Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:25:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Reinaldo Pessanha.pdf: 378565 bytes, checksum: 7e6b92dfc326074e05575bbeba5b10bd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-02-10 / Analysts are essential to the functioning of capital markets as they make predictions and recommendations that support the investment decisions of both institutions and individual investors. Analysts study the fundamentals of public companies, their growth prospects, financial structure and cash flow, corporate governance, industry structure and the macroeconomic environment in which companies are inserted. In this context, business leaders play a major role, as they influence the directions of the corporation and their performance. The goal of this paper is to investigate the influence of the concentration of power in the hands of the major corporate leader on the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts of Brazilian companies. The accuracy is measured in accordance with the international literature. The proxy for the concentration of power was constructed by Silveira and Barros (2011b) and takes into consideration the individual power of the main corporate leader the Chairman of the Board of Directors (Chairman) or the CEO (Chief Executive Officer) and also the degree of passivity and homogeneity of the Board of Directors. The sample contains 107 public companies listed in BM&FBOVESPA (Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo) in 2010. It only includes companies that had analyst coverage in the twelve months preceding the end of the fiscal year. The forecasts and financial information were collected from Thomson One Analytics® and Economática®. Information on the concentration of power was provided by Silveira and Barros (2011b), who collected the data in the websites of companies and in Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM). The analysis shows evidence that the concentration of power positively influences the accuracy of analyst forecasts. This idea is in line with a few prior studies on the concentration of power and volatility of results that argue that powerful business leaders tend to be more conservative. / Os analistas de mercado são importantes para o funcionamento do mercado de capitais à medida que fazem previsões e recomendações que fundamentam as decisões de investimentos de instituições e investidores individuais. Para isso, os analistas estudam os fundamentos de companhias abertas, sua capacidade de crescimento de receita, estrutura financeira e geração de caixa, governança corporativa, setor de atuação e a conjuntura macroeconômica na qual as empresas estão inseridas. Nesse contexto, os líderes corporativos exercem papel preponderante, pois determinam os rumos das corporações e exercem impacto importante sobre seus resultados. O objetivo geral deste trabalho é investigar a influência da concentração de poder nas empresas de capital aberto brasileiro sobre acurácia das previsões dos analistas de mercado. A acurácia é mensurada através de metodologias utilizadas na literatura internacional. Como proxy para a concentração de poder é utilizada a medida construída por Silveira e Barros (2011b) que considera o poder individual do principal líder corporativo Presidente do Conselho de Administração (Chairman) ou Diretor Presidente (Chief Executive Officer CEO), a passividade e a homogeneidade do Conselho. A amostra é composta por 107 companhias de capital aberto listadas na BM&FBOVESPA (Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo) no ano fiscal de 2010. A amostra do trabalho consiste em um conjunto de dados em corte transversal. Foram consideradas na amostra somente as empresas que apresentavam cobertura dos analistas nos doze meses anteriores ao final do ano fiscal. As previsões e informações financeiras foram coletadas junto à Thomson One Analytics® e Banco de Dados do Sistema Economática®. As informações sobre concentração de poder referem-se à base de dados de Silveira e Barros (2011b) coletadas a partir de websites das companhias e da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM). De acordo com os resultados encontrados há evidências de que a concentração de poder influencia positivamente a acurácia das previsões dos analistas. Essa ideia está alinhada com alguns estudos sobre concentração de poder e volatilidade dos resultados que argumentam que líderes corporativos poderosos podem assumir uma posição conservadora.

