A central paradox in neorealism is that the absence of world government is assumed to imply a dangerous security dilemma, and yet few realists have argued in favor of world government while great powers have historically resisted delegation of military force to supranational institutions. If international anarchy causes costly security competition and war, powerful states should have a strong incentive to unify and neorealist explanations for why states resist peaceful unification are either underdeveloped or implicit. This paper develops a rational choice realist model which suggests that anarchy is not a structural constraint which forces states to compete intensely for power, but a rational choice that state leaders make to avoid the costs of world government. The model assumes that state leaders face a delegation constraint which implies a tradeoff between eliminating the military burden necessary to deter attacks in anarchy, and abstain from world government to avoid forced redistribution of material resources pushed by poorer states or risk that the world government might turn tyrannical and coerce the subjects it has been mandated to protect. The paper uses deductive method to deduce actor preferences and illustrate the plausibility of the central predictions of the model. The model predicts that income equality, democratization, nationalism and military defensive advantage makes anarchy stable, a condition under which states have little reason to unify. On the other hand, high income inequality, lack of democratic accountability, territorial revisionism, and military offensive advantage make anarchy costly, but unification more difficult to achieve given the underlying conflicting preferences. Hence, states rather take the risk of fighting in hopes of eliminating future military competition than to agree on a world government where redistribution and cultural conflicts are likely to make wealthy great powers with modest population sizes worse off than they would be in anarchy. The paper concludes that anarchy is not a tragedy that makes world government impossible, but world government is a potential tragedy that makes anarchy rational.

<p>The problems of the world today are global and thus we must act on a global level to solve them. We need to establish a perpetual and global peace and we also need to create global justice. How is this to be done? In 2008 the philosopher Torbjörn Tännsjö tried to provide an answer on these questions in the book Global Democracy – The Case for a World Government. In his book Tännsjö argues for an institutional cosmopolitan approach, trying to convince us that a world government would guarantee both a global and perpetual peace, as well as global justice. In this thesis I will present Tännsjö´s main argument and then share my thoughts and give my critique on them.</p>

<p>In the paper different views on the question of world government and world governance are presented. I take the position that only a <em>democratic</em> world government is a desirable political goal, as it is only possible to promote individual autonomy consequently solving global problems. While accepting that there could be different answers to this condition, I analyze three approaches to the subject by Tannajo, Nielsen and Held and argue that shared sovereignty within a world federation defined by a democratic global constitution is a necessary condtion to call a world order a democratic one.</p>

In the paper different views on the question of world government and world governance are presented. I take the position that only a democratic world government is a desirable political goal, as it is only possible to promote individual autonomy consequently solving global problems. While accepting that there could be different answers to this condition, I analyze three approaches to the subject by Tannajo, Nielsen and Held and argue that shared sovereignty within a world federation defined by a democratic global constitution is a necessary condtion to call a world order a democratic one.

The basis of this thesis is that weapons of mass destruction will continue to proliferate and will inevitably - given enough time- be used against civilian populations repeatedly. As this occurs the opposition between support for international law and the power of the state will intensify. This will go on for some time and will, in all probability, become extremely destructive. Eventually, however, the states (and individual people) of the world will realize that the simultaneous existence of international anarchy and weapons of mass destruction runs counter to long term human survival. This realization will , very likely, lead people to eliminate anarchy, i.e. create a world government.

The problems of the world today are global and thus we must act on a global level to solve them. We need to establish a perpetual and global peace and we also need to create global justice. How is this to be done? In 2008 the philosopher Torbjörn Tännsjö tried to provide an answer on these questions in the book Global Democracy – The Case for a World Government. In his book Tännsjö argues for an institutional cosmopolitan approach, trying to convince us that a world government would guarantee both a global and perpetual peace, as well as global justice. In this thesis I will present Tännsjö´s main argument and then share my thoughts and give my critique on them.