Ce travail étudie, théoriquement et empiriquement, l'interaction entre le commerce international et l'investissement direct étranger (IDE), interaction qui a été un des principaux canaux de la mondialisation économique et de l'essor des chaînes de valeur mondiales dans la segmentation des activités de production. Les modèles théoriques montrent que le commerce international et les IDE peuvent se développer dans une relation de substituabilité ou de complémentarité. La nature de cette relation peut être la conséquence de facteurs exogènes, déterminants de la spécialisation des pays, ou le résultat de la stratégie endogène des firmes dans l'organisation de leurs activités à l'international. La validation empirique s'appuie sur une adaptation du modèle de gravité, en appliquant les techniques économétrique sur données de panel sur des données bilatérales pour la France au cours de la période de 1993 à 2012. Les estimations mettent en évidence une relation de complémentarité entre le commerce et l'IDE au niveau le plus agrégé. Cependant, une analyse comparative à un niveau plus désagrégé permet de trouver des indices de substituabilité et de complémentarité selon les groupes de pays partenaires. / This work investigates, theoretically and empirically, the relationship between international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), which has been one of the key channels of economic globalization, and of the development of global value chains in the international segmentation of production. Theoretical models show that international and FDI may be substitutes or complements. The nature of this relationship may be the consequence of exogenous factors, determinants of country specialization, or the result of the endogenous strategy of firms in the organization of their international activities. The empirical validation relies on an adaptation of the gravity model, using panel econometrics with bilateral data for France during the 1993-2012 period. Estimates show a complementarity relationship between trade and FDI at the most aggregated level. However, a comparative analysis at a more disaggregated level reveals some signs of substitutability or complementarity according to the group of partner countries.

This dissertation is devoted to the analysis of various aspects of inefficiency in the political economy. It consists of four self-containing theoretical essays. The first two chapters deal with the interplay between inefficiency and commitment. Chapter 1 studies the problem of commitment in autocratic regimes and its implications for growth. Chapter 2 argues that the absence of commitment undermines the validity of the Coase theorem. The next two chapters address alternative sources of inefficiency, abstracting from commitment-related problems. Chapter 3 discusses inefficiencies arising in organizations whose members possess veto power and suggests a way of mitigating the problem. Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of demand linkages on the efficiency of lobbying for trade policy. Chapter 1. “Autocracy, Devolution and Growth” Some autocracies have sustained high economic growth for many decades; others have stagnated at low levels of production. Paradoxically, the stagnating autocracies appear to possess more natural resources and be more resistant to political change than the growing autocracies. The paper argues that the scope for capital accumulation and growth in an autocracy is largely determined by the autocrat's incentive to cling to power. The main result of the paper is that there will be private capital accumulation only if the autocrat’s benefits from political control are not too high. The reason is that, as capital accumulates and growth slows down, the autocrat faces an increasing temptation to expropriate the capitalists. Since expropriation eliminates growth, the autocrat may voluntarily refrain from expropriating if future growth is sufficiently large; otherwise, the temptation to expropriate can only be resisted through a credible commitment, that is, by devolving some political power. For autocrats with large benefits of control, for example valuable natural resource rents, devolution of power may always be unattractive. As a result, capitalists realize that they will eventually be expropriated, and capital accumulation therefore never starts. On the other hand, autocrats with small resource rents will eventually devolve power, since this commitment is necessary to sustain growth. Therefore, capitalists are willing to start accumulating despite the autocratic regime. In other words, autocracies are vulnerable to the resource curse.   Chapter 2. “The Coase Theorem Is False” (with Tore Ellingsen) The paper provides simple and robust counterexamples to the Coase Theorem. More precisely, we show that equilibrium investments in club goods can be suboptimally small despite the presence of well-defined and perfectly protected property rights and the absence of transaction costs and informational asymmetries. The reason is that, in equilibrium, a club of owners will typically not exercise their right to exclude outsiders, preferring instead to exercise their right to sell access. As long as the club of owners does not have all the bargaining power in such ex post access negotiations, strategic non-membership provides a valuable free-riding opportunity. Chapter 3. “Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity” (with Erik Berglöf, Mike Burkart and Guido Friebel) In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with heterogeneous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under unanimity, the least efficient member imposes her preferred effort choice on the entire organization. In the presence of externalities and an incomplete charter, the threat of forming an “inner organization” can undermine the veto power of the less efficient members and coerce them to exert more effort. We identify the conditions under which the threat of forming an inner organization is never executed, and under which inner organizations are equilibrium outcomes, and provide a rationale for the diversity of decision rules. Chapter 4. “Protection for Sale to Oligopolists” This paper modifies Grossman and Helpman’s "Protection for Sale" model by allowing demand linkages and oligopolistic competition. It shows that increased substitutability between products weakens interest groups’ incentives to lobby. For the case of two industries it obtains a particularly simple result: the protection of the organized industry’s product falls, whereas the protection of the unorganized industry’s product increases with product substitutability. The model suggests that empirical studies of the "Protection for Sale" may overstate the lobby groups’ desire for protection. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006

Lo scopo della nostra ricerca è di proporre un modello dell'intervento pubblico che differisce dall'approccio standard e di valutare le sue implicazioni in termini di benessere. Noi sosteniamo che in molte circostanze la regolamentazione risulta essere un processo di "give-and-take" pittosto che di "take-it-or-leave-it". Più precisamente, la nostra idea è che la politica regolamentatoria possa essere più generalmente modellizzata come il risultato di un processo di contrattazione, che normalmente implica la partecipazione attiva di ciascun agente coinvolto nell'interazione regolamentatoria. Nel Capitolo 1, seguendo l'intuizione di Spulberg, la regolamentazione è modellizzata come un processo di negoziazione tra i gruppi di interesse dei consumatori e delle imprese, con l'agenzia nel ruolo di mediatore. La nostra analisi mostra che l'impresa regolamentata sfrutta il suo potere contrattuale per ottenere un sussidio, il quale è più elevato che con un'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it" di un meccanismo che massimizza il benessere sociale. L'eccessiva sussidiazione dell'impresa penalizza i consumatori ed implica una perdita di benessere sociale. Noi troviamo altresì che, con informazione asimmetrica sui costi, l'intervallo di tipi dell'impresa che partecipano in equilibrio all'interazione regolamentatoria può essere più grande con la politica negoziata che con la politica "take-it-or-leave-it". Vorremmo sottolineare che il Capitolo 1 è introduttivo e costituisce un passo preliminare per la nostra ricerca. Aldilà dei risultati analitici, il suo contributo è duplice. Innanzitutto, esso descrive le strutture basilari di una politica regolamentatoria negoziata e le sua implicazioni in termini di benessere. In secondo luogo, esso mostra che l'approccio basato sulla contrattazione rappresenta effettivamente un'estensione piuttosto che una negazione dell'approccio standard. In particolare, la contrattazione su una politica regolamentatoria può essere interpretata come un modello generale che include l'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it" come caso limite, che si verifica quando l'impresa è privata di qualsiasi potere di contrattazione durante le negoziazioni. La discussione nel Capitolo 2 sviluppa la struttura precedente e considera un'agenzia che è delegata dal Congresso a rappresentare gli interessi dei consumatori nel precesso di contrattazione con l'impresa sulla politica regolamentatoria. L'esistenza di un'attività di negoaziazione tra l'agenzia e l'impresa è stata largamente ignorata dalla letteratura economica, con la principale eccezione rappresentata dai contributi di Scarpa. Comunque, Armstrong e Sappington, nella loro rassegna sui recenti sviluppi nella teoria della regolamentazione, hanno riconosciuto che la formulazione standard, la quale alloca tutto il potere di contrattazione al regolamentatore, è adottata per convenienza tecnica piuttosto che per realismo. Mentre l'agenzia è stata precedentemente raffigurata come un arbitro imparziale, nel Capitolo 2 supponiamo che essa rappresenti una parte contrattuale, la cui natura può essere benevolente od egoista. In questo contesto, noi studiamo la possibilità di collusione tra l'agenzia regolamentatoria e l'impresa regolamentata, un fenomeno che spesso si verifica in una relazione regolamentatoria. La contrattazione "a latere" tra i due partner colludenti è modellizzata come un processo di negoziazione (eventualmente illegale)parallelo alla negoziazione sulla politica regolamentatoria. La nostra analisi mostra che i consumatori sono penalizzati dalla corruzione, in quanto essi interamente sussidiano il guadagno totale dalla collusione. Inoltre, il nostro modello suggerisce che un'agenzia più forte nel processo di contrattazione rende più desiderabile per il Congresso (cioè per i consumatori)consentire la collusione in equilibrio. Nei primi due capitoli, noi abbiamo considerato l'esistenza di solamente un mercato monopolistico. Il Capitolo 3, che ha beneficiato del contributo fondamentale di Carlo Scarpa, estende l'impianto precedente ed esamina la regolamentazione di due mercati interdipendenti quando i beni sono sostituti. Questo è il caso, per esempio, nelle industrie del gas naturale e dell'elettricità o delle ferrovie e autostrade. Noi ci focalizziamo sul progetto della struttura regolamentatoria. In particolare, noi intendiamo determinare se è meglio per il benessere dei consumatori avere un'autorità unica per entrambi i mercati o suddividere la giurisdizione regolamentatoria tra due differenti agenzie. Quando la politica regolamentatoria è il risultato di un'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it", la nostra analisi mostra che due agenzie - ciascuna massimizzante il surplus totale nel suo proprio