Thesis: M.Sc. (Hons.)--University of Western Sydney, Macarthur. Faculty of Business and Technology. 1997. / References: 141-153.

Nesta dissertação é explorado o comportamento emergente de uma população heterogênea de jogadores negociando segundo o jogo do ultimato: dois jogadores recebem uma oferta; um deles (o proponente) propõe a sua divisão, enquanto o outro jogador (o aceitador) pode aceitar ou rejeitar a proposta. A rejeição é prejudicial a ambos jogadores, pois nenhum deles recebe sua parcela dos possíveis ganhos. Neste contexto, o ganho e seus momentos são calculados a partir de métodos analíticos simples e várias simulações computacionais corroboram os resultados obtidos. Também são analisadas as flutuações estatísticas da distribuição do ganho. Além disso, é apresentada uma abordagem simples evolucionária que considera mudanças em estratégias baseadas em ganhos anteriores. Para este caso, é demonstrado que o tempo médio de permanência (idade) de uma estratégia de uma população de "justos" convergepara um valor constante enquanto t se aproxima do ∞ e o cutoff médio decai segundouma lei de potência em tempos altos, após uma queda inicial. Também foram observadas transições entre comportamentos de alto e baixo ganho. Adicionalmente foi estudadauma versão espacial desse modelo. Para tanto são consideradosjogadores interagindo com seus primeiros vizinhos em reticulados 2D de acordo com duas dinâmicas estocáticas: (1) morte e nascimento com amostragem seletiva (MNAS), (2) Gibbs sampling sobre a vizinhança (GS). Estes resultados trazem importantes considerações sobre o projeto de simulaçõesno contexto da teoria dos jogos evolucionários, em particular na simulação dos aspectos relevantes quando modelando grandes populações. / Weexplore the emergent behavior of a heterogeneous population of players negotiating via an ultimatum game: two players are offered a gift; one of them (the proposer) suggestshow to divide the offer while the other player (the responder) can either agree or reject the deal. Rejection is detrimental to both players as it results in no eamings. In this context, the payoff and its moments are calculated from simple analytical methods and several computer simulations corroborate the obtained results. Wealso analyze statistical fluctuationson payoff distribution. In addition,we present a simple evolutionaryapproach that considers changes in strategies based on previous eamings. For this case, we show that average permanence time (age) in a strategy of a fair population converges to a constant value when t approaches ∞ and the cutoff average decays as a power law for large times after a initial deterministic slip. We have also observed transitions between highlow payoffbehaviors. Additionallywe studied a spatial version ofthis model. For this we consider players interacting with their nearest neighbors in 2D lattices according to two different stochastic dynamics: (1) Death and birth with selective sampling (MNAS), (2) Gibbs sampling on neighborhood (GS) Webelieve that these results can bring important considerationsto the design of simulations in the context ofthe evolutionary game theory, in particular in the simulation of relevant features when modeling large populations.

Nesta dissertação é explorado o comportamento emergente de uma população heterogênea de jogadores negociando segundo o jogo do ultimato: dois jogadores recebem uma oferta; um deles (o proponente) propõe a sua divisão, enquanto o outro jogador (o aceitador) pode aceitar ou rejeitar a proposta. A rejeição é prejudicial a ambos jogadores, pois nenhum deles recebe sua parcela dos possíveis ganhos. Neste contexto, o ganho e seus momentos são calculados a partir de métodos analíticos simples e várias simulações computacionais corroboram os resultados obtidos. Também são analisadas as flutuações estatísticas da distribuição do ganho. Além disso, é apresentada uma abordagem simples evolucionária que considera mudanças em estratégias baseadas em ganhos anteriores. Para este caso, é demonstrado que o tempo médio de permanência (idade) de uma estratégia de uma população de "justos" convergepara um valor constante enquanto t se aproxima do ∞ e o cutoff médio decai segundouma lei de potência em tempos altos, após uma queda inicial. Também foram observadas transições entre comportamentos de alto e baixo ganho. Adicionalmente foi estudadauma versão espacial desse modelo. Para tanto são consideradosjogadores interagindo com seus primeiros vizinhos em reticulados 2D de acordo com duas dinâmicas estocáticas: (1) morte e nascimento com amostragem seletiva (MNAS), (2) Gibbs sampling sobre a vizinhança (GS). Estes resultados trazem importantes considerações sobre o projeto de simulaçõesno contexto da teoria dos jogos evolucionários, em particular na simulação dos aspectos relevantes quando modelando grandes populações. / Weexplore the emergent behavior of a heterogeneous population of players negotiating via an ultimatum game: two players are offered a gift; one of them (the proposer) suggestshow to divide the offer while the other player (the responder) can either agree or reject the deal. Rejection is detrimental to both players as it results in no eamings. In this context, the payoff and its moments are calculated from simple analytical methods and several computer simulations corroborate the obtained results. Wealso analyze statistical fluctuationson payoff distribution. In addition,we present a simple evolutionaryapproach that considers changes in strategies based on previous eamings. For this case, we show that average permanence time (age) in a strategy of a fair population converges to a constant value when t approaches ∞ and the cutoff average decays as a power law for large times after a initial deterministic slip. We have also observed transitions between highlow payoffbehaviors. Additionallywe studied a spatial version ofthis model. For this we consider players interacting with their nearest neighbors in 2D lattices according to two different stochastic dynamics: (1) Death and birth with selective sampling (MNAS), (2) Gibbs sampling on neighborhood (GS) Webelieve that these results can bring important considerationsto the design of simulations in the context ofthe evolutionary game theory, in particular in the simulation of relevant features when modeling large populations.