La tesi affronta il tema della responsabilità dei membri del consiglio di amministrazione di s.p.a verso la società per gli inadempimenti dei doveri gestori insiti negli atti o nelle omissioni collegiali. L'accertamento dei presupposti della responsabilità degli amministratori deve avvenire su base individuale con conseguente possibilità di imputazione del danno da risarcire ad alcuni consiglieri e non ad altri, che pure abbiano compartecipato al medesimo inadempimento: il singolo amministratore può infatti essere esonerato da responsabilità mediante la prova della personale immunità da colpa (dimostrando di essere stato diligente alla luce della natura del suo incarico e delle sue specifiche competenze) anche a prescindere dalla manifestazione formale del dissenso ex art. 2392 cc., ult. comma. La solidarietà rappresenta la regola di attuazione dell'obbligazione risarcitoria tra gli amministratori ritenuti corresponsabili in relazione al medesimo fatto dannoso. È possibile tuttavia pervenire ad una graduazione della condanna risarcitoria in virtù dell'eventuale connotazione dolosa dell'inadempimento di un singolo consigliere e dell'applicazione del regime risarcitorio differenziato di cui all'art. 1307 c.c.. La società può inoltre rinunziare alla solidarietà anche ex ante con adozione in via statutaria di un regime di responsabilità parziaria per tutti o alcuni degli amministratori, purchè nei soli rapporti tra società e amministratori e nei limiti di cui all'art. 1229 cc. / This thesis provides an analysis of the pertinent aspects of the liability of corporate directors for breach of their fiduciary duties in case of collegial functioning of an Italian s.p.a.'s board of directors. The liability of the directors must be determined on an individual basis and whether they are exculpated from liability for a breach of their duties can vary for each director based on his specialized skills and on the role he plays in the board (independent director, president, member of a committee), regardless of the entering of the dissent from the board's action into the corporate records. The liability is joint and several where two or more directors jointly participate in the same breach of a fiduciary duty with a right of contribution inter se. The corporation ( S.P.A. ) may waive to the protection secured by the joint and several liability rule either (i) by opting for a proportional liability regime with respect to the directors' liability vis-a-vis the corporation and except for the cases of directors' fraud or gross negligence or (ii) by entering into partial settlements with one director (or more directors) for the portion of the damage attributable to his (or their) personal fault.

Este trabajo se enmarca en el ámbito de las empresas españolas cotizadas durante el periodo comprendido entre el año 2003 y 2007, y concretamente, en la retribución del equipo de alta dirección. Tres son los estudios que se llevan a cabo con el objetivo de determinar hasta qué punto las empresas son capaces de controlar y adaptar las retribuciones de su equipo de alta dirección a los requerimientos económicos, contextuales y políticos -consejo de administración y estructura de propiedad- y en qué medida dichas retribuciones se relacionan con los resultados de las empresas, prestando una mayor atención a los factores políticos. Para lo cual se emplea la metodología de datos de panel. / This work is included in the scope of the Spanish companies during the period between 2003 and 2007, and indeed, in the pay of the senior management team. Three studies carried out in order to determine to what extent companies are able to control and adjust the salaries of its top management team to economic, political, contextual and board and ownership structure " and to what extent these fees are related to business performance, and paid more attention to political factors. To which is used panel data methodology.

Il presente contributo esamina il consiglio d’amministrazione delle società aventi azioni quotate in Borsa Italiana, e le retribuzioni destinate ai suoi membri, alla luce delle numerose innovazioni dell’ordinamento giuridico italiano e seguendo quella linea di analisi recentemente proposta dalla letteratura avente alla propria base l’idea che gli amministratori possono influenzare a proprio vantaggio i termini del pay-package loro corrisposto. A tal fine l’elaborato presenta una struttura articolata in due parti, nella prima delle quali viene fornita una visione organica dell’assetto istituzionale in cui l’analisi empirica, prodotta nella seconda, trova il proprio presupposto. Più specificatamente, la prima parte della tesi fornisce un’analisi giuridico-finanziaria della figura dell’amministratore (Capitolo 1) e del consiglio d’amministrazione (Capitolo 2), che risulta, oltre che assente in letteratura, quantomai attuale alla luce delle numerose e recenti riforme normative introdotte in materia. La normativa primaria, costituita dagli articoli del codice civile riguardanti gli amministratori ed i sistemi d’amministrazione e controllo (libro V, sezione VI bis, del Codice Civile) e dalle disposizioni