Submitted by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2014-10-08T16:08:34Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Eder David de Freitas Melo - 2013.pdf: 1422055 bytes, checksum: c5593c89e18f97456f2168ed939dd133 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2014-10-09T15:39:38Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Eder David de Freitas Melo - 2013.pdf: 1422055 bytes, checksum: c5593c89e18f97456f2168ed939dd133 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-09T15:39:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Eder David de Freitas Melo - 2013.pdf: 1422055 bytes, checksum: c5593c89e18f97456f2168ed939dd133 (MD5) license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-09-03 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / In this research, the object of study is the concept of life on Friedrich Nietzsche‘s philosophy. Our interpretative hypothesis is that the Nietzsche‘s work can be understood as a philosophy about life, being that a subtle and valuable neuralgic axis of it shows itself in questionings about the meaning of suffering and finitude. In the first part of the research, we restricted the study of Nietzsche‘s interpretation of the greek tragedy in the writing of his youth. Besides that, we approached the view of the tragic wisdom as a wisdom about life, and the construction and characterization of the tragic by Nietzsche as a privileged way of relating of life, with art as a paradigm. In the second and last part of the research, we get back to the philosophy of maturity in its concepts of wil to Power, eternal recurrence and amor fati (love of fate). These are analyzed as a conceptual construction about life that remain either sensitive to the issue of suffering and death or can be interpreted as a way to philosophize about the tragic character of life. / Nesta pesquisa, o objeto de estudo é o conceito de vida na filosofia de Friedrich Nietzsche. Temos como hipótese interpretativa que a obra nietzscheana pode ser concebida como uma filosofia sobre a vida, sendo que um sutil e valioso eixo nevrálgico disso se mostra em questionamentos sobre o sentido do sofrimento e da finitude. Na primeira parte da pesquisa, delimitamos o estudo na interpretação nietzscheana da tragédia grega em seus escritos de juventude. Isso, com vistas à compreensão da sabedoria trágica como sabedoria de vida, e da construção e caracterização do trágico por Nietzsche como uma forma privilegiada de se referir à vida, tendo a arte como paradigma. Na segunda e última fase da pesquisa, nos voltamos para a filosofia de maturidade em seus conceitos de vontade de poder, eterno retorno e amor fati. Estes são analisados como uma construção conceitual sobre a vida que tanto continuam sensíveis à questão do sofrimento e da morte quanto podem ser interpretados como um filosofar a respeito do caráter trágico da vida.

Lee Shui Man Murine. / Thesis (M.Div.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 95-97). / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.vi / ABBREVIATIONS --- p.vii / INTRODUCTION --- p.viii / Chapter I. --- What does suffering mean? --- p.viii / Chapter II. --- Saint Therese of Lisieux: Her Spirituality and Suffering --- p.ix / Chapter III. --- Thesis Statement --- p.xii / Chapter IV. --- Methodology --- p.xii / Chapter V. --- Contents --- p.xiv / Chapter CHAPTER 1 : --- Core Essence of Therese's Spirituality: The Little Way of Spiritual Childhood --- p.1 / Chapter I. --- Spiritual Formation --- p.2 / Chapter II. --- Essence of the Little Way of Spiritual Childhood --- p.7 / Chapter III. --- Practice of the Little Way --- p.18 / Chapter IV. --- Assessment of the Little Way --- p.22 / Chapter V. --- The Little Way: A Life Journey to Seek and Experience the Loving Presence of God --- p.26 / Chapter CHAPTER 2 : --- Experience of Suffering --- p.29 / Chapter I. --- Major Experiences of Suffering --- p.30 / Chapter 1. --- Before Entering Carmel (1873 - 1888) --- p.30 / Chapter 2. --- After Entering Carmel (1888 - 1897) --- p.35 / Chapter II. --- Essential Elements of Therese's Response to Suffering --- p.44 / Chapter III. --- Suffering in Her Little Way --- p.48 / Chapter CHAPTER 3 : --- Theological Meaning of Suffering and Its Relationship to the Little Way --- p.49 / Chapter I. --- Theological Meaning of Suffering --- p.50 / Chapter II. --- Relationship between Suffering and the Little Way --- p.63 / Chapter III. --- Suffering : A Loving Presence of God --- p.66 / Chapter CHAPTER 4 : --- Key Contributions and Limitations --- p.69 / Chapter I. --- Key Contributions --- p.70 / Chapter II. --- Limitations and Challenges --- p.81 / Chapter III. --- Suffering : Further Areas to Address --- p.86 / CONCLUSIONS --- p.88 / Chapter I. --- Theological Meaning and Practice of Suffering: An Interpretation --- p.88 / Chapter II. --- Limitations of This Study --- p.92 / Chapter III. --- Suffering : A Mystery to be Explored and Lived Out --- p.93 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.95

