Este estudo tem por objetivo captar as percepções dos conselheiros de administração no Brasil a respeito das atividades que norteiam o escopo de atuação dos mesmos, em especial da RSC, Responsabilidade Social Corporativa. O intuito é de responder aos seguintes questionamentos: os conselheiros de administração no Brasil possuem uma visão ampliada do seu escopo de atuação, se envolvendo nas questões estratégicas das organizações? Nesse contexto, qual a percepção destes em relação à questão da RSC? O estudo observa a interrelação existente entre RSC, GC, Governança Corporativa, e o papel dos conselheiros. A premissa é de que a agenda da RSC é progressivamente uma extensão da agenda de GC e seria da responsabilidade dos conselhos de administração (ELKINGTON, 2006; INGLEY, 2008; JAMALI et al, 2008). Na pesquisa de campo, foram coletados dados junto a 128 conselheiros certificados pelo BCC, Banco de Conselheiros Certificados do IBGC, Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa. Os resultados apontam na direção de que os conselheiros não consideram relevantes, dentro do seu escopo de atuação, somente as atividades de cunho monitoramento e controle, mas também as atividades estratégicas e aquelas relacionadas à RSC. A RSC é justificada, conforme os conselheiros, porque uma empresa possui a responsabilidade de ir além de criar empregos, pagar impostos e gerar lucros. Tal posicionamento reflete na maneira exposta pelos conselheiros de como tomam decisões. Segundo os mesmos, mais do que os valores e as crenças dos acionistas, eles consideram aquilo que gera valor no longo prazo para as organizações. Os conselheiros não buscariam simplesmente remunerar o capital dos acionistas, mas criar e manter valor para que as organizações possam operar de forma sustentável. Com esses resultados, entende-se que essa pesquisa contribui para o desenvolvimento dos campos de estudo da RSC e da GC. / This study aims to grasp the perceptions of corporate board members in Brazil about the activities that guide the scope of work of the same, in particular the CSR, Corporate Social Responsibility. The intent is to answer the following questions: do corporate board members in Brasil have a broad view of the scope of their activities, engaging in strategic issues of the organizations? In this context what their perception regarding the issue of CSR? The study remarks the interrelationships among CSR, CG, Corporate Governance, and the role of directors. The main premise is that the CSR agenda is increasingly an extension of the CG agenda, so that it would be under the responsibility of Corporate Boards (ELKINGTON, 2006; INGLEY, 2008; JAMALI et al, 2008). During the field-level research, data have been collected from 128 counselors certified by BCC, Bank of Certified Counselors from IBGC, Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance. Results indicate that directors do not consider relevant, in the scope of their activities, such as monitoring and control, but also the strategic activities and activities related to CSR. According to directors, CSR is justified because companies have the responsibility to go beyond creating jobs, paying taxes and profiting. This positioning reflects on the manner directors revealed to make their decisions. According to them, beyond considering the values and beliefs of the shareholders, they consider all that creates long-term value for the organizations. Directors would not only seek to remunerate the shareholder capital, but also to create and maintain value for the organizations so that they can operate sustainably. With these results, it is understood that this research contributes to the development of CSR and CG fields of study.

Submitted by Eliene Soares da Silva (eliene.silva@fgv.br) on 2012-07-31T15:55:35Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Final_Thesis_Beatriz_Schalka.pdf: 1044126 bytes, checksum: b67899dc3d2c8303cc985a6fc89e8a41 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Eliene Soares da Silva (eliene.silva@fgv.br) on 2012-07-31T15:57:13Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Final_Thesis_Beatriz_Schalka.pdf: 1044126 bytes, checksum: b67899dc3d2c8303cc985a6fc89e8a41 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-07-31T15:59:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Final_Thesis_Beatriz_Schalka.pdf: 1044126 bytes, checksum: b67899dc3d2c8303cc985a6fc89e8a41 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-07-02 / Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title 'Novo Mercado' refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.

This paper examines the moderating effect of national culture on the relationship betweenboard gender diversity and corporate financial performance. To test the hypotheses, FixedEffects regression is used in combination with a sample of 1,499 firms from 23 countries and7,125 firm-year observations over a time frame of seven years. This paper provides evidencefor a significant positive effect of board gender diversity on firm performance if there are atleast three females seated on the board. Furthermore, a significant moderating effect ofnational culture on the relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance hasbeen found.