contenute nel T.U.F., va oggi infatti completata con le nuove disposizioni contabili derivanti dall’applicazione degli IAS, ed in particolare dell’IFRS2, con le novità introdotte dalla cosiddetta Nuova Legge sul Risparmio (D. L. n. 262/2006), con le linee di comportamento descritte nella terza versione del Codice di Autodisciplina (Best Practice Code, 2006), con le prescrizioni di tipo previdenziale e fiscale contenute nelle Leggi "Finanziaria" del 2006 e del 2007, nonché con le novità in materia di governance bancaria volute da Mario Draghi (emanate a Marzo di quest’anno ma da recepire entro il 30 Giugno 2009). La seconda parte dell’elaborato, prendendo spunto dai diversi approcci utilizzati in letteratura (Capitolo 3), e con riferimento al contesto italiano, fornisce invece un’analisi empirica del sistema di compenso applicato agli amministratori. Dapprima è tracciata, relativamente al periodo indagato (1999-2006), la dinamica temporale della ricchezza distribuita ai propri amministratori dalle società italiane. Successivamente viene fornita una stima dell’intensità degli incentivi impliciti nei directors’ pay-packages (i.e. pay-performance sensitivity), unitamente ad una analisi delle determinanti che ne sono alla base. L’ipotesi che guida tale parte del lavoro è che in un contesto caratterizzato da proprietà concentrata, a causa della capacità dell’azionista di maggioranza di estrarre risorse dalla società, è ragionevole presumere che gli amministratori risultino destinatari di una remunerazione meno sensibile alle performances dell’impresa e tendenzialmente più elevata. Più semplicemente la questione che viene posta è se gli amministratori scontano la possibilità d’espropriazione, componendo convenientemente il proprio pacchetto di compenso. I risultati ottenuti confermano la validità dell’impianto d’ipotesi proposto ed evidenziano che la qualità della corporate governance è la variabile chiave. Le imprese dotate di un efficace ed efficiente governo societario riescono a controllare il processo di formazione delle remuneration policies impedendone manipolazioni opportunistiche. Le imprese caratterizzate da weak corporate governance risultano invece non solo incapaci di attuare politiche retributive volte alla massimizzazione del valore d’impresa, ma anche esposte all’estrazione di risorse da parte dei propri amministratori. / What the largest corporation pay their top managers is one of the most analyzed topics in corporate finance since Jensen and Murphy, 1990. As they noted (Jensen and Murphy 2004), a well-designed remuneration package for executives attracts the right executives at the lowest cost; retains them at the lowest cost (i.e. encourage the right executives to leave the firm at the appropriate time); and motivates executives to take actions that create long-run shareholder value and avoid actions that destroy value. However, several recent studies have shown that the characteristics of real world compensation contracts rarely meet their counterparts in compensation contracting theory because of the executives’ capability to influence the terms of their compensation package to their personal advantage. For example, Yermack (1997) provides evidence that executives influence timing of their stock option awards, receiving at-the money options just prior to releasing news that increases company stock prices. Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) argue that the practice of granting options at-the-money (rather than out-of-the-money or with exercise prices indexed to market movements) reflects the influence of rent-seeking managers trying to maximize their compensation in ways that are largely camouflaged to investors and the public. Going ahead, others empirical research give proofs that the executives’ power to influence their pay package is stronger when shareholders are diffuse and more passive (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001), and when the corporate governance is weaker (Garvey and Milbourn, 2006; Harford and Li, 2007). At the same time, the expropriation literature shown that dominant shareholders, especially in firms with poor corporate governance (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2008) and in countries with weak legal protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002; Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002; Durnev and Kim, 2005), are able to divert resources from others shareholders to himself for personal consumption. Since expropriation implies fewer resources assignable to marginal shareholder, the firms which are ex ante more likely to be expropriated, trade at discounted valuations. Despite the considerable empirical evidence on the costs bore both by the dominant shareholder and by the minorities in case of expropriation, the literature doesn’t provide evidence of the cost supported by directors. Expropriation, in fact, represents, ex ante, a cost also for directors. First, it’s a direct cost which negatively affects the expected overall compensation rewarded, when directors have part of their remuneration which is tied to company’s performances. Since expropriation