Is unipolarity sustainable? The dominant perspective among international relations scholars is that the United States is in decline relative to China, and that much of this decline is the result of globalization and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization. According to an alternative perspective, however, globalization and hegemony reinforce unipolarity. This study tests these perspectives against each other and finds significant support for the alternative perspective. The results suggest that unipolarity is not a temporary aberration, but rather a deeply embedded condition with the potential to persist well into this century.

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The purpose of this thesis is to provide a critical evaluation of the neorealist theory of international relations and its soft balancing variant through the use of case studies referring to transatlantic relations in the post-Cold War era. Each case study indicates a specific category of power. These are: i) Military - the European attempt to create a common military arm from 1991 to 2003. ii) Diplomatic - the EU's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 1991 to 2003. iii) Economic the EU-USA steel dispute in 2002/03. In particular, the thesis undertakes to analyse whether the EU balanced the USA in the post-Cold War period either as a result of the altered structural distribution of capabilities within the international system (unipolarity) or of a set of deliberate plans to do so. After introducing the concepts of unipolarity, hard and soft balancing, the thesis outlines three comprehensive answers that neorealist scholars have generated as to whether the USA can or cannot be balanced in the post-Cold War international system, namely the structural, the soft balancing, and the alternative structural options. Then, drawing on a defensive realist perspective, this research goes on to consider the creation of the EU as a great power in the post-Cold War era. In light of this, the thesis aims to find out whether the rise of the EU as a great power has had an impact upon unipolarity either because of structural incentives or because of a predetermination to frustrate the aggressive policies of the unipolar state. The thesis then proceeds to investigate whether throughout the case studies series the EU has balanced the USA. The case studies highlight that the EU, freed from the rigid bipolar stalemate it had been locked into during the Cold War, undertook to exert greater influence on the world stage in the post-Cold War period. To some extent the EU has accomplished this in all of the power dimensions analysed in this thesis. Nevertheless, the EU's efforts to hold sway within the international system were not aimed at addressing the relative power imbalance created by unipolarity, and there were no deliberate plans harboured by the EU to frustrate the influence of any aggressive unipolar state. Overall, this thesis found the causal logic outlined by neorealism to be convincing to the extent that the EU emerged as a great power in the post-Cold War era and had greater freedom of action under unipolarity. However, with the partial exception of the economic dimension of power, there was no persuasive evidence uncovered to support the anticipated outcome of the neorealist theoretical slant, namely that great powers tend to balance each other. Moreover, while the soft balancing claim is considered to have promise as an attempt to understand how the EU can respond to US power under unipolarity, this study did not find sufficient evidence of the EU's deliberate intentions of doing so.

Several contemporary theories in the neo-realist corpus, modifies earlier assumptions about unit level behavior. The explanatory value of these theories has to be tested. The aim of this research, was to test the explanatory value of Davide Fiammenghis theory about the security curve, and Nuno P. Monteiros theory about unipolarity. In order to test the theories, a case study was designed where Japans aggression against the USA in 1941, was used as a least-likely case. Inspired by the idea from neo-classical realism, that the perceptions of decisions makers can vary considerably from real conditions, I used primary sources to study the perceptions and calculations inside the Japanese government. Three critical foreign policy decisions, made by the Japanese government in 1940 and 1941 were analyzed. Fimmenghis theory were first rejected, yet when it was modified to fit the condition of asymmetric economic dependence, it fit well the data. The study also indicated, that Monteiros theory can explain state behavior, if a state anticipates that it could end up in unipolar, international system.

The end of the Cold War in 1990 was followed by a shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world, profoundly transforming the nature of international alliance politics. Then, what are the systemic features of the unipolar system that have changed alliance relations in comparison to the previous bipolar and multipolar world? How can we explain the diverse reaction of the U.S. allies in different regions in response to the U.S. request for the modification of alliance functions and reshaping of the alliance burden sharing? How do we measure and interpret changes in the nature of alliance politics in a unipolar system? The goal of this project is to provide a systematic answer to these questions. Focusing on international system polarities and alliance burden sharing behavior, this dissertation builds a framework for understanding the dynamics of alliance politics. In particular, I argue that alliance burden sharing as an empirical indicator plays a critical role in explaining the changed nature of the unipolar alliance system. First, I examine how the two interrelated systemic factors - external threat and the distribution of power - influence alliance burden sharing with a system-level analysis by utilizing a quantitative method with state-year burden sharing data from 1885 to 2000. Second, I present case studies of South Korea and Japan's alliance burden sharing in the post-Cold War period. A central argument of the dissertation is that the role and function of alliance is determined by structural constraints of different international system polarities. Specifically, this project demonstrates that burden sharing is a key factor representing the impact of systemic properties of unipolarity on the behavioral changes in alliance politics.

