Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 6132.pdf: 851637 bytes, checksum: 6881ffcd8203c0ce0d1033adc3eed7be (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-29 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / This work is aimed at investigating the inner life in Bergson s first book, Time and Free Will An essay on the immediate data of consciousness (1889). We try to analyze especially the notions of duration and space in light of what we call the divided self , i.e., the division established by Bergson between the superficial self related to space, social life and language and the deap-seated self which concerns the pure duration of consciousness, the continuous multiplicity of interpenetration of psychological states and creating and unpredictability that constitutes each free act. At the end, and already in possession of the conclusions on the Essay, we will discuss the bergsonian intuitive method and its relationship with the divided self. / Este trabalho tem por intuito investigar a vida interior no primeiro livro de Bergson, Ensaio sobre os dados imediatos da consciência, de 1889. Trataremos de analisar sobretudo as noções de duração e espaço à luz daquilo que chamamos o eu dividido , isto é, a divisão estabelecida por Bergson entre o eu superficial relacionado ao espaço, à vida social e à linguagem e o eu profundo o qual diz respeito à duração pura da consciência, à multiplicidade contínua de interpenetração dos estados psicológicos e da criação e imprevisibilidade constituintes de cada ato livre. Ao final, e já de posse das conclusões acerca do Ensaio, discorreremos sobre o método intuitivo bergsoniano e sua relação com o eu dividido.

The aim of this study is to show how a possible philosophy of life can arise from Bergson&rsquo / s conception of time. In realizing this aim, I appeal to Hadot&rsquo / s description of the paradox of the human condition. I claim that in order to understand how a Bergsonian philosophy of life through Bergson&rsquo / s conception of time would arise we need to understand the paradox of the human condition. The reason for this is that there are a lot of dualities in Bergson&rsquo / s philosophy all of which, I claim, are based on this fundamental duality concerning the human condition. I believe that when this paradox and its possible resolution are restated in Bergsonian notions, a Bergsonian philosophy of life that consists of a life sub specie durationis, that is a life under the aspect of duration, would arise. Hadot considered the paradox within the context of phenomenology alone. This made me proceed by searching for other approaches to the paradox within Bergson&rsquo / s philosophy. I realized that the attempts in finding out possible solutions to this problem cannot be found in the context of phenomenology alone and that the vitalist and the existentialist aspects have to be considered in order to remain faithful to Bergson&rsquo / s philosophy as well as in order to construct a Bergsonian philosophy of life. The phenomenological aspect of the paradox arises around Bergson&rsquo / s notion of displacement of attention and when the notion of dur&eacute / e r&eacute / elle is considered with consciousness in the light of the notion of intensity. The vitalist aspect enters into our discussion when we analyze Bergson&rsquo / s notion of &eacute / lan vital around the consideration of true evolution. I believe that the existentialist aspect of the paradox of the human condition comes from Bergson&rsquo / s notion of freedom around the discussion of the superficial and the fundamental self. It emerges if the individual asks himself how to deal with this paradox that in turn defines his struggle to transform the tension the paradox involves and that tells him to bring his own attitude towards it.