Sverige framställs ofta som ett av världens mest jämställda länder där män och kvinnor har samma möjlighet till inflytande och makt. Kvinnor på ledande positioner i Sverige har ökat de senast årtionden men när det kommer till högre positioner brister kvinnor i representationen, framförallt inom det privata näringslivet. Lönsamhetsargumentet har ofta används som ett skäl för att öka andelen kvinnor i börsnoterade styrelser och företagsledning, medan studier om diversifierade styrelser visar på ett blandat resultat både vad gäller lönsamhet och effektivitet. Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka representationen av kvinnor i företagens ledning på Large cap, Stockholmsbörsen men också se på hur denna representation kan förklaras samt hur mångfalden i styrelserna eventuellt kan utvecklas. Ett ytterligare syfte är att undersöka om det finns ett finansiellt argument om lönsamhet som kan motivera en ökning av andelen kvinnor i bolagsstyrelserna och om andelen kvinnor i nomineringskommittéerna leder till fler kvinnliga ledamöter i bolagsstyrelserna. Detta studeras genom en statistisk korrelationsanalys. Analysen förs på en teoretisk nivå utifrån ett genusperspektiv och ett ramverk om diversity management och mångfald. Totalt undersöktes 56 bolag under perioden 2006 till 2010, vilket innebär totalt 280 årsredovisningar. Resultatet visar att representationen av kvinnor i bolagsstyrelserna och ledningsgrupperna på Large cap är låga. Den kvinnliga styrelserepresentationen låg i genomsnitt mellan 2006 och 2010 på ca 21,5 procent och det var endast upp till fem företag som hade jämställd könsblandning bland styrelseledamöterna. Ledningsgrupperna visar på ännu lägre nivåer, med representation av ca 12,5 procent kvinnor och endast ett företag uppnådde jämställd könsblandning i ledningsgruppen år 2010. Studiens korrelationsanalyser visar på ett svagt linjärt samband mellan både andelen kvinnor i bolagsstyrelserna och lönsamhet i form av räntabilitet på sysselsatt kapital och mellan andel kvinnor i nomineringskommittéerna och andelen kvinnor i styrelserna. Slutsatser att dra av denna studie är att den kvinnliga representationen i bolagsstyrelser förändras successivt men förefaller att gå åt rätt håll med en ökning av kvinnor. Det största problemet är möjligen inte den kvinnliga representationen i bolagsstyrelserna utan män och kvinnors olika erfarenheter av organisationer vilket kan härledas till organisationernas könsstrukturer. Diversity management och mångfald kan utgöra argument för att öka representationen av kvinnor, detta genom att då ta tillvara på all kompetens i företagen och på så vis skapa konkurrensfördelar. Dock innebär detta ett arbete i organisationernas alla nivåer och kräver också aktieägarnas engagemang. / This study examines female representation in the board of directors and corporate management in companies listed at the OMX Stockholm Stock Exchange’s Large cap. The purpose of this thesis is to study female appearance in these companies and how it could be explained, as well as how diversity in the board of directors could develop. Another purpose is to explore if more women generate profitability and if more women in the committee of nomination in the companies leads to more women in the companies’ boards of directors. The approach of this thesis is quantitative, using a statistical data correlation analysis, but also applies a gender perspective of the organisation. The empirical results show a low presentation of women both in the board of directors and corporate management and the correlation in both analyses isn’t that strong. The conclusions are that the female appearance changes gradually but appears to have a positive development. The largest problem seems not to be the female appearance in the board of directors rather than the gender structures in the organisations. Diversity management could make an argument to take care of the competence in the organisations and get competitive advantages but that it’s demand collaboration in each level of the companies and the shareholders commitment.

