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Learning-oriented learners who they are and how the church can help /Brewer, Debra Lee, January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (M. Div.)--Emmanuel School of Religion, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-58).
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The relationship between inhibitory control and System 1 and System 2 processes in deductive and spatial reasoning : a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Psychology at the University of Canterbury /Graham, Charlotte. January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2007. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 36-37). Also available via the World Wide Web.
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The creative process : the effects of domain specific knowledge and creative thinking techniques on creativity /Kilgour, A. Mark. January 2006 (has links)
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Waikato, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 389-415) Also available via the World Wide Web.
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Affect in mathematical thinking and learning /Hannula, Markku January 2004 (has links)
Disp. Turun yliopisto, 2004. / På ryggen: Annales Universitatis Turkuensis. Med litteraturhenvisninger.
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An investigation into the relations between association and intelligenceYule, Ella Pratt January 1933 (has links)
No description available.
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Concomitants of attention, personality and rate of information processingBarkhuizen, Werner 14 October 2015 (has links)
D.Litt. et Phil. (Organisational Psychology) / Please refer to full text to view abstract
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A script theory of intentional contentGuirguis, Mazen Maurice 05 1900 (has links)
Fred Dretske (1981) claimed that the essence of the kind of cognitive activity that gives rise to
Intentional mental states is a process by which the analogue information coming from a source-object
is transformed into digital form. It is this analogue-to-digital conversion of data that enables us to form
concepts of things. But this achievement comes with a cost, since the conversion must involve a loss
of information. The price we pay for the lost information is a proportional diminishment in our ability
to discriminate the source-object from others that may be similar to it. I argue that this fact underlies
an important distinction between what a mental state may be about and to what the state may be
directed,
Aboutness and directedness are two of four Intentional dimensions on which this project concentrates.
The other two are aspectual shape and misrepresentation. The distinction between aboutness and
directedness is a part of a proposed approach to Intentionality based on the script theory of Roger
Schank and Robert Abelson (1977). Scripts are schemata—organized knowledge structures that guide
our understanding of the world around us. Schank and Abelson's basic ideas are extended to yield four
different script-types: episodic (related to situations and events), instrumental (related to procedural
knowledge), personal (representing an agent's goals and plans), and definitional (involved in object-recognition).
The relationship between scripts and the Intentionality of thought is the main focus of this dissertation.
An important secondary concern is the viability of externalism and internalism. It is argued that
neither of these attitudes is independently adequate to provide a full account of Intentional content.
Rather, the proper approach is to confine externalistic influences to aboutness and then characterize
directedness in a manner that captures the world-according-to-the-agent. This strategy is implemented
in the following way: aboutness is construed causally-evolutionarily; directedness is constructed with
the help of the notion of an equivalence class; aspectual shape is shown to be a function of the kind of
information a script provides; and an account of misrepresentation is given by comparing the different
extensions generated from aboutness and directedness respectively. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate
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The nature of teacher reflective practice in an unforgiving learning environmentAlexander, Lesley Dianne 05 1900 (has links)
This study supported Schon's notions of reflective practice as being applicable to
teachers involved in teaching physical activities in the context of unforgiving learning
environments and specifically to teachers in the sport diving community. According to Schon,
one's ability to recognize patterns and act effectively and efficiently in situations of uniqueness
and uncertainty depends upon one's capacity to frame problems. In doing so, one draws upon a
repertoire of past experience arid ways of capturing that experience which enables the
development of the ability to reframe problems in light of information gathered from the direct
experience. Reframing occurs through the processes of reflection-in-action and reflection-onaction
and is a response to an internal dialogue related to the action setting, in which something
has not happened as expected, thus producing a curious or intrigued response.
