Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2018-11-12T15:20:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Jane Marusa Nunes Luiz_.pdf: 565579 bytes, checksum: 13fdbf6433de47f1951a5c703acbbd78 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-12T15:20:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jane Marusa Nunes Luiz_.pdf: 565579 bytes, checksum: 13fdbf6433de47f1951a5c703acbbd78 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-07-05 / Nenhuma / O objetivo deste estudo é investigar empiricamente o comparecimento dos membros do conselho às reuniões e seus efeitos na remuneração do conselho de administração das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto listadas na BM&FBOVESPA, no período de 2015 a 2016. Para a consecução desta pesquisa, testou-se um grupo abrangente de variáveis considerando os argumentos da teoria de agência e a literatura anterior, mediante a utilização de regressão linear múltipla. Os resultados indicam que o tamanho do conselho e o número de conselheiros ocupados afetam negativamente a remuneração, enquanto que a independência do conselho, a participação em comitês, a idade e a área de formação são positivamente associadas com a remuneração do conselho de administração. Também se verificou que há relação entre o tamanho, a rentabilidade e o controle acionário da empresa com a remuneração do conselho. Identificou-se ainda que o percentual de frequência dos membros do conselho é de aproximadamente 93%, e que são realizadas em torno de 12 reuniões anuais, todavia o esforço do conselho de administração, medido pela frequência e o número de reuniões, não demonstrou significância estatística para explicar a remuneração. Essas descobertas fornecem implicações para futuras pesquisas a respeito do desempenho dos conselheiros no monitoramento da gestão e a remuneração do conselho de administração e dos executivos. / The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the attendance of direcors at meetings and their effects on board compensation of Brazilian companies listed on BM&FBOVESPA, from 2015 to 2016. To achieve this research, a comprehensive set of variables was tested considering the arguments of agency theory and previous literature, using multiple linear regression. The results indicate that the size of the board and the number of busy direct affect negatively the compensation, while board independence, participation in committees, age and graduation are positively associated with compensation of the board of directors. It has also been found that there is a relationship between size, profitability and the shareholding control of the company with the board compensation. It was also identified that the percentage of board members' attendance is approximately 93%, and which are held around 12 annual meetings, however, the effort of the board of directors, as measured by the frequency and number of meetings, showed no significance statistical analysis to explain the compensation. These findings provide implications for future researches into the performance of directors in monitoring the management and compensation of the board of directors and executives.

Corporate Governance (CG) nowadays is on the agenda of most developed and developing countries, including Jordan, and is receiving considerable attention in the business world as well as in the area of academic research, which is an indication of its importance for business development and society as a whole. The knowledge base about CG in developing countries appears to be limited, but it is growing in size and importance. This study therefore aims to investigate current CG practices and barriers to the development of good CG practices in firms. In order to accomplish the research objectives, a mixed research methodology was adopted. The findings of the study contribute to knowledge by providing empirical data to test and extend the theory of CG. The results suggest that most big and old firms are applying best practice of good CG. Regarding factors inhibiting the practice of effective CG, the results indicate that weakness of the legal environment for firms and lack of knowledge of BODs about CG principles are the most important factors. The empirical results find that constitution, compliance and conscience will affect firm’s performance positively. Separation between the position of CEO and Chairman, the existence of independent NEDs, the use of board subcommittees and a strong disclosure regime also help firms to improve performance. On the basis of the empirical results, the study recommends that the government needs to reform the relevant legislation. These suggestions may strengthen the internal governance of firms, thereby increasing performance and maximise shareholders’ wealth.