Legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title and treaty negotiations with First Nations in British Columbia (BC) are inextricably linked. While much has been written on the impacts of a small number of such legal decisions, there has been very little research that critically examines how legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title, in general, influence the way the parties to the BC treaty process conduct treaty negotiations. In-depth interviews with ten First Nations, provincial, and federal chief negotiators/advisers, together with British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) commissioners and senior-level program staff, suggest that legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title influence the conduct of treaty negotiations in an indirect and serpentine manner. Further to this, the results suggest that legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title may act to simultaneously facilitate and constrain the conduct of negotiations.

Legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title and treaty negotiations with First Nations in British Columbia (BC) are inextricably linked. While much has been written on the impacts of a small number of such legal decisions, there has been very little research that critically examines how legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title, in general, influence the way the parties to the BC treaty process conduct treaty negotiations. In-depth interviews with ten First Nations, provincial, and federal chief negotiators/advisers, together with British Columbia Treaty Commission (BCTC) commissioners and senior-level program staff, suggest that legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title influence the conduct of treaty negotiations in an indirect and serpentine manner. Further to this, the results suggest that legal decisions on Aboriginal rights and title may act to simultaneously facilitate and constrain the conduct of negotiations.

This article reflects on the treaty-making power of the Congress and the President of the Republic in light of the Peruvian domestic law and International Law (particularly within the framework of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties) taking into account the discussions that arose betweenthe legislative and the executive powers regarding the ratification of the Extradition Treaty between Peru and France of 2016. The domestic law applicable to the conclusion of a treaty in Peru establishes that the President of the Republic is the only one who has the power to express the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty through ratification, which has internationallegal effects. The Congress has the power to approve treaties whose provisions are related to topics listed in Article 56 of 1993 Peruvian Constitution. The Congress’ legislative approval implies a parliamentary control regarding the acts of the President. However, Congress cannot compel the President to ratify a treaty (as it was discussed regarding the Extradition Treaty between Peru andFrance) neither issue the ratification. / Este artículo reflexiona en torno a las atribuciones para celebrar tratados que tienen el Congreso y el Presidente de la República a la luz del derecho interno peruano y del Derecho Internacional (en especial, de la Convención de Viena de 1969 sobre Derecho de los Tratados), teniendo en cuenta las discusiones que surgieron entre el Poder Legislativo y el Poder Ejecutivo con respecto a la ratificación del Tratado de Extradición entre la República de Perú y la República Francesa de 2016. Las normas internas aplicables a la celebración de tratados en el Perú establecen que el Presidente de la República es el único que está facultado para expresar el consentimiento del Estado en obligarse por un tratado al ratificarlo, lo cual tiene efectos jurídicos internacionales. La atribución del Congreso de aprobar los tratados cuyas materias están previstas en el artículo 56 de la Constitución Política del Perú de 1993 implica el control parlamentario a los actos del Presidente. No obstante, el Congreso no puede obligar al Presidente de la República a ratificar un tratado (como se discutió con relación al Tratado de Extradición entre la República de Perú y la República Francesa) ni es competente para emitir una ratificación.

為研究地主國租稅環境對台灣跨國企業海外子公司區位選擇的影響，本文以巢式羅吉特模型研究 2001 年至 2013 年間台灣上市櫃公司海外關係企業（排除金融保險業和 F 股）的資料。相對於過去探討海外子公司區位選擇的文獻僅著重於地主國稅率和地主國是否有反避稅制度（移轉訂價制度和資本弱化條款），本文首度加入租稅協定相關的變數：「地主國是否與台灣簽訂租稅協定」和「地主國租稅協定網絡」，探討兩者與海外子公司區位選擇的關係。 本研究實證結果發現地主國與台灣簽訂租稅協定並不能增加海外子公司在該地設立的機率，反而可能因租稅協定中的資訊交換條款而降低在該地設立子公司的機率；地主國租稅協定網絡愈豐富則是會增加跨國企業在該地設立海外子公司的機率，表示跨國企業可能藉由設立在租稅協定網絡豐富國家的海外子公司，適用該國的租稅協定利益。其他與地主國租稅環境相關變數的實證結果為潛在地主國稅率愈低及無反避稅制度的國家會較吸引海外子公司的設立。 / Using nested logit model, the thesis examined the impact of international taxation on location choice of Taiwanese multinational firms from 2001 to 2013. Compared to previous studies that only focused on the impact of tax rate and anti-avoidance legislations (transfer pricing rule and thin capitalization prvision), the thesis focused on the impact of tax treaty, examining the relationship between location choice and bilateral or multilateral tax treaties. The results showed that countries which had tax treaty with Taiwan did not attract Taiwanese multinational firms, and the possible reason was the exchange of information article in tax treaties. The study also found that the more tax treaties one potential host country had, the higher probability of Taiwanese multinational enterprises setting up subsidiaries in that host country, which suggested that Taiwanese multinational enterprises may have the behavior of treaty shopping. Other results related to tax variables showed that potential host countries with lower tax rate or with no anti-avoidance legislations would attract Taiwanese multinational firms.