View of rational choice in coherence with ultimatum game. Rational choice theory adjusted by joining behavioral economics to better comprehend decision-making processes. In this thesis I focus on researching strong influences using multiple simple games. Namely: ultimatum game, dictator game and modifications of previous. They will be carried out by online questionnaire. Next step will be analysis of components to determine significant ones and impact of game's modifications. I assume that decision-maker's rationality will be disproven. This thesis will continue with assessing influence of risk and fear of loss. Goal is to gather enough of detailed data about motivations and participants in order to perform analysis and establish statistically significant influences.

The aim of this work is to show that even people who outwardly demonstrate irrational behaviour are actually rational. The only reason why their actions deviate from theoretical rational behaviour is given by different utility functions. Ultimatum game with its easy rules represents a great way to show deviations between human and rational behaviours. The model described in the thesis focuses on Responder's decision making, which is influenced not only by maximization of pure economical profit but also by many other factors, which are summed in the model in one variable -- attitude to fairness. It is shown how this variable can be predicted using decisions obtained from a multi-round Ultimatum game. To prove that humans behave in accordance with their own preferences, the modelled game does not only estimate players' attitudes to fairness but also predicts players' following actions using knowledge of estimated values.

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People interact with each other rationally and irrationally. Standard economic theories assume that people act rationally, yet, behavioral economic theories indicate that sometimes people act irrationally because of the specific situation, their character, and many other factors. Culture plays a role in shaping people’s preferences, values, personalities, norms, and beliefs. That being the case, it is important to shed some light on the effect of different types of cultures on people’s decision-making behavior, in order to better understand human nature with regard to economic decisions. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to define how people from various cultures behave differently while making economic decisions, and to provide a better understanding for the motives behind people’s preferences towards decision-making. The first and second chapters of this thesis consider studies in experimental economics about the effect of introducing effort to the ultimatum game. The first chapter provides evidence that people’s decisions are driven by either hierarchy or property rights by comparing the results of three different cultures. The second chapter shows the impact of proposers’ effort in the ultimatum game, in which, culturally driven phenomenon impact on the proposers’ behavior. The third chapter investigates the impact of the Islam religion on experimental studies with regard to decision making and it shows that religious beliefs play an important role in shaping people’s preferences.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:40:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gabriel Gaudencio do Rego.pdf: 1139897 bytes, checksum: b56f45681ad1b3adb1fbebc620c7562a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-11 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Games are useful tools to simulate social interactions of cooperation or competition and can be applied in conjunction with behavioral and electrophysiological techniques, such as Event Related Potentials (ERP) analysis. The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a well-studied game which can be used to investigate how individuals react to injustice. An initial value is divided between a proponent, who suggests a division rate of this value, and a respondent, who may accept or reject it. If the respondent accepts, both players gain the proposed value, and if he or she rejects, they gain nothing. The behavioral and electrophysiological results have demonstrated typical reactions in the game. The Medial Frontal Negativity (MFN), a component associated with the automatic processing of negative social feedback, and the P300, associated with attention and memory process, are two components commonly observed during UG. While the interaction between volunteers and proponents with typical development is well described, the interaction between volunteers and proponents with Down syndrome is still unknown. This research aimed to investigate differences in the behavioral data, MFN and P300 in participants playing the UG with a typical proposer and Down proposer. 32 subjects participated in the experiment. Scales of social desirability, moral identity, self-esteem and an implicit association test about Down syndrome were applied. The results showed similar behavioral patterns among proponents and previous data described in the literature. Regarding ERPs, the MFN was not detected and there was greater amplitude of P200 component for proposals of the Down. There was also greater amplitude of P300 for fair proposals of the typical proponent compared to the fair proposals of the Down, and of these two compared to unfair proposals of both. The amplitude of the P300 for proposals of typical was negatively correlated with self-esteem scores. Together, the results suggest that the presence of a player with Down syndrome might influence the perception and expectation of the participants about the game, and this effect could be extended to the interaction with the typical proponent. The absence of MFN suggests that participants do not perceived the unfair proposals as a social negative outcome and P300 suggests that the interaction with the typical proposer was more relevant to the participants. Moreover, this relevance was modulated due to personal characteristics of self-esteem. Further studies are suggested in this area to confirm the hypotheses suggested in the present research. / Os jogos simulam situações sociais relativamente simples de cooperação ou competição e podem ser aplicados conjuntamente às técnicas de pesquisa comportamentais e eletrofisiológicas como a análise de potenciais relacionados a eventos (ERP). Um jogo muito estudado é o Ultimatum Game (UG), que pode ser utilizado para investigar como indivíduos reagem à injustiça. Um valor inicial é dividido entre um propositor, que sugere uma divisão do valor, e um respondente que pode aceitar ou rejeitar. Caso este aceite os dois ganham o valor proposto, caso rejeite ninguém ganha. Os resultados comportamentais e eletrofisiológicos têm demonstrado reações comuns no jogo. Os ERPs mais comuns é o MFN, associado ao processamento automático de feedbacks sociais negativos, e o P300, associado a processos atencionais e de memorização. Enquanto a interação entre sujeitos de pesquisa com propositores de desenvolvimento típico já é bem conhecida, o efeito desta interação com propositores com síndrome de Down ainda é desconhecido. O presente buscou investigar diferenças no padrão comportamental, de MFN e P300 em participantes jogando UG com propositor típico e com Down. 32 sujeitos participaram do experimento. Foram aplicadas escalas de desejabilidade social, identidade moral, de autoestima e um teste de atitudes implícitas frente às pessoas com Down. Os resultados demonstraram padrões comportamentais semelhantes entres os propositores e a literatura. Quanto aos ERPs, o MFN não foi detectado e houve presença de componente P200 para propostas de Down. Houve também maior amplitude de P300 para propostas justas do típico em comparação as justas do Down e destes dois em comparação às propostas injustas de ambos. A amplitude do P300 para propostas do típico apresentaram correlação negativa com escalas de autoestima. Os resultados sugerem que a presença de um jogador com síndrome de Down influenciou a percepção e expectativa dos participantes quanto ao jogo, e que este efeito pode ter se estendido para a interação com o propositor típico. A ausência de MFN sugere que não houve processamento das propostas injustas como respostas sociais negativas e o P300 sugere que a interação com o propositor foi de maior relevância para os participantes. Além disto, esta relevância foi modulada em razão de características pessoais de autoestima. São sugeridos novos estudos no tema para confirmar as hipóteses aqui apresentadas.