is a net loss for the company, which leads to a correspondent fall in the company market valuation, the closer is the alignment of directors’ interests with those of shareholders, the bigger is this cost. Second, since directors have to perceive the maximization of shareholders’ wealth (i.e. avoid loss of it), expropriation should affect negatively the director’s reputation capital. This work examines the director’s compensation in firms which are more likely to be expropriated by their dominant shareholders. In essence, the question I address is whether directors discount the expropriation’s possibility, setting up conveniently their compensation’s contract. I explore this issue using a sample of directors’ compensation data of Italian Listed firms made up over the period 1999-2006. The case of Italian Listed companies is of particular interest for several concomitant reasons. First, Italian firms have been historically more prone to choosing a closely-held ownership structure characterized by a wide separation between ownership and control (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Volpin, 2002; and Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Mengoli, Pazzaglia, and Sapienza, 2006). Second, Italy is a country where the low protection of minority shareholders allows controlling shareholder to extract a considerable amount of private benefits (Bigelli and Mengoli, 2004; McCahery and Vermeulen, 2004; and Bigelli, Merhotra and Rau, 2006). Finally, Italy is a country where the high dominant shareholder’s capability to replace directors and where the low efficiency of the job-market of directors, provide narrowed incentives to directors in order to effective monitoring dominant shareholder’s actions (Barontini and Caprio, 2002; Volpin, 2002). Overall, results confirm the testable hypotheses, and provide evidence of the key-role exerted by corporate governance. Firms with strong corporate governance are able to monitor the compensation policies creation process avoiding opportunistic manipulation. On the opposite, firms with weak system of corporate governance seem unable to implement compensation policies directed at the firm value maximization, and, going ahead, seem to be expropriated also by theirs directors.

Strategy involvement of boards in small and medium-sized businesses has not been given adequate focus in contemporary research. The main concern has been on exploring the phenomenon in large corporations, which means that the field remains fairly unexplored. The purpose of this study is two folded. Firstly we want to understand what obstacles boards of small and medium-sized businesses face for strategy involvement. Secondly we want to generate new insights and knowledge about how these obstacles can be tackled. In order to accomplish these goals we assume the following two research questions: Research Question 1: Are there any obstacles in the way for strategy involvement of boards in small and medium-sized businesses? Research Question 2: What solutions are there to overcome these obstacles for strategy involvement of boards in small and medium-sized businesses? The first question aims to explore and map potential obstacles for strategy involvement, whereas the second question addresses potential solutions. By utilizing a qualitative approach and interviews we want to better understand the context. Our goal of using this method was to reveal motives and opinions to get a better understanding of how small and medium-sized businesses deal with strategy issues. The participants held various positions within small and medium-sized businesses in Sweden. CEOs, directors and busy directors participated in semi-structured interviews. This study is based upon two frameworks. Firstly we constructed an obstacle framework consisting of five obstacles derived from existing literature. Secondly we made a solution framework, which includes potential solutions connected to the obstacles, also derived from contemporary research. These two frameworks were then used to see what opinions our participants held about them. The data were analyzed by performing a thematic analysis. The idea of using this technique was to identify themes participants held in common. We found some patterns among the respondents which led us to revise both of the frameworks. The main finding of this study is that the presence of a board role conflict seems to be very limited in the context of small and medium-sized businesses. We furthermore found that there are differences in how to solve obstacles in regards to firm size. Two of the suggested solution in existing literature was found to be irrelevant for small and medium-sized businesses. Namely that it is not necessary to get CEOs to embrace strategy involvement, and stopping CEOs from handing over deceiving information is not solved by changing incentives. We also found patterns of two new solutions which were added in the revised solution framework. The first solution involves having regular strategy sessions and meetings. The second solution suggests that it can be advantageous to replace directors uncommitted to strategizing.