One of the most debated issues is that of corporate governance. The topic has been investigated by scholars from several scientific fields including the legal. Indeed, corporate governance has been examined by a great number of law scholars, with particular regards to the improvement of various aspects. For example, effective corporate governance focuses on protecting and advancing aspects related to shareholders’ rights, the board of directors and corporations’ internal and external audit systems. The main objective of this research is to suggest reformation to the Saudi corporate governance framework in order to achieve satisfactory corporate governance practices. The second purpose of the research is to investigate the current practices involved in Saudi corporate governance arrangements. The final aim is to determine how a Saudi corporate governance framework would most benefit corporate governance from the Islamic perspective. This study intends to provide a regulatory analysis to influence those regulations that should be implemented to adjust corporate governance practices as they affect the Saudi capital market. The researcher found that Saudi corporate governance has been promulgated in accordance with principles of on-going international corporate governance. Alternatively, the Islamic perspective on corporate governance has been debated more recently, as an idea that needs to be progressed in order to provide associated benefits to the corporate governance framework in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, Saudi corporate governance provisions can be seen as based largely on positive man-made laws. The researcher further discovered that Saudi corporate governance as an institutional framework is divided between several institutions, whether internal or external, which might result in some ambiguity when it comes to implementing good corporate governance practices. However, the research results revealed that Saudi corporate governance provisions have to be reformed in accordance with popular worldwide corporate governance principles, namely the UK Corporate Governance Code, the UK Companies Act and the OECD principles of corporate governance produced.

I organisationers begynnelse fanns en annan typ av verklighet mot den vi idag kan se. Dagens organisationssamhälle är starkt förändrat med en större globalisering och ett fragmenterat samhällsliv. Tillsammans med organisationers jakt på effektivisering och vinstmaximering skapas nya strukturer och former av organisering. Med dessa förändringar i organiseringen och organisationssamhället skapas även en ny verklighet för individer i VD-roller att verka i. Mer aktuellt än någonsin verkar också de många avhoppen och avskedanden av individer i denna roll vara. I min studie undersökte jag därför huruvida ansvar och krav på en VD är anpassade till dagens organisationssamhälle för att möjliggöra uppfyllandet av rollen. Denna frågeställning besvarar jag genom att studera vilka krav som ställs av omgivningen på individen i en VD-roll, hur individen i VD-rollen ser på sin roll och vad VD-rollen innebär i praktiken. Vad jag såg var att man i dagens organisering kan se en anpassning till den komplexitet som dagens organisationssamhälle innebär. Den ökade kunskaps-nivån i samhället och organisationerna som man kan se idag skapar en möjlighet till en ökad decentralisering som också medger en anpassning av ledarrollen. Jag såg dock en diskrepans i de krav som ställs av företagsstyrelsen på individerna i rollen mot hur de själva upplever innehållet i sin roll och där-igenom även sin person eftersom deras självidentitet påverkas till stor del av deras egenupplevelse av sin ledarroll. En diskrepans såg jag även mellan rollens praktik relaterat till både hur individen ser på sin roll samt hur omgivningen ställer krav på individen. Dessa delar anser jag bör ligga på företagsstyrelserna att arbeta med för att utforma sina krav anpassat till rollens praktik och individens egenupplevelse av rollen. Detta skulle kunna underlätta individernas möjlighet att uppfylla kraven på VD-rollen och lyckas i sitt arbete eftersom de idag har en mycket krävande arbetssituation med långa arbetsdagar och stora ansvar. / In the beginning of organisations there was a different kind of reality to what we see today. Today´s organisational society is profoundly altered with a greater globalisation and a more fragmented society. Together with the strive for increased efficiency and profit maximisation by the organisations, this leads to new structures and organisational models. These changes in the organising and organisational society also create a new reality for the individuals in a CEO´s role to operate in.  More topical than ever seem also the many defections and dismissals of individuals in this role to be. In my research I therefore studied whether responsibilities and requirements for a CEO are adapted to today´s organizational society to enable the fulfilment of the role. I reach the conclusion for this question by studying the requirements for the CEO role, the individual’s self-experience of the role and the practice of the CEO role. What I found was that an adaption to the complexity of today´s organizational society can be seen in today´s organisational models. The increased level of knowledge in society and organisations create an opportunity for greater decentralisation which also allows for an adjustment of the leadership role. I did, however, find a discrepancy in the demands made by the board of directors for the individuals in the role relative to their own self-experience of the role, and thereby also their persona as their self-identity is largely influenced by their self-experience of their leadership role. I also found a discrepancy between the practice of the role and the individuals self-experience of the role as well as the requirements made on the individual in the role. I consider these discrepancies to be the responsibility of the board of directors to ensure they are taken into account for when the requirements for the individuals in the role are defined. This could facilitate better possibilities for the individuals in the role to succeed as today´s reality includes a demanding working environment with long hours and great responsibility.