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-08-23T12:33:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucianne Ramalho do Canto_.pdf: 4128139 bytes, checksum: 331ce28f478404cd8cc2656513be7e7f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-23T12:33:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucianne Ramalho do Canto_.pdf: 4128139 bytes, checksum: 331ce28f478404cd8cc2656513be7e7f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-06-28 / UNISINOS - Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos / O presente trabalho apresenta um estudo a respeito da intensidade de participação do Conselho de Administração na formulação estratégica das grandes empresas brasileiras. O mesmo se justifica, principalmente, por ainda haver muita pluralidade e ausência de conclusão em relação a qual o nível ideal de participação do conselho com a estratégia da organização. Além disso, as atuais crises financeiras e empresariais colocam os conselhos como atores da discussão sobre a responsabilidade com a governança da empresa. Para analisar a intensidade de participação dos conselhos na formulação estratégica, se buscou entender o contexto em que as empresas estão inseridas; as características do órgão que favorecem ou dificultam o envolvimento ativo na formulação da estratégia; e as atividades desempenhadas pelos mesmos na formulação estratégica. Esses objetivos foram cumpridos através da vertente qualitativa de pesquisa, que se utilizou de três diferentes formas de coleta de dados: (1) pesquisa documental, principalmente em atas e documentos do conselho; (2) entrevistas em profundidade com presidentes de conselho, conselheiros e expert do IBGC; e (3) observações em reuniões do conselho de administração das organizações participantes. Como campo de pesquisa foram utilizadas as grandes empresas brasileiras, pertencentes aos níveis 2 e novo mercado. Com o estudo, foi possível observar que as empresas cumprem diferentes intensidades de participação na condução da formulação estratégica. Foram analisados alguns aspectos que podem impactar nessa posição como: composição acionária, estrutura de poder, composição do conselho e práticas realizadas pelo mesmo. Por fim, foi definido o perfil de cada empresa estudada em relação ao seu tipo de “strategising”, relacionando com as evidências encontradas ao estudar a estrutura e características de cada conselho. Foi possível constatar, que os conselhos, em geral, apresentam um alto nível de envolvimento com a estratégia das organizações – mas cada uma com as suas lacunas no que diz respeito à condução do processo de formulação estratégica. / The current essay presents a study about the board of director’s intensity of participation in the strategy formulation of the large Brazilian companies. This study can be justified mainly by the fact that still remains many points of views and a lack of conclusion regarding the ideal involvement level of the board concerning the company’s strategy. In addition, the current financial and corporate crisis leverages the boards as protagonists of the discussion about the responsibility with the company governance. To analyze the participation intensity of the board on the strategy formulation, it was sought to understand the context in which the companies operates, the board of director’s characteristics which reflects positively or create difficulties to its active involvement and how the board engages to the strategy formulation in practical terms. Those objectives were reached through a qualitative research, which has used three different data collection ways: (1) documentary research, mostly in the board of directors minute books and its documents; (2) in-depth interviews with chairmen of the board, advisers and IBGC expert; and (3) observations of board of director meetings. As the research field were considered some of the biggest Brazilian companies, belonging to the levels 2 or “new market”, according to the BM&FBOVESPA definition. Along the study, it was possible to observe that the companies comply with different intensity levels on participating or conducting the strategic formulation. Were analyzed some aspects that could impact on this position, such as shareholding structure, power structure, the composition of the board and their practices. Finally, it was defined the profile of every studied company according to its “strategizing” style, relating to the founded evidences while studying their board of directors structure and characteristics. It was found that the board of directors, generally, shows a high level of involvement with the companies strategies – however each one with their gaps regarding the strategic formulation leading process.

<p>From July 2005 on, the new Swedish Corporate Governance Code will be applied gradually by companies listed on the stock exchange or any authorized financial market in Sweden. The Code has been drawn up in order to clarify and to improve the self-regulation in Swedish companies. The need for codified self-regulation standards has been considered as urgent due to negative trends on the market such as the last few years’ corporate scandals in domestic and international trade and industry. The sought-after consequence is to clarify the mission framework for corporate directors.</p><p>Ch. 15, section 1 of the Swedish Corporate Act (Aktiebolagslagen) regulates the internal and external damages liability of corporate directors. In order to decide whether or not they have broken a rule or neglected to follow their responsibilities, and thereby contracted damages liability, a so-called culpa judgement is to be made. Virtue of the culpa judgement is foremost found in Ch. 8 of the Swedish Corporate Act, regulating the tasks of the corporate directors.</p><p>The Stockholm Stock Exchange has decided to incorporate the Code in their quotation prerequisites. This means that all quoted companies have to comply to the Code or, when compliance is not possible, explain the cause of divergence.</p><p>My purpose with this master thesis is to investigate in what way the new Corporate Governance Code affects the culpa judgement, as well as to discuss in what conditions the Stockholm Stock Exchange can handle the code as a disciplinary instrument towards the quoted companies.