Réalisé en cotutelle avec L'École des hautes études en sciences sociales de Paris / Le but de cette étude est de tirer profit de la contribution de Ludwig Wittgenstein à la question de la fonction éthico-thérapeutique du discours philosophique à la lumière du modèle de la vie philosophique de Pierre Hadot, dont le modèle stoïcien nous sert de cas de figure, et au sein duquel cette fonction occupe une place centrale. L’ensemble de l’étude est composé de quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre vise à faire ressortir et analyser les cinq composantes fondamentales de la conception hellénistique et romaine de la vie philosophique tirée de l’interprétation de Hadot qui serviront par la suite de lignes directrices pour l’exploration de ces thèmes chez Wittgenstein : la subordination du discours philosophique au mode de vie éthique, la conversion philosophique comme transformation individuelle, l’askesis comme méthode de conversion philosophique, l’idéal de sagesse comme visée éthique de la conversion philosophique et le modèle analogique de la thérapeutique philosophique. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous examinons comment Wittgenstein peut nous aider à penser la question de la subordination du discours philosophique au mode de vie éthique. En premier lieu, il apparaît que le discours philosophique peut avoir la fonction éthique d’exprimer un certain vouloir. Plus précisément, les valeurs fondamentales, en relation avec un contre-vouloir (besoins, tendances, désirs, sentiments) à la base de préconceptions cristallisées dans des images captivantes, forment un caractère philosophique particulier et orientent implicitement les différentes conceptions que le philosophe, par l’usage de sa volonté, fait le choix d’exprimer par le biais du discours philosophique. En second lieu, le discours philosophique peut avoir la fonction éthique de générer de bonnes habitudes de vie, c’est-à-dire de produire un effet éthique sur les comportements que nous adoptons et les actions que nous posons de façon répétée. En effet, certains arrangements conceptuels, s’ils sont en accord avec l’éthique telle qu’elle est vécue dans les pratiques effectives de la forme de vie humaine, jettent un éclairage sur notre mode de vie éthique, en fonction de la conception du bonheur que nous valorisons, de façon à ce que nous puissions orienter nos actions habituelles en ce sens. Le troisième chapitre vise à mettre à profit la contribution de Wittgenstein à la question du discours philosophique comme outil de transformation individuelle conçue selon le modèle de la conversion philosophique. En premier lieu, il semble que le discours philosophique peut opérer une conversion de la volonté, synonyme d’une conversion à soi, et qui désigne l’arrachement à l’égard d’un certain vouloir inauthentique, indissociable d’un contre-vouloir au fondement de la pensée exprimée par le langage, pour revenir à un vouloir authentique qui coïncide avec le domaine qui est propre au sujet éthique que nous sommes. En second lieu, la fonction éthique du discours philosophique peut également s’exprimer à travers la visée éthique de la conversion qui peut être conçue comme un idéal asymptotique et philosophique de bonheur au sens de paix ou d’absence de trouble fondé sur une éthique de la finitude, de la liberté et de l’authenticité comportant une dimension transpersonnelle. Le quatrième chapitre aborde la conception wittgensteinienne de la méthode philosophique à partir de la question du discours philosophique comme askesis. En premier lieu, le discours philosophique peut avoir ici une fonction éthique lorsqu’il est utilisé pour opérationnaliser une méthode de conversion consistant en un ensemble de techniques discursives pratiquées de façon répétée en vue d’adopter une attitude éthique. En second lieu, cette fonction peut être thérapeutique dans la mesure où la méthode de conversion peut être conçue à partir du modèle analogique de la thérapeutique philosophique, c’est-à-dire à partir d’une conception implicite ou explicite de la maladie, de la thérapie et de la santé philosophiques telle qu’en témoigne la thérapeutique holistique du langage qu’il semble possible de tirer de la pensée du second Wittgenstein. / The purpose of this study is to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s contribution to the issue of the ethical and therapeutic function of philosophical discourse in the light of the model of philosophical life of Pierre Hadot, exemplified by the Stoic model, and in which this function is central. The whole study consists of four chapters. The first chapter aims to highlight and analyze the five basic components of the Hellenistic and Roman conception of philosophical life drawn from the interpretation of Hadot which will then serve as guidelines for the exploration of these themes in Wittgenstein’s thought : the subordination of philosophical discourse to the ethical way of life, philosophical conversion as personal transformation, askesis as a method of philosophical conversion, the ideal of wisdom as ethical aim of philosophical conversion and the analogic model of philosophical therapy. In the second chapter, we examine how Wittgenstein can help elucidate the issue of subordination of philosophical discourse to the ethical way of life. First, it appears that philosophical discourse can have the ethical function to express a certain will. Specifically, core values, in connection with a counter-will (needs, tendencies, desires, feelings) underlying preconceptions crystallized in captivating images, form a particular philosophical character and implicitly determine the different conceptions that the philosopher, by the use of his will, makes the choice to express through philosophical discourse. Second, philosophical discourse can have an ethical function to generate good habits, that is to say, to produce an ethical impact on the behaviors that we adopt and the actions that we take repeatedly. Indeed, some conceptual arrangements, if they are in agreement with the effective practices of the human form of life, shed light on our ethical way of life, according to the conception of happiness that we value, so that we can orientate our habitual actions consequently. The third chapter aims to build on Wittgenstein's contribution to the question of philosophical discourse as a tool for personal transformation based on the model of philosophical conversion. First, it seems that philosophical discourse can give rise to a conversion of the will, synonymous with a conversion of the self to itself, which refer to the tearing away from a certain inauthentic will, inseparable from a counter-will at the foundation of thought expressed through language, to return to an authentic will that coincides with the domain that is specific to the ethical subject that we are. Second, the ethical function of philosophical discourse can also be expressed through the ethical aim of conversion that can be seen as an asymptotic and philosophical ideal of happiness as peace or absence of disturbance based on an ethics of finitude, freedom and authenticity with a transpersonal dimension. The fourth chapter discusses Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical method through the question of philosophical discourse as askesis. First, philosophical discourse here can have an ethical function when used to operationalize a conversion method consisting of a set of discursive techniques used repeatedly in order to adopt an ethical attitude. Second, this function can be therapeutic in that the conversion method can be elaborated through the analogic model of philosophical therapy, that is to say, as an implicit or explicit conception of disease, of therapy and philosophical health as evidenced by the holistic therapy of language it seems possible to draw from the second period of Wittgenstein’s thought.

