Les hommes politiques agissent rationnellement dans le sens où ils cherchent à maximiser leur utilité. Ils utilisent pour y arriver des mécanismes d’échange qui propulsent leurs actions de politistes dans un marché politique régi par des règles de contraintes dites constitutionnelles. Ce système d’échange, que la littérature dénomme logrolling, qui se met en place est particulièrement visible à l’intérieur du Parlement Européen où l’échange de voix est assez marqué. La politique devient échange, au même titre que la science économique, telle que la définissent Buchanan (1991) et Hayek (1981). Le marché politique, du point de vue du logrolling, renforce les liens entre les hommes politiques au sein d’une même assemblée ; dès lors que chacun y trouve un quelconque avantage politique. La volonté commune d’accéder aux requêtes des électeurs et de rendre compte des spécificités territoriales trouve une place dans la perspective d’un marché politique qui coordonne les intérêts des parlementaires européens par essence divergents. Seulement, comme pour un marché de biens et services classique, le marché politique a besoin de règles – constitutionnelles – pour provoquer une coordination entre des préférences diverses ; si bien qu’une bonne constitution est une constitution qui permet aux intérêts de se coordonner (Hardin, 1989). Autrement dit, il existerait des règles de type constitutionnel dont les contributions seraient d’enrichir l’échange politique, et par conséquent, de permettre aux parlementaires européens de satisfaire leurs besoins politiques en termes de votes parlementaires / The politicians act rationally in the way that they try to maximize their utility. They use to achieve it mechanisms of exchange which propel their political action in a political market governed by rules of constraints said constitutional. This system of exchange, which the literature calls logrolling is particularly visible inside the European Parliament where the exchange of voice is marked enough. The politics becomes bargaining, in the same way as the economics, such as Buchanan (1991) and Hayek (1981) define it. Political market, in logrolling viewpoint, strengthens the links between politicians into the same parliament; as soon as everyone finds any political advantage. Common will to reach requests from voters and report on territorial specificities finds the place in the prospect of a political deal that coordinates the interests of European Parliamentarians inherently divergent. But as a classical market for goods and services, the political market needs rules - constitutionals - to bring on coordination between various preferences; so that a good constitution is a constitution that allows coordinating interests (Hardin, 1989). In other words, there are rules of constitutional types whose contributions would enrich political bargaining, therefore allowing European Parliamentarians to satisfy their political needs in terms ofparliamentary votes.

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Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Le phénomène de la dette publique dans les démocraties contemporaines est toujours un sujet d’actualité qui mobilise aussi bien les économistes, les politologues et les historiens. La spécificité de cette thèse est qu’elle combine à la fois l’aspect économique, politique et historique de la dette publique. Elle se concentre particulièrement sur l’étude de la relation entre la dette publique et la démocratie. Selon J. Buchanan, l’ordre institutionnel d’une démocratie conduit naturellement à un accroissement de la dette publique. Inspirée de cette proposition, l’idée de cette thèse consiste à s’interroger sur les effets du système politique et démocratique sur la dette publique. Plus exactement, l’objectif consiste à expliquer la variation de la dette publique par la gouvernance politique et la distribution des préférences électorales. Nous vérifions les hypothèses formulées à l’aide d’une étude économétrique réalisée sur des échantillons composés d’une trentaine de pays et de données macroéconomiques et politiques couvrant la période 1994 – 2013. / The phenomenon of public debt in contemporary democracies is a topical subject that mobilizes economists, political scientists and historians. The particularity of this thesis is to examine the economic, political and historical aspects of public debt. It focuses on the relationship between public debt and democracy. According to J. Buchanan, democracy naturally leads to the accumulation of public debt. Inspired by this notion, the aim of this thesis is to explain the effects of the political and democratic system on public debt, specifically variations in public debt resulting from the system of governance and distribution of electoral preferences. To test these hypotheses, we developed empirical research and built a sample culled from about thirty countries consisting of macroeconomic and political data covering 1994 _ 2013.