mercato - impongono prezzi che sono più bassi di quelli derivanti da centralizzazione regolamentatoria. Al contrario, quando la politica regolamentatoria è il risultato di un processo di contrattazione, noi troviamo che un regolamentatore unico, che sequenzialmente contratta con entrambe le imprese, dà ai consumatori un livello di benesere più elevato, purchè il costo ombra dei fondi pubblici, attraverso i quali la produzione è sussidiata, sia sotto una certa soglia. Dunque, in presenza di negoziazioni, il nostro modello suggerisce che la centralizzazione dovrebbe essere la migliore struttura regolamentatoria per i consumatori nei paesi sviluppati, ove la raccolta fiscale non è troppo distorsiva. Se il costo ombra è sopra questa soglia, come spesso accade nei paesi in via di sviluppo, decentralizzare la struttura regolamentatoria risulta in un miglioramento del benessere sociale. / The aim of our research is to propose a pattern of government intervention which differs from the standard approach and to assess its welfare implications. We argue that in many circumstances regulation turns out to be a process of give-and-take rather than take-it-or-leave-it. More precisely, our idea is that the regulatory policy can be more generally modelled as the outcome of a bargaining process, which normally entails the active participation of each agent involved in the regulatory interaction. In Chapter 1, following Spulber’s intuition, regulation is modelled as a negotiation process between the consumers’ and firm’s interest groups, with the agency in the role of mediator. Our analysis shows that the regulated firm exploits its bargaining power to obtain a subsidy which is higher than under a take-it- or-leave-it offer of a total surplus maximizing mechanism. The oversubsidization of the firm penalizes consumers and entails a total surplus loss. We find also that, under asymmetric cost information, the range of the firm’s types participating in equilibrium in the regulatory interaction may be wider under the negotiated policy than under the take-it-or- leave-it policy. We would like to stress that Chapter 1 is introductory and constitutes a preliminary step for our research. On top of the specific analytical results, its contribution is twofold. First, it describes the basic features of a negotiated regulatory policy and its welfare implications. Second, it shows that the bargaining approach to regulation actually represents an extention rather than a negation of the standard approach. In particular, the bargaining over a regulatory policy may be interpreted as a general set-up which includes the take-it-or-leave- it offer as a limit case, that occurs when the firm is deprived of any bargaining power during negotiations. The discussion in Chapter 2 develops the previous framework and considers an agency which is delegated by Congress to represent consumers’ interests in the bargaining process with the firm over a regulatory policy. The existence of a negotiation activity between the agency and the firm has been by and large ignored by the economic literature, with the main exception represented by Scarpa’s contributions. However, Armstrong and Sappington, in their review on the recent developments in the theory of regulation, have recognized that the standard formulation, which allocates all the bargaining power to the regulator, has been adopted for technical convenience rather than for realism. While it has been previously depicted as an impartial arbitrator, the agency is assumed in Chapter 2 to represent a bargaining party, whose nature may be either benevolent or self-interested. In this setting, we study the potential for collusion between the regulatory agency and the regulated firm, a phenomenon which often occurs in a regulatory relationship. The side contracting between the two colluding partners is modelled as a (possibly illegal) negotiation process parallel to the bargaining over the regulatory policy. Our analysis shows that consumers are penalized by corruption, since they entirely subsidize the total stake in collusion. Furthermore, our model suggests that a stronger agency in the bargaining process makes it more desirable for Congress (i.e. for consumers) to allow collusion in equilibrium. In the first two chapters, we have considered the existence of just one monopolistic market. Chapter 3, which has benefited from the fundamental contribution of Carlo Scarpa, extends the previous setting and examines the regulation of two interdependent markets, whose goods are substitutes. This is the case, for instance, in the industries of natural gas and electricity or railroads and motorways. We focus on the design of the regulatory structure. In particular, we intend to determine whether it is better for consumers’ welfare to have a unique authority for both markets or to split the regulatory jurisdiction between two different agencies. When the regulatory policy is the outcome of a take-it-or-leave-it offer, our analysis shows that two agencies - each maximizing total surplus in its own market - set prices which are lower than those arising under regulatory centralization. On the contrary, when the regulatory policy is the outcome of a bargaining process, we find that a unique regulator, which sequentially bargains with both firms, gives consumers a higher welfare level, as long as the shadow cost of public funds, through which production is subsidized, is below a certain threshold. Hence, under negotiations our model suggests that centralization should be the best regulatory pattern for consumers in developed countries, where tax collection is not too distortionary. If the shadow cost is above that threshold, as it often happens in developing countries, decentralizing bargaining turns out to be consumers’ welfare improving.