This thesis explores whether independent directors in the USA and Canada are effective in holding management accountable by: (1) analyzing how the policy of relying on independent directors developed and operates; (2) introducing the main theoretical critiques of independent directors’ monitoring effect; and (3) examining whether empirical studies in the field of management science and financial economics support the policy in both countries of relying on independent directors as corporate monitors. Empirical evidence shows that boards with a majority of independent directors, in some circumstances, were associated with better firm performance (in the post-SOX period) and fulfilled certain board tasks effectively in the United States. Canadian studies, however, have not shown a positive association with improved firm performance. Audit committees composed entirely of independent directors have been effective in ensuring the quality of financial reporting in the United States, but this effect has not been found in Canada. Compensation committees composed fully of independent directors neither constrained the level of executive compensation nor tied CEO pay to firm performance in either country. US firms with an audit committee member who had accounting expertise, rather than financial analysis or supervisory expertise, were associated with a higher quality of financial reporting, while Canadian firms with an audit committee member who has financial expertise, instead of financial literacy, were associated with a similar effect. Studies also showed that independent directors perform better in certain circumstances. Based on empirical evidence, US regulators should consider: (1) changing the current mandatory requirements for an independent board and a completely independent compensation committee to a comply-or-explain requirement; (2) narrowing the qualification of a financial expert to an individual who has accounting expertise; and (3) recruiting independent directors who have two or fewer outside directorships, hold more of the corporation’s shares, have lower cost of acquiring corporate information, and have no social connections with the CEO. In Canada, weak evidence of the monitoring effectiveness of independent directors supports the existing comply-or-explain approach. Canadian regulators may only need to require or recommend that at least one audit committee member has financial expertise, instead of only financial literacy.

In March 2003, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) released new corporate governance guidelines, which included debatable “best practice” recommendations such as the adoption of an independent board and separation of the roles of chairperson and CEO. Given the premise that strong corporate governance enhances shareholder value and, by extension, increases initial public offering (IPO) issuers’ appeal to investors, this thesis assesses the level of conformity by a sample of Australian firms, which made an IPO between 1994 and 1999, with the best practice recommendations. We also examine the relationship between firm outcomes (including IPO underpricing, post-IPO long-run performance, and the likelihood of a SEO) and board governance quality, captured by board composition, board leadership, board size and share ownership of directors. These outcomes are addressed as they are important dimensions of firm performance that may be reasonably assumed to be associated with the quality of corporate governance, and these tests can provide an insight into the preference of investors who arguably are best placed to assess the appropriateness of the recommendations promoted by the ASX. Further, we analyse changes in IPO firms’ board structures from the time of listing to five years later to determine if IPO firms adopt governance structures that are more in line with the best practice recommendations after listing and if the changes are related to IPO firms’ long-run performance. Overall, we find that IPO firms that arguably have the strongest incentive to adopt the “optimal” board structures diverge substantially from ASX’s recommendations both at the time of IPO and five years later. IPO firms’ board structures are found to be unrelated with the level of IPO underpricing and board size, after controlling for the size of the firm, is significant in explaining both long-run aftermarket performance and the probability of a SEO. IPO firms with larger boards and those that increase the board size after listing are found to perform better in the long-run. However, contrary to expectation, smaller boards are associated with a higher likelihood of equity reissuance. Overall, the results lead us to question the role played by the board of directors in signalling firm quality. Our findings also suggest that ASX’s best practice recommendations are likely to distort the market-driven practices already in place.

Zugl.: Köln, Univ., Diss., 2009

No description available.

