Submitted by Marina Oehling Gelman (marinaogelman@gmail.com) on 2013-01-22T17:03:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Gelman_Marina dissertação de Mestrado.pdf: 1994212 bytes, checksum: 32599808f56a09ecc60348d87f9fc45c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Eliene Soares da Silva (eliene.silva@fgv.br) on 2013-01-22T17:28:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Gelman_Marina dissertação de Mestrado.pdf: 1994212 bytes, checksum: 32599808f56a09ecc60348d87f9fc45c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-01-22T17:51:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gelman_Marina dissertação de Mestrado.pdf: 1994212 bytes, checksum: 32599808f56a09ecc60348d87f9fc45c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-11-28 / In the last two decades Corporate Governance has gained the deserved relevance. The Board of Directors is considered a central mechanism for good corporate governance practices, considering its role of mitigating agency conflicts through monitoring the agents, either managers or controlling shareholders. The complete development of such monitoring role depends on Directors acting professionally, technically, regardless any interest and influence of third parties, therefore, independently. Considering its importance, the Independent Director is at the center of good corporate governance practices debates. Literature involving the issue has multiplied and focuses almost exclusively on the effects of the independent director in certain aspects of the companies, such as, performance, share value, management monitoring, refraining to discuss the concept of independence. The mandatory requirement for independent director became a rule in Brazil in 2006, when BM&FBOVESPA reformed the special listing segments regulations. Since that reform, Novo Mercado and Level 2 requires that the companies’ board have at least 20% of independent directors. The regulations of the special listing segments provides for a concept of independent director. However, the definition is weak for not considering two relevant aspects: (i) the election and dismissal, at any time, of the independent director by the controlling group; and (ii) the existence of shareholder agreements binding the vote of the directors elected by the controlling group. We argue that there is a contradiction on the current definition of Novo Mercado and Level 2 which intent to disaffiliate the Independent Director and the Controlling Shareholder, however, it does not specify which relations between them should be avoided, nor considers the power that the controlling group has to dismiss the director elected by it regardless any reason, neither takes into account the existence of shareholders’ agreements, that intrinsically establish a new kind of relation with the controlling shareholder. The lack of such regulation allows situations where the independent directors are closely related to the controlling group and often bound to a shareholders’ agreement among the controlling shareholders, losing its individual capacity and his/her independence. 11 It is important to study the concept of independent director to adapt it to Brazilian reality. Only understanding the role of the independent director makes it possible to frame an appropriate concept that may incentive effects of independence aspired. This research identifies the percentage of independent directors according to the current definition and what would be the percentage of independent directors considering the new proposed definition and compares such results. The paper ultimate confirms the hypothesis that the percentage of independent Board members that the companies has been electing, when compared to the Directors considered independent in accordance to the new proposed definition, decreases. By highlighting the fragility of the Brazilian concept of independent director, the work contributes to the literature on the development of Brazilian capital markets, proposing a new definition of independent director necessary to enhance independent management and to promote the rights of all shareholders in accordance to the law, to BM&FBOVESPA’s special listing segments rules and international standards. / Nas duas últimas décadas o assunto Governança Corporativa tem ganhado merecida relevância. O Conselho de Administração tem sido considerado um mecanismo central para a boa prática de governança corporativa, tendo em vista sua função de mitigar os conflitos entre representantes e representados, através da fiscalização dos atos dos representantes, quer sejam eles a Diretoria, quer sejam os acionistas controladores. Entende-se que o pleno desenvolvimento deste monitoramento depende de uma conduta por parte do Conselheiro que possa ser profissional, técnica, desvinculada de interesses e influências de terceiros, portanto, independente. Diante de sua importância para o tema, a figura do Conselheiro Independente ocupa o centro das discussões sobre boas práticas de governança corporativa. A literatura sobre o assunto se multiplicou e vem se concentrando quase que exclusivamente na discussão dos efeitos do Conselheiro Independente em determinados aspectos das companhias, tais como em seu desempenho, no valor de suas ações, no monitoramento da administração, abstendo-se de discutir o conceito de independência. A figura do membro independente no Conselho de Administração surgiu como regra no Brasil em 2006, quando da reforma dos regulamentos dos segmentos especiais de listagem da BM&FBOVESPA. A partir desta reforma foi criada a exigência, no Novo Mercado e no Nível 2 de Governança Corporativa, da presença de pelo menos 20% de Conselheiros Independentes. Os próprios regulamentos destes segmentos especiais trazem o conceito de independente. Contudo, a definição vigente é incipiente por não levar em consideração pelos menos dois aspectos: (i) a eleição e destituição, a qualquer tempo, de membros independentes pelo grupo de controle; e (ii) a existência de acordos de acionistas que vinculam o voto dos Conselheiros eleitos pelos acionistas controladores. O trabalho argumenta que existe uma contradição na definição vigente no Novo Mercado e Nível 2 que, por um lado objetiva desvincular a figura do Conselheiro Independente do Acionista Controlador, mas por outro nem especifica quais os tipos de vínculos que devem ser proibidos entre eles, nem considerada o poder do grupo controlador de destituir imotivadamente o conselheiro por ele eleito e nem trata da existência de acordos de acionistas, que intrinsecamente estabelecem um novo tipo de vínculo jurídico com o acionista controlador. Tal falta de regulação permite situações em que os Conselheiros Independentes sejam pessoas estreitamente relacionadas aos controladores e muitas vezes vinculadas a um acordo de voto do grupo de controle, perdendo seu poder de ação individual e sua independência. É relevante que o conceito de Conselheiro Independente seja estudado e adequado à realidade brasileira. E é apenas a partir da compreensão do seu papel que se torna possível desenhar um conceito apropriado para que se incentive a produção de efeitos de independência desejáveis na prática. No campo empírico o trabalho identifica como a definição de independência atualmente vigente nos segmentos especiais da BM&FBOVESPA é refletida na composição dos Conselhos de Administração, conforme indicado pelas próprias companhias por ocasião do preenchimento do formulário de referência, para então aplicar a nova definição proposta ao quadro atual de conselheiros e comparar os resultados quantitativos encontrados com a realidade vigente. O trabalho conclui com a confirmação da hipótese de que o percentual de membros independentes que as companhias têm elegido, quando comparados aos Conselheiros que podem ser considerados independentes, de acordo com a nova definição proposta no estudo teórico, é menor em relação à definição vigente. Ao destacar a fragilidade da regra atualmente vigente o trabalho procura contribuir para a literatura relacionada a desenvolvimento e fortalecimento do mercado de capitais brasileiro, propondo uma definição de Conselheiro Independente necessária ao exercício de uma gestão mais independente, de modo a promover os direitos de todos os acionistas, em observância à Lei das S.A., aos regulamentos dos segmentos especiais da BM&FBOVESPA e de acordo com padrões internacionais.