Dissertation thesis summary: Influence of nannies on the overall development of the ward This dissertation thesis deals with the topic of child minding by an alternative caregiver, the so-called nanny. Its target is to broadly examine and describe the issue, with emphasis on defined aspects. The presented theoretical-research work covers existing institutions and services for child care in both Czech Republic and abroad. It primarily strives, however, to capture the essence of motherhood from psychological, philosophical and genetic points of view. This effort takes into consideration the question of separation, and consequently traumatization in childhood. A significant part of the paper concentrates on the area of education of the child care providing persons. The research chapters focus on the influence of the nanny not only on the child, but also on the family atmosphere and the educational stances of the parents. It further deals with the position of the nanny within the family, and with bounds of the child-nanny relationship. The output of the work is then a practical handbook, a manual with specifically defined content of an educational program (for nanny-position aspirants and for already practicing professionals). The material was drawn up with help of experts, with the aim to point out weak spots...

Cette thèse vise analyser les déterminants (objectifs et subjectifs) à l’origine de l'hétérogénéité des évaluations de projets. Dans un premier temps, j'analyserai comment les quantités (objectives) sont incorporées dans l'analyse coût-bénéfice. Le premier chapitre principal traite de la manière dont l'analyse coût-bénéfice est affectée par la distribution temporelle des impacts considérée. À travers l'exemple du changement d'affectation des terres provenant de la production de biocarburants, il ressort que les décisions concernant les projets ayant des impacts environnementaux non constants dans le temps s'appuient sur des valeurs actuelles nettes biaisées, ce qui peut entraîner la mise en œuvre de projets en réalité non souhaitables ou la non-implémentation de projets réellement souhaitables. Ce travail est à la fois théorique et numérique.Ensuite, j'étudie le rôle de la structure des préférences sur la prise de décision individuelle dans un cadre individuel puis un cadre collectif. Au niveau individuel, nous développons un modèle théorique qui permet soit de la substituabilité, soit de la complémentarité entre les biens en fonction du contexte (revenu et qualité de l'environnement). Il en résulte que l'élasticité-revenu du consentement à payer marginal peut être négative dans un contexte de substituabilité inter-biens, ce qui contraste avec les modèles habituels qui ne permettent que des élasticités positives du revenu (le bien environnemental ne peut jamais être inférieur mais est toujours normal). Notre cadre théorique affecte également la façon dont la consommation et la qualité de l'environnement sont actualisées, ce qui est d'autant plus pertinent dans un contexte de chocs sur les revenus. Au niveau collectif, j’utilise une approche expérimentale pour analyser l'effet de l'interaction entre les individus ayant des structures de préférences différentes sur les contributions au bien public. Il en résulte que la substituabilité parfaite est associée à un plus grand nombre de passagers clandestins que la complémentarité. Cependant, une aversion à l'inégalité avantageuse émerge également des individus dont les préférences sont à l'origine d'une parfaite substituabilité vis-à-vis de ceux dont les préférences sont fondées sur la complémentarité. / This thesis aims at providing insights on the (objective and subjective) determinants of the heterogeneity of project evaluations. At first, I analyze how (objective) quantities are incorporated in the cost-benefit analysis. The first main chapter deals with the way cost-benefit analysis is affected by the time distribution of impacts considered. Through the example of land use change from biofuel production, I find that decisions regarding projects with non-constant environmental impacts rely on distorted net present values, which may result in the implementation of actually non-desirable projects or the non-implementation of actually desirable projects. This work is both theoretical and numerical.Second, I investigate the role of the structure of preferences, i.e. whether private goods and environmental goods are substitutable or complementary in providing utility, on individual decision-making in an individual framework and a collective framework. At the individual level (second main chapter), we develop a theoretical model which allows either for substitutability or complementarity depending on the context (income and environmental quality). It results that the income elasticity of willingness to pay can be negative in contexts of between-goods substitutability, which contrasts with usual frameworks which only allow for positive income elasticities (thus the environmental good can never be inferior but is always normal). Our framework also affects the way consumption and environmental quality are discounted, which is all the more relevant in the context of income shocks. At the collective level (third main chapter), we use an experimental approach to analyze the effect of the interaction between individuals with different structures of preferences on contributions to the public good. It results that perfect substitutability is associated with more free-riding than complementarity. However, an aversion to advantageous inequality also emerges from individuals whose preferences underlie perfect substitutability towards those whose preferences are based on complementarity.