Cette thèse prend pour objet d’étude les administrateurs salariés en France, soit les représentants du personnel élus par les travailleurs, le plus souvent sur liste syndicale, pour siéger au conseil d’administration [CA] ou de surveillance [CS] de leur entreprise avec les mêmes droits et devoirs que les autres administrateurs, y compris le droit de vote sur les décisions stratégiques. A partir d’une méthodologie croisant différentes techniques d’enquête (l’analyse documentaire, deux études monographiques, la passation d’un questionnaire et l’observation participante), nous interrogeons la régulation sociale qui se joue dans les entreprises alors dites « démocratisées ». Parce que le sujet prête encore à confusion, nous commençons par une double mise en contexte : conceptuelle, en opérant un retour sur la définition de la « participation des salariés aux décisions » pour souligner la singularité du CA ou CS comme espace participatif ; historique, en analysant la dynamique de l’institutionnalisation saccadée des administrateurs salariés pour en éclairer sa dimension de jure. Nous nous intéressons ensuite à sa dimension de facto. Nous interrogeons en premier lieu l’effectivité de la règle et constatons d’une part que son application est directement dépendante de son ancrage dans une source de droit contraignant et, d’autre part, que la singularité de ce dispositif se reflète dans le profil des syndicalistes appelés à siéger au CA ou CS qui présentent, dans leur grande majorité, un capital militant particulièrement développé. Et ce parce que l’action de l’administrateur salarié, que nous observons en second lieu, a pour particularité de s’inscrire à la fois au sein du système de gouvernement d’entreprise et des relations professionnelles. Si sa capacité d’action dans le premier est le plus souvent limitée à la sphère de l’influence, le CA ou CS peut néanmoins constituer un espace pertinent de l’action collective à la condition d’un effort d’articulation des différentes scènes de représentation du personnel par l’organisation syndicale. Nous montrons ainsi que la participation des salariés aux décisions stratégiques ne conduit pas mécaniquement à un rééquilibrage des pouvoirs dans l’entreprise, mais qu’elle peut produire une reconfiguration des relations professionnelles pour peu que les différents acteurs en présence s’en saisissent. / This thesis focuses on the study of board-level employee representatives, i.e. employee representatives elected by the workforce under trade union nomination who serve on their company’s board of directors [BoD] or supervisory board [SVB] with the same rights and duties than that of other directors, including the right to vote on strategic decisions. Thanks to a methodology which combines different survey techniques (documentary analysis, two case studies, questionnaire distribution, participant observation), we question the nature of the social regulation which takes place within such so-called “democratised” companies. As this subject continue to lead to misunderstanding, we start setting the scene against a twofold context: a conceptual one, going back to the definition of “workers’ participation in decision-making” in order to underline the idiosyncrasy of the BoD or SVB as a participatory scene; an historical one, analyzing the non-linear dynamics of board-level employee representation’s institutionalisation in order to shed light on its de jure dimension. We then turn to its de facto dimension. First, we question the effectiveness of this rule and we observe that, on the one hand, its application directly depends on its anchorage in a source of binding law and, on the other hand, that the uniqueness of this provision is reflected in the profile of the union members selected to serve on the board whose great majority has a particularly well-developed “activist capital”. This is because, secondly, board-level employee representative’s action specificity lies both in the corporate governance and the industrial relations systems. If his/her capacity of action is limited to the sphere of influence in the former, the BoD of SVB could however be deemed a relevant arena of collective action provided that the trade union engages in an effort aimed at articulating the various scenes of workers’ representation. We demonstrate that workers’ participation in strategic decision-making does not automatically lead to a rebalancing of power within the company, but that it can produce a reshaping of industrial relations as long as the various involved actors seize it.

