<p> This study examines the legal barriers of those engaged in identity loan face when filing for workers' compensation. Farm workers are among the most marginalized groups of unauthorized migrants laborers. Those workers engaged in identity loan are further exploited because of their precarious employment status. Identity loan is a when a worker borrows another persons Social Security Number in order to be employed. When that individual is injured on the job they do not file a workers' compensation claim because fear of employer retaliation, exposure to the government and misinformation. Everyone in California has a right to workers' compensation no matter his or her legal or employment status. Workers' compensation attorneys were interviewed to understand the obstructions farm workers' using identity loan are up against when filing for workers' compensation. Proof of identity and misinformation are among the most substantial barriers to successfully filing a workers' compensation claim.</p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, 2006. / Title from title screen (viewed 13th February, 2009) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Faculty of Law, University of Sydney. Degree awarded 2006. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

This thesis claims that if law has a distinctive and genuine normative force, then it is thanks to the fact that law’s authority originates from a particular institutional layout that allows for a division of moral labour between legislation and adjudication. After establishing what the moral dimension of authority is a matter of, and how law’s normative force can be justified by reference to it, this thesis defends a comprehensive-moral account of law’s authority. In this respect, the thesis argues that the moral dimension of law’s authority can be highlighted well if we consider it as emerging through a morally meaningful institutional distinction between legislation and adjudication: the institutional profile of legislative authority and that of adjudicative authority differ from each other, in that each can be said to be underlain by its own evaluative standards. On the one hand, the particularity of legislative authority is a matter of its community-driven, forward-looking character and of its consensual structure; as well as of the declaratory nature and the agent-relative status of reasons issued by legislative provisions. On the other hand, adjudicative authority is distinctive because it has a litigant-driven, remedial character and employs an adversarial structure so that it accomplishes its impartial investigatory task through the issuance of agent-neutral reasons. So understood, the institutional profile of legislative authority is considered to be morally meaningful in the sense that it incorporates a rule-consequentialist and value-pluralist rationale; while that of adjudicative authority is taken to owe its own moral meaningfulness to the fact that it fosters reciprocity between litigants.

Which uses of the power to criminalise are misuses of that power? When, in other words, is an exercise of the power to create a criminal offence an exercise of that power which cannot be morally justified? This thesis seeks to provide one part of the answer, by addressing an aspect of the question little discussed by criminal law theorists. Thus it seeks not classes of conduct which it is impermissible to criminalise, nor classes of objective which offence-creators cannot permissibly pursue. Rather the thesis addresses the distinct issue of means – of how criminal offences (are set up to) bring about their creators’ objectives. It asks which means of achieving objectives it is impermissible to employ or make available, and how the power to criminalise must be used to avoid their employment or availability. In answering these questions the thesis distinguishes a number of types of criminal offence, by reference to the means by which the tokens of each (are set up to) achieve objectives. The argument is that to create tokens of these types is often to misuse power, because it is often to employ, or make available, impermissible means. This judgment of impermissibility is a function of a number of principles of political morality, some of which are developed at length in the course of the thesis. No single principle (or set of principles) is presented as an absolute limit on the power to criminalise; but each is part of a complete picture of how that power can permissibly be used, and contributes to vindicating the thesis defended within these pages. That thesis, to repeat, is that some uses of criminalisation are no better than misuses, on account of the means by which the resulting offences (are set up to) achieve their creators’ ends.

The incidents of human rights violations have increasingly captured the international attention. I think that part of the reasons for human rights violations is because of the foundational theories of the current international law. In this thesis project, I argue that basic human rights should be the moral foundation of the international law. I achieved my goal in several steps. In the first section, I introduced the thesis project; I also outline my objectives. In the second section, I briefly define human rights, basic human rights, and provided the scope of basic human rights. In the third section, I provided my argument that basic human rights should be the moral foundations of the international law; provide criterion of state legitimacy; I critiqued the United Nations in the context of my arguments. Finally, I concluded by formulating the international basic human rights law.

The incidents of human rights violations have increasingly captured the international attention. I think that part of the reasons for human rights violations is because of the foundational theories of the current international law. In this thesis project, I argue that basic human rights should be the moral foundation of the international law. I achieved my goal in several steps. In the first section, I introduced the thesis project; I also outline my objectives. In the second section, I briefly define human rights, basic human rights, and provided the scope of basic human rights. In the third section, I provided my argument that basic human rights should be the moral foundations of the international law; provide criterion of state legitimacy; I critiqued the United Nations in the context of my arguments. Finally, I concluded by formulating the international basic human rights law.

The thesis critically examines the view that associates religion with bellicosity in politics. It is argued that the structural link between religion and the propensity to (political) violence is inaccurate because (1) religious theories of just war can be shown to be tolerant of difference in important instances and thus not belligerent; (2) secular ideology can be shown to be intolerant and bellicose in important cases; and consequently (3) the more important explanatory factor of bellicosity is not necessarily religion but it can be found elsewhere. It is argued that the true source lies in the association of a monistic ideological commitment and the willingness of its political agents to impose it on those with different ideological views. The thesis is a critical and comparative discussion of those who have dealt with ideological violence. It compares interventionist theorists with those who are not in religious tradition and contemporary theory of just war to reveal that the cause of violence is located in an avoidable failure to reconcile religious morality and politics. The thesis adds a new perspective on the debate, calling for a rethink of the relationship between religion and violence in politics. It also proposes greater scepticism about widely held assumptions about the bellicose tendency of religiously motivated political agents, arguing that theorists should rethink the real cause of bellicosity beyond the religious domain and pay closer critical attention to the sources of the belligerence of secular agents.