Atuando como principal mecanismo interno para a diminuição dos custos de agência entre acionistas e gestores, entre acionistas controladores e minoritários, o conselho de administração possui um papel fundamental na governança corporativa das empresas. Por esta razão, o objetivo deste estudo é analisar o papel do conselho de administração. Analisamos o caso concreto da maior instituição financeira do país: o caso do Banco do Brasil e busca-se identificar a sua contribuição para a atual política de governança corporativa adotada pela instituição. É importante destacar a relevância do Banco do Brasil no cenário econômico, político e social nacional. Trata-se da maior instituição financeira da America Latina, alcançando recentemente a marca de R$ 755.706 milhões de ativos administrados. Como uma empresa de economia mista, tem como seu principal controlador o governo federal, com participação de 59,2% do capital total, tornando a sua administração, constantemente, alvo de dúvidas e incertezas por parte dos investidores. Veremos que o Banco do Brasil através de sua alta cúpula e principalmente do conselho de administração vêm sinalizando estar engajado em diminuir estas incertezas do mercado e demonstrar mais transparência em suas operações, adotando melhores práticas de governança corporativa em sua gestão. Esta forte preocupação já lhe rendeu resultados, pois em junho de 2006 o BB tornou-se a primeira empresa federal a ser listada no Novo Mercado da Bovespa. / Acting as the main internal mechanism to reduce agency costs between managers and shareholders, between controlling and minority shareholders, the board has a key role in corporate governance of companies. For this reason, the objective of this study is to analyze the role of the board. We analyze the case of the largest financial institution in the country: the case of Bank of Brazil and try to identify their contribution to the current corporate governance policy adopted by the institution. Importantly, the relevance of the Bank of Brazil in the economic, political and social national. It is the largest financial institution in Latin America, recently reached the mark of R $ 755,706 billion of assets under management. As a mixed economy company, has as its main controller the federal government, with participation of 59.2% of total capital, making its administration, constantly subject to doubt and uncertainty among investors. We will see that the Bank of Brazil through its high dome and above the board have indicated to be engaged in reducing these uncertainties in the market and demonstrate greater transparency in its operations by adopting best corporate governance practices in its management. This concern has earned him strong results, because in June 2006, BB became the first federal company to be listed in the New Market from Bovespa.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-29T11:13:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_6477_DISSERTAÇÃO PDF - LUCIANA HOLTZ.pdf: 1147456 bytes, checksum: e4685b4cda339cffd9ae631e2c05aad3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-05-22 / Esta pesquisa foi desenvolvida com o objetivo de investigar os efeitos das características da estrutura e composição do conselho de administração sobre a qualidade das informações contábeis das empresas listadas na BM&FBovespa. Especificamente as características do conselho estudadas foram o tamanho e a independência do conselho de administração, e a separação dos cargos de presidente do conselho e diretor executivo da empresa. As proxies para qualidade da informação contábil foram a relevância da informação contábil e informatividade dos lucros. A amostra abrange empresas não financeiras listadas na BM&FBovespa com liquidez anual superior a 0,001, compreendendo o período de 2008 à 2011. Os dados foram coletados apartir do banco de dados Economática® e diretamente dos informes anuais e formulários de referência das empresas disponíveis no sítio da CVM ou BM&Fbovespa. Para atingir o objetivo proposto a metologia da pesquisa consiste em uma abordagem quantitativa com base em Vafeas(2000), Firth, Fung e Rui (2006) e Habib e Azim (2008). A análise dos dados foi a partir da utilização da técnica de regressão múltipla para a estimação dos modelos de relevância da informação contábil e informatividade dos lucros. Os resultados indicam que no mercado brasileiro, para as empresas que negociam ações na BM&FBovespa, as características de independência do conselho de administração e separação dos cargos de presidente do conselho de administração e diretor executivo influenciam positivamente na qualidade da informação contábil reportada, especificamente sobre relevância do patrimônio líquido. Já a informatividade dos lucros é afetada positivamente pela independência do conselho de administração e negativamente pelos conselhos com tamanhos maiores (acima de 9 membros). Os resultados em geral corroboram com estudos internacionais tais como Vafeas (2000), Firth, Fung e Rui (2006), Ahmed, Hossain e Adams (2006) e Dimitropoulos e Asteriou (2010), especialmente em relação à independência do conselho de administração. É possível verificar