In the following thesis, I argue that to contextualize Machiavelli’s republican thought in his Italian humanist heritage permits us to understand how Machiavelli reaches back not only to an Italian pre-humanist inheritance of liberty as freedom from servitude, but to a Stoic conception of agency which he inherits and shapes in that concept of liberty. While my analysis of Machiavelli and his humanist heritage is in fundamental agreement with that of Quentin Skinner in The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, it develops however the implications of two theses that Paul O. Kristeller outlines in his works on Italian humanism: the eclectic nature of humanist ideas and their rhetorical focus. From this I draw a slightly different picture of the humanist heritage and its polemics with Augustine, and from these an understanding about Stoic agency and how it is inherited and shaped in Machiavelli’s conception of the citizen and civic duties.

Zugl.: Köln, Universiẗat, Habil.-Schr., 2004/05.

Orientador: Isabella Tardin Cardoso / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-22T01:01:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DePietro_MatheusClemente_D.pdf: 3681860 bytes, checksum: 36814b62d25b775f7a20920f7440eee7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: O presente estudo dá continuidade à pesquisa anterior acerca da noção estóica de "harmonia" ou "acordo" na prosa do filósofo romano Lúcio Aneu Sêneca (4 a.C. -65 d.C.). Conforme verificado em estudo de Mestrado, areferida noção-, central à escola estóica -, encontra-se expressa por Sêneca de diversos modos, e, além disso, tem suas diversas particularidades apresentadas e desenvolvidas em diferentes "faces" pelo filósofo. No presente estágio da pesquisa, concentramos nossa investigação na obra De uita beata ("Sobre a vida feliz"), e procuramos analisar a presença e função que diferentes noções de "harmonia" e "acordo" têm no texto. Para isso, apresentamos uma tradução completa da obra, acompanhada de notas explicativas e de estudo acerca da tradição manuscrita do texto. No que concerne à noção em apreço, propomo-nos a conduzir investigação extensiva sobre noções de "harmonia" na escola estóica, bem como dos fundamentos teóricos que as suportam, e apresentamos os resultados em forma de uma sistematização geral desse conceito. Após tais considerações, realizamos análise detalhada de dois trechos do De uita beata,nos quais a presença de referências à "harmonia" estóica se mostra de modo mais evidente. A análise revelou que, ao menos nessas passagens, é observável um discurso densamente filosófico, aparente apenas após atenção a certos elementos estilísticos nela empregados, bem como ao reconhecimento de alusões e referências que Sêneca faz a particularidades da noção estóica de "harmonia". De modo geral, ao longo de toda a pesquisa-,seja durante a tradução, a investigação teórica, ou a análise de passagens da obra -, procuramos atentar ao vínculo entre filosofia e retórica verificável em Sêneca / Abstract: This thesis gives continuity to previous research on the Stoic notions of "harmony" and "agreement" in the prose works of the Roman philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 BCE -65 CE). As observed in my studies at Masters' level, the idea in question is employed by Seneca in different manners and, in addition, it has its peculiarities presented and developed in several facies by the philosopher. In the current research I have focused my investigation on De uita beata ("On the happy life"), and I have conducted an analysis on the presence and function that different notions of "harmony "and "agreement" have in the text. To that purpose I present a complete translation of the work, accompanied by explanatory footnotes and by an inquiry of the manuscript tradition of the text. Regarding the idea under scrutiny, I have attempted careful examination of the notions of "agreement" in the Stoic school, as well as of the theoretical premises they relate to, and I have presented the results thereof in the form of a broad systematization of that concept, especially in its relation to Seneca's De uita beata. After such considerations I have performed a detailed analysis of two passages of De uita beata, in which the presence of references and allusions to some sort of Stoic "harmony" is more evident. The analysis has concluded that, at least in these excerpts, one may observe densely philosophical discourse, something manifest after close attention to certain stylistic elements found in it, as well as the identification of allusions and references that Seneca makes to particularities of that Stoic notion. In general -be it in the translation, in the theoretical investigation, or in the analysis of selected passages -,I have attempted, during the entirety of the research, to highlight and attend to the link between philosophy and rhetoric observable in Seneca / Doutorado / Linguistica / Doutor em Linguística