Cette thèse propose une analyse de l'incapacité du gouvernement des Etats-Unis à modifier en profondeur sa politique d'immigration. Elle montre que son principal facteur explicatif est institutionnel : la résilience du régime d'immigration, entendu comme mode de régulation de l'admission d'immigrants, s'explique par sa capacité à s'appuyer sur une structuration de l'économie politique de l'immigration favorable au blocage des réformes. Pour démontrer cette proposition, notre étude est donc articulée en deux blocs : les facteurs engendrant une crise du régime, et ceux permettant son statu quo. Dans un premier temps, les facteurs structurels et conjoncturels de la crise du régime sont étudiés. Une analyse empirique de la régulation de l'immigration met en évidence ses deux dysfonctionnements structurels : d'une part un déséquilibre croissant entre le nombre de candidats à l'immigration et l'offre de visas et, d'autre part, la formation d'un stock de résidents en situation irrégulière. Néanmoins, l'analyse des représentations de la population américaine concernant cette régulation démontre que la volonté de réformer les conditions d'admission de l'immigration relève aussi de facteurs subjectifs. Une conjoncture économique dégradée intensifie la perception d'une crise du régime, et la préférence pour sa fermeture. Dans un second temps, les facteurs explicatifs de l'absence de fermeture du régime sont analysés. La validité de deux hypothèses explicatives de sa résilience est démontrée par une analyse des épisodes de réforme de 1994 à 2010. En premier lieu, la mise en œuvre politique d'une réforme donne la primauté aux préférences des groupes d'intérêts organisés (communautés immigrées, employeurs, syndicats, nativistes) par rapport à celles de l'opinion publique. En second lieu, les préférences antagonistes de ces groupes d'intérêts les rendent incapables de coopérer : malgré sa non-optimalité, le régime d'immigration correspond donc à une issue stable des négociations législatives, car il limite les pertes de l'ensemble des acteurs en présence. / This PhD dissertation deals with the inability of the United States government to adopt an overhaul of its immigration policy. We show that the main factor accounting for this situation is institutional: the structure of the political economy of immigration explains why reforms attempts fail, and therefore helps to stabilize the regulation of immigrant admissions in the United States. To demonstrate this proposal, we firstly review the roots of the immigration crisis and then analyze why it is not overcome. The immigration crisis in the United States is produced by a set of trends. Some of them are structural. As a fact, the immigration system in the United States is deeply dysfunctional for two reasons. It is firstly very inefficient at properly organizing legal immigration by balancing an increasing demand for immigration visas with an offer bound through quotas. It is secondly unable to dissuade the settlement of a growing undocumented immigrant population. Still, the perception of this immigration crisis and the demand for reform are linked to cyclical factors. Nativist demands for a tightening of immigration legislation are notably greater during times of economic recession. We then explain the absence of immigration restriction in the United States through the demonstration of two complementary factors. Firstly, the political process through which immigration reform is defined give more influence to organized interest groups (such as immigrant communities, employers, unions and nativists) than to public opinion. Secondly, these groups are unable to cooperate for an immigration reform compromise, due to their competing preferences. In another words, the current statu quo prevailing in immigration reform may be suboptimal in terms of regulation of immigrant admissions. It is nevertheless stable, because it allows losses which would inevitably result from a successful immigration reform.