La présente étude vise à examiner les facteurs qui déterminent la nomination de femmes au conseil d'administration et à explorer le lien entre la diversité du genre dans le conseil et la performance de l’entreprise. En utilisant des données sur la composition du conseil d'administration et la performance financière des sociétés appartenant à l'indice boursier SBF120 entre 2007 et 2012, nous trouvons que la nomination de femmes administrateurs est fortement associée aux caractéristiques du conseil et à la structure de propriété. En effet, la propriété managériale, la propriété institutionnelle, la propriété familiale, la taille du conseil, et l'indépendance du conseil sont tous fortement corrélés avec la représentation des femmes au sein du conseil d'administration d'une entreprise. En outre, nos résultats montrent que l’impact de la diversité du genre se manifeste dans deux directions contradictoires : elle affecte positivement la performance comptable et influence négativement la performance du marché. Apparemment, les administratrices sont l’objet d’une évaluation biaisée par le marché qui sous-estime leur présence dans les conseils d’administration. Ce qui est encore plus intéressant, c’est que nos analyses montrent une double nature de la représentation des femmes au sein des conseils d’administration des entreprises françaises cotées. Autrement dit, l'effet de la présence de femmes dans le conseil d’administration sur la performance de l’entreprise varie en fonction de l'affiliation des administratrices avec l’actionnaire majoritaire. / The current study aims at examining the factors that determine the appointment of women to the board of directors and at exploring the link between board gender diversity and financial performance. Using data on the board composition and the firm performance of companies belonging to the SBF120 stock market index between 2007 and 2012, we find evidence that the appointment of women directors is strongly associated with ownership structure and board characteristics. Indeed, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, family ownership, board size, and board independence are all strongly correlated with the representation of women directors on a firm's board. Furthermore, our results show that the impact of gender diversity manifests in conflicting directions, positively affecting accounting performance and negatively influencing market performance. Apparently, female directors are subject to a biased evaluation by the market, which undervalues their presence on boards. More surprisingly, our analyses show a twofold nature of female representation in the French market. That is, the effect of female directorship on firm performance varies with the affiliation of women on the board.