In the following thesis, I argue that to contextualize Machiavelli’s republican thought in his Italian humanist heritage permits us to understand how Machiavelli reaches back not only to an Italian pre-humanist inheritance of liberty as freedom from servitude, but to a Stoic conception of agency which he inherits and shapes in that concept of liberty. While my analysis of Machiavelli and his humanist heritage is in fundamental agreement with that of Quentin Skinner in The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, it develops however the implications of two theses that Paul O. Kristeller outlines in his works on Italian humanism: the eclectic nature of humanist ideas and their rhetorical focus. From this I draw a slightly different picture of the humanist heritage and its polemics with Augustine, and from these an understanding about Stoic agency and how it is inherited and shaped in Machiavelli’s conception of the citizen and civic duties.

La présente recherche porte sur la théorie des parties du discours dans l’Antiquité grecque et plus particulièrement sur la réflexion entourant les conjonctions. Le premier chapitre se concentre sur la définition de la conjonction trouvée dans la Poétique d’Aristote, de même que sur les autres passages du corpus aristotélicien qui permettent de mieux cerner les contours d’une entité grammaticale encore mal définie. Le second chapitre porte sur la conjonction dans les recherches logico-grammaticales de l’école stoïcienne. La définition stoïcienne de la conjonction, de même que les différentes catégories de conjonctions identifiées par les Stoïciens sont examinées. Le rôle central des conjonctions au sein de la théorie stoïcienne des propositions complexes est souligné et met en lumière l’interrelation étroite entre la logique et la grammaire à ce point du développement de la théorie grammaticale. Le chapitre final porte sur la définition et les catégories de conjonctions trouvées dans la Tekhnè grammatikè, un bref manuel de grammaire attribué au philologue alexandrin Denys le Thrace. L’influence de la théorie stoïcienne des propositions complexes sur cette première tentative de systématisation grammaticale est mise en lumière, de même que l’interférence de préoccupations philologiques. / This research is concerned with the theory of the parts of speech in Greek antiquity and more precisely with the topic of conjunctions. The first chapter examines the definition of the conjunction given in Aristotle’s Poetics, as well as the other texts of the Aristotelian corpus which allow us the get a better grasp on a still ill-defined grammatical entity. The second chapter deals with the conjunction within the logico-grammatical researches of the Stoic school. It examines the Stoic definition of the conjunction, as well as the various categories of conjunctions that were identified by the Stoics. The central role of conjunctions in the Stoic theory of complex assertions is emphasized, thus showing the close interrelation between logic and grammar at this point in the development of grammatical theory. The final chapter is concerned with the definition and the classes of conjunctions given in the Tekhnè grammatikè, a short grammatical treatise ascribed to the Alexandrian philologist Dionysius Thrax. It shows the influence of the Stoic theory of complex assertions on this first attempt at grammatical systematization, as well as the interference of philological concerns.