Des difficultés sociales sont liées au trouble de la personnalité limite (TPL). Pour les comprendre, le traitement de l’information lors de décisions sociales doit être étudié. Parmi ces informations sociales, les expressions faciales émotives sont moins bien identifiées chez les individus ayant un TPL (Daros et al., 2013) comparativement aux individus sains. Également, une étude rapporte que des participants ayant un TPL acceptent plus d’offres monétaires, indépendamment du degré d’équité, que les individus sains dans une tâche de prise de décision sociale simulant des interactions avec des individus (représentés par des visages joyeux ou colériques) divisant de l’argent avec les participants (Polgár et al., 2014). Cependant, ils rapportent aussi que pour les offres monétaires de 20 à 30 % du montant à diviser les participants sains acceptaient les offres des visages joyeux plus fréquemment, cet effet était absent pour les participants ayant un TPL. L’objectif de cette étude est donc de savoir si les différences de reconnaissance des émotions médient la relation de la sévérité des traits du TPL avec des décisions sociales d’acceptation d’offres monétaires accompagnées d’expressions faciales (joie, colère et neutre). Nos résultats corroborent l’association négative des traits du TPL avec la reconnaissance des émotions (Daros et al., 2013) et l’association positive entre l’acceptation des offres et les traits du TPL (Polgár et al., 2014). Cependant, aucun effet médiateur n’est observé. Ainsi, nous concluons que la reconnaissance des émotions et la prise de décision sociale représentent des aspects indépendants des profils sociocognitifs liés aux traits du TPL. / Social difficulties are linked to borderline personality disorder (BPD). To understand them, the processing of information during social decisions must be studied. A form of social information is emotional facial expressions which are less well identified in individuals with BPD (Daros et al., 2013) compared to participants without a diagnosed mental health issue. Also, one study reports that participants with BPD accept more monetary offers (regardless of the amount of money they were offered) participants without a diagnosed mental health issue in a social decision-making task simulating interaction with individuals (represented by happy or angry faces) dividing money with participants (Polgár et al., 2014). However, they also report that for monetary offers that represented 20-30% of the divided sum, participants without a diagnosed mental health issue participants accepted offers from happy faces more frequently. However, this effect was absent in participants with BPD. The aim of this study is to determine whether differences in emotion recognition abilities mediate the relationship of BPD trait severity with social decisions to accept monetary offers accompanied by facial expressions (joy, anger and neutral). Our results support the negative association of BPD traits with emotion recognition (Daros et al., 2013) and the positive association between offer acceptance and BPD traits (Polgár et al., 2014). However, no mediating effect is observed. Thus, we conclude that emotion recognition and social decision-making represent independent aspects of the sociocognitive profiles related to BPD traits.