique et philosophique de bonheur au sens de paix ou d’absence de trouble fondé sur une éthique de la finitude, de la liberté et de l’authenticité comportant une dimension transpersonnelle. Le quatrième chapitre aborde la conception wittgensteinienne de la méthode philosophique à partir de la question du discours philosophique comme askesis. En premier lieu, le discours philosophique peut avoir ici une fonction éthique lorsqu’il est utilisé pour opérationnaliser une méthode de conversion consistant en un ensemble de techniques discursives pratiquées de façon répétée en vue d’adopter une attitude éthique. En second lieu, cette fonction peut être thérapeutique dans la mesure où la méthode de conversion peut être conçue à partir du modèle analogique de la thérapeutique philosophique, c’est-à-dire à partir d’une conception implicite ou explicite de la maladie, de la thérapie et de la santé philosophiques telle qu’en témoigne la thérapeutique holistique du langage qu’il semble possible de tirer de la pensée du second Wittgenstein. / The purpose of this study is to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s contribution to the issue of the ethical and therapeutic function of philosophical discourse in the light of the model of philosophical life of Pierre Hadot, exemplified by the Stoic model, and in which this function is central. The whole study consists of four chapters. The first chapter aims to highlight and analyze the five basic components of the Hellenistic and Roman conception of philosophical life drawn from the interpretation of Hadot which will then serve as guidelines for the exploration of these themes in Wittgenstein’s thought : the subordination of philosophical discourse to the ethical way of life, philosophical conversion as personal transformation, askesis as a method of philosophical conversion, the ideal of wisdom as ethical aim of philosophical conversion and the analogic model of philosophical therapy. In the second chapter, we examine how Wittgenstein can help elucidate the issue of subordination of philosophical discourse to the ethical way of life. First, it appears that philosophical discourse can have the ethical function to express a certain will. Specifically, core values, in connection with a counter-will (needs, tendencies, desires, feelings) underlying preconceptions crystallized in captivating images, form a particular philosophical character and implicitly determine the different conceptions that the philosopher, by the use of his will, makes the choice to express through philosophical discourse. Second, philosophical discourse can have an ethical function to generate good habits, that is to say, to produce an ethical impact on the behaviors that we adopt and the actions that we take repeatedly. Indeed, some conceptual arrangements, if they are in agreement with the effective practices of the human form of life, shed light on our ethical way of life, according to the conception of happiness that we value, so that we can orientate our habitual actions consequently. The third chapter aims to build on Wittgenstein's contribution to the question of philosophical discourse as a tool for personal transformation based on the model of philosophical conversion. First, it seems that philosophical discourse can give rise to a conversion of the will, synonymous with a conversion of the self to itself, which refer to the tearing away from a certain inauthentic will, inseparable from a counter-will at the foundation of thought expressed through language, to return to an authentic will that coincides with the domain that is specific to the ethical subject that we are. Second, the ethical function of philosophical discourse can also be expressed through the ethical aim of conversion that can be seen as an asymptotic and philosophical ideal of happiness as peace or absence of disturbance based on an ethics of finitude, freedom and authenticity with a transpersonal dimension. The fourth chapter discusses Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method through the question of philosophical discourse as askesis. First, philosophical discourse here can have an ethical function when used to operationalize a conversion method consisting of a set of discursive techniques used repeatedly in order to adopt an ethical attitude. Second, this function can be therapeutic in that the conversion method can be elaborated through the analogic model of philosophical therapy, that is to say, as an implicit or explicit conception of disease, of therapy and philosophical health as evidenced by the holistic therapy of language it seems possible to draw from the second period of Wittgenstein’s thought. / Réalisé en cotutelle avec L'École des hautes études en sciences sociales de Paris

In the following thesis, I argue that to contextualize Machiavelli’s republican thought in his Italian humanist heritage permits us to understand how Machiavelli reaches back not only to an Italian pre-humanist inheritance of liberty as freedom from servitude, but to a Stoic conception of agency which he inherits and shapes in that concept of liberty. While my analysis of Machiavelli and his humanist heritage is in fundamental agreement with that of Quentin Skinner in The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, it develops however the implications of two theses that Paul O. Kristeller outlines in his works on Italian humanism: the eclectic nature of humanist ideas and their rhetorical focus. From this I draw a slightly different picture of the humanist heritage and its polemics with Augustine, and from these an understanding about Stoic agency and how it is inherited and shaped in Machiavelli’s conception of the citizen and civic duties.