Cette thèse propose une nouvelle approche de découverte de signatures de familles (et superfamilles) d'enzymes. Dans un premier temps, étant donné un échantillon aligné de séquences appartenant à une même famille, cette approche infère des grammaires algébriques caractérisant cette famille. Pour ce faire, de nouveaux principes de généralisation et de nouvelles classes de langages ont été introduites sur la base de la substituabilité locale. Un algorithme a également été développé à cet effet qui produit une grammaire réduite, conservant la structuration des exemples, d'un langage substituable. Dans un second temps, ce manuscrit présente une méthode de classification des séquences d'une superfamille en familles à l'aide d'une analyse de concepts formels basée sur l'alignement des séquences qui permet la détection de nouvelles familles et la découverte des motifs fonctionnels pour améliorer les signatures précédentes. / This thesis proposes a new approach to discover signatures of families (and superfamilies) enzymes. At first, given a sample of aligned sequences belonging to the same family, this approach infers context-free grammars characteristic of this family. To do this, new principles of generalization and new classes have been introduced based on substitutability. An algorithm has also been developed for this purpose, which produces a reduced grammar able to retain the structure of examples. In a second step, this manuscript presents a method for classification of a superfamily sequences into families with a formal concept analysis based on alignement sequences allowing detection of new families and the discovery of patterns to improve functional previous signatures.

Submitted by Tiago Carvalho Machado de Souza (tiagocmsouza@gmail.com) on 2017-09-11T00:06:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tiago Souza - Dissertation.pdf: 996229 bytes, checksum: d66c6f04bc786ddb3ffcd12843e49226 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2017-09-12T13:25:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tiago Souza - Dissertation.pdf: 996229 bytes, checksum: d66c6f04bc786ddb3ffcd12843e49226 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-26T12:10:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tiago Souza - Dissertation.pdf: 996229 bytes, checksum: d66c6f04bc786ddb3ffcd12843e49226 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-16 / This dissertation is composed of two articles in applied economics. The first intends to develop a better understanding of how economies’ income distribution relates to pricing decisions of firms with market power. The goal is to identify variables that induce companies’ price changes looking to the demand side — instead of the more usual supply side explanations. It is an intuitive framework that allows bringing together otherwise con-flicting results of the empirical literature. The economy’s per-capita income, income share of buyers and companies’ market size (share of population that purchases their goods) are factors that determine their pricing behavior and help explaining patterns observed in reality. The second article is about countries’ decision to not repay their public debt. The focus, however, is on the relative scarcity of productive inputs that results from defaulting, and how easy it is to substitute among them. It is a different way of looking at the economic costs generated when governments miss to pay their debts. The environment built provides interesting results, as for example interest rate spreads that emerge by just changing inputs’ elasticity of substitution, without relying on differences in agents’ risk aversion. / Esta tese é composta por dois artigos em economia aplicada. O primeiro busca entender a maneira como a distribuição de renda de uma economia impacta a decisão de preços de firmas com poder de mercado. O objetivo é identificar, no lado da demanda, elementos que induzam mudanças na escolha de preços de empresas --- ao invés de explicações advindas do lado da oferta, mais usuais na literatura. É um arcabouço intuitivo e que permite conciliar resultados inicialmente conflitantes na literatura empírica que trata do mesmo assunto. A renda per-capita da economia, concetranção de renda dos compradores de um bem e o tamanho do mercado das empresas (fração da população que compra um bem) são fatores determinantes do preço e ajudam a explicar padrões observados no mundo real. O segundo artigo trata da decisão de default de países na gestão da sua dívida píblica. O foco, contudo, é na escassez de recursos produtivos em consequência do default e a facilidade com que se pode substituir esses insumos por outros. É uma proposta diferente de olhar para os custos economicos induzidos pelo não pagamento da dívida pública. O ambiente desenvolvido gera resultados interessantes, como spreads de juros apenas alterando a elasticidade de substituição dos insumos, sem recorrer a mudanças na aversão a risco dos agentes.