Monistic structure of joint-stock company This thesis is concerned with monistic structure of joint-stock company in the Czech Republic. It seeks to characterize the legislation relating to this legal institute, which is quite new in the Czech legal system. To be able to evaluate this legislation, the thesis provides the reader with a broader range of information concerning this topic. Therefore, on the basis of these pieces of information, the thesis analyzes the Czech legislation in force that regulates monistic structure of companies. The aim of the text is to provide different views on this issue, various interpretations and proposals on the future development of this legislation. First the thesis gives general information on corporate governance systems, i. e. a monistic structure and a dualistic one, which are subsequently compared. Remaining part of the thesis deals with the structure chosen as a topic for this text. Second part is concerned with regulations of monistic structure in foreign countries and their legal systems. The purpose is to outline basic aspects of traditional monistic structures - monistic structures in countries that have influenced the form of this type of corporate governance system the most. As the monistic system of corporate governance is spread out especially in the...

in English Diversity in Composition of Supervisory Boards This paper focuses on analysing the current situation of composition of board of directors in Europe as well as in the United States with the emphasis on supervisory boards in the dualistic model and the non-executive members of boards in the monistic model. It is aimed on one hand at evaluating the business case for diversity as its proponents including the European Commission and several European governments present it, on the other at judging diversity from the critical point of view of its opponents. Lastly, this paper presents different approaches that may be taken to this topic, i.e. the measures that can be engaged in order to achieve higher diversity. In the beginning I shortly summarise the nature and function of the supervisory board under Czech law as well as the general status of supervisory board or the non-executive part of board of directors in both corporate governance systems. I then scrutinise the approaches to diversity in Europe and the USA and look at the different criteria of diversity considered. The centre of this work comprises of evaluating both the advantages and benefits of diversity on one hand and disadvantages and costs on the other. It is particularly this part of the analysis that is crucial to both...

Definition and basic theoretic information about Corporate Governance of big industry company Description and Analyse of corporate Management, the functions of Top Management Members, their role in relationship to owners / shareholders (describtion of used tools for internal control of government, investment and tools for financial analyses)

The objective of my thesis is description of mutual relations between shareholder's meeting and board of directors of joint-stock company including their activities, rights and obligations. Then I focused on comparison of legislation of commercial code and bill of commercial corporations. In my first chapter, I dealt with characteristics of joint-stock company, its foundation by public offering or without and its formation. Second chapter concerns with legal regulations of General meeting, especially with the emphasis to its convening, composing, running, decision process and scope including rights and obligations of shareholders. Third part is focused on issues related to board of directors, its election, activity, responsibility and liability for damage and also rights and obligations of individual members. Finally in last part, I compared current legislation of commercial code and bill of commercial corporations in matters of shareholder's meeting and board of directors.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo testar quais são as características dos Conselhos de Administração de 20 bancos, com capital aberto, no Brasil, no período compreendido entre os anos de 2007 a 2013, bem como detectar a influência das mesmas sobre a Rentabilidade do Ativo (ROA), Rentabilidade do Patrimônio Líquido (ROE) e a Razão Valor de Mercado (RVM). Para alcançar esses objetivos foram levantadas características relevantes que envolvem os Conselhos de Administração (CA) dos bancos, apoiando-se nas recomendações do Comitê de Basileia sobre o que se exige da estrutura desses Conselhos como instrumento de governança. Além das instruções do Comitê, outros artigos científicos, envolvendo dados dos CA e sua provável influência sobre a rentabilidade, foram referenciados. Após o levantamento das variáveis do CA utilizou-se uma análise de regressão múltipla para avaliar se as mesmas influenciam ou não e, em que dimensão elas interferem na rentabilidade dos bancos. Os resultados foram divididos em duas partes: a primeira levou em conta a alavancagem de controle do maior acionista de cada banco no período estudado e, a segunda considerou como uma das variáveis independentes a alavancagem de controle dos três maiores acionistas, entre os anos de 2007 a 2013. Através do resultado estatístico de uma análise quantitativa constatou-se que as características do CA influenciam, em intensidades diferentes, o ROA, ROE e o RVM. Quanto ao ROE e ao ROA, os menores níveis de Governança Corporativa (GC) demonstraram influências negativas para os dois tipos de controle, enquanto que o maior nível, o 3, mostrou influenciar positivamente o resultado. O número de componentes do CA refletiu, positivamente, sobre a rentabilidade. Porém, um aumento ocasionaria um decréscimo na mesma. As variáveis de controle influenciaram em pelo menos uma das variáveis dependentes. O estudo estatístico apresentou um importante resultado sobre a GC em bancos brasileiros. Esse aspecto pode servir de suporte ao investidor em sua tomada de decisão, pois evidencia que as variáveis abordadas devem ser consideradas quando forem verificados os retornos. / This study aims to test some characteristics of the Board of Directors of 20 publicly traded banks in Brazil in the period of 2007 to 2013, to determine whether these influence the Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and market value ratio (MVR).To achieve these goals, some relevant features that involve the Board of Directors (BoD) of banks were prospected, based on recommendations of the Basel Committee about the demands on the structure of these councils as instruments of governance. Scientific articles involving characteristics of the BoD and the possible influence on profitability were also considered. Once the BoD variables are set up, a multiple regression analysis was applied to assess whether, and how, the characteristics of the BoD influence the profitability of banks. The tests were divided into two parts: the first considering the leverage control of the largest shareholder of each bank, in every year; and the second had as one of the independent variables to leverage control of the three largest shareholders in the same period. Through the statistical results of a quantitative analysis, it was observed that the characteristics of the BoD influence, at different intensities, ROA, ROE and MV. In consideration of ROE and ROA, lower levels of Corporate Governance (CG) showed negative influences for both types of control, while the higher level, 3, resulted positive influence in the result. The number of members of the CA correlated positively with profitability. The control variables influenced on at least one of the dependent variables. Through this study, a significant statistical result is presented about GC in Brazilian banks. This may support the investor in his decision-making, highlighting that these variables must be considered when returns are checked.

