Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:25:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 iss2005.pdf: 1124516 bytes, checksum: 715c2432b36d257eab548dc7aea4adde (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-04-11 / The present paper aims to construct the sense and the reach of the material criterion of the hypothesis of tax incidence over services, established by the constitutional competence norm, comparing the concept of services rendered and the infra-constitutional legislation. We must emphasize that the material criterion of the tax incidence of hypothesis over services involves both the concept of services rendered and the services list function and that both have been an object of controversy between legal doctrine and jurisprudence. In view of this, we have proposed the adoption of a new concept of service rendered: the logical-semantic, where to render service is the legal relation that has as aim the action or the effect of serve, provide, give, concede, excuse, give oneself something in activity form, to execute an intellectual work or material construction. Regarding the services list, we have elaborated the comprehension that its function is to establish the criteria so that the events of the real world can be identified by law operators as legal facts. As it composes the incidence hypothesis of an abstract and general norm, the list describes the criteria to the identification of a fact, in other words, connotative. To realize the proposed task on a scientific way, we have started from the analysis of law general categories, stipulating the comprehension of relevant subjects to investigation, as the concepts of Science of Law, positive law, legal system, legal norm and tributary incidence. We have elected the semiotics as theoretical instrument to realize the logical-semantic and pragmatic analysis of the concept of services rendered, list services function and the items described by this list. Finally, we have established the material criterion of the hypothesis of tax incidence as being the legal relation to render services described by the services list introduced on legal ordinance by the Complementary law n. 116/03. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo construir o sentido e o alcance do critério material da hipótese de incidência do imposto sobre serviços, estabelecido pela norma de competência constitucional, cotejando o conceito de prestação de serviços e a legislação infraconstitucional. Convém ressaltar que o critério material da hipótese de incidência do imposto sobre serviços envolve tanto o conceito de prestação de serviços quanto a função da lista de serviços e que ambos têm sido objeto de polêmica entre a doutrina jurídica e a jurisprudência. Em vista disso propomos a adoção de um novo conceito de prestação de serviço: o lógico semântico, segundo o qual prestar serviços é a relação jurídica que tem como objeto a ação ou o efeito de servir, propiciar, dar, conceder, dispensar, dar de si algo em forma de atividade, executar trabalho intelectual ou obra material. Quanto à lista de serviços, elaboramos o entendimento de que sua função é a de estabelecer os critérios para que os eventos do mundo real possam ser identificados pelos operadores do direito como fatos jurídicos. Na medida em que compõe a hipótese de incidência de uma norma geral e abstrata, a lista descreve critérios para identificação de um fato, ou seja, é conotativa. Para que a tarefa proposta pudesse ser realizada de modo científico, partimos da análise das categorias gerais do direito, estipulando o entendimento sobre temas relevantes para a investigação como os conceitos de Ciência do Direito, direito positivo, sistema jurídico, norma jurídica e incidência tributária. Elegemos a semiótica como instrumental teórico para realizar a análise lógico-semântica e pragmática do conceito de prestação de serviços, da função da lista de serviços e dos itens descritos por essa lista. Finalmente, estabelecemos o critério material da hipótese de incidência tributária como sendo a relação jurídica de prestar serviços descrita pela lista de serviços introduzida no ordenamento

Le critère organique en droit administratif est un instrument de qualification juridique qui repose sur la présence d’une personne publique dans un rapport de droit. Il trouve ses origines à la fin du XIXème siècle dans la subjectivisation des droits de puissance publique dont l’Etat est investi et l’admission de la distinction entre les personnes publiques et les personnes privées. Confondu avec le critère du service public au début du XXème siècle, le critère organique acquiert son autonomie à l’heure de la « crise » de la notion juridique de service public dans les années 1930-1940. Le critère organique, qui témoigne de la logique institutionnelle à laquelle le droit administratif français est attaché, sert de support à la construction des notions-cadres de ce droit.Depuis de nombreuses années, le critère organique fait cependant l’objet d’une vive contestation. D’une part, le mouvement de « banalisation » qui traverse le droit des personnes publiques renforce l’insuffisance de ce critère dans la détermination du droit applicable. D’autre part, les transformations contemporaines du modèle administratif français provoquent une régression de la référence à ce critère. Alors que la personnalité publique apparaissait hier comme le mode privilégié de prise en charge de l’action publique, l’administration est incitée à externaliser ses activités. En dépit d’un phénomène de « privatisation » de l’action administrative, le juge et le législateur maintiennent l’application de règles exorbitantes en l’absence du critère organique.Alors que le phénomène administratif se déploie aujourd’hui au-delà des seules personnes de droit public, la définition du critère organique en droit administratif demeure fermement arrimée à la notion de personne publique. Plusieurs facteurs invitent toutefois à reconsidérer la définition de ce critère. La fonctionnalisation de l’action publique ne dissimule qu’imparfaitement les liens qui s’établissent au sein de la « sphère publique » entre les personnes publiques et certaines personnes privées, qui demeurent sous étroit contrôle public. C’est donc sur la base de la notion de « contrôle public » que peut être entreprise une redéfinition de ce critère en droit administratif. / In French administrative law, the organic criterion is an instrument of legal qualification dependent upon the presence of a public body in a legal relationship. Its origins date back to the 19th century in the subjectivation of the rights of public power of which the State is invested and the differentiation of the public and private bodies. Misconstrued with the criterion of public service at the beginning of the 20th century, the organic criterion gains its autonomy at the time of the "crisis" of the notion of public service which consecrates the dissociation of notions of public body and public service. This criterion, which bears witness to the institutional logic to which administrative law is associated, serves as the foundation for the construction of notions.However, the organic criterion has been the subject of strong opposition for many years. On the one hand, the "trivialization" movement which affects rights of public bodies reinforces the inadequacy of this criterion in determining the applicable law. On the other, as a result of contemporary changes to the French administrative model, the reference to this criterion has diminished. While the public body appeared in the past as the preferred mode for public action, the administration is encouraged nowadays to "outsource" its activities. Despite a phenomenon of "privatization" of administrative measures, the judge and the legislator maintain the application of special rules in absence of the organic criterion.While the administrative phenomenon now extends beyond public law, the definition of the organic criterion in administrative law remains firmly linked to the notion of public body. Several factors, however, call for a redefinition of this criterion. The functionalization of public action only partially conceals the relation between public and certain private bodies within the public sphere which nevertheless remain under close public control. It is on the basis of the notion of "public control" that a redefinition of this criterion can be undertaken in administrative law.