Les Communautés européennes et l'Union européenne ont toujours exprimé leur engagement à respecter les droits de l'homme. Depuis la première Convention intergouvernementale chargée de la rédaction du projet de Charte des Droits Fondamentaux (1999-2001), une deuxième Convention a été organisée. La dernière a proposé le projet de Constitution pour l'Union européenne qui par la suite a été rejeté dans deux referenda nationaux et a soulevé de nombreuses questions sur la légitimité de l'Union et son avenir. Récemment, le Conseil de l'Union Européenne a décidé d'abandonner le projet de Constitution pour l'Union européenne et a ouvert la voie vers le traité modificatif. À part la légitimité de l'Union en tant que organisation internationale ou ordre juridique international et tous les problèmes auxiliaires que la constitutionnalisation implique, ce processus est inextricablement lié au sujet très controversé de la politique des droits de l'homme. Conformément au traité constitutionnel, la Charte d'un côté et la Convention européenne des droits de l'Homme de l'autre seraient devenu parties intégrantes du système constitutionnel européen. Par contre, le nouveau traité modificatif comprendra juste un renvoi à la Charte. Néanmoins, le problème de l'Union européenne demeure l'absence d'une politique cohérente avec toutes ses éléments - des instruments écrits contraignants, l'efficacité des voies de recours, une agence des droits de l'homme, un budget et un plan horizontal. Tandis que le traité constitutionnel sans pour autant résoudre tous ces problèmes a représenté un grand pas en avant dans cette direction, le nouveau traité semble être un compromis. / The European Communities and the Union have always expressed their commitment to the respect of Human Rights. Since the first EU Convention drafted the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 1999/2001 a second Convention has been and gone proposing a Constitution to the Union which was subsequently rejected during the ratification phase in two national referenda raising a number of questions about the Union and its future. Recently, the European Council has decided to abandon the Constitution project and opened the way to the reform treaty. Let aside the legitimacy of the Union as international organization or legal order and all the ancillary problems that this constitutionalization entails, this whole process is genuinely and inextricably linked to another controversial point - the Human Rights policy. According to the Constitutional treaty the Charter on the one hand and the ECHR on the other hand, were to be internalized within the EU's constitutional system. As opposed to the Constitutional treaty the new reform treaty will only make reference to the Charter. Nevertheless, the real problem of the EU is the absence of a human rights policy with everything this entails, legally binding instruments assessing the fundamental rights, effective remedies, a human rights agency, a budget and a horizontal plan. While the Constitutional Treaty without entirely solving the problem marked important developments to this effect, the new reform treaty seems to be a compromise.

Poland was erased from European political maps in 1795 and fought in vain for freedom for the next century, until World War I provided another chance for independence. On November 11, 1918, the creation of the Polish Republic was proclaimed, but in an atmosphere of uncertainty, particularly relative to frontiers. The border with Germany was established in 1920-21 after plebiscites. While peaceful in Masuria, Ermland and Pomerania, there were three violent uprisings of the ethnic Poles in Upper Silesia. The status of Gdansk as a Free City was confirmed at Versailles in 1919. The Southern border with Czechoslovakia was settled in 1920. The Eastern borders were established after a war with Ukraine and a conflict with Lithuania. The last and most exhausting war with Soviet Russia was ended by 1921s Riga Peace Treaty. Polands boundaries were finally recognized by the Conference of Ambassadors in March 1923.

Since the end of the Cold War, political and geographical realities have changed considerably. One such reality was the balance of power between East and West, which was especially visible in Europe. The contest between rivals, the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), was over. Ultimately, NATO found itself the pre-eminent security organisation in Europe. The new post-cold war environment forced questions about the appropriate role for NATO. However, that changed with both the process of NATO expansion into former Warsaw pact countries and the ethnic conflicts throughout the former Yugoslavia. NATO found a new purpose during the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia as ‘peace-enforcer’ in the Balkan region. The focus of this thesis is NATO’s role in peace-enforcement in the former Yugoslavia. It examines how NATO dealt with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Specifically, how NATO managed to re-establish its relevance as a security organisation. NATO’s military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo were crucial in securing the end of hostilities in both those regions. NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) all played significant roles in subsequent peace-enforcement and peace-building roles in the region by suppressing violence through power projection and institution building. In 2001, NATO undertook a third operation in the Balkans, that time of a more limited nature, disarming ethnic Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. NATO’s presence there also encouraged stability. This thesis argues that, ultimately, NATO maintained its relevance by the establishing a new role for itself after the Cold War through Eastward expansion and in suppressing ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Both these roles have been successful. The decisive interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYROM forced the belligerents to stop fighting. NATO’s subsequent enforcement of the peace has stopped each conflict from flaring up again. With NATO membership now including most of Europe, it remains the only viable security organisation on the continent. NATO’s effectiveness as a security organisation was demonstrated with its ability to end the conflict in the Balkans and providing a stable environment for the people of the region. This intervention was crucial to the definition of a new role for NATO in the post-Cold War world. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1320482 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics 2008

In Canada, the duty to consult doctrine has been articulated as a legal remedy to address the potential infringement of Aboriginal and treaty rights by the Crown. The political dimension and implications of this legal duty on the evolving federal relationship between First Nations and the provincial Crown concerning lands and resources have yet to be fully explored. This research presents the argument that the duty to consult jurisprudence and the new relationship policy in British Columbia are moving towards the articulation of a treaty federalism relationship between the Crown and First Nations. The implications of these findings are then analyzed within the Saskatchewan policy environment, and a potential consultation framework is offered for this province. Crucial linkages between duty to consult jurisprudence and Aboriginal governance, and their implications for policy are highlighted, which contribute to further understanding the complex relationship between First Nations and the Crown in Canada on land and resources.

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In Canada, the duty to consult doctrine has been articulated as a legal remedy to address the potential infringement of Aboriginal and treaty rights by the Crown. The political dimension and implications of this legal duty on the evolving federal relationship between First Nations and the provincial Crown concerning lands and resources have yet to be fully explored. This research presents the argument that the duty to consult jurisprudence and the new relationship policy in British Columbia are moving towards the articulation of a treaty federalism relationship between the Crown and First Nations. The implications of these findings are then analyzed within the Saskatchewan policy environment, and a potential consultation framework is offered for this province. Crucial linkages between duty to consult jurisprudence and Aboriginal governance, and their implications for policy are highlighted, which contribute to further understanding the complex relationship between First Nations and the Crown in Canada on land and resources.