</p> / <p>Från juli 2005 skall den nya svenska koden för bolagsstyrning successivt börja tillämpas av bolag vars aktier kan handlas på börs eller annan auktoriserad marknadsplats i Sverige. Koden har utformats i syfte att förtydliga och förbättra självregleringen i svenska bolag. Behovet av kodifierade självregleringsnormer har ansetts stort inte minst med tanke på de senaste årens bolagsskandaler i svenskt och internationellt näringsliv. Följden blir, hoppas man, bland annat att bolagens styrelser och verkställande direktörer skall kunna arbeta efter tydligare ramar i sina uppdrag.</p><p>Genom ABL 15:1 regleras styrelseledamots och vd:s interna och externa skadeståndsansvar. För att kunna avgöra huruvida de brutit mot eller underlåtit att genomföra sina förpliktelser, och därigenom ådragit sig ett skadeståndsansvar, görs en s k culpabedömning. Ledning för culpabedömningen hämtas främst från bolagsledningens arbetsuppgifter såsom de är formulerade i ABL 8 kap.</p><p>Stockholmsbörsen har beslutat att införliva koden i sina noteringskrav. Detta innebär att samtliga noterade bolag måste följa kodens regler eller, när så inte är möjligt, avge en förklaring till varför så inte skett.</p><p>Föremålet för min uppsats är att utreda på vilket sätt den nya koden för bolagsstyrning påverkar culpabedömningen, samt diskutera Stockholmsbörsens förutsättningar att hantera koden som ett disciplinärt instrument gentemot de noterade bolagen.</p>

<p>Avsikten med studien är att undersöka relationen mellan valberedning, ägare och styrelse samt utifrån detta studera vilken roll valberedningen har, enligt den Svenska Koden.</p><p>Vi har utgått ifrån en deduktiv ansats, där vi både har genomfört en kvantitativ och en kvalitativ undersökning. Den kvalitativa studien baseras på djupintervjuer av ledamöter i svenska börsnoterade företag, medan den kvantitativa undersökningen resulterar i en statistisk undersökning, som utgår från bolagsstyrningsrapporter i årsredovisningar från 2006.</p><p>I det teoretiska perspektivet tas den Svenska Koden för bolagsstyrning upp som utgångspunkt och kompletteras med Aktiebolagsslagen (ABL), agentteorin, intressentmodellen, coporate governance, CSR-modellen samt ett genusperspektiv.</p><p>I empirin redovisas respondenternas yttranden samt den statistiska undersökningen.</p><p>Vi har med hjälp av empiri och analys kommit fram till ett antal slutsatser; valberedningen har endast en uppgift, vilken är att ta fram förslag om nya ledamöter till styrelsen. Förslagen ska leda till att styrelsen får en så bra sammansättning som möjligt. Valberedningen har till viss del ökat förtroendet för bolagen, genom att processen blivit tydligare samt mer transparant. Vår undersökning visar att nästan samtliga företag som är noterade på Stockholmsbörsens LargeCap-lista, använder sig av en valberedning, vilket vi ser som ett bra tecken. Koden är fortfarande relativt ny och är därför ännu inte fulländad. Koden är även unik i ett internationellt perspektiv och den svenska företagskulturen verkar anpassa sig efter Kodens riktlinjer.</p> / <p>The thesis aspires to explore the relationship between the nomination committee, shareholders and the board of directors, and that on the basis of this to study which role the nomination committee has, according to the guidelines of the Swedish Code.</p><p>We have had a deductive approach, where we both have implemented a qualitative and a quantitative survey. The qualitative study is based on interviews with members in Swedish companies, listed on the stock-market, while the quantitative study results in a statistic survey which is gathered from corporate governance reports in the annual reports from 2006.</p><p>The theoretical perspectives uses the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance as a starting point and is complemented with the Swedish Company Law, the Agent Theory, Stakeholder Theory, Corporate Governance, the CSR model, gender- and ethical perspective.</p><p>The respondents’ statements and the statistic survey are in this section presented.</p><p>We have through our empirical and analyses, drawn a number of conclusions. The Nomination committee has only one responsibility, which is to present candidate proposals for the board of directors. The proposals are supposed to lead to a composition that is as balanced as possible. The Nomination committee has in a certain extent enhanced the confidence for corporations through a clearer process and transparency. Our exploration shows that almost every company listed on the stock-market, are applying a nomination committee, which we see as a good sign. The Swedish Code is still relatively new and is therefore not yet perfect. The Swedish Code is also unique in an international perspective and the Swedish corporate culture seems to acclimatize well to its policies.</p>