1 One-tier organisational structure of Czech joint-stock companies and British public limited companies Abstract This thesis deals with selected issues of one-tier board structure of a joint-stock company in the Czech and British legislation. The emphasis is placed on the position and regulation of the Board of directors, its members, shareholders, and their mutual relationship. Not only has the present legal regulation been monitored, but also its historical roots, which significantly influenced the evolution of the institute and its present form. The first chapter deals with corporate governance. It includes all aspects and theories, which as a whole have completed the position of a shareholder as well as a joint-stock company itself. Moreover, diffuse and concentrated ownership is explained, as well as separation of ownership of the company from its management, and the related "principal"-"agent" problem. Also, the basic characteristics of Anglo-Saxon and continental approach to the law have been reflected. The second chapter describes and clarifies the essence and the form of one-tier board structure as it is regulated in the UK. A remarkable element of British company law is the extent to which the company's internal affairs are left to its shareholders through the company's articles of association....

Orientador: Maria Chaves Jardim / Resumo: Esta pesquisa tem como intuito analisar a participação de representantes dos trabalhadores no conselho de administração de empresas públicas de sociedade de economia mista do setor elétrico brasileiro, buscando, entre outros objetivos, identificar se a passagem pelo conselho administrativo potencializa o capital burocrático desses representantes. A metodologia aplicada nesta pesquisa dispôs de leituras bibliográficas sobre a história do movimento operário brasileiro abordando as estratégias do sindicalismo em suas diferentes fases, sobre a temática da governança corporativa e a Lei de Responsabilidade das Estatais (nº 13.303), aprovada no ano de 2016, que estabeleceu critérios como experiência profissional, educação acadêmica e vedações que diretamente incidiram nos conselhos de administração. Além disso, foram realizadas entrevistas com três conselheiros eleitos das empresas Furnas, Eletronorte e Eletrosul conjuntamente com um representante da associação dos funcionários. E foi feito análise de legislações e minibiografia dos membros dos conselhos estudados. Em termos teóricos, esta pesquisa utilizou-se dos conceitos de campo, estratégia, jogo social, entre outros de Pierre Bourdieu que contribuíram para compreender as dificuldades, facilidades e as variáveis que rondam a participação dos representantes dos trabalhadores na mais alta cúpula administrativa de uma empresa estatal. Um dos resultados alcançados foi que os representantes conquistam à legitimidade pela lógica admi... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: This research aims at analyzing the participation of workers' representatives on the board of directors in joint-stock public companies in the Brazilian energy sector, seeking, among other objectives, to identify whether the passage through the administrative board enhances the bureaucratic capital of these representatives. The methodology applied in this research made use of bibliographic references about the history of the Brazilian workers' movement, focusing on the strategies of unionism in its different phases concerning the theme of corporate governance and Responsibility Law of state-owned companies (nº 13.303), approved in 2016, which established criteria such as professional experience, academic education and prohibitions that directly affected the Boards of Directors. In addition, interviews were conducted with three elected directors from companies Furnas, Eletronorte and Eletrosul along with a representative of the employees' association. Legislation were analysed and a mini-biography of the studied council members was made. In theoretical terms, this research used the concepts of “field, strategy, social game”, by Pierre Bourdieu, among others, which contributed to understand the difficulties, facilities and variables that surround the participation of workers' representatives in the highest administrative leadership of a state company. One of the results achieved was that the representatives conquer the legitimacy by the administrative logic when playing roles t... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Mestre