La présente recherche porte sur la théorie des parties du discours dans l’Antiquité grecque et plus particulièrement sur la réflexion entourant les conjonctions. Le premier chapitre se concentre sur la définition de la conjonction trouvée dans la Poétique d’Aristote, de même que sur les autres passages du corpus aristotélicien qui permettent de mieux cerner les contours d’une entité grammaticale encore mal définie. Le second chapitre porte sur la conjonction dans les recherches logico-grammaticales de l’école stoïcienne. La définition stoïcienne de la conjonction, de même que les différentes catégories de conjonctions identifiées par les Stoïciens sont examinées. Le rôle central des conjonctions au sein de la théorie stoïcienne des propositions complexes est souligné et met en lumière l’interrelation étroite entre la logique et la grammaire à ce point du développement de la théorie grammaticale. Le chapitre final porte sur la définition et les catégories de conjonctions trouvées dans la Tekhnè grammatikè, un bref manuel de grammaire attribué au philologue alexandrin Denys le Thrace. L’influence de la théorie stoïcienne des propositions complexes sur cette première tentative de systématisation grammaticale est mise en lumière, de même que l’interférence de préoccupations philologiques. / This research is concerned with the theory of the parts of speech in Greek antiquity and more precisely with the topic of conjunctions. The first chapter examines the definition of the conjunction given in Aristotle’s Poetics, as well as the other texts of the Aristotelian corpus which allow us the get a better grasp on a still ill-defined grammatical entity. The second chapter deals with the conjunction within the logico-grammatical researches of the Stoic school. It examines the Stoic definition of the conjunction, as well as the various categories of conjunctions that were identified by the Stoics. The central role of conjunctions in the Stoic theory of complex assertions is emphasized, thus showing the close interrelation between logic and grammar at this point in the development of grammatical theory. The final chapter is concerned with the definition and the classes of conjunctions given in the Tekhnè grammatikè, a short grammatical treatise ascribed to the Alexandrian philologist Dionysius Thrax. It shows the influence of the Stoic theory of complex assertions on this first attempt at grammatical systematization, as well as the interference of philological concerns.

Orientador: Paulo Sérgio de Vasconcellos / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-17T22:50:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bregalda_MairaMeyer_D.pdf: 1603873 bytes, checksum: 73b64fdd6282e9c3dffd18a7d6f49282 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Resumo: Este trabalho objetivou verificar que aspectos de conceitos encontrados durante a época republicana de Roma - como, por exemplo, a glória, a liberdade, a fama etc - se mostram na obra de Sêneca (4 a.C. - 65 d.C.). Constatou-se que a maneira segundo a qual o filósofo constrói essas noções difere da de Cícero (106 - 43 a.C.). Pode-se dizer, seguramente, que Sêneca "interioriza" conceitos que estavam, antes do Império, restritos a um contexto social e político. Para o Estoicismo, o importante é a vida moral dos seres humanos, e é nesse campo de ação que os escritos de Sêneca se desenvolvem. A investigação pretendeu demonstrar o modo como Sêneca trata os conceitos romanos, apresentando, de maneira original, as noções equivalentes gregas. Em sua obra, notadamente nas Epistulae morales ad Lucilium e em alguns Dialoghi - como o De breuitate uitae e o De tranquillitate animi - o filósofo emprega instrumentos linguísticos lexicais e morfossintáticos (esses últimos, de modo mais numeroso) referentes à interioridade. Em Sêneca, não somente os recursos linguísticos como também os imagéticos constituem parte do processo de interiorização. Nosso intuito, neste presente estudo, buscou expor tais recursos na medida em que surgiam juntamente com os conceitos por nós trabalhados / Abstract: This dissertation aimed at ascertaining which aspects found during the republican time period in Rome - for instance glory, freedom, fame, among others - are evident within Sêneca's work (4 BC - 65 AD). It was observed that the way this philosopher goes about building these notions is different from that of Cícero (106 - 43 a.C). One may firmly state that Sêneca "interiorizes" concepts that had been, prior to the Empire, restricted to social and political contexts. To Stoicism, the most important thing is the moral life of human beings, and it is within this field of action that Sêneca's writings are developed. This investigation intends to show the way Sêneca deals with these Roman concepts by showing, in an original way, the equivalent Greek notions. In his work, notably in Epistulae morales ad Lucilium and in some Dialoghi - such as De breuitate uitae and De tranquillitate animi - the philosopher makes use of linguistic instruments such as lexical and morphosyntactic ones (the latter being used more frequently) to refer to interiority. Within Sêneca's work, the process of interiorization involves not only linguistic but also imagery resources. Our goal, in the present study, sought to expose these resources as they emerged along with the concepts we work with / Doutorado / Linguistica / Doutor em Linguística