Schopenhauer utiliza a ideia de redenção no sentido religioso para tratar a supressão do caráter que define a negação da vontade. Ele afirma que essa supressão é justamente aquilo que, na Igreja cristã, é muito apropriadamente denominada renascimento e o conhecer, do qual provém, efeito da graça. Tal comparação parece surpreendente quando consideramos que Schopenhauer se declara um filósofo ateu e que, para ele, a fé e o saber são coisas fundamentalmente diferentes e que devem ser mantidas separadas. Mas há na ideia de graça uma característica que pode justificar o recurso que Schopenhauer faz a ela: a ausência de uma causa que possa explicar a sua manifestação. Assim, tanto no sentido religioso quanto no modo como Schopenhauer concebe a negação da vontade, a redenção como efeito da graça pode ser entendida como uma benção concedida gratuitamente, pois não é possível conquistá-la voluntariamente através do esforço pessoal. Entretanto, se não há uma causa que determine a negação, há dois caminhos que podem direcionar a vontade até o ponto em que a negação pode ocorrer espontaneamente. O que há em comum entre esses dois caminhos é a presença do sofrimento como pré-requisito para que eles possam ser atravessados. O sofrimento é essencial para que se possa compreender a negação porque ele é o elemento que permite combater a tese segundo a qual haveria uma relação entre a virtude e a felicidade, de forma que o inocente seria poupado da dor e, portanto, ele poderia ser feliz. Por ser contrário a essa tese, Schopenhauer considera que, quanto mais o homem padece, mais ele se aproxima da verdadeira finalidade da vida, que consiste em compreender que viver é necessariamente sofrer. Para a explicação da analogia entre os conceitos da filosofia de Schopenhauer e os dogmas cristãos, o texto foi dividido em dois capítulos. No primeiro apresentamos as razões que podem justificar a relação que Schopenhauer estabelece entre a sua filosofia e o cristianismo, através da qual ele compara os dogmas do pecado original e do efeito da graça aos conceitos de afirmação e negação da vontade. Porém, apesar de propor essa comparação e afirmar que sua filosofia é a verdadeira expressão da religião cristã, Schopenhauer defende também uma separação estrita entre religião e filosofia, pois ele recusa uma mistura que possa resultar em uma filosofia religiosa. Para respeitar a separação que Schopenhauer prescreve entre esses dois tipos de saber, o segundo capítulo terá como objetivo compreender a transição da afirmação para a negação da vontade independentemente da relação que estes conceitos possam ter com as alegorias religiosas. / In order to deal with the suppression of character which defines the denial of will Schopenhauer applies the idea of redemption in a religious sense. He declares that this suppression corresponds precisely to what the Christian Church properly calls rebirth and the knowledge, which the effect of Grace results from. Such a comparison seems to be a surprising one when we consider Schopenhauer proclaiming himself an atheist as well as declaring faith and knowledge as fundamentally diferent concepts that should be kept separate. There is, though, in the idea of grace a distiction that can justify Schopenhauers resource on using it: the lack of a cause which can explain its occurence. Thus, both in a religious way and in the manner Schopenhauer conceives the denial of will, redemption can be understood as a blessing freely granted, because it is not possible to conquer it by personal effort. However, if there is not a determined cause for the denial, there are two ways that can guide the will to the point in which it can spontaneously occur. In both ways there is the presence of suffering and it is a prerequisite for their crossing. Suffering is essential for understanding the denial of will because it is the element that permits to confront the thesis according to which there would be a relation between virtue and happiness, so that the innocent person would be free from pain and then would be happy. In opposition to this thesis Schopenhauer considers that the more a human being suffers the closer he gets to the real meaning of life that consists in the comprehension that to live is necessarily to suffer. For the explanation of the analogy between the concepts of Schopenhauers philosophy and the Christian dogmas the text was divided into two chapters. In the first we demonstrate the reasons wich can justify the relation that Schopenhauer establishes between his philosophy and Christianity, through which he compares the dogmas of the original sin and the effect of grace to the concepts of assertion and denial of the will to live. Nevertheless, in spite of establishing this comparison and declaring his philosophy as the expression of the Christian religion, Schopenhauer also proclaims a strict dissociation of religion and philosophy, for he refuses the combination that can result in a religious philosophy. In respect to the dissociation that Schopenhauer prescribes between these two kinds of knowledge the second chapter will focus on the purpose of understanding the transition from the assertion to the denial of will independently of the relation these concepts can have to the religious allegories.