que estruturas de governança mais fortes exercem efeitos que melhoram a qualidade das informações contábeis reportadas. / This research was developed with the objective of investigating the effects of the characteristics of structure and composition of the board of directors on the quality of accounting information of the companies listed on the BM&FBovespa. Specifically, the characteristics of the board studied were the size and the independence of the board, and the separation of the roles of the president of the board and the chief executive of the business. The proxies for quality of accounting information were the value relevance of the accounting information and the informativeness of earnings. The sample includes non-financial firms listed on the BM&FBovespa with an annual liquidity higher than 0,001, during the period of 2008 to 2011. The data was collected from the Economática® data base and directly from annual reports and reference forms of firms available on the CVM or BM&FBovespa site. To reach the proposed objective the methodology of research consists in a quantitative approach based on Vafeas (2000), Firth, Fung and Rui (2006) and Habib and Azim (2008). The analysis of the data was based on the technique of multiple regression for the estimation of models of value relevance of accounting information and informativeness of earnings. The results indicate that in the Brazilian market, for firms that negotiate stock on the BM&FBovespa, the characteristics of independence of the board of directors and separation of the roles of president of the board of directors and of chief executive have a positive influence on the quality of the accounting information being reported, specifically on the relevance of the net equity. The informativeness of earnings is positively affected by the independence of the board of directors and negatively by the bigger boards (above nine members). The results in general corroborate with international studies such as Vafeas (2000), Firth, Fung and Rui (2006), Ahmed, Hossain and Adams (2006) and Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010), specially relating to the independence of the board of directors. Is possible to check that stronger governance structures exercise effects that improve the quality of accounting information reported.

Atuando como principal mecanismo interno para a diminuição dos custos de agência entre acionistas e gestores, entre acionistas controladores e minoritários, o conselho de administração possui um papel fundamental na governança corporativa das empresas. Por esta razão, o objetivo deste estudo é analisar o papel do conselho de administração. Analisamos o caso concreto da maior instituição financeira do país: o caso do Banco do Brasil e busca-se identificar a sua contribuição para a atual política de governança corporativa adotada pela instituição. É importante destacar a relevância do Banco do Brasil no cenário econômico, político e social nacional. Trata-se da maior instituição financeira da America Latina, alcançando recentemente a marca de R$ 755.706 milhões de ativos administrados. Como uma empresa de economia mista, tem como seu principal controlador o governo federal, com participação de 59,2% do capital total, tornando a sua administração, constantemente, alvo de dúvidas e incertezas por parte dos investidores. Veremos que o Banco do Brasil através de sua alta cúpula e principalmente do conselho de administração vêm sinalizando estar engajado em diminuir estas incertezas do mercado e demonstrar mais transparência em suas operações, adotando melhores práticas de governança corporativa em sua gestão. Esta forte preocupação já lhe rendeu resultados, pois em junho de 2006 o BB tornou-se a primeira empresa federal a ser listada no Novo Mercado da Bovespa. / Acting as the main internal mechanism to reduce agency costs between managers and shareholders, between controlling and minority shareholders, the board has a key role in corporate governance of companies. For this reason, the objective of this study is to analyze the role of the board. We analyze the case of the largest financial institution in the country: the case of Bank of Brazil and try to identify their contribution to the current corporate governance policy adopted by the institution. Importantly, the relevance of the Bank of Brazil in the economic, political and social national. It is the largest financial institution in Latin America, recently reached the mark of R $ 755,706 billion of assets under management. As a mixed economy company, has as its main controller the federal government, with participation of 59.2% of total capital, making its administration, constantly subject to doubt and uncertainty among investors. We will see that the Bank of Brazil through its high dome and above the board have indicated to be engaged in reducing these uncertainties in the market and demonstrate greater transparency in its operations by adopting best corporate governance practices in its management. This concern has earned him strong results, because in June 2006, BB became the first federal company to be listed in the New Market from Bovespa.