A cooperação em defesa na América do Sul é explicada pela Teoria Realista Ofensiva de Cooperação em Defesa sob a Unipolaridade - aqui introduzida. Identificada uma lacuna significativa nas teorias de Relações Internacionais e nos trabalhos que buscam explicar, de forma ad hoc, a cooperação em defesa em outras regiões do mundo, nossa teoria traz explicações para (1) a motivação dos Estados para cooperar em defesa; (2) as variáveis independentes que afetam a cooperação em defesa; (3) um modelo amplo de cooperação em defesa que possa ser replicado em diferentes regiões do mundo. Demonstramos que cooperar em defesa serve para aumentar a posição relativa dos Estados participantes tanto frente aos demais Estados quanto frente à potência unipolar, sem, contudo, aumentar as pressões do dilema da segurança. Esse suposto reafirma o princípio egoísta dos Estados, de buscarem maximizar o seu poder para melhor garantir a sua sobrevivência, mas mostrando que novos tempos exigem novas formas de maximização de poder. Para tanto, demonstramos a continuidade da unipolaridade dos Estados Unidos na balança de poder global e apontamos, via 15 indicadores diferentes, que a polaridade sul-americana encontra-se em um momento de transição entre uma multipolaridade desequilibrada e uma unipolaridade brasileira, sofrendo pressões sistêmicas de ambas as configurações e corroborando as expectativas de nossa teoria. Conclui-se que o reaparelhamento ou não das Forças Armadas brasileiras levará à definição do sobe e desce das pressões sistêmicas regionais para a cooperação em defesa: se confirmada a unipolaridade, haverá maiores incentivos para as iniciativas em andamento criadas e mantidas pelo protagonismo brasileiro, como a UNASUL e o CDS. Contudo, se configurada a multipolaridade desequilibrada, os incentivos sistêmicos serão para a manutenção de uma integração baixa e instituições fracas na área de cooperação em defesa na América do Sul. / The defence cooperation in South America is explained by the Offensive Realist Theory of Cooperation in Defence under Unipolarity - hereby introduced. After identifying a meaningful gap in international relations theories and in ad hoc works which tryed to explain defence cooperation in other parts of the world, our theory brings explanations for (1) states' motivations to cooperate in defence; (2) the independent variables that affect defense cooperation; (3) a comprehensive model of defense cooperation that can be applied to different regions of the world. We have shown that cooperating in defence works for improving the relative position of the participating states vis-a-vis either the other states or the unipole without increasing the pressures of the security dilemma. This requisite reaffirms the selfish principle of states of maximising their power to better ensure their survival, but showing that new times demand new ways of power maximisation. To do so, we have demonstrated the maintenance of the United States' unipolarity at the global balance of power and shown, through 15 different indexes, that the South-American polarity finds itself in a transitory moment between an unbalanced multipolarity and a Brazilian unipolarity, suffering then pressures from both configurations and thus corroborating our theory's expectations. Our conclusion is that the refitting or not of the Brazilian Armed Forces will lead to the definition of the ups and downs of the sistemic regional pressures on defence cooperation: if it is confirmed the Brazilian unipolarity, there will be greater incentives for the ongoing initiatives created and maintened by Brazil, such as UNASUR and SDC. Nevertheless, if the unbalanced multipolarity is confirmed, the sistemic incentives will be for the maintenance of a low regional integration and weak institutions on the South American defence cooperation field.

A cooperação em defesa na América do Sul é explicada pela Teoria Realista Ofensiva de Cooperação em Defesa sob a Unipolaridade - aqui introduzida. Identificada uma lacuna significativa nas teorias de Relações Internacionais e nos trabalhos que buscam explicar, de forma ad hoc, a cooperação em defesa em outras regiões do mundo, nossa teoria traz explicações para (1) a motivação dos Estados para cooperar em defesa; (2) as variáveis independentes que afetam a cooperação em defesa; (3) um modelo amplo de cooperação em defesa que possa ser replicado em diferentes regiões do mundo. Demonstramos que cooperar em defesa serve para aumentar a posição relativa dos Estados participantes tanto frente aos demais Estados quanto frente à potência unipolar, sem, contudo, aumentar as pressões do dilema da segurança. Esse suposto reafirma o princípio egoísta dos Estados, de buscarem maximizar o seu poder para melhor garantir a sua sobrevivência, mas mostrando que novos tempos exigem novas formas de maximização de poder. Para tanto, demonstramos a continuidade da unipolaridade dos Estados Unidos na balança de poder global e apontamos, via 15 indicadores diferentes, que a polaridade sul-americana encontra-se em um momento de transição entre uma multipolaridade desequilibrada e uma unipolaridade brasileira, sofrendo pressões sistêmicas de ambas as configurações e corroborando as expectativas de nossa teoria. Conclui-se que o reaparelhamento ou não das Forças Armadas brasileiras levará à definição do sobe e desce das pressões sistêmicas regionais para a cooperação em defesa: se confirmada a unipolaridade, haverá maiores incentivos para as iniciativas em andamento criadas e mantidas pelo protagonismo brasileiro, como a UNASUL e o CDS. Contudo, se configurada a multipolaridade desequilibrada, os incentivos sistêmicos serão para a manutenção de uma integração baixa e instituições fracas na área de cooperação em defesa na América do Sul. / The defence cooperation in South America is explained by the Offensive Realist Theory of Cooperation in Defence under Unipolarity - hereby introduced. After identifying a meaningful gap in international relations theories and in ad hoc works which tryed to explain defence cooperation in other parts of the world, our theory brings explanations for (1) states' motivations to cooperate in defence; (2) the independent variables that affect defense cooperation; (3) a comprehensive model of defense cooperation that can be applied to different regions of the world. We have shown that cooperating in defence works for improving the relative position of the participating states vis-a-vis either the other states or the unipole without increasing the pressures of the security dilemma. This requisite reaffirms the selfish principle of states of maximising their power to better ensure their survival, but showing that new times demand new ways of power maximisation. To do so, we have demonstrated the maintenance of the United States' unipolarity at the global balance of power and shown, through 15 different indexes, that the South-American polarity finds itself in a transitory moment between an unbalanced multipolarity and a Brazilian unipolarity, suffering then pressures from both configurations and thus corroborating our theory's expectations. Our conclusion is that the refitting or not of the Brazilian Armed Forces will lead to the definition of the ups and downs of the sistemic regional pressures on defence cooperation: if it is confirmed the Brazilian unipolarity, there will be greater incentives for the ongoing initiatives created and maintened by Brazil, such as UNASUR and SDC. Nevertheless, if the unbalanced multipolarity is confirmed, the sistemic incentives will be for the maintenance of a low regional integration and weak institutions on the South American defence cooperation field.

