Submitted by SARA MORAIS DA ROSA null (sara_moraesrosa@hotmail.com) on 2016-12-02T18:10:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 ROSA, Sara Morais da. Entre o ensino de Filosofia e a aprendizagem filosófica..pdf: 1001150 bytes, checksum: dafd4d2aacf73fa400323c74e4bea27f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Felipe Augusto Arakaki (arakaki@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-12-05T15:36:04Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 rosa_sm_me_mar.pdf: 1001150 bytes, checksum: dafd4d2aacf73fa400323c74e4bea27f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-05T15:36:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 rosa_sm_me_mar.pdf: 1001150 bytes, checksum: dafd4d2aacf73fa400323c74e4bea27f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O trato concedido à Filosofia, como disciplina oficial do currículo escolar brasileiro, foi desde o seu princípio tangenciado por ambivalências e inconstâncias que forjaram para o seu ensino um horizonte controverso. Ainda que as diretrizes e normativas educacionais acerca do ensino da filosofia aventassem para sua potência em romper com os dispositivos de transmissão e aquisição mecânica de conteúdos, o modelo institucionalizado deste ensino permanece, ainda hoje, refém de uma dimensão reprodutivista de caráter explicador. Este paradigma pouco contestado, a saber, a lógica da explicação, é responsável por instaurar no ensino um dualismo cego, a partir do qual as modulações do aprendizado do estudante devem necessariamente estar sujeitas à manifestação das explicações e representações de um professor. Desse modo, a função do ensino deixou de se projetar em direção à promoção de uma experiência filosófica, assumindo a tarefa de conformar o pensamento a uma ortodoxia filosófica, restringindo a potência do filosofar a uma imagem distorcida do próprio pensar. Portanto, ainda que propuséssemos uma perspectiva do aprender como emprego livre e pessoal da razão, conforme aventou Kant, esta não seria capaz de prescindir da submissão do pensamento aos estados da representação, afinal, na gênese deste procedimento da razão consiste também a marca indelével de uma imagem dogmática do pensar que subsidia as diversas dimensões de sua manifestação. A partir desta imagem dogmática, que se erigiu segundo ideias gerais do senso comum e do bom senso, o pensar fora entendido pelo viés recognição, como processo que engendra a constituição de modelos e conformações, segundo a ordem da representação, sem jamais diferenciar-se na experimentação do devir. À vista disso, objetivamos investigar nesta dissertação em que medida nos é possível, ainda, promover, no contexto de um ensino representacional, uma aprendizagem filosófica que se abra à experimentação do pensar, como criação de novos sentidos. Para tanto, buscaremos elucidar em que consiste esta experiência do pensar, à luz do uso disjuntivo das faculdades, para, em seguida, compreender em que sentido esta experiência se faz possível com vistas ao aprender a filosofar. A hipótese que atravessa este trabalho articula-se em torno da obra deleuziana Proust e o Signos, a partir da qual defendemos a possibilidade de encontrar, na relação do aprendiz com o signo, uma nova perspectiva sobre a aprendizagem filosófica como lugar de emergência do pensar. / The treatment granted to Philosophy as an official subject of Brazilian school curriculum has always been characterized by ambivalences and inconsistencies that have forged a controversial horizon to its teaching. Although the guidelines and educational regulations for the Philosophy teaching have suggested its potential to break the transmission and mechanical acquisition of contents, its institutionalized model still remains trapped in a reproductivist dimension of an explainer character. This paradigm, very little contested and known as logic of explanation, is responsible for establishing a noxious dualism in teaching, from which the student’s learning must necessarily be subject to the manifestation of the teacher’s explanations and representations. Thus, the role of teaching has stopped projecting itself towards the promotion of a philosophical experience. It assumed the task of shaping the student’s thought to a philosophical orthodoxy, restricting the potential of philosophizing to a distorted image of thinking itself. Therefore, even though we proposed a perspective of learning as a free and personal use of reason, as Kant has suggested, it would not be able to waive the submission of thought to the states of representation. After all, the indelible mark of a dogmatic image of thought that supports the various dimensions of its manifestation consists in the genesis of this procedure of reason. From this dogmatic image, which has been consolidated based on general ideas, common sense and good sense, the thinking has been understood by the recognition process, which engenders the establishment of models and conformations, according to an order of representation, without ever differing itself in an experimentation of becoming. Considering this, we aim to investigate in this thesis to what extent it is still possible to promote, in the context of a representational teaching, a philosophical learning that is open to the experimentation of thinking as creating new senses. In order to do that, we will seek to elucidate in what consists the experience of thinking from the disjunctive use of faculties, to then understand how this experience is possible aiming at learning how to philosophize. The hypothesis that permeates this research study is built around Deleuze’s work, Proust and Signs, from which we defend the possibility of finding, in the learner's relationship with the sign, a new perspective on the philosophical learning as a place of emergence of thinking.

Dans ses premières œuvres, Deleuze recherche une "pensée sans image", inséparable de la critique de "l'image de la pensée", c'est-à -dire de la représentation. Le problème, organisant alors la philosophie de Deleuze, est celui du rapport de la pensée avec l'image, problème qui est repris .et déplacé, de Nietzsche et la philosophie à Différence et répétition. Pour "décrire" les actes d'une pensée sans image, Deleuze procède en trois étapes : "le point de départ" est la critique de l'image de la pensée, la dénonciation de la représentation et de ses présupposés, qui emprisonnent et dénaturent la pensée. "Le véritable commencement" consiste, dès lors, à dégager les conditions, non de l'expérience possible comme dans la représentation, mais de l'expérience réelle, c'est-à-dire une nouvelle image de la pensée qui la libère de la représentation. A l'image représentative de la pensée, Deleuze substitue donc une nouvelle image de la pensée qui est l'ensemble des conditions d'une pensée sans image. Enfin, la troisième étape, "l'authentique répétition", est la mise à jour d'une pensée sans image, sub-représentative. Loin d'être naturelle, donnée à un penseur de bonne volonté, comme recognition, la pensée sans image est création de penser dans la pensée, pensée sauvage, nomade, qui nait sans modèle préalable, ni ressemblance : elle surgit de la rencontre violente avec le signe qui la force à penser. Autrement dit, la pensée sans image, c'est le système du simulacre. / In his early works, Deleuze looks for a "thought without image", inseparable from the critique of the "image of thought", i.e. of representation. The problem, organizing Deleuze's philosophy, is the relation of thought with the image problem that is picked up and moved, from Nietzsche and phi/osophy to Difference and repetition. To "describe" the acts of a thought without image, Deleuze proceeds in three steps: "the starting point" is the criticism of the image of thought, the denunciation of representation and its presuppositions, which trap and distort the thought. "The real beginning" consists, therefore, in identifying the conditions, not of experience possible such in the representation, but the actual experience, which is a new image of thought that frees it from the representation. The representative image of thought, Deleuze substitute to a new image of thought which is the set of conditions for a thought without image. Finally, the third step, "the authentic repetition", is the update of a thought without image, sub­ representative. Far from being natural, given to a thinker of goodwill, like recognition, the thought without image is creation of thinking in thought, thought wild, nomadic, who was born without prior model, or likeness: it arises from the violent encounter with the sign that forces it to think. In other words, the thought without image, is the system of the simulacrum.

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