This thesis examines constraints of the EU’s engagement in the frozen conflicts of the South Caucasus, namely, the Abkhazia, the South Ossetia, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. The study begins with a puzzle in which the EU’s ambition for prioritizing the resolution of frozen conflicts mismatches with the reality related to the status quo of frozen conflicts. By using an abductive reasoning in an observed surprising fact, the research highlights that the complexity of the region can be the main contributor to the EU’s limitations.   With this purpose, the ENP as a normative power of the EU is analyzed to identify how the EU is attempting to be a major actor in the region in order to secure its borders. Subsequently, the limitations of the EU in engaging in frozen conflicts are examined from ‘security dilemma’, ‘balance of power’ and ‘bandwagoning’ neorealism perspectives together with a comparative study on the three conflicts. The results show that the complexity of the region is a principal constraint for the EU. In particular, geopolitical rivalries with Russia and small states with their alliances contribute to the complexity of the region. However, this study also explores the idea that the complexity of the region is not only the best explanation for the EU’s limitations, but also the EU’s structure per se creates a lack of credibility with relations to the respective Caucasian states. For future studies, I suggest that the analysis of the social learning mechanism of the EU will be an asset for understanding the region and avoiding Eurocentric approaches towards Caucasian political systems and people. Regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, policymakers can consider that it is possible to change the EU’s low profile either by having clear strategies concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or replacing one of the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group with the EU.

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This thesis analyzes Russian foreign policy towards Azerbaijan in the post-Soviet era. The dissolution of the Soviet Union paved the way for the independence of Azerbaijan. This development necessitated the redefinition of the relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan. However, post-Soviet Russia was reluctant to treat Azerbaijan as a fully independent state that could develop its relations other states freely. In this way, Moscow sought to keep Azerbaijan under its own sphere of influence. To this purpose, Russia used its influence in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the development of the Caspian Sea energy resources as its two main policy instruments for controlling Azerbaijan. When Vladimir Putin was elected as the President of Russia in 2000, it was not clear whether the previous Russian foreign policy towards Azerbaijan would continue as in the past or change. The developments between 2000 and 2005 show that Vladimir Putin changed the previous Russian stance on the Caspian Sea energy resources and took more collaborative posture towards Azerbaijan. However, Putin continued the earlier Russian position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This study argues that there has been both change and continuity in Russian foreign policy towards Azerbaijan since Vladimir Putin&rsquo / s rise to Russia&rsquo / s presidency in 2000. In this sense, Russian foreign policy under Putin could be conceptualized mainly as a pragmatic foreign policy. This conceptualization makes it possible to identify both change and continuity in Russian foreign policy towards Azerbaijan.

The thesis deals with the issue of energy security in geopolitically strategic region of South Caucasus. The focus is on analyzing the development of energy policy in the individual countries of the region since the collapse of the Soviet union. On this basis is determined the most important security challenge: Armenia. This challenge results from the need to counteract the influence of external actors in the region and to address long-standing regional conflicts that would contribute not only to the stability of the South Caucasus, but also help to fully realize the potential of the region as an important transit corridor for Caspian and Iranian energy resources.

The aim of the present paper is to answer the question on how do regional powers shape the security environment within their regional subcomplex? The research interest is conditioned by the rise of powers that represent strong actors, especially in regional affairs, and which certainly influence dynamics within their region. It has been assumed that the manifestation of power at the regional level can also be transferred, to the global level leading to an elevated position of these actors in global affairs, allowing equally for the existing Western-led order to be challenged. These assumptions have been applied and tested on the example of the regional powers Russia, Turkey and Iran and their respective influence on the security dynamics in the South Caucasus as their historically common shared neighbourhood. In order to disentangle the complicated web of relationships and influential factors, the descriptive framework of the Theory of Regional Security Complexes as suggested by Barry Buzan has been outlined and applied. Based on these theoretical observations the attention has been further turned towards the empirical testing of the hypothesis which states that Russia, Turkey and Iran have exercised influence during the second Nagorno-Karabakh War 2020 that occurred between Armenia and Azerbaijan...

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Pendant ces dernières années il y a eu aussi beaucoup des recherches axées à analyser pourquoi souvent les élections ne respectent pas ces standards, quel est leur rôle dans les régimes hybrides et autocratiques, et il y a aussi des recherches qui enquêtent notamment les fraudes électorales. Cette thèse propose une contribution dans le débat et elle souligne que les études sur les fraudes électorales on souvent sous-traitées : les dimensions internationales. Ces dimensions sont conceptualisées dans deux façonnes. La première concerne la pression démocratisant occidentale et comment elle peut influencer le changement et/ou l’évolution des fraudes électorales. La deuxième, concerne les dynamiques des socialisations en terme d’échange d’informations parmi les régimes hybrides par rapport diffèrent modalités de fraudes électorales. Selon mes analyses dans les cas où il y a une pression démocratisant occidentale plus forte les autorités locales changent les méthodes des fraudes électorales. Ce changement ne doit pas être considéré forcement comme un amélioration de l’intégrité électoral tout court. Plutôt, avec l’amélioration des cadres légales de la gestion électorale, les autorités modifient les fraudes pour essayer d’éluder le criticisme occidental. En autre, pour bien modifier les méthodes des fraudes électorales les autorités d’un pays recourent à des pratiques d’apprentissage tout en regardant les expériences des autres pays. Ces arguments théoriques ont été vérifiés sur trois cas d’études, notamment Armenia, Azerbaïdjan et Géorgie. Ces pays ont des caractéristiques en commune, qui permettent des analyses diachroniques et synchroniques concernant les fraudes électorales à partir de leurs indépendances de l’Union Soviétique. / During the last years many research have been conducted to analyse why elections fail, what is their role in hybrid as well as authoritarian regimes, and there is a growing stream of literature that is investigating electoral frauds and electoral malpractices. This thesis provides a contribution in this debate by pointing to one of the less analysed factors in the study of electoral frauds and electoral malpractices, which is the international dimension. The latter is conceptualized in two ways: the first one relates to Western democratizing pressure and how it can affect the change or the evolution of electoral frauds and malpractices. The second one concerns socialization dynamics in terms of methods of frauds and malpractices among authorities in different countries. It is argued that where there is a stronger Western democratizing pressure authorities change the way they conduct elections, even if this change does not forcefully means democratization. Rather, along with formal improvements in elections management, authorities alter and modify methods of frauds and malpractices as a way to elude Western criticism. In order to properly modify electoral frauds and malpractices, authorities resort to learning practices by looking at other experiences. These theoretical arguments have been verified on three cases study, which are Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. These countries share some key characteristics, which allowed for cross-temporal and spatial analysis regarding electoral frauds and malpractices since their independence from the Soviet Union.

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In 2010 the EU initiated negotiations for new agreements forming the legal basis for relations between it and partner countries of the EaP, termed Association Agreements (AA). Negotiations were entered with all three countries in the South Caucasus as well as Ukraine and Moldova, and foresaw greater political association through extensive rule harmonisation. Yet, when negotiations came to an end at the Eastern Partnership summit in November 2013, Azerbaijan had dropped out, Ukraine made a last minute U-turn, and Armenia instead opted for Russian President Putin’s brand new Eurasian Customs Union (ECU). At the time, the change of events was to a large extent ascribed to Russian coercion. Based on empirical material from over 200 news articles, I perform a descriptive data analysis and process tracing, to elucidate what instruments were used and why. I argue that there is a strong relation between the prior relations of dependence between the target and Russia, lending coercive potential to varying degrees. The individual relations of dependence not only explain the choice of instrument but also its relative success.

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