From July 2005 on, the new Swedish Corporate Governance Code will be applied gradually by companies listed on the stock exchange or any authorized financial market in Sweden. The Code has been drawn up in order to clarify and to improve the self-regulation in Swedish companies. The need for codified self-regulation standards has been considered as urgent due to negative trends on the market such as the last few years’ corporate scandals in domestic and international trade and industry. The sought-after consequence is to clarify the mission framework for corporate directors. Ch. 15, section 1 of the Swedish Corporate Act (Aktiebolagslagen) regulates the internal and external damages liability of corporate directors. In order to decide whether or not they have broken a rule or neglected to follow their responsibilities, and thereby contracted damages liability, a so-called culpa judgement is to be made. Virtue of the culpa judgement is foremost found in Ch. 8 of the Swedish Corporate Act, regulating the tasks of the corporate directors. The Stockholm Stock Exchange has decided to incorporate the Code in their quotation prerequisites. This means that all quoted companies have to comply to the Code or, when compliance is not possible, explain the cause of divergence. My purpose with this master thesis is to investigate in what way the new Corporate Governance Code affects the culpa judgement, as well as to discuss in what conditions the Stockholm Stock Exchange can handle the code as a disciplinary instrument towards the quoted companies. / Från juli 2005 skall den nya svenska koden för bolagsstyrning successivt börja tillämpas av bolag vars aktier kan handlas på börs eller annan auktoriserad marknadsplats i Sverige. Koden har utformats i syfte att förtydliga och förbättra självregleringen i svenska bolag. Behovet av kodifierade självregleringsnormer har ansetts stort inte minst med tanke på de senaste årens bolagsskandaler i svenskt och internationellt näringsliv. Följden blir, hoppas man, bland annat att bolagens styrelser och verkställande direktörer skall kunna arbeta efter tydligare ramar i sina uppdrag. Genom ABL 15:1 regleras styrelseledamots och vd:s interna och externa skadeståndsansvar. För att kunna avgöra huruvida de brutit mot eller underlåtit att genomföra sina förpliktelser, och därigenom ådragit sig ett skadeståndsansvar, görs en s k culpabedömning. Ledning för culpabedömningen hämtas främst från bolagsledningens arbetsuppgifter såsom de är formulerade i ABL 8 kap. Stockholmsbörsen har beslutat att införliva koden i sina noteringskrav. Detta innebär att samtliga noterade bolag måste följa kodens regler eller, när så inte är möjligt, avge en förklaring till varför så inte skett. Föremålet för min uppsats är att utreda på vilket sätt den nya koden för bolagsstyrning påverkar culpabedömningen, samt diskutera Stockholmsbörsens förutsättningar att hantera koden som ett disciplinärt instrument gentemot de noterade bolagen.

Avsikten med studien är att undersöka relationen mellan valberedning, ägare och styrelse samt utifrån detta studera vilken roll valberedningen har, enligt den Svenska Koden. Vi har utgått ifrån en deduktiv ansats, där vi både har genomfört en kvantitativ och en kvalitativ undersökning. Den kvalitativa studien baseras på djupintervjuer av ledamöter i svenska börsnoterade företag, medan den kvantitativa undersökningen resulterar i en statistisk undersökning, som utgår från bolagsstyrningsrapporter i årsredovisningar från 2006. I det teoretiska perspektivet tas den Svenska Koden för bolagsstyrning upp som utgångspunkt och kompletteras med Aktiebolagsslagen (ABL), agentteorin, intressentmodellen, coporate governance, CSR-modellen samt ett genusperspektiv. I empirin redovisas respondenternas yttranden samt den statistiska undersökningen. Vi har med hjälp av empiri och analys kommit fram till ett antal slutsatser; valberedningen har endast en uppgift, vilken är att ta fram förslag om nya ledamöter till styrelsen. Förslagen ska leda till att styrelsen får en så bra sammansättning som möjligt. Valberedningen har till viss del ökat förtroendet för bolagen, genom att processen blivit tydligare samt mer transparant. Vår undersökning visar att nästan samtliga företag som är noterade på Stockholmsbörsens LargeCap-lista, använder sig av en valberedning, vilket vi ser som ett bra tecken. Koden är fortfarande relativt ny och är därför ännu inte fulländad. Koden är även unik i ett internationellt perspektiv och den svenska företagskulturen verkar anpassa sig efter Kodens riktlinjer. / The thesis aspires to explore the relationship between the nomination committee, shareholders and the board of directors, and that on the basis of this to study which role the nomination committee has, according to the guidelines of the Swedish Code. We have had a deductive approach, where we both have implemented a qualitative and a quantitative survey. The qualitative study is based on interviews with members in Swedish companies, listed on the stock-market, while the quantitative study results in a statistic survey which is gathered from corporate governance reports in the annual reports from 2006. The theoretical perspectives uses the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance as a starting point and is complemented with the Swedish Company Law, the Agent Theory, Stakeholder Theory, Corporate Governance, the CSR model, gender- and ethical perspective. The respondents’ statements and the statistic survey are in this section presented. We have through our empirical and analyses, drawn a number of conclusions. The Nomination committee has only one responsibility, which is to present candidate proposals for the board of directors. The proposals are supposed to lead to a composition that is as balanced as possible. The Nomination committee has in a certain extent enhanced the confidence for corporations through a clearer process and transparency. Our exploration shows that almost every company listed on the stock-market, are applying a nomination committee, which we see as a good sign. The Swedish Code is still relatively new and is therefore not yet perfect. The Swedish Code is also unique in an international perspective and the Swedish corporate culture seems to acclimatize well to its policies.