Como votam os legisladores latino-americanos em temas de política externa? Essa pergunta é norteada por um longo debate na literatura especializada acerca da especificidade da política externa em relação às demais políticas públicas e sua influência no comportamento legislativo. Por um lado, argumenta-se uma tendência a um comportamento unificado entre os partidos políticos nos temas internacionais, revelando baixa politização da política externa na arena legislativa. O elevado custo eleitoral de se opor à política externa presidencial, o baixo retorno eleitoral dos temas internacionais e a maior capacidade institucional do Poder Executivo conduzir a política externa do país são alguns dos principais argumentos desta perspectiva analítica. Por outro lado, enfatiza-se a importância dos arranjos e coalizões domésticas na formulação da política externa, apontando semelhança entre os comportamentos legislativos nas arenas doméstica e internacional. A diluição entre a fronteira que divide os assuntos domésticos e internacionais, assim como o crescente efeito distributivo advindo da política externa em economias cada vez mais interdependentes são alguns dos fatores explicativos desta perspectiva teórica. Embora haja grande profusão de estudos acerca do comportamento legislativo na política externa cujo objeto é o caso norte-americano, para o caso dos países latino-americanos ainda há um baixo número de trabalhos empíricos, especialmente aqueles que incluem mais de um caso na análise. Assim, a presente tese analisa as votações nominais em temas de política externa em seis países latino-americanos: Argentina, Brasil, Chie, México, Paraguai e Peru. São dois os principais objetivos. Primeiro, comparar o comportamento legislativo em temas de política externa e doméstica a fim determinar semelhanças e diferenças em alguns aspectos centrais: o nível de unidade partidária, a dimensionalidade dos votos e o nível de conflito interpartidário. Segundo, encontrar os fatores determinantes do voto do legislador latino-americano em temas de política externa. Para tanto, calculamos os índices de Rice dos principais partidos políticos dos seis países, comparando-os com os scores da arena doméstica. Fazemos o uso de técnicas de estimação dos pontos ideais dos legisladores latino-americanos em temas de política externa para determinar o nível de conflito interpartidário e a dimensionalidade das votações. Adicionalmente, analisamos o voto do legislador latino-americano em temas de política comercial por meio de regressão logística, incluindo nos modelos explicativos variáveis correspondentes às características socioeconômicas do distrito eleitoral do legislador. Nossos resultados indicam baixa diferenciação entre os níveis de unidade partidária dos partidos 5 políticos nas arenas doméstica e internacional, além de níveis similares de conflito interpartidário, ainda que haja algumas variações importantes entre os casos. Verificou-se baixa dimensionalidade nas votações de política externa em todos os países, interpretada como a disposição dos partidos políticos no contínuo ideológico direita - esquerda e a dicotomia entre governo e oposição. Finalmente, a análise dos modelos logísticos indica, para o caso específico da política comercial, similaridade nos fatores estruturadores do voto do legislador, mais notadamente a dicotomia entre governo e oposição e a ideologia dos partidos políticos. Concluímos a baixa relevância da especificidade da política externa na influência do comportamento legislativo em plenário, comportamento este muito similar às demais políticas públicas. / How do Latin-American legislators vote in foreign policy issues? The question addresses a long debate in the specialized literature regarding foreign policy specificity among other public policies and its influence on legislative behavior. On one hand, unified behavior among political parties on international issues is argued to be the standard behavior, revealing low polarization in legislative foreign policy decisions. The high costs of opposing presidents foreign policy, the low electoral gains obtained from foreign policy activism and the greater capacity of Executive to conduct international issues are among the main arguments of this perspective. On the other hand, the importance of domestic institutions and coalitions are emphasized as important features of the foreign policy decision-making process, pointing out similarity between legislative behaviors in both arenas. The dilution between domestic and foreign boundaries, as well as the distributive effect from increasing internationalized economies derived from foreign policy choices are some of explanatory features from this theoretical perspective. Although there is a great amount of studies focusing on legislative behavior in foreign policy at the US Congress, there is a lack of empirical research regarding Latin-American countries, especially across cases. The present thesis investigates foreign policy roll call votes of six Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru. The main goals are two. First, to compare the legislative behavior in domestic and foreign policies regarding the level of party unity, dimensionality of voting and the level of inter-party conflict. Second, explaining legislative votes in foreign policy. We calculate the rice index for the major political parties of the six countries mentioned above, comparing the scores in both domestic and international arenas. We also apply technics of estimating legislator\'s ideal points to assess the level of inter-party polarization and the dimensionality of foreign policy votes. We argue that there is no significant difference between legislative behaviors regarding the domestic and foreign arenas. Party unity, the level of inter-party polarization and the dimensionality of policy are all quite similar in both domestic and international issues. Our findings also indicate low dimensionality in foreign policy votes interpreted as the ideological position of political parties and the government opposition dichotomy. Finally, the logistic models also indicate ideology and coalition as the main explanatory variables of legislators votes in trade policy. The specific nature of foreign policy does not impact significantly legislative behavior in Latin America.

