Cette thèse met en lumière trois questions importantes au regard des banques Islamiques. Dans le premier chapitre, nous examinons l'impact de la concurrence sur les différences de fixation des taux de dépôt dans les banques Islamiques et conventionnelles. Nous montrons qu'il existe des différences notables dans les déterminants des taux de dépôt dans les deux types d'institutions. La concurrence du marché a un impact significatif sur le taux de dépôt des banques conventionnelles mais pas des banques Islamiques. Notre résultat, en général, suggère que bien que le dépôt des banques Islamiques semble être similaire à celui des banques conventionnelles, leurs déterminants sont différents. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous poursuivons nos enquêtes en examinant la question de la concurrence et de la stabilité. La concurrence entre banques Islamiques et conventionnelles augmente-t-elle la stabilité ou la fragilité des banques ? Notre principale constatation suggère que le marché concurrentiel des deux banques n'est pas bénéfique pour la stabilité des banques. Conformément au résultat du premier chapitre, lors de la prochaine enquête, la concurrence sur deux marchés ne concerne que les banques conventionnelles. Dans le troisième chapitre de cette dissertation, nous analysons le rôle du Conseil de surveillance de la Charia sur le financement par capitaux propres des banques. Notre résultat montre que le financement par capitaux propres des banques Islamiques est influencé par certaines caractéristiques de la Conseil de surveillance de la Charia. La présence d'un membre de la Conseil de surveillance de la Charia au Conseil d'administration ou d'un membre de l'exécutif a un impact positif sur le financement par actions tandis que l'existence d'un département de la Charia dans les banques Islamiques diminue la proportion de financement par capitaux propres. / This dissertation highlights three important issues in Islamic banks. In the first chapter, we investigate the impact of dual market competition on the differences in deposit rate setting in Islamic and conventional banks. We show that there are notable differences in the determinants of deposit rates in the two types of institution. Market competition has a significant impact on deposit rate of conventional banks but not Islamic banks. Our result, in general, suggests that although Islamic banks’ deposit seems to be similar than conventional banks, their determinants are different. In the second chapter, we continue our investigations by looking at the competition-stability issue. Does competition between Islamic and conventional banks increase banks’ stability or fragility? Our main finding suggests that competitive dual banking market is not beneficial for banks’ stability. In line with the result from the first chapter, in the next investigation, dual market competition only matters for conventional banks. In the third chapter of this dissertation, we analyze the role of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) on banks’ equity financing. Our result shows that Islamic banks’ equity financing is influenced by some characteristics of SSB. The presence of SSB member in the Board of Directors (BOD) or executive member has a positive impact on equity financing whereas the existence of a Shariah department in Islamic banks decreases the proportion of equity financing.

The subject of the thesis is analysis of executive and supervisory bodies of joint-stock companies based on the legislation effective since 1st January 2014. The goal is to describe the structure of such bodies, their establishment, competence and guidelines for action. By comparing with the former legislation, it aims to find the differences, new institutes a possibilities brought by the recodification of private law and thus evaluate their effect and possible future influence. The thesis also points out some potentially controversial parts and defects of the new legislation.

This dissertation deals with the issue of Supervisory boards in Czech state-owned enterprises. At first it defines a clear set of terms to differentiate within appropriate legal forms of state entrepreneurship applicable in Czech Republic. Thereafter it offers the analysis of implementing the nomination process recently brought to our governmental system. The empirical part of this thesis is constituted by the qualitative research of personal policy of the state in four selected stated-owned enterprises carried out for the period from 2006 till 2015. Education, working experience, political membership and personal integrity were the main focus areas while researching the members of selected supervisory boards.

The thesis deals with two types of organizational structure of a joint-stock company regard to changing legislation, effective from 1st January 2014. The work is initially focused on new type of organizational structure - a monistic organizational structure. It consists of the board of directors and the statutory director. The work explains the operation and scope of the company's bodies. The second type of organizational structure, which analyses the work, is dual organizational structure. It consists of the management board and the supervisory board. The work is based on the Civil Code and the Business Corporations Act.