A number of issues specific to teacher reflection in unforgiving learning environments
emanated from the analysis of one sport diving teacher engaged in teaching an entry-level sport
diving course which involved three different teaching environments (the classroom setting, the
confined water [pool] and open water [ocean] environments). Three research questions guided
the analysis. In answer to the first research question: What factors do sport diving
practitioners reflect upon in each of the three environments? six reflective themes were
identified in this case study with five being common across the three teaching environments and
the remainder being specific to the classroom environment. The common themes were: a
trusting relationship, the necessity of teacher control, to see the 'unforgivingness' of the
environment, learning from one's practice, challenges to one's practice and understanding one's
practice. In answer to the second research question: What influences the reflective process?
the analysis revealed thirteen underlying or influencing factors or dispositions across the three
teaching environments with eight of them being common to either two, or all three, of the
environments. In answer to the third research question: What is the nature of sport diving
practitioners' reflective practice? five categories have been used to address the analysis: 1)
across environment related, 2) classroom and confined water (pool) related, 3) confined water
(pool) and open water (ocean) related 4) classroom and open water (ocean) related and 5)
specific to one environment.
The reflection process documented in this study suggested that Schon's notion of
reflective practice is very applicable to the professional development of sport diving as his
conception of reflection applies to the three areas of teaching which exist in unforgiving learning
environments: the problem solving disposition of teacher reflection, the learning from one's
practice, and the probing of internal dialogue. / Education, Faculty of / Curriculum and Pedagogy (EDCP), Department of / Graduate
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Automatic and attentionally controlled processing in the cerebral hemispheresEglin, Susan Mirjam January 1982 (has links)
The thesis describes research investigating differences between the two hemispheres in automatic and in attentionally controlled processes. It is suggested that the interaction between these two processes may be a source of hemispheric differences. Three different paradigms that each imply different definitions of automatic and attentionally controlled processes are used: A paradigm used to demonstrate illusory conjunctions, a modified priming paradigm and a modified Stroop-task.
Converging evidence from all three paradigms indicates that automatic processes are common to both hemispheres. Lateral asymmetries only emerge in attentional effects. For verbal information, selective attention mechanisms in the left hemisphere are found to be selective for left hemisphere items only, whereas right hemisphere mechanisms are sensitive to information from both hemispheres.
The right hemisphere appears to be able to give some automatic support to attended verbal processing in the left hemisphere, while the reverse seems to be more difficult. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate
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The linguistic u-turn in the philosophy of thoughtFleming, Michael Neil 05 1900 (has links)
A central task of contemporary analytic philosophy is to develop an understanding of how our minds are
connected to the external (or mind-independent) world. Arising from this task is the need to explain how
thoughts represent things in the world. Giving such an explanation is the central endeavor of this
dissertation—the aim being to contribute to our understanding of what it is for a subject to be thinking of
a particular object. The structure of the dissertation is set, in part, by responding to the commonly held
view that a satisfactory explanation of what it is to think of a particular object can be drawn out of, or
extended from, an explanation of what it is to be referring to that particular object.
Typically, in investigating these matters, it is accepted that there is an explanatory priority of
language over thought. This is the Priority Thesis. Some take the Priority Thesis to reflect an appropriate
methodological strategy. In this form, it implies the methodological point that the best way to describe
thoughts is by describing them as they are expressed in language. Most, however, seem to take the Priority
Thesis to be symptomatic of a substantive, metaphysical truth. This, to put it one way, is that the content
of a thought is paralleled by the content of the associated linguistic expression. I call this the Assumption
of Parallelism. This characterizes what we call Linguistic Turn philosophy (i.e., analytic philosophy).
The body of the dissertation arises out of questioning the extent of the application ofthe Priority
Thesis in developing theories of reference and thought. I call the move of the partial overturning ofthe
Priority Thesis the Linguistic U-Turn. The overall conclusion is that we cannot explain what it is to think
of a particular object by extending explanations of what it is to be referring to that particular object. In
particular, I reject what I call the Causal Theory of Thought—the view that the representational properties
of a thought are explained by the referential properties of the appropriate singular term. My aim, then,
is to show that a popular conviction concerning the representational properties of thoughts about things
in the world is not warranted. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate
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