Titel: Förklaringar till varför ersättning till VD och styrelse är olika - En studie om ersättningars form och funktion. Bakgrund: Ersättning till VD är generellt sätt högre än den ersättning en styrelse erhåller. Vi ämnar studera varför ersättningarna mellan organen skiljer sig åt i den utsträckning de gör och vad det kan bero på. Syfte: Förklara varför ersättningarnas form och funktion skiljer sig åt mellan VD och styrelse. Metod: Utgå från tidigare forskning och genomföra statistiska analyser av kontrollvariabler, för att sedan studera hur resultaten i testerna förändras när vi tillför våra egna variabler, som mäter skillnader i uppgifter hos VD och styrelse, och observera ifall signifikanta samband till ersättningarna kan utläsas. Resultat: Utifrån våra statistiska tester erhöll vi ett positivt signifikant samband med hur VD:ar har yttrat sig i VD-breven i årsredovisningarna, och VD:ns rörliga ersättning. Vilket visar på att en specifik uppgift för VD genererar en högre ersättning till denne. Detta tyder på att en skillnad i uppgifter mellan organen VD och styrelse, kan förklara varför det finns nivåskillnader i ersättningarna till de båda organen. Vidare kunde inga empiriska samband till VD:ns fasta ersättning, eller styrelsens fasta ersättning hänföras till våra variabler som mätte skillnader i uppgifter. Slutsatser: Vi kan konstatera att VD:ns rörliga ersättning påverkas av hur denne uttalat sig i VD-breven i årsredovisningarna. Vi kan från vår teoretiska referensram, härleda att detta beror på en skillnad i uppgifter mellan organen VD och styrelse. Våra teoretiska modeller konstaterar att VD och styrelse har differentierade uppgifter, vilket i sin tur påverkar hur ersättning till respektive organ kan skilja sig i utformning och nivå. / Title: Explanations as to why compensation to CEO and board of directors are different – A study about the compensations form and function. Background: Compensation to a CEO is generally higher than that of the compensation witch a board of directors receive. We intend to study why the compensation between the agencies differ in the extent that they do, and the reasons for that difference. Purpose: Explain why the compensations form and function differ between the CEO and the board of directors. Method: From existing research, we aim to execute statistical analyses of controlvariables, then study how the results of our tests alters when we insert our own variables that aim to measure the differences in functions of the CEO and the board of directors, and observe if significant relationships are to be found. Results: Based on our statistical tests, we obtained a positive significant relationship with the CEOs discloser in the CEO letters in the annual reports, and the CEOs variable compensation. This shows that a specific function of the CEO generates a higher compensation to such a position. This suggests that a difference in functions between the agencies, CEO and board of directors, may explain why there are different levels of compensations to both agencies. Furthermore, no empirical relationship of the CEOs fixed compensation, or of the board's fixed compensation could be related to our variables measuring differences in functions. Conclusions: We can conclude that the CEO's variable compensation is affected by how the CEO has expressed himself or herself in the CEO letters in the annual reports. We can, from our theoretical framework, deduce that this is due to a difference in functions between the agencies CEO and board of directors. Our theoretical models conclude that the CEO and the board of directors have differentiated tasks, which in turn can affect how the compensation to each agency may differ in form and level.