La génération massive de données, nous avons de plus en plus de données issues de différentes sources d’informations ayant des propriétés hétérogènes. Il est donc important de prendre en compte ces représentations ou vues des données. Ce problème d'apprentissage automatique est appelé apprentissage multivue. Il est utile dans de nombreux domaines d’applications, par exemple en imagerie médicale, nous pouvons représenter le cerveau humains via des IRM, t-fMRI, EEG, etc. Dans cette cette thèse, nous nous concentrons sur l’apprentissage multivue supervisé, où l’apprentissage multivue est une combinaison de différents modèles de classifications ou de vues. Par conséquent, selon notre point de vue, il est intéressant d’aborder la question de l’apprentissage à vues multiples dans le cadre PAC-Bayésien. C’est un outil issu de la théorie de l’apprentissage statistique étudiant les modèles s’exprimant comme des votes de majorité. Un des avantages est qu’elle permet de prendre en considération le compromis entre précision et diversité des votants, au cœur des problématiques liées à l’apprentissage multivue. La première contribution de cette thèse étend la théorie PAC-Bayésienne classique (avec une seule vue) à l’apprentissage multivue (avec au moins deux vues). Pour ce faire, nous définissons une hiérarchie de votants à deux niveaux: les classifieurs spécifiques à la vue et les vues elles-mêmes. Sur la base de cette stratégie, nous avons dérivé des bornes en généralisation PAC-Bayésiennes (probabilistes et non-probabilistes) pour l’apprentissage multivue. D'un point de vue pratique, nous avons conçu deux algorithmes d'apprentissage multivues basés sur notre stratégie PAC-Bayésienne à deux niveaux. Le premier algorithme appelé PB-MVBoost est un algorithme itératif qui apprend les poids sur les vues en contrôlant le compromis entre la précision et la diversité des vues. Le second est une approche de fusion tardive où les prédictions des classifieurs spécifiques aux vues sont combinées via l’algorithme PAC-Bayésien CqBoost proposé par Roy et al. Enfin, nous montrons que la minimisation des erreurs pour le vote de majorité multivue est équivalente à la minimisation de divergences de Bregman. De ce constat, nous proposons un algorithme appelé MωMvC2 pour apprendre un vote de majorité multivue. / With tremendous generation of data, we have data collected from different information sources having heterogeneous properties, thus it is important to consider these representations or views of the data. This problem of machine learning is referred as multiview learning. It has many applications for e.g. in medical imaging, we can represent human brain with different set of features for example MRI, t-fMRI, EEG, etc. In this thesis, we focus on supervised multiview learning, where we see multiview learning as combination of different view-specific classifiers or views. Therefore, according to our point of view, it is interesting to tackle multiview learning issue through PAC-Bayesian framework. It is a tool derived from statistical learning theory studying models expressed as majority votes. One of the advantages of PAC-Bayesian theory is that it allows to directly capture the trade-off between accuracy and diversity between voters, which is important for multiview learning. The first contribution of this thesis is extending the classical PAC-Bayesian theory (with a single view) to multiview learning (with more than two views). To do this, we considered a two-level hierarchy of distributions over the view-specific voters and the views. Based on this strategy, we derived PAC-Bayesian generalization bounds (both probabilistic and expected risk bounds) for multiview learning. From practical point of view, we designed two multiview learning algorithms based on our two-level PAC-Bayesian strategy. The first algorithm is a one-step boosting based multiview learning algorithm called as PB-MVBoost. It iteratively learns the weights over the views by optimizing the multiview C-Bound which controls the trade-off between the accuracy and the diversity between the views. The second algorithm is based on late fusion approach where we combine the predictions of view-specific classifiers using the PAC-Bayesian algorithm CqBoost proposed by Roy et al. Finally, we show that minimization of classification error for multiview weighted majority vote is equivalent to the minimization of Bregman divergences. This allowed us to derive a parallel update optimization algorithm (referred as MωMvC2) to learn our multiview weighted majority vote.