The term ‘restitution narrative’ describes the hope we all have when illness or accidental impairment befalls us to be returned to a pre-morbid condition of health as soon as possible, and in modern Western society we expect the miracle of restitutions to be mediated by medical science. Medicine is still unable to cure a wide range of illness and disability. For these people the restitution narrative fails. This study attempts to create space between health and illness, the space of the failed patient, within which to explore the iatrogenic and disabling effects on bodies and minds living in a society that has come to expect not to suffer when illness or disability is incurable and chronic. Through the medium of a purpose built website, people who are chronically ill and disabled discussed the ‘wicked issues’ that make lives already challenged unnecessarily difficult. Application of the findings of research in psychobiology is applied to speculate whether health may be worsened by being a failed patient in a culture for which health has become the ultimate good. Ideas of social fuzziology are brought into play to help imagine ways in which the dualities of health and illness, normal and abnormal, are broken down and the normalizing ideologies of medicine resisted. / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Chronic pain has been identified as a major and underestimated health care problem, with extensive individual, social and economic ramifications. It has been estimated that the annual economic cost of chronic pain in Australia exceeds AU$34 billion. The available epidemiological evidence suggests chronic pain is a relatively common health problem in Australia which is a significant public health issue. Chronic pain is a complex phenomenon which is not easily defined. However, it is important to consider the ways in which chronic pain is conceptualised, as this can have significant implications for the individual in terms of how they think about their pain, and the way they are treated within the health care system and the broader society. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, pain was predominantly considered a symptom of a biological problem in the body. Absence of physical disease was thought to indicate pain was the result of aberrant psychological processes. However, chronic pain proved resistant to this ‘mind-body’ approach, and the lack of efficacy of many biomedical interventions, combined with an apparently increasing prevalence of chronic pain, pointed to the inadequacy of purely biomedical approaches to pain treatment. The latter part of the twentieth century saw the recognition of pain as a multidimensional experience influenced by the interaction of numerous biological, psychological and social factors. Consequently, the biopsychosocial model of health, which emphasised such a ‘holistic’ perspective, gained substantial recognition in the pain management domain, and was endorsed as the preferred model of pain management. This has contributed to the development of new approaches to chronic pain treatment, particularly in the area of cognitive behavioural therapy and the establishment of multidisciplinary pain centres. There is evidence, however, that the ‘promise’ of the multidimensional conceptualisation and treatment of chronic pain has not been realised in the daily lives of people with chronic pain. Review of the literature indicates a tendency for research and practice to focus on the biological and psychological aspects of chronic pain, while minimising social environmental factors, such as the health care system and cultural belief systems regarding pain, which may also be significant. This thesis proposes that in order to more comprehensively respond to the complex phenomenon of chronic pain, it is necessary to further develop the social domain of the biopsychosocial model. A study was conducted to explore and describe individual experiences of living with chronic pain, as a basis for improving knowledge about the influence of the social environment on the individual. The thesis focuses not only on the individual descriptions of living with chronic pain, but also on the inter-relatedness between the individual and their social environment. Further, this thesis uses a process of critical interpretive analysis to identify aspects of the social environment which can exert a constraining or enabling effect on the individual with chronic pain. The thesis draws on critical realism theory, particularly the morphogenetic approach