This Master's thesis aims to analyze changes in the corporate governance during the financial crisis, highlight the main changes in the field of corporate governance in UniCredit during this period and compare UniCredit`s Corporate Governance with OECD principles. In addition, on the basis of the analysis carried out, my objective will be to recommend possible updates in the Principles and also generalize the findings in order to help Czech companies improve their current system of governance.

The subject of the thesis is analysis of executive and supervisory bodies of joint-stock companies based on the legislation effective since 1st January 2014. The goal is to describe the structure of such bodies, their establishment, competence and guidelines for action. By comparing with the former legislation, it aims to find the differences, new institutes a possibilities brought by the recodification of private law and thus evaluate their effect and possible future influence. The thesis also points out some potentially controversial parts and defects of the new legislation.

The thesis deals with two types of organizational structure of a joint-stock company regard to changing legislation, effective from 1st January 2014. The work is initially focused on new type of organizational structure - a monistic organizational structure. It consists of the board of directors and the statutory director. The work explains the operation and scope of the company's bodies. The second type of organizational structure, which analyses the work, is dual organizational structure. It consists of the management board and the supervisory board. The work is based on the Civil Code and the Business Corporations Act.

Main goal of this dissertation is to analyze and evaluate current situation and the level of management and control of ČSAD JIHOTRANS company and to valorize the mutual relationship between administrative authority and executive management in this company. Dissertation is divided into two parts, first is theoretical part, in which will be explained issue of administration and management of company, with the help of literature and relevant legislations and practical part, where outcomes will be applied to selected company. To fulfill the goal of this dissertation was primarily used analysis of economic indicators of the company and interviews with chairman of the company board. In the end theoretical outcomes will be compared with real state, in which the company is and there will be given a solution of potential problems.

One-tier structure of a joint-stock company from the perspective of the prepared amendment to the Business Corporations Act Abstract This thesis analyses internal functioning of one-tier joint-stock companies, particularly from the perspective of the amendment to the Business Corporations Act, which will come into force in the beginning of the following year. First part of thesis offers comparative analysis of worldwide one-tier joint-stock company legislation, especially in American states, and in English and Italian law. The first two legislations of the above represent one-tier system in its traditional form and the development, that this system has undergone. Comparation with Italian legislation serves as an example of a legal system, in which one-tier model, as in Czechia, falls behind other model of governance of a joint-stock companies. Second part concerns the current legislation of a one-tier joint-stock companies in Czech corporate law, with emphasis to ambiguities in interpretation and application, which originate mainly in duality of elected bodies and conciseness of a special regulation, which was replaced by legislator with a reference to two-tier system. Third, essential part of this thesis analyses Czech legislation in the light of the Act No 33/2020 Coll., which significantly amends the...

The presented work aims to map the trends in the development and professionalization of foundations on the background of the civil society that was formed in the Czech Republic after 1989. It addresses the importance of endowment and appreciation of foundation assets in the long-term perspective and describes the circumstances that led to the creation of the Foundation Investment Fund (NIF). It also tries to follow the legislative and economic conditions for the development of the Czech endowment sector. In this sense the paper aims to bring some contribution to the civil society studies. Through a case study on The Committee of Good Will - The Olga Havel Foundation the thesis deals with the causes, effects and changes of the foundation's professionalization process. The research uses the means of internal and external document analysis, interviews with the foundation representatives and the method of participating observation. The effects of the professionalization process have manifested in personnel management changes (eg. recruitment of paid employees, hiring external professionals), project management changes and overall change in the scope of the foundation's activities. The foundation also took necessary steps towards better appreciation of its assets, proper care of its existing donors and...

