Este trabalho analisa o instituto do veto presidencial no Brasil, comparando os períodos de 1946-1964 e 1990-2000. Cria um modelo de jogo do veto para o Brasil, empregando a Teoria da Escolha Racional e a Teoria dos Jogos. Basicamente, o desafio é superar o paradoxo apresentado pela literatura de que o veto não é previsto mas acontece. Examina os efeitos da alteração, entre um período e outro, do quorum de derrubada do veto sobre o confronto Executivo - Legislativo e suas implicações para o presidencialismo de coalizão brasileiro. Os resultados alcançados foram os seguintes: 1) nosso modelo do jogo do veto supera o paradoxo ao admitir a existência dos jogos ocultos que acompanham o veto e o processo legislativo: polarização política, conexão eleitoral, disputa entre poderes; 2) além disso, demonstramos que a prática do apoio mútuo no Legislativo permite a ocorrência do veto e de sua manutenção; 3) o quorum de derrubada do veto, e sua alteração, é importante na formação das coalizões de governo, mais especificamente, das maiorias; 4) variável igualmente importante é a disciplina partidária, que garante a eficácia das maiorias formadas. / This work analyzes the presidential veto in Brazil, comparing the periods of 1946- 1964 and 1990-2000. It creates a model of veto game for Brazil, using the Rational-Choice Theory and the Game Theory. Basically the challenge is to overcome the paradox presented by the literature, that the veto is not foreseen but it happens. We examine the effects of the alteration, between a period and other, of the override veto quorum on the Executive- Legistative confrontation and its implications for the Brazilian coalition presidentialism. The reached results were the following ones: 1) our model of the veto game overcomes the paradox when admits the existence of the nested games that accompany the veto and the legislative process: political polarization, electoral connection, dispute among powers; 2) besides, we demonstrated that the practice of the mutual support in the Legislative allows the veto to occurs and its maintenance; 3) the override veto quorum, and its alteration, is important to the formation of government's coalitions, more specifically, of the majority; 4) variable equally important is the party discipline, that guarantees the effectiveness of the majority.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T15:52:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo5037_1.pdf: 1176609 bytes, checksum: b2c1974b660d060ab91e0a6528a75dc0 (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / O objetivo do presente estudo é mostrar como através do mecanismo do fast track é possível uma maior cooperação entre os veto players institucionais norte-americanos na produção da política comercial do país, de forma que se fortaleça o Executivo norte-americano nas negociações comerciais internacionais. A política comercial é um jogo de dois níveis, em que o Executivo se vê jogando no plano internacional quando negocia acordos comerciais e no plano doméstico para conseguir que esses acordos sejam ratificados pelo Congresso. O Executivo, agente que conduz a política comercial por delegação do Congresso, precisa de uma maior delegação para que possa ter um maior poder de barganha nas negociações comerciais internacionais. O Congresso, por sua vez, é o veto player doméstico que tem o poder de decidir pela permanência do status quo na política comercial, ao vetar o acordo comercial, ou de anuir com a mudança, através da aprovação do acordo para a ratificação e da sua incorporação ao ordenamento jurídico interno. É a partir das relações entre o Legislativo e o Executivo, a qual tem as características de uma relação agente principal, que a política comercial é produzida. A literatura tem se focado em como a quantidade de veto players afeta a política comercial. Neste estudo, a intenção é mostrar que esses veto players podem cooperar através da redução dos pontos de veto, possibilitando assim mudanças significativas na política comercial, e como essa cooperação tem o efeito de melhorar a posição dos Estados Unidos nas negociações comerciais internacionais. Para isso, usa-se o caso da cooperação através da concessão de fast track pelo Legislativo ao Executivo