Par une analyse du discours de la théorie juridique serbe du XXe siècle, cette thèse contribue non seulement à la description des traits distincts de la pensée juridique serbe, mais aussi à la détermination de la possibilité de la réception des concepts libéraux par une société transitoire, dont la culture politique est bien différente de celle de la société occidentale. En ce sens, l’influence modeste de la théorie du droit social d’origine française indique le conservatisme de l’élite universitaire serbe, qui ne faisait pas confiance à la société et à ses capacités autonomes. Cette élite s’est rendu compte que la société serbe était toujours traditionaliste, patriarcale et pauvre en institutions civiles bien établies. C’est pourquoi l’idée libérale d’une société civile qui englobe l’État, et dont ce dernier n’est qu’une entité au service des citoyens, leur est connue, mais peu convaincante. Au contraire, leur programme libéral s’appuie sur l’idée de l’État de droit qui s’opposerait à l’énergie des masses populaires et, par ses institutions élitistes, présuppose la société des individus libres. Croyant fort à la société comme la source ultime de l’activité législative et judiciaire, les théories françaises du droit social ont lancé une idée inadmissible pour la théorie serbe: la domination de la société sur l’État. Cependant, cette aversion des théoriciens serbes vis-à-vis de la société autonome ne révèle pas seulement le manque de la tradition libérale dans leur pensée. Elle explique aussi les raisons d’une transplantation difficile des institutions démocratiques occidentales et, en général, d’une dure transition de la société post-communiste serbe. / The discourse analysis of the Serbian theory of law in the 20th century in the thesis contributes not only to the description of the distinctive features of the Serbian legal thought but also to the establishment of a possibility for the reception of liberal concepts by a society in transition, whose political culture differ from the western society. In that sense, a modest influence of the theory of social law of French origin indicates a conservatism of the Serbian university elite, who did not have faith in the Serbian society and its capacities. This elite was aware of the fact that the Serbian society was still traditionalistic, patriarchal and poor in the institutions of the civil society. Therefore, although they were familiar with the liberal idea of the civil society that includes the state, according to which the state is nothing else but a citizens’ service, it was unconvincing. On the contrary, their liberal program relied on the idea of the Legal state which would stand against the energy of the masses and which would put the existence of a society of free individuals before its elitist institutions. Firmly believing in the society as the final source of the legislative and judicial activity, these French theories of social law launched an idea which was unacceptable for the Serbian theory: the idea of the domination of the society over the state. Still, an aversion towards the autonomous society of Serbian theoreticians does not only reveal the lack of liberal tradition in there thought. It explains the causes of the problematic mapping of the western democratic institutions, but also a difficult transition of the Serbian post-communist society in general.

Cette thèse s’interroge sur les raisons de la crise actuelle de la notion de souveraineté. La plupart des critiques affirment dénoncer la souveraineté dans sa conception classique telle que formulée par Hobbes et Bodin. Il s’agira alors de montrer que ces critiques manquent leur objet. Elles ne concernent pas la souveraineté de Hobbes ou Bodin mais une reconstruction de celle-ci. La thèse soutenue est que les évolutions paradigmatiques au sein des différentes disciplines ayant à traiter de la souveraineté ont profondément modifié son sens, de même que le sens des termes la définissant. Les concepts de pouvoir, d’État, de droit, ont été transformés en fonction de l’évolution des États et des préoccupations de chercheurs appartenant à des champs différents. Ce travail s’attachera à préciser la diversité de sens accordée aux différentes notions pour ensuite montrer que les critiques actuelles de la souveraineté transposent leurs propres définitions aux termes utilisés par Bodin et Hobbes. Il apparaîtra alors qu’en reprenant la souveraineté dans son sens originel, il est impossible de la considérer comme limitée. / This doctoral thesis questions the reasons behind the current crisis of the concept of sovereignty. Most critics claim they denounce sovereignty in its classical sense, that is to say as expressed by Hobbes and Bodin. We will show that these critics fail to identify their object. They don’t aim at the notion of sovereignty as developed by Hobbes and Bodin, but rather a reconstruction of it. The idea defended here is that paradigmatic evolutions within the various disciplines dealing with sovereignty have deeply altered its meaning, as well as the meaning of the terms defining it. Concepts such as power, State, and Law have been changed according to the evolution of the States and the concerns of researchers in various fields. This work endeavors to clarify the plurality of meanings granted to these different concepts in order to show that the current critics of sovereignty are substituting their own definitions for the terms used by Bodin and Hobbes. Thus, it appears that by using sovereignty in its original sense, it cannot be regarded as limited.

The theme of this thesis is "formalism in law" as a concept that permeates an essential part of modern legal thinking. This work shows that it is usually perceived as a critical concept, but without a clear and steady meaning. In recent times, however, the discussion involving this concept changed so that it now includes individuals positively acknowledging themselves as formalists. An overview of this debate (only marginally concerning the Czech environment yet, however) forms the bulk of the thesis. The second essential part of it is a separate rethinking of the place of formalism in law, in all its aspects - in interpretation and application of law, in the creation of law, even in legal education and legal scholarship. This thesis consists of three unequal parts, the first of which is further divided into three sections. The first part deals with the formalism as a topic of discussion in legal philosophy during the entire 20th century, and the intention is to present this debate to Czech readers. Its first section is devoted to a topic typically linked to criticism of formalism in law in Western legal scholarship, as it presents the American legal realism of the interwar period. It shows it as a strong and visible culmination of earlier critical efforts visible on both sides of the Atlantic...