Main goal of this dissertation is to analyze and evaluate current situation and the level of management and control of ČSAD JIHOTRANS company and to valorize the mutual relationship between administrative authority and executive management in this company. Dissertation is divided into two parts, first is theoretical part, in which will be explained issue of administration and management of company, with the help of literature and relevant legislations and practical part, where outcomes will be applied to selected company. To fulfill the goal of this dissertation was primarily used analysis of economic indicators of the company and interviews with chairman of the company board. In the end theoretical outcomes will be compared with real state, in which the company is and there will be given a solution of potential problems.

The diploma thesis deals with the transparency of Czech state-owned enterprises. Thus how they are run, how they are managed and staffed and how they are regulated. The thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is concern with the constitution of the state-owned enterprises, their development after the change of regime and especially with their sale within the coupon privatization. The second chapter deals with the current privatization of the state-owned enterprises but rather only theoretically and argues whether the state is an appropriate owner and a good bussinesman. The third chapter is devoted to (non)transparency of the state-owned enterprises which means appointing (non)experts to the supervisory boards and (in)sufficient control of these enterprises. The fourth chapter is a case study of Budweiser Budvar. In the end the reader finds the answer to the question whether the set rules for the operation and management of the state-owned enterprises are sufficient.

Problem: That the stakeholder’s expectations don´t answer to what auditors can and may do have been a problem for several years. This problem was defined for the first time by Liggio at 1974. Since 1974 there have been several researches about the expectation gap for auditors. Purpose: The purpose of our study is to research what the audit effort in HQ Bank means for the expectation gap. Theory: The theories in our study discuss the audit profession, the definition of the expectation gap, how trust develops between individuals, the regulations that the authorities discuss and a review of earlier researches in this subject. Method: We have done a qualitative study in which we interviewed approved auditors at PwC and Convensia in addition we interviewed the chief lawyer at the Swedish financial supervisory authority to answer our purpose. Conclusions: The conclusion of our study is that the expectation gap exists between the auditors and the stakeholders. Another conclusion is that the incidents in HQ Bank have influenced the expectation gap in a negative direction, to reduce the expectation gap we suggest that adjustments of the regulations must be done and that the auditors themselves must inform their stakeholders what auditors can and may do. / Problem: Att intressenters förväntningar på revisorn inte svarar mot vad revisorn faktiskt kan och får göra har varit ett problem för revisorsyrket i många år. Detta problem definierades först av Liggio 1974. Sen dess har flertalet forskningar gjorts inom ämnet förväntningsgap. Syfte: Vår studie syftar till att undersöka vad debatten om revisionsinsatsen i HQ Bank innebär för förväntningsgapet. Teori: Uppsatsens teoretiska referensram behandlar teorier som beskriver revisorsyrket, definition av förväntningsgapet, hur förtroendet utvecklas mellan individer, de lagändringar som diskuteras samt en översikt av tidigare forskning inom ämnet. Metod: För att besvara syftet gjorde vi en kvalitativ studie där vi intervjuade godkända revisorer på PwC och Convensia revision. Dessutom intervjuade vi Finansinspektionens chefsjurist. Slutsatser: Denna studies slutsatser blev att det råder ett förväntningsgap mellan revisorerna och dess intressenter. Vi har även kommit fram till att händelserna i HQ Bank har påverkat förväntningsgapet i en negativ riktning, för att få bukt med förväntningsgapet anser vi att det krävs ändring av regelverken tillsammans med att revisorerna själva upplyser deras intressenter om vad en revisor faktiskt kan och får göra.