This cumulative dissertation covers four papers on the management and governance of family firms. The first paper provides a systematic review of the literature on family-related determinants of the board of directors’ tasks, composition and processes in family firms. The review clusters and synthesizes the literature into six major determinants, details the methods used, and provides recommendations for future research in the field. The second paper develops a contingency approach to board task needs of family firms. The paper identifies five contingency factors and demonstrates how board task needs typically evolve over the ownership stages of family businesses. The third paper constitutes a qualitative empirical study on the role of board control in controlling owner family businesses. Based on a multiple case study approach, the study shows that controlling owners frequently use board control as a self-governing mechanism to mitigate self-control problems. Additionally, the study provides insights on favorable board processes and board composition in the controlling owner setting. Overall, the dissertation underlines the importance of factoring in the influence of family firm heterogeneity on the board of directors. The fourth paper concludes the dissertation with a teaching case study on a small family firm that is exposed to the threat of a disruptive innovation in its industry.:1 Introduction 1.1 Research Objective 1.2 Summary of the Research Papers 1.3 References 2 Determinants of Boards in Family Firms: A Systematic Literature Review 2.1 Abstract 2.2 Introduction 2.3 Boards of Directors in Family Firms 2.4 Research Method 2.5 Findings on Family-Related Determinants 2.6 Synthesis of Results 2.7 Future Research 2.8 Conclusion 2.9 Appendix 2.10 References 3 The Board of Directors in Family Firms: One Size Fits Forever? 3.1 Abstract 3.2 Introduction 3.3 Board Tasks in Family Firms 3.4 Development of a Conceptual Model 3.5 Limitations of the Model 3.6 Conclusion 3.7 References 4 Self-Control Through Board Control: Formalized Governance in Controlling Owner Family Businesses 4.1 Abstract 4.2 Introduction 4.3 Theoretical Foundations 4.4 Research Method 4.5 Findings 4.6 Discussion 4.7 Conclusion 4.8 References 5 Teaching Case Study ATB: Digital Disruption in the Manufacturing Industry 5.1 Abstract 5.2 Case Manuscript 5.3 Teaching Note 5.4 References 6 Conclusion 6.1 Contribution of the Dissertation 6.2 Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 6.3 References