Submitted by Fernanda Rodrigues de Lima (fernanda.rlima@ufpe.br) on 2018-07-10T21:33:52Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) TESE Rachel Perez Palha.pdf: 2001794 bytes, checksum: cd8aadd0de5d3cdbe54cfc0566b292df (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-10T21:33:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) TESE Rachel Perez Palha.pdf: 2001794 bytes, checksum: cd8aadd0de5d3cdbe54cfc0566b292df (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-28 / CNPQ / The literature presents several supplier selection models which discuss what features might be present in this type of analysis, such as plant localization, organizational structure, structures for governance, and models which consider uncertainty in information levels. Usually, models that focus on the selection itself impose the same method for running the selection process on all decision makers (DMs), even when a group of DMs makes the decision. However, a given problem might be evaluated differently depending on the DM, due to his/her having different objectives for the same problem and, due to the diversity found in civil construction projects, different activities have to be hired, and these have different effects on the project. Usually, in the civil construction industry, the hiring process ends up with a negotiation phase between the contractor and the top rated subcontractors. Thereby, in order to support DMs of contractors to follow a structured decision process to reach a better deal, this thesis presents a framework to aid DMs in selecting subcontractors. The framework considers two models to deal with each phase of the hiring process. The first model to be employed is the Additive-veto model for sorting problematic. Thus, an analyst lists the activities to be hired, and the DMs’ preferences are used to sort them into classes. This procedure enables DMs to apply a governance process compatible with the effect such activity may produce in the project, client, and contractor. Following a selection model is used. The analyst has to evaluate the rationality of each DM to choose a compatible MCDM/A method. Later on, when the framework directs the process to a group decision, a voting procedure chosen based on the preferences of the DMs is used to aggregate the DMs’ preferences. At last, the DMs follow a negotiation phase with the top-ranked subcontractors to decide which the best deal is. All models are illustrated with a numerical application in the civil construction industry. It can be verified that the framework proposed brings flexibility and allows DMs to make more informed decisions, enabling them to feel more secure about the hiring process of subcontractors. Since it requires less DMs to get involved in the decision process, the project benefits from reducing the time required from DMs, thus, reduces the cost of the decision process. In addition, the framework proposed can be used in other contexts, due to its flexibility. / A literatura apresenta vários modelos para seleção de fornecedores que discutem as características que podem estar presentes neste tipo de análise, tais como localização de plantas, estrutura organizacional, estrutura de governança e modelos que consideram níveis de incerteza na informação. Normalmente, modelos que focam na seleção em si, impõem a todos os decisores o mesmo método para o processo de seleção, ainda que um grupo de decisores seja responsável pela decisão. Entretanto, uma determinada situação pode ser analisada de diferentes formas a depender do decisor, devido aos diferentes objetivos que estes apresentam e, devido a diversidade encontrada nos projetos de construção civil, diferentes atividades precisam ser subcontratadas e estes impactam o projeto de forma diferente. Normalmente, na indústria da construção civil, o processo de contratação termina em uma fase de negociação entre a construtora e os subcontratados que apresentaram as melhores propostas. Desta forma, a fim de dar suporte para que os decisores de construtoras possam tomar decisões utilizando um processo decisório estruturado, esta tese apresenta um framework para auxiliar decisores na escolha de subcontratados. O framework utiliza dois modelos para tratar cada fase do processo de contratação. O primeiro modelo a ser utilizado é o modelo Aditivo com veto para a problemática de classificação. Um analista deve listar todas as atividades a serem contratadas e as preferências dos decisores são utilizadas para classifica-las em categorias. Esse procedimento permite que os decisores administrem cada subcontratado de acordo com o impacto da atividade sob o projeto, cliente e construtora. Em seguida, o analista precisa avaliar a racionalidade de cada decisor para escolher um método multicritério de ordenação compatível. A agregação das preferências dos decisores é realizada usando um procedimento de votação, o qual é escolhido pelo grupo quando o framework assim o indicar. Por fim, os decisores negociam com os subcontratados que apresentaram as melhores propostas para escolher um. Todos os modelos são apresentados com aplicação numérica na construção civil. Pode ser verificado que o framework proposto traz flexibilidade e permite aos decisores tomarem decisões com informação, permitindo que eles se sintam seguros a respeito do processo de contratação. Uma vez que requer que menos decisores se envolvam no processo decisório, pode haver redução no tempo em que se requer a atenção dos decisores, reduzindo o custo do processo. Adicionalmente, o framework pode ser usado em outros contextos devido à sua flexibilidade.

LL.M. (International Law) / Syria is currently embroiled in a bitter and bloody conflict which began three years ago, in the prime of what was commonly known as the Arab spring. The Syrian people clamoured for new leadership and greater freedoms. However, the hopes of an Arab spring soon faded into a cold, desolate Arab winter. Instead of acceding to the demands of the citizens, the Syrian president has sought to subdue and eliminate them. Resulting in August 2013 of the government forces reportedly unleashed deadly chemical weapons on opposition forces. The United Nations Security Council failed to embark on any action by this point, due to the first veto by Russia and China on 4 October 20113. The death toll subsequently peaked at over 100 000. Whilst on the 24th of November, 2013 following two days of conflict in the Eastern Ghouta region of Syria 160 people were killed. Could the devastation of Syria and its people have been avoided? Is there any organisation responsible for the safety and protection of the Syrian people? The answer lies in an organisation called the United Nations. The United Nations Security Council however has the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security but this is not exclusive. Their primary function (as clearly stated in the United Nations Charter) is the responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security.

This thesis focuses on the correlation of the UNSC voting behaviour of the People's Republic of China and its foreign policy. China's importance as a global power at the platform of the UN has been rising ever since 1971, the year of China's admittance as a new member of the UN and more importantly also the permanent member of the Security Council with the power of veto. Given that the veto power strongly influences the actions of the UNSC, its use has served as a major indicator of what issues are considered as most unfavourable and threatening to China's national interests and foreign policy goals. This thesis elaborates on the development of the foreign policy of China, which has changed significantly since the year of its acquired UN membership but has also kept many principles, present even before the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. By specifically concentrating on the individual cast vetoes, also considering the use of a so-called hidden veto and the reasons behind them being cast, this thesis tries to find out, how China has been using its veto power with regards to its declared foreign policy objectives within the UN Security Council.