developed by Archer (1995), to guide the analysis process and to develop potential strategies for addressing identified social disadvantages. The integration of the individual stories of living with chronic pain with an interpretive analysis process, and the underlabouring philosophical perspective of critical realism, provided the framework to investigate the influence of the social environment on individual experience of living with chronic pain. In this thesis, a journey metaphor is used as an overarching framework to tie together the three principal themes identified through the analysis of the interview transcripts. The themes focused on the biomedical, psychological and cultural paths that participants followed in search of understanding and cure for their pain; the social suffering they experienced through lack of understanding and legitimation of their condition; and the identification and development of strategies for living with chronic pain. The thesis highlights the critical importance of focusing not only on the individual with chronic pain but also on the social environment within which the individual lives, and the ways in which these domains intersect and influence each other. The social environment was found to condition the individual and others in society, including health care practitioners, in relation to how they think and behave regarding pain, which in turn can have enabling or constraining consequences for the individual with pain. In particular, cultural beliefs about ‘normal’ pain, and the material structures of the health care system and employment and work places, were found to have a potentially negative impact on the individual with pain. It is concluded that these aspects of society will continue to exert constraining influences on people’s lives until the focus of policy and practice is expanded to include not just the individual with pain, but also the social environment in which they live. To address this, a number of policy and practice improvements are suggested.

<p>Abstract</p><p>This paper applies an impressionistic and reflexive genre of ethnography to understand the ethnographer’s meeting with the humanitarian aid workers in post-tsunami Sri Lanka. It offers an analysis of the political atmosphere in the country prior to the tsunami as a central framework for understanding current tensions and debates over the distribution of tsunami aid resources, and traces the emergence of what has been termed Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. Based on three months of ethnographic fieldwork from April to July 2005 among aid workers at the central level in Colombo and a careful attention to the rhetorics and arguments that characterized the writings in the Sri Lankan press during this period, the paper argues that while public debates over tsunami aid distribution has been entwined with political rivalries between the Sri Lankan government, and Sinhala and Tamil nationalist groups, the everyday reality of international humanitarians evolved around the forming of a common development language to categorise the demands of the aid intervention and on the performances of individual organisations, personified by a limited number of individuals in the professional fora of the humanitarians in Colombo.</p>

Abstract This paper applies an impressionistic and reflexive genre of ethnography to understand the ethnographer’s meeting with the humanitarian aid workers in post-tsunami Sri Lanka. It offers an analysis of the political atmosphere in the country prior to the tsunami as a central framework for understanding current tensions and debates over the distribution of tsunami aid resources, and traces the emergence of what has been termed Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. Based on three months of ethnographic fieldwork from April to July 2005 among aid workers at the central level in Colombo and a careful attention to the rhetorics and arguments that characterized the writings in the Sri Lankan press during this period, the paper argues that while public debates over tsunami aid distribution has been entwined with political rivalries between the Sri Lankan government, and Sinhala and Tamil nationalist groups, the everyday reality of international humanitarians evolved around the forming of a common development language to categorise the demands of the aid intervention and on the performances of individual organisations, personified by a limited number of individuals in the professional fora of the humanitarians in Colombo.