A cooperação em defesa na América do Sul é explicada pela Teoria Realista Ofensiva de Cooperação em Defesa sob a Unipolaridade - aqui introduzida. Identificada uma lacuna significativa nas teorias de Relações Internacionais e nos trabalhos que buscam explicar, de forma ad hoc, a cooperação em defesa em outras regiões do mundo, nossa teoria traz explicações para (1) a motivação dos Estados para cooperar em defesa; (2) as variáveis independentes que afetam a cooperação em defesa; (3) um modelo amplo de cooperação em defesa que possa ser replicado em diferentes regiões do mundo. Demonstramos que cooperar em defesa serve para aumentar a posição relativa dos Estados participantes tanto frente aos demais Estados quanto frente à potência unipolar, sem, contudo, aumentar as pressões do dilema da segurança. Esse suposto reafirma o princípio egoísta dos Estados, de buscarem maximizar o seu poder para melhor garantir a sua sobrevivência, mas mostrando que novos tempos exigem novas formas de maximização de poder. Para tanto, demonstramos a continuidade da unipolaridade dos Estados Unidos na balança de poder global e apontamos, via 15 indicadores diferentes, que a polaridade sul-americana encontra-se em um momento de transição entre uma multipolaridade desequilibrada e uma unipolaridade brasileira, sofrendo pressões sistêmicas de ambas as configurações e corroborando as expectativas de nossa teoria. Conclui-se que o reaparelhamento ou não das Forças Armadas brasileiras levará à definição do sobe e desce das pressões sistêmicas regionais para a cooperação em defesa: se confirmada a unipolaridade, haverá maiores incentivos para as iniciativas em andamento criadas e mantidas pelo protagonismo brasileiro, como a UNASUL e o CDS. Contudo, se configurada a multipolaridade desequilibrada, os incentivos sistêmicos serão para a manutenção de uma integração baixa e instituições fracas na área de cooperação em defesa na América do Sul. / The defence cooperation in South America is explained by the Offensive Realist Theory of Cooperation in Defence under Unipolarity - hereby introduced. After identifying a meaningful gap in international relations theories and in ad hoc works which tryed to explain defence cooperation in other parts of the world, our theory brings explanations for (1) states' motivations to cooperate in defence; (2) the independent variables that affect defense cooperation; (3) a comprehensive model of defense cooperation that can be applied to different regions of the world. We have shown that cooperating in defence works for improving the relative position of the participating states vis-a-vis either the other states or the unipole without increasing the pressures of the security dilemma. This requisite reaffirms the selfish principle of states of maximising their power to better ensure their survival, but showing that new times demand new ways of power maximisation. To do so, we have demonstrated the maintenance of the United States' unipolarity at the global balance of power and shown, through 15 different indexes, that the South-American polarity finds itself in a transitory moment between an unbalanced multipolarity and a Brazilian unipolarity, suffering then pressures from both configurations and thus corroborating our theory's expectations. Our conclusion is that the refitting or not of the Brazilian Armed Forces will lead to the definition of the ups and downs of the sistemic regional pressures on defence cooperation: if it is confirmed the Brazilian unipolarity, there will be greater incentives for the ongoing initiatives created and maintened by Brazil, such as UNASUR and SDC. Nevertheless, if the unbalanced multipolarity is confirmed, the sistemic incentives will be for the maintenance of a low regional integration and weak institutions on the South American defence cooperation field.

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