Företag på NASDAQ OMXS Small Cap har sedan 2008 omfattats av svensk kod för bolagsstyrning, Koden. Kodens målgrupp är företagen men syftet är att främja investerares och aktieägares intressen. Det är således rimligt att ställa krav på att Kodens regler är av hög kvalité utifrån deras perspektiv. I studien undersöks vilka samband som existerar mellan reglerna i Koden angående styrelsen och Small Cap företagens lönsamhet, mätt som räntabilitet på totalt kapital. Sambanden används sedan för att avgöra om reglerna i Koden är korrekt utformade eller om de behöver modifieras. Resultaten visar att VD-ersättning är negativt relaterad till räntabilitet på totalt kapital vilket innebär att regeln om en ersättningskommitté behöver modifieras eller kompletteras. Inga samband hittades mellan kvinnor i styrelsen och lönsamhet och ej heller mellan styrelsens storlek och lönsamhet. Reglerna kring dessa två variabler bedöms vara i linje med resultatet och behöver inte modifieras. Svagare negativa samband hittades mellan styrelsens oberoende avseende ledning och ägare och lönsamhet. Reglerna angående styrelsens oberoende avseende ledning bedöms vara i behov av en mindre justering, likaså reglerna angående oberoende avseende ägarna. / NASDAQ OMXS Small Cap firms are since 2008 subject to swedish code of corporate governance, the Code. The Code’s targetgroup are firms but the purpose is to promote investor and shareholder interests. It’s thus reasonable to ask for high quality in the rules of the Code from their perspective. This study examine which connections between rules of the Code concerning board of directors and profitability, measured as return on assets, that exist. These connections are then used to decide if the rules of the Code are correct or in need of modification. Our results show that CEO-remuneration is negatively related to profitability which means that the rule about remunerationcommittee need a modification or to be supplemented. No connections between number of women in boards and profitability was found and no connection between board size and profitability either. The rules of the Code regarding these two variables are in line with our results and need no modification. Weaker connections between board independence with respect to management and owners and profitability was found. The rules of the Code regarding board independence concerning management and owners are in need of small adjustments.

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2009.

Corporate governance has received considerable attention over the past few decades especially after several corporate scandals and global financial crises surfaced. It is a tool that ensures the wealth maximization interest of shareholders (Grove & Clouse, 2015; Gupta, 2015). Several studies on corporate governance have been made around the world, mostly in the context of developed nations. These have made significant contributions to the corporate governance literature and practice. However, there is scant research that addresses corporate governance issues in the context of emerging economies. In terms of applicability, it is important to view corporate governance not as a whole but in the context of specific fashion due to the economic, political, social and cultural differences among countries. In spite of the numerous studies in the subject and their contributions, a significant gap exists in our understanding of the relationship between corporate governance structure, process and board performances. Most of the prior studies focused on board structure giving much less emphasis to the board process- the missing link. By way of addressing the gap and providing a broader understanding of the relationship among the corporate governance variables, this study, among others, explored how board structure and board process influence the board performance in an emerging market economy context. Board performance has hardly been explored in this setting and this study tries to contribute to the existing literature by examining the antecedents of the boards‟ performance. The antecedents are positioned in the second order constructs that include the board structure and the board process. The antecedents with the board structure go beyond the usual variables of size, CEO duality and the outside/inside directors‟ ratio. A mixed method approach was used in the collection and analysis of the data. Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected from private and public banks‟ governing bodies and various groups of stakeholders. The quantitative data were mainly analyzed statistically using the Partial Least Square method of the Structural Equation Modeling. The qualitative data obtained from the survey and the interviews were thematically analyzed to identify important concerns. The findings from the quantitative data analysis showed that board structure has positive and significant influence on board process, board service and control v task performance. The findings also indicated a positive and significant relationship between board process and both board service and control task performance. Furthermore, the study revealed that board process mediates the relationships between board structure and both board service and control roles; it was also found that ownership type affects board performance but has no influence on company performance. The stakeholders‟ perceptions of various aspects of corporate governance practices, as beginners, were found out to be not bad. However, Ethiopia, like many emerging market economies, does not yet have a fully developed legal and regulatory system. Additionally, the enforcement capacities of the regulatory organ are at a nascent stage, and a private sector that is able to support effective corporate governance has yet to emerge. The nature of the Ethiopian banking corporate governance system can be characterized by a one tier system with a non-executive board of directors and ownership concentration. The boards of directors are also mainly control oriented rather than strategic or service oriented leaders. / Graduate School of Business Leadership (SBL) / D.B.L.