Eutanasifrågan är ständigt aktuell i vårddebatten. En etisk granskning utgör grund för föreliggande arbete, där etiska begrepp och principer ställts i förhållande till eutanasi. Eutanasi definieras i praxis, såsom att en läkare avsiktligt avslutar patientens liv genom administrering av en dödlig läkemedelsdos. Syftet var att belysa etiska aspekter kring eutanasi. Fjorton vetenskapliga artiklar analyserades, vilka utgjorde grunden för resultatets två teman: etiska aspekter som talar för eutanasi och etiska aspekter som talar mot eutanasi. I resultatet framhävdes självbestämmanderätten som ett argument för att eutanasi var etiskt försvarbart. Självbestämmanderätten ansågs även vara applicerbar vid frågor gällande döden. Av studien framstod autonomi vid livets slutskede som komplext, då påverkan från närstående, sjukvårdspersonal samt avsaknaden av medicinsk kunskap kunde föranleda icke-autonoma beslut. Outhärdligt lidande framkom som ett starkt argument för att eutanasi var etiskt försvarbart, men flertalet ansåg dock att den palliativa vården är tillräcklig för att lindra lidandet. Känslan av förlorad värdighet föranledde patienters önskan om eutanasi, strävan efter den goda döden framkom ideligen i artiklarna. I Sverige bör kunskap om eutanasi sökas genom att studera forskning gjord i de länder där eutanasi är legalt, vilket kan ge en fördjupad insikt kring vilka etiska aspekter som lyfts i eutanasidebatten i dessa länder. / Euthanasia is constantly current in the health-care debate. An ethical review forms the foundation for the present work, in which ethical concepts and principles set in relation to euthanasia. Euthanasia is defined in practice that a physician intentionally ends a patient's life by administering a lethal dose of medicine. The aim was to highlight the ethical aspects of euthanasia. Fourteen scientific articles were analyzed, which constitute the basis of the result's two themes: ethical aspects in favor of euthanasia and ethical aspects spoken against euthanasia. The results highlighted autonomy as an argument for euthanasia, self-determination was also considered applicable to issues regarding death. Autonomy at the end of life is complex, the influence of relatives, medical personnel and the lack of medical knowledge could lead to non-autonomous decisions. Unbearable suffering emerged as a strong argument for euthanasia, though many felt that palliative care is sufficient. The sense of loss of dignity caused desire euthanasia, the pursuit of the good death appeared constantly in the articles. In Sweden, Knowledge about euthanasia could be provided by studying research done in countries where euthanasia is legal, which can provide a deeper insight about the ethical aspects raised in the euthanasia debate in these countries.

In this thesis, I argue that clinical law teaching requires a theoretical analysis and pedagogical framework to address law students encounters with social suffering in clinical law contexts. A critical pedagogy of suffering, I argue, would take at its starting point an acknowledgement of the importance of the law student-client encounter as a deeply important pedagogical site - a place where certain views about lawyering, law, and justice are played out, and therefore a place that ought to be the subject of close attention by clinical law scholars and teachers. I argue that a critical pedagogy of suffering would focus specifically on the presence of human suffering in many of these encounters. Such a pedagogy would seek to distill the ways in which larger social and systemic forces produce and distribute social suffering, and how the dominant legal gaze and dominant legal practice are too often incapable of assessing or responding to these forces. It would also work to challenge notions that emotions and suffering are apolitical and unrelated to progressive legal practice, and to build a conception that engaged, critical witnessing of social suffering by lawyers and law students might lead to passionate and thoughtful lawyering for social justice in clinical law settings.

This thesis is an articulation of how the principles of socially-engaged Buddhism, a spiritual practice rooted in the teachings of the historical Buddha that integrates Buddhist practice and social activism, can enrich and enhance contemporary educational practice. It discusses Buddhist epistemology, metaphysics, ontology, psychology, ethics, and practice and relates these things to holistic education, critical pedagogy, SEL, and global education. On the basis of the theoretical understanding represented by that discussion, it articulates several theoretical principles that can be practically applied to the practice of teaching and learning to make it resonate with the theory and approach of sociallyengaged Buddhism. In integrating the implications of Buddhist teachings and practices with teaching and learning practice, it draws from bell hooks’ notion of “engaged pedagogy” in order to articulate a transformational, liberatory, and progressive approach to teaching called “socially-engaged pedagogy.” Socially-engaged pedagogy represents the notion that teaching and learning can be a practical site for progressive social action designed to address the real problem of suffering, both in the present and in the future, as it manifests in the world, exemplified by stress, illness, violence, war, discrimination, oppression, exploitation, poverty, marginalization, and ecological degradation.