Sedan 1980 talet har det inom den militära utbildningen i västvärlden och då främst i USA blivitallt mer fokuserat på manöverkrigföring och manöverteori. Även i den svenska utbildningen ärmanöverteorin central numera. Den svenska militärstrategiska doktrinen anger attmanövertänkande skall vara det som den svenska försvarsmakten har som konceptuella grund. Vidstudier av manöverkrigföring och manöverteorier är det oftast krigshistoriska exempel som tas ianspråk. Av naturliga skäl är det oftast de stora krigen och slagen under de två världskrigen somanalyseras. Historiskt har den tyska och israeliska krigföringen gått i främsta leden när det gällermanöverkrigföring. Av den anledningen har jag valt att analysera ett mindre och begränsat krigoch se hur dessa teorier passar in på detta krig. Mitt syfte är alltså att se om vi kan klassificerakriget mellan Storbritannien och Argentina 1982, som ett krig enligt de teorier som vi idaganvänder i vår militär utbildning. Jag kommer att beskriva teorierna för krigföringen och därefterpresenterar jag en kortfattad beskrivning av Falklandskrigets viktigaste händelser.I analysen konstaterar jag att det inte går att ge något helt klart svar på vilken typ av krigföringsom användes under Falklandskriget. Både Storbritannien och Argentina hade en blandning avmanöverkrig och utnötningskrigföring. Slutsatsen av uppsatsen ger att klassificeringen av kriget äratt det var ett utnötningskrig som hade inslag av manöverkrigföring / Since 1980 there has been a focus on manoeuvre warfare and manoeuvretheory, especially in the USA. In the Swedish military education, manoeuvretheory now also plays a central part. The Swedish military strategic doctrinestates that manoeuvre thinking is to be the conceptual base for the Swedisharmed forces. When we study manoeuvre warfare and manoeuvre theory, weoften use military history and the classical battle as the sources to study. Fornatural reasons it is usually the big wars and battles that have been in focus,especially World War I and II. Historically, the German and the Israeli schoolsof warfighting have played a key part of developing the art of manoeuvrewarfare. For that reason I have chosen to study and analyse a smaller war withmuch more limited circumstances. The purpose of the study is to see if thetheory fits into this small war.My purpose for this composition is to see if we can classify the war betweenGreat Britain and Argentina in 1982, the Falklands war, as a war with thetheories that we use today in our military education. To begin with I willdescribe the two theories of warfighting, manoeuvre warfare and attritionwarfare, after that I will present a short description of the most vital case in theFalklands war.In my analysis, I have discovered that there is no clear picture of how we canclassify the type of warfare that was used in the Falklands war. Both GreatBritain and Argentina accomplished the war with a mixture of the two methodsof warfighting. To begin with there were signs of manoeuvre warfare, but asthe war went on the more indication of attrition warfare appears.The conclusion of the composition is that the Falklands war was an attritionwar with elements of manoeuvre warfare. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-uppsHylla: Upps. ChP 02-04

The conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and eastern Ukraine have spurred a great deal of interest regarding the implications for modern warfare. Both schoolers and militaries alike have been trying  to decern what kind of implications these conflicts, complete with new weapons and capabilities have upon tomorrow’s battlefield. Theories that try to provide an explanatory outcome of conflicts has often been centered down to the age-old question whether it is the scientific material side or the artistic maneuver that takes the precedence for explaining victory on the battlefield. The purpose of this paper is to try and combine those views by using Randall Collins theory regarding the outcome of conflicts, to explain the battles of Ilovaisk 2014 and the Azerbaijani advance in Sothern Nagorno-Karabakh 2020. That way both sides are taken into account and help mitigate the debate. Furthermore, the making of a structural analytical framework tests the theory and is beneficial for further research. The framework developed from the theory, have two different main casual ways to explain victory on the battlefield. One stem from the material side called attrition and one from the artistic side called maneuverer. The framework was then applied upon a number of different reports, books, and other open sources from the conflicts. Conclusions from the results are that attritional warfare has been a viable way to achieve victory and that the long-range precision firepower that drone warfare offer has the advantage over the defensive counters.

The sieges in Ukraine demonstrate a resurgence of the siege phenomenon in modern conventional warfare. However, the siege of Bakhmut seems to be very costly for little use, which raises the question how we can understand it. The purpose of the study is to investigate how the siege of Bakhmut can be understood from using the terms attrition and maneuver warfare. To define the concepts, Edward Luttwak and Hans Delbrück theories were chosen and the methodology used in the study was a qualitative text analysis of media and think tanks reporting on the siege of Bakhmut. The conclusion of the analysis was that the intensity of the siege increased as the purpose of the siege became more politicized, but also two different perspectives on the siege emerged. One view suggests that the siege was a result of failed maneuver and confusion in the purpose of the operation. The other view suggests that the siege was an active choice based on the Wagner group's political background and the low quality of infantry. Of these two, the latter was considered the most relevant. The implications of the conclusions are that Bakhmut breaks an identified pattern in Russian siege art by Kristin Ljungqvist, where the siege of Bakhmut is not considered a failure of maneuver but rather a desired outcome. Finally, it is recommended to repeat the study when a source material of a higher critical value exists. / Belägringarna i Ukraina demonstrerar en återkomst av belägringsfenomenet i modern konventionell krigföring. Däremot verkar belägringen av Bakhmut vara oherhört kostsam för en liten nytta. Detta väcker frågan om hur belägringen kan förstås. Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur belägringens uppkomst kan förstås utifrån termer av manöver- respektive utnötningskrigföring. För att definera termerna nyttjades Edward Luttwak och Hans Delbrück teorier, samt den metod som nyttjades var en kvalitativ textanalys av media och tankesmedjor som har rapporterat och analyserat belägringen.Slutsatsen av analysen var att belägringens intensitet har ökat i samband med att belägringen har fått en alltmer politisk innebörd. Det framkom även två perspektiv på belägringen. Den ena synen hävdar att belägringen var ett symptom av misslyckande då de ryska styrkorna inte uppnåde manöverkrigföring och att syftet med belägringen var tvetydigt. Den andra synen menar på att belägringen var ett aktivt val på grund av Wagnergruppens bakgrund och den låga kvalitén av infanteriet. Av dessa två anses den senare slutsatsen vara mest relevant. Implikationerna av detta är att belägringen av Bakhmut bryter ett tidigare mönster av rysk belägringskonst som har identifierats av Kristin Ljungqvist. Slutligen rekommenderas det att studien genomförs på nytt då källmaterial av högre kvalité är tillgängligt.

Maneuver warfare theory has been used to explain success in numerous modern conflicts and is extensively incorporated into contemporary military doctrine. However, during 2022-2023, the war in Ukraine resembled World War I attritional warfare, leading theorists to question the relevance of maneuver warfare in today’s conflicts. This thesis examines the applicability of maneuver warfare theory in contemporary conflicts by analyzing success in land operations in eastern Ukraine, testing Stephen Biddle’s theory, The Modern System, in a comparative case study. The result indicates that asymmetry in force employment, referring to one side using military means more efficiently than the opponent, leads to success, and conversely that symmetry creates an attritional character of battle. The thesis contributes with insight into the dynamics between maneuver and attrition in high-intensity interstate wars, highlighting the importance of flexibility and adaptability. The conclusions emphasize the need of further research on maneuver warfare in contemporary conflicts.