Introduction: The three ways of making a wish for organ donation known are donor registration, donation card and telling the relatives. The relatives always have to be consulted to know the last expressed wish. If the wish was unknown there is a presumed consent, but the relatives have veto and can refuse organ donation. A new proposal suggests that the veto should be removed.Aim: To identify and analyse the ethical considerations concerning decision making on organ donation with an emphasis on the role of relatives.Methods: A search for literature was made. Scientific articles, debate articles, constitutional texts, reports and other texts were selected. The selection of sources was performed on the basis of relevance for the aim of the study which means for answering the research questions.Results: Recurrent themes were identified in studies with an emphasis on the experiences of relatives who have been part of decision making on organ donation. The themes identified were: “incompetence to decide”, “disagreement”, “lack of information and support”, “comprehension of brain death” and “protection”. The themes, together with the reading of debate articles and other texts, formed the basis of arguments in favour of and against relatives’ right to veto.Conclusions: There are many factors influencing relatives in their decision concerning organ donation. There are strong arguments against the relatives’ right to veto. Donor registration and a sensitive approach in the conversation with relatives are important factors to increase the consent rate and fulfil the wish of the deceased.

Measures of human development, no matter their specific methodology, have always placed Costa Rica substantially higher than its neighbor, Nicaragua, but no apparent governmental, resource, or historical discrepancy can account for this gap. This thesis uses two case studies to examine this phenomenon from three different theoretical perspectives, and conclude which has the greatest explanatory power to account for the disparity between these two particular governments. Political scientists have noted that parliamentary systems lend themselves to better governance when compared with their presidential countersystems. Shugart and Carey (1992) cite peculiarities within some presidential models which may account for lower rates of human development. Another approach, offered by Tsebelis (2002) produces a more generalized explanation of this phenomenon, while Lawrence Harrison (1985) offers an entirely different, culture-based explanation. This thesis seeks to examine the validity of these claims, using Costa Rica and Nicaragua as case studies. Limiting the thesis to these two presidential governments will highlight the variation that exists within the presidential model, and possibly shed light on the most significant variables.

No description available.

The Daya Bay experiment has determined the last unknown mixing angle $theta_{13}$. This thesis describes the layout of the experiment and the detector design. The analysis presented in the thesis covered the water attenuation, spent fuel neutrino and electron anti-neutrino spectrum. Other physics analysis and impact to future experiments are also discussed. / Ph. D.

Le principal reproche qui est adressé au droit international est la faiblesse de ses mécanismes de sanctions. Pour cette raison, plusieurs penseurs juridiques ont conclu que le droit international n'existait pas. Le présent mémoire vise donc à étudier la rhétorique derrière cette affirmation et à examiner sa validité. Pour ce faire, nous analysons dans un premier temps la relation entre la sanction et le droit à travers le cadre positiviste du XIXe siècle. Nous étudions tour à tour les soi-disant critères constitutifs de la sanction. Nous les comparons avec d'autres ordres non juridiques pour ensuite rejeter le postulat positiviste qui fait de la contrainte et de la centralisation des pouvoirs les éléments essentiels de la sanction. Nous étudions ensuite le cadre d'adoption des sanctions économiques du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. Cette étape nous permet d'expliquer les principales faiblesses et limitations du droit international. Parmi celles-ci, le manque de coopération internationale, le droit de veto et le principe de la souveraineté nationale sont les éléments qui freinent l'adoption des sanctions coopération internationale. Nous examinons ensuite les objectifs derrière l'imposition des sanctions ainsi que leur efficacité. Finalement, nous étudions les embargos en général et les embargos sur les armes. Cette étude nous permet d'une part de démontrer les effets des sanctions économiques sur la population civile et sur les États tiers. D'autre part, elle nous permet de mieux comprendre les problèmes relatifs à l'administration d'une sanction, ainsi qu'aux mesures de contournement des interdictions. / The fundamental criticism addressed to internationallaw denounces the weaknesses of its sanctions mechanisms. For this reason, severallegal thinkers conc1uded to the inexistence of international law. The present text studies the rhetoric behind this statement and examines its validity. To do so, we analyze in the first place the relationship between sanction and law through the positivist framework of the XIXth Century. We examine in turn the so-called fundamental elements of sanction. We compare these elements with different non-Iegal orders so that we can ultimately reject the positivist theory according to which coercion and centralization ofpower are the fundamental elements of sanction. Chapter II examines the United Nations Security Council framework for adopting economic sanctions. This step allows us to underline the main sources ofweaknesses and limitations of internationallaw. In this respect we observe that the lack of international cooperation is the major weakness of internationallaw. Furthermore, an analysis of the relevant dispositions of the United Nations Charter shows that the veto right and the principle of international sovereignty are two elements that hamper international cooperation. We then study the objectives behind the adoption of sanctions as well as their effectiveness. Finally, we study general embargoes as well as arms embargos. This inquiry allows us to focus on the effects of economic sanctions on both civilians and third States. It also helps us understand the problems with regard to the administration of a sanction, as well as the ways to bypass the prohibitions.