Selon la théorie des parties prenantes, la Responsabilité Sociétal de l’Entreprise (RSE) est la réponse donnée par les entreprises à la pression croissantes des employées, actionnaires, communautés locales, ONG environnementales ou régulateurs afin de prendre en compte les impacts environnementaux et sociaux de leurs activités. L’enjeu n’est pas une simple compensation des externalités négatives mais une transformation des entreprises pour permettre une croissance durable. Ainsi, la RSE pousse les entreprises à être proactive et à dépasser les attentes règlementaires. Cependant, comment réussir à concilier des objectifs si différents voire opposés ? Alors que de plus en plus d’entreprises intègrent la RSE au cœur de leurs stratégies, les processus de gouvernance semblent être le chainon manquant pour réunir performance économique, sociale et environnementale. Cette thèse présente des arguments empiriques et théoriques de l’impact de la gouvernance à son plus haut niveau, du conseil d’administration au Directeur Général (DG). Après un chapitre d’introduction, le chapitre 2 analyse le lien entre la composition des conseils d’administrations et l’intégration de la RSE dans la stratégie des entreprises. Il s’appuie sur une loi sur la représentation des femmes dans les conseils d’administrations. Adopté en France en 2011, cette loi a entrainé la nomination de nouveaux administrateurs, majoritairement des femmes plus jeunes que leurs prédécesseurs. Pour autant, ce chapitre montre que l’augmentation de la diversité au sein des conseils n’est pas corrélée à variation de la performance financière et extra-financière. Ce chapitre repose sur l’étude des entreprises du SBF 120 de 2009 à 2015. Cependant, si les caractéristiques des administrateurs sont impliquées dans les processus de décisions, la mise en place des stratégies et le management de l’entreprise est confié au soin du DG. Grâce à un système de rémunération avec part variable, le conseil d’administrations s’applique à aligner les intérêts du DG avec les siens. Le chapitre 3 étudie l’efficacité des rémunérations variables basées sur des critères environnementaux ou sociétaux. Il montre que l’impact de ces « Bonus RSE » dépend du modèle de gouvernance de l’entreprise. Chez les entreprises possédant une gouvernance de type actionnarial, les « Bonus RSE » semble n’avoir qu’un impact négatif sur la performance financière. En revanche, pour les entreprises du type partenarial, ces bonus permettent efficacement l’amélioration des performances extra-financières sans diminuer la performance financière. Cette étude empirique se base sur un panel mondial de 3500 entreprises sur la période 2006-2015. Le chapitre 4 propose un modèle théorique permettant d’analyser l’impact de la nature intrinsèque ou extrinsèque des motivations. Basé sur le modèle principal-agent développé par Che et Yoo (2001), ce chapitre analyse différentes incitations pour une entreprise composée de deux agents travaillant sur une tâche « RSE ». Trois scénarios sont étudiés : les deux agents reçoivent une compensation financière, les deux agents sont motivés intrinsèquement, un agent est motivé intrinsèquement et l’autre financièrement. Le modèle montre que le scénario optimal pour le principal dépend du niveau de motivation intrinsèque mais également de l’interdépendance entre les décisions des deux agents. Dans le cas particulier de la rémunération des directeurs d’entreprises, les données empiriques montrent qu’inclure des critères RSE dans la rémunération est plus adapté aux entreprises avec une forte interdépendance décisionnelle. La conclusion retrace le lien qui unit gouvernance et RSE à plusieurs niveaux, et discute de l’implication des réseaux et effets de mimétisme entre entreprise. / According to the stakeholders’ theory, Corporate Social Responsibly is the firm’s response to increasing pressure from employees, shareholders, communities, environmental NGOs or regulators to consider the social and environmental consequences of their business activity. What is at stake, is not only a compensation of negative externalities but the adaptation and the participation of firms to a sustainable growth. In that sense, CSR is not just about being efficient but being the best and push firms to be proactive and go beyond legal requirements. But how manage objectives so various and even opposite? While firms start to integrate CSR into their global business strategy, at the top of the decision-making process, corporate governance appears to be the missing link to join economic, environmental and social objectives. This dissertation provides empirical and theoretical evidences of the determining factors involved at the high level of firms’ governance, from the board of directors to the CEO. After an introduction chapter, chapter 2 investigates the link between board composition and integrated CSR strategies. Adopted in 2011, the law targets listed firms and brought about the entrance of new directors, more likely to be women and younger than prior directors. However, we do not find evidence that this diversity is correlated to financial or extra-financial performance. For this chapter, we use a panel composed of French listed companies (SBF120 index) over the 2009-2015 period. If director’s characteristics are involved at the top of the decision making-process, the execution of the strategy and management of the firm is delegated to the CEO. Using variable pay, compensation part determined by performance objectives, the board aligns the CEO’s interests with his own interests. Chapter 3 shows evidence of the effectiveness of CSR based compensation part, labelled under the term “CSR contracting”. We show that the impact of such compensation depends on the governance structure. For firms who focus on shareholder, CSR contracting is more likely to have a negative impact on financial performance and no impact on extra-financial performance. On the contrary, for firms with a stakeholder model of governance, we show that CSR contracting is effective and have a positive impact on the environmental and social performance without impacting the economic results. This empirical work is conducted on a worldwide dataset with 3500 firms over the 2006-2015 period. Chapter 4 provides a theoretical framework to understand the role of governance factor on the efficiency of incentives. We develop a model based on Che et Yoo (2001) model to study the influence of compensation among a team of two managers who have to work on a CSR task. We determine the optimal compensation between three compensation mixes: both agents receive monetary compensations, both agents receive external rewards from their environment, one agent receives monetary compensation and the other receives an external reward. We show that the choice of the optimal compensation scheme depends on the environment outside the firm, i.e. the level of the exogenous reward, and the environment inside the firm through the level of the interdependence between the managers' decisions which corresponds to the capacity of the firm to create cooperation between the agents. Then, using evidence from executive compensation, we apply this model to the relationship between the CEO and the board of directors and find that the adoption of monetary incentives for CSR tasks is more suitable for firms with a high decisional interdependence than for firms with a lower interdependence. In conclusion, from directors’ characteristics to the overall governance organisation, we retrace the link between corporate governance and CSR integrated strategies; a link who could go beyond firm frontiers and include industry ties and peer effects.