The United Kingdom Combined Code is today the most fundamental corporate governance code applicable in United Kingdom. The nation of United Kingdom encourages governance practices by implementing the Directive 2006/46/EC on a voluntary basis before being mandatory. While corporate governance is applicable to many corporations, pension providers may be seen as one of the ideal market sector for governing, since they act as institutional investors representing a major shareholder group. Institutional investors may even improve corporate governance practices as they represent a major part of public sector capital. Owning large amount of shares, their function is to supervise in the firms’ corporate governance activities in order to monitor the transparency and disclosure procedures. To be able to monitor other companies' activities, pension providers must set up an example for enforcing corporate governance practices themselves and follow them respectively.   This descriptive case study observes the corporate governance structures represented in annual reports of five large chosen pension providers during the years 2007 to 2009 capturing the financial crisis occurring in 2008, in United Kingdom. The purpose of the study is to examine if strong corporate governance is incorporated in the following pension providers, Aberdeen Asset Management plc, Aviva plc, Prudential plc, Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Limited and Standard Life plc. The focus is on board composition and established committees. The scope of this study answers the following research question: How do the five pension providers, Aberdeen, Prudential, Royal London, Standard Life and Aviva, comply with or explain deviations found in their respectively annual reports from 2007-2009 in accordance with the Combined Code 2008 and the Annotated Combined Code 2005?   Fundamental for pension providers is to work on a long-term basis with value creation as goal. Still the core focus of corporate governance remains, to create a system offering protection for all stakeholders. As the result shows, all of the five chosen corporations strongly implement national corporate governance practices throughout 2007-2009 on both board composition and established committees. Still, they suffered short-term negative fluctuations from the United Kingdom financial crises in 2008, but recovered shortly afterwards. Even though these fluctuations occurred, all of the corporations have long-term value as one of their main objectives. The long-term value can partly be sustained by strong corporate governance practices as it a main objective in corporate governance.

Bakgrund: Behovet av bolagsstyrning är stort för mindre familjeföretag, då det kan hjälpa dem att hantera deras komplexa omvärld. Framförallt är det styrelsen som har en viktig roll när det gäller bolagsstyrning i familjeföretag. Ett aktivt styrelsearbete är viktigt för att de ska kunna stå sig i den ökande globala konkurrensen. En extern styrelseledamot kan bidra till ett aktivt och effektivt styrelsearbete och därmed ge företaget konkurrensfördelar. Det finns dock vissa problem förknippade med tillsättandet av externa styrelseledamöter som kan påverka valet att ta in utomstående i styrelsen. Därmed väcks frågan; vad är det egentligen som påverkar ett litet familjeföretags beslut att tillsätta en extern styrelseledamot? Syfte: Studiens syfte är attförklara varför små familjeägda aktiebolag väljer att tillsätta externa styrelseledamöter. Metod: Studiens syfte har besvarats genom en kvalitativ metod med en deduktiv ansats. Empiriskt material har samlats in genom djupgående intervjuer med representanter för tre små familjeägda aktiebolag, varav två av företagen har tillsatt en extern styrelseledamot medan ett företag inte tillsatt en extern styrelseledamot. Slutsats: Studien visar att tillsättandet av externa styrelseledamöter drivs av behovet av en extern styrelseledamot. Behovet, i sin tur, påverkas av ägarfamiljens komplexitet och företagets komplexitet. Desto större komplexitet, desto större är behovet av externa styrelseledamöter. Har företaget däremot en utvecklad struktur så minskas behovet. En annan slutsats som dragits från studien är att det krävs ett initiativ utifrån för att små familjeföretag ska ta beslut om ett tillsättande av en extern styrelseledamot. Dessutom visar studien att familjeföretag söker att förstärka deras styrelses servande roll, genom att tillsätta externa styrelseledamöter. / Background: The need for corporate governance in small family businesses is large since it helps the companies to handle their complex environment. The board of directors has a prominent role of corporate governance in family businesses, where an active board is important for the businesses in order for them to meet the increasing global competition. An outside director can contribute to a more active and efficient board work and thereby give the business competitive advantages. However, there are some problems associated with the appointment of outside directors that can affect the choice of bringing an outsider to the board. Consequently, raises the question; what really affects the decision to appoint an outside director in a small family business? Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explain why small family owned limited companies choose to appoint outside directors. Method: In order to fulfillthe purpose of the study a qualitative method with a deductive approach hasbeen used. Empirical data was collected trough profound interviews withrepresentatives of three small family businesses, out of which two has outside directors while one business has not appointed an outside director. Conclusion: The study shows that the appointment of outside directors is driven by the need for an outside director. The need is affected by the level of family complexity and business complexity. A high level of complexity equals a large need for outside directors. The need will diminish if the business has a well developed structure. Another conclusion is that it takes initiative from outside the company for them to take a decision to appoint an outside director. Furthermore, the study shows that family businesses want to improve the service role of the board by appointing an outside director.