Cette thèse prend pour objet d’étude les administrateurs salariés en France, soit les représentants du personnel élus par les travailleurs, le plus souvent sur liste syndicale, pour siéger au conseil d’administration [CA] ou de surveillance [CS] de leur entreprise avec les mêmes droits et devoirs que les autres administrateurs, y compris le droit de vote sur les décisions stratégiques. A partir d’une méthodologie croisant différentes techniques d’enquête (l’analyse documentaire, deux études monographiques, la passation d’un questionnaire et l’observation participante), nous interrogeons la régulation sociale qui se joue dans les entreprises alors dites « démocratisées ». Parce que le sujet prête encore à confusion, nous commençons par une double mise en contexte : conceptuelle, en opérant un retour sur la définition de la « participation des salariés aux décisions » pour souligner la singularité du CA ou CS comme espace participatif ; historique, en analysant la dynamique de l’institutionnalisation saccadée des administrateurs salariés pour en éclairer sa dimension de jure. Nous nous intéressons ensuite à sa dimension de facto. Nous interrogeons en premier lieu l’effectivité de la règle et constatons d’une part que son application est directement dépendante de son ancrage dans une source de droit contraignant et, d’autre part, que la singularité de ce dispositif se reflète dans le profil des syndicalistes appelés à siéger au CA ou CS qui présentent, dans leur grande majorité, un capital militant particulièrement développé. Et ce parce que l’action de l’administrateur salarié, que nous observons en second lieu, a pour particularité de s’inscrire à la fois au sein du système de gouvernement d’entreprise et des relations professionnelles. Si sa capacité d’action dans le premier est le plus souvent limitée à la sphère de l’influence, le CA ou CS peut néanmoins constituer un espace pertinent de l’action collective à la condition d’un effort d’articulation des différentes scènes de représentation du personnel par l’organisation syndicale. Nous montrons ainsi que la participation des salariés aux décisions stratégiques ne conduit pas mécaniquement à un rééquilibrage des pouvoirs dans l’entreprise, mais qu’elle peut produire une reconfiguration des relations professionnelles pour peu que les différents acteurs en présence s’en saisissent. / This thesis focuses on the study of board-level employee representatives, i.e. employee representatives elected by the workforce under trade union nomination who serve on their company’s board of directors [BoD] or supervisory board [SVB] with the same rights and duties than that of other directors, including the right to vote on strategic decisions. Thanks to a methodology which combines different survey techniques (documentary analysis, two case studies, questionnaire distribution, participant observation), we question the nature of the social regulation which takes place within such so-called “democratised” companies. As this subject continue to lead to misunderstanding, we start setting the scene against a twofold context: a conceptual one, going back to the definition of “workers’ participation in decision-making” in order to underline the idiosyncrasy of the BoD or SVB as a participatory scene; an historical one, analyzing the non-linear dynamics of board-level employee representation’s institutionalisation in order to shed light on its de jure dimension. We then turn to its de facto dimension. First, we question the effectiveness of this rule and we observe that, on the one hand, its application directly depends on its anchorage in a source of binding law and, on the other hand, that the uniqueness of this provision is reflected in the profile of the union members selected to serve on the board whose great majority has a particularly well-developed “activist capital”. This is because, secondly, board-level employee representative’s action specificity lies both in the corporate governance and the industrial relations systems. If his/her capacity of action is limited to the sphere of influence in the former, the BoD of SVB could however be deemed a relevant arena of collective action provided that the trade union engages in an effort aimed at articulating the various scenes of workers’ representation. We demonstrate that workers’ participation in strategic decision-making does not automatically lead to a rebalancing of power within the company, but that it can produce a reshaping of industrial relations as long as the various involved actors seize it.