Cette thèse prend pour objet d’étude les administrateurs salariés en France, soit les représentants du personnel élus par les travailleurs, le plus souvent sur liste syndicale, pour siéger au conseil d’administration [CA] ou de surveillance [CS] de leur entreprise avec les mêmes droits et devoirs que les autres administrateurs, y compris le droit de vote sur les décisions stratégiques. A partir d’une méthodologie croisant différentes techniques d’enquête (l’analyse documentaire, deux études monographiques, la passation d’un questionnaire et l’observation participante), nous interrogeons la régulation sociale qui se joue dans les entreprises alors dites « démocratisées ». Parce que le sujet prête encore à confusion, nous commençons par une double mise en contexte : conceptuelle, en opérant un retour sur la définition de la « participation des salariés aux décisions » pour souligner la singularité du CA ou CS comme espace participatif ; historique, en analysant la dynamique de l’institutionnalisation saccadée des administrateurs salariés pour en éclairer sa dimension de jure. Nous nous intéressons ensuite à sa dimension de facto. Nous interrogeons en premier lieu l’effectivité de la règle et constatons d’une part que son application est directement dépendante de son ancrage dans une source de droit contraignant et, d’autre part, que la singularité de ce dispositif se reflète dans le profil des syndicalistes appelés à siéger au CA ou CS qui présentent, dans leur grande majorité, un capital militant particulièrement développé. Et ce parce que l’action de l’administrateur salarié, que nous observons en second lieu, a pour particularité de s’inscrire à la fois au sein du système de gouvernement d’entreprise et des relations professionnelles. Si sa capacité d’action dans le premier est le plus souvent limitée à la sphère de l’influence, le CA ou CS peut néanmoins constituer un espace pertinent de l’action collective à la condition d’un effort d’articulation des différentes scènes de représentation du personnel par l’organisation syndicale. Nous montrons ainsi que la participation des salariés aux décisions stratégiques ne conduit pas mécaniquement à un rééquilibrage des pouvoirs dans l’entreprise, mais qu’elle peut produire une reconfiguration des relations professionnelles pour peu que les différents acteurs en présence s’en saisissent. / This thesis focuses on the study of board-level employee representatives, i.e. employee representatives elected by the workforce under trade union nomination who serve on their company’s board of directors [BoD] or supervisory board [SVB] with the same rights and duties than that of other directors, including the right to vote on strategic decisions. Thanks to a methodology which combines different survey techniques (documentary analysis, two case studies, questionnaire distribution, participant observation), we question the nature of the social regulation which takes place within such so-called “democratised” companies. As this subject continue to lead to misunderstanding, we start setting the scene against a twofold context: a conceptual one, going back to the definition of “workers’ participation in decision-making” in order to underline the idiosyncrasy of the BoD or SVB as a participatory scene; an historical one, analyzing the non-linear dynamics of board-level employee representation’s institutionalisation in order to shed light on its de jure dimension. We then turn to its de facto dimension. First, we question the effectiveness of this rule and we observe that, on the one hand, its application directly depends on its anchorage in a source of binding law and, on the other hand, that the uniqueness of this provision is reflected in the profile of the union members selected to serve on the board whose great majority has a particularly well-developed “activist capital”. This is because, secondly, board-level employee representative’s action specificity lies both in the corporate governance and the industrial relations systems. If his/her capacity of action is limited to the sphere of influence in the former, the BoD of SVB could however be deemed a relevant arena of collective action provided that the trade union engages in an effort aimed at articulating the various scenes of workers’ representation. We demonstrate that workers’ participation in strategic decision-making does not automatically lead to a rebalancing of power within the company, but that it can produce a reshaping of industrial relations as long as the various involved actors seize it.