Over the course of four sections this PhD examines the ways in which the Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean philosophers portray bodily activity. In particular, it argues that their claims regarding bodies' natural tendency to preserve themselves, and seek out the goods capable of promoting their well-being, came to influence Hobbes's and Spinoza's later accounts of natural, animal and social behaviour. The first section presents the ancient accounts of natural and animal bodily tendencies and explores the specific ways in which the Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean views on animal desires came to complement and diverge from each other. After investigating the perceived links between natural philosophy, psychology and ethics, the section proceeds to consider how the ancients used this 'unified' view of nature to guide their accounts of the soul's primary appetites and desires. Also examined is the extent to which civil society is portrayed as a means of securing the individual against others, and how Aristotelian philia, Theophrastian oikeiotês and Stoic oikeiōsis came to stand in opposition to the fear-driven and compact-based accounts of social formation favoured by the Epicureans. The second section considers how the ancient accounts of impulsive behaviour and social formation were received and diffused via new editions of ancient texts, eclectic readings of Aristotle, and the attempts of Neostoic and Neoepicurean authors to update and systematise those philosophies from the late sixteenth century onwards. The particular treatments of Hellenistic thought by authors such as Justus Lipsius, Hugo Grotius and Pierre Gassendi are considered in detail and are placed within the context of the growing trend to use Stoic and Epicurean thought to replace the authority of Aristotle in the areas of science, psychology, and politics. The final two sections are devoted respectively to considering the ways in which Hobbes and Spinoza encountered the Hellenistic accounts of bodies and demonstrating how these earlier accounts came to feature in each of their own discussions of bodily tendencies. Engaging with a wide range of their texts, each section develops the many nuances and contours that emerged as both writers developed and fine-tuned their accounts of bodily actions. This reveals the many ways in which the ancient accounts of self-preservation helped to unify large aspects of Hobbes's and Spinoza's own philosophical corpus, while equally showing how a well-developed account of bodily tendencies might challenge the scholastic worldview and expand further the boundaries of the so-called 'New Science'.

Cette nouvelle édition critique du De fuga saeculi d’Ambroise de Milan repose sur la collation de nouveaux témoins manuscrits et sur la révision de ceux utilisés par C. Schenkl, dont les valeurs respectives sont évaluées à l’aide d’un stemma absent de son édition de 1897. Le texte ainsi édité est assorti d’une traduction originale en langue française. Le De fuga saeculi, œuvre spirituelle et morale publiée par Ambroise avec trois autres textes au sujet proche, est replacé dans le contexte milanais de la fin du IVe siècle : mutations des modes de vie chrétiens, intérêt pour la vie monastique, concurrence avec les partisans du néoplatonisme et devoir pastoral de guider et former la communauté d’une capitale impériale. L’enquête sur les sources révèle que le De fuga saeculi est à la fois l’héritier des traditions philosophiques platoniciennes et stoïciennes relues au prisme de la pensée de Philon d’Alexandrie, et le promoteur d’une fuite du monde spécifiquement chrétienne inspirée d’épisodes et de préceptes de l’Ancien et du Nouveau Testament. Le commentaire éclaire les enchaînements d’une pensée kaléidoscopique, mettant en évidence les thèmes principaux, leurs reprises et leurs variations. Est ainsi soulignée l’originalité ambrosienne de la fuga saeculi sur un sujet d’actualité à la fin du IVe siècle et au début du Ve siècle : une fuite intra-mondaine qui est différente de celle encouragée par ses contemporains, Jérôme, Paulin de Nole et Augustin. / This new critical edition of De fuga saeculi by Ambrose of Milan is based on the collation of new witness manuscripts and the revision of those used by C. Schenkl (their respective worth was examined thanks to a missing stemma in the 1897 edition). The edition is accompanied by an original French translation. A spiritual and moral work published by Ambrose along with three other texts on a similar topic, De fuga saeculi is placed in its Milanese context of the end of the 4th century : transformations in Christian ways of living, an interest in monastic life, competition with advocates of Neo-Platonism and a pastoral duty to guide and train the community of an imperial capital. An enquiry into the sources reveals that De fuga saeculi both inherits the Neo-Platonician and Stoic philosophical traditions – reinterpreted through the thought of Philo of Alexandria –, and advocates a specifically Christian escape out of the world, inspired by events and precepts from the Old and New Testaments. The commentary displays the sequences of a kaleidoscopic thought and highlights its majors themes, re-uses and variations. Inner-wordly escape is a topical issue of the late 4th and early 5th centuries, but Ambrose’s conception expressed in De fuga saeculy is original given that it differs from those of contemporary writers such as Jerome, Paulinus of Nola and Augustine.