Cette thèse prend pour objet d’étude les administrateurs salariés en France, soit les représentants du personnel élus par les travailleurs, le plus souvent sur liste syndicale, pour siéger au conseil d’administration [CA] ou de surveillance [CS] de leur entreprise avec les mêmes droits et devoirs que les autres administrateurs, y compris le droit de vote sur les décisions stratégiques. A partir d’une méthodologie croisant différentes techniques d’enquête (l’analyse documentaire, deux études monographiques, la passation d’un questionnaire et l’observation participante), nous interrogeons la régulation sociale qui se joue dans les entreprises alors dites « démocratisées ». Parce que le sujet prête encore à confusion, nous commençons par une double mise en contexte : conceptuelle, en opérant un retour sur la définition de la « participation des salariés aux décisions » pour souligner la singularité du CA ou CS comme espace participatif ; historique, en analysant la dynamique de l’institutionnalisation saccadée des administrateurs salariés pour en éclairer sa dimension de jure. Nous nous intéressons ensuite à sa dimension de facto. Nous interrogeons en premier lieu l’effectivité de la règle et constatons d’une part que son application est directement dépendante de son ancrage dans une source de droit contraignant et, d’autre part, que la singularité de ce dispositif se reflète dans le profil des syndicalistes appelés à siéger au CA ou CS qui présentent, dans leur grande majorité, un capital militant particulièrement développé. Et ce parce que l’action de l’administrateur salarié, que nous observons en second lieu, a pour particularité de s’inscrire à la fois au sein du système de gouvernement d’entreprise et des relations professionnelles. Si sa capacité d’action dans le premier est le plus souvent limitée à la sphère de l’influence, le CA ou CS peut néanmoins constituer un espace pertinent de l’action collective à la condition d’un effort d’articulation des différentes scènes de représentation du personnel par l’organisation syndicale. Nous montrons ainsi que la participation des salariés aux décisions stratégiques ne conduit pas mécaniquement à un rééquilibrage des pouvoirs dans l’entreprise, mais qu’elle peut produire une reconfiguration des relations professionnelles pour peu que les différents acteurs en présence s’en saisissent. / This thesis focuses on the study of board-level employee representatives, i.e. employee representatives elected by the workforce under trade union nomination who serve on their company’s board of directors [BoD] or supervisory board [SVB] with the same rights and duties than that of other directors, including the right to vote on strategic decisions. Thanks to a methodology which combines different survey techniques (documentary analysis, two case studies, questionnaire distribution, participant observation), we question the nature of the social regulation which takes place within such so-called “democratised” companies. As this subject continue to lead to misunderstanding, we start setting the scene against a twofold context: a conceptual one, going back to the definition of “workers’ participation in decision-making” in order to underline the idiosyncrasy of the BoD or SVB as a participatory scene; an historical one, analyzing the non-linear dynamics of board-level employee representation’s institutionalisation in order to shed light on its de jure dimension. We then turn to its de facto dimension. First, we question the effectiveness of this rule and we observe that, on the one hand, its application directly depends on its anchorage in a source of binding law and, on the other hand, that the uniqueness of this provision is reflected in the profile of the union members selected to serve on the board whose great majority has a particularly well-developed “activist capital”. This is because, secondly, board-level employee representative’s action specificity lies both in the corporate governance and the industrial relations systems. If his/her capacity of action is limited to the sphere of influence in the former, the BoD of SVB could however be deemed a relevant arena of collective action provided that the trade union engages in an effort aimed at articulating the various scenes of workers’ representation. We demonstrate that workers’ participation in strategic decision-making does not automatically lead to a rebalancing of power within the company, but that it can produce a reshaping of industrial relations as long as the various involved actors seize it.

This thesis deals with civil liability of the Supervisory Board and its members for breaching his duties. Emphasis is placed on responsibility and legal relationship, whose content is obligation to pay damages, between Supervisory Board and its member and business companies (in the new terminology "business corporation"). This thesis is dealing at first with the legal anchoring of the Supervisory Board as such, the creation and termination of the Supervisory Board and the definition of its living space not only in the relation to corporation, but also to individual shareholders, General Assembly and of course to the Board - including their mutual rights and responsibilities. Thesis is crossed by author's intention to evaluate the active legislation, whose legislative life is coming to an end, and on the basis of that to comment upcoming legislation that at least brings a fresh wind to the corporate life. Shortly is discussed upon by the factual impossibility to prosecute members of the Supervisory Board for crimes associated with their performance.