There are few literatures to explore political party¡¦s Nomination Institution and its relationship with electoral system. This thesis traces Legislative Yuan elections system from multi-member-district, single non-transferable vote to single-member district with plurality system and single-district two votes system and explore whether the modification has had an impact on party¡¦s nomination institution. According to theoretical assumption and foreign research statistics, ¡§single-district two votes system¡¨ tends to promote political party nomination system towards top-down decentralization. This study aims to investigate whether single-district two votes system is able to influence political parties to improve the centralized nomination institution that had been rooted in SNTV. The findings are positive regarding the application of single-district two votes system. During the seventh legislators election, major Parties of R.O.C. had adjusted their Nomination Institution, and Party members¡¦ opinions along with public¡¦s preference had been taken into accounts greatly compare to the past. KMT is one of the salient examples for not only make the largest modification in nomination, but also gain the most profit from this election.

My research project is a break from the current trend in the literature that focuses on the conflict associated with roll call voting—party polarization and institutional friction. I am interested in determining how policy characteristics of roll call decisions can affect legislators' vote choices. Bills not only differ according to issue content—agricultural policy versus social welfare policy—but also according to how ambiguous they are—a collection of disparate issues versus one specific issue. Using a dataset of House roll calls from 1985-2004 and the Policy Agendas Project content coding scheme, I show that variation in both policy area and policy ambiguity of a given bill is associated with variation in the accuracy of ideology in predicting roll call vote choice. / text

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-03T12:29:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 EDVALDOTEIXEIRA.pdf: 1188990 bytes, checksum: 35c1d0f8cbc5d2a182509d48c35af3cb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-12-10 / This project approaches the theme of Folkcommunication and the studies of popular religiousness as a communicational manifestation with the holy and has as its objective to analyze the means of popular devotion, such as form of communication with the holy, being the existential factor (individual demands, social, economic, cultural) of the classes that are socially marginalized as motivation of such communication. The emphases of the theory of folkcommunication have been used as references in research, methodologically, bibliographical research and field research, where it was applied to the participating observation, with the intention of recognizing the imaginary operant in the life of the faithful devout present in their practices. The analysis reveals that the cultural complexity generates various forms of communication, within which lies the popular religiousness, that is to the life of the faithful devout, a legacy full of spirituality and humanitarian richness that manifests itself within the culture of the simple people, specially touching on the subject of the existential dimension. This result contributes to the enrichment of folkcommunicational studies that concerns itself with the popular devotion as a form of communication with the holy. / Este trabalho aborda o tema Folkcomunicação e os estudos da religiosidade popular como manifestação comunicacional com o sagrado e tem por objetivo analisar os meios de devoção popular como forma de comunicação com o sagrado, sendo o fator existencial (demandas individuais, sociais, econômicas, culturais) das classes socialmente marginalizadas como motivação dessa respectiva comunicação. Foram tomadas as ênfases da teoria da folkcomunicação como referencial para a pesquisa que fez uso, metodologicamente, de pesquisas bibliográficas e pesquisa de campo, onde se aplicou a observação participante, no intuito de perceber o imaginário operante na vida do fiel devoto presentes em suas práticas. A análise revelou que a complexidade cultural gera várias formas de comunicação, dentre elas a religiosidade popular, que é para a vida do fiel devoto, um legado cheio de espiritualidade e riqueza humanitária que se encarna na cultura do povo simples, em especial no tocante à dimensão existencial. Este resultado contribui para o enriquecimento dos estudos folkcomunicacionais, no que concerne à devoção popular como forma de comunicação com o sagrado.