No description available.

<p>The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) seeks to provide a standard uniform law for international sales contracts. This research paper analyses the rationale behind South Africa&rsquo / s delay in deciding whether to ratify the CISG, and its possible effect on trade with other nations. The CISG drafters hoped that uniformity would&nbsp / remove barriers to international sales thereby facilitating international trade. Ratification of the convention is only the beginning of uniformity / uniformity must then be extended to its application&nbsp / and interpretation. Not all countries have ratified the Convention yet they engage in international trade in goods: this state of affairs presents challenges since traders have to choose a national&nbsp / law that applies to their contract where CISG does not apply. This takes traders back to the undesirable pre-CISG era. On the other hand, those States that have ratified the convention face&nbsp / different challenges, the biggest one being a lack of uniformity in its interpretation. The problem of differing interpretations arises because some CISG Articles are vague leading to varied&nbsp / interpretations by national courts. Further, the CISG is still largely misunderstood and some traders from States that have ratified CISG exclude it from application. South Africa can only ratify an&nbsp / international instrument such as the CISG, after it has been tabled before Parliament, and debated upon in accordance with the Constitution. CISG&rsquo / s shortcomings, particularly regarding&nbsp / interpretation, make it far from certain that CISG would pass the rigorous&nbsp / legislative process. Nonetheless, the Constitution of South Africa requires the South African courts and legislature to promote principles of international law. The paper, therefore, examines, whether the Legislature has a constitutional obligation to ratify CISG. South Africa&rsquo / s membership of the WTO requires&nbsp / that it promote international trade by removing trade barriers. It is, therefore, vital for South Africa to be seen to be actively facilitating international trade. Even though the trade benefits which&nbsp / flow from ratification are not always visible in States that have ratified the CISG, there is some doubt whether South Africa can sustain its trade relations without ratifying the CISG. The paper shows that the formation&nbsp / of contracts under the South African common law is very similar to formation as set out under Part II of the CISG and if the CISG were to be adopted in South Africa, no major changes would be&nbsp / needed in this regard. International commercial&nbsp / principles as an alternative to the CISG still require a domestic law to govern the contract and would, therefore, leave South African traders in the&nbsp / same position they are in currently, where their trading relations are often governed by foreign laws. Ratifying CISG would certainly simplify contract negotiations particularly with regard to&nbsp / governing law provisions. Overall the advantages of ratification for South Africa far outweigh the shortcomings of the CISG, and ratification will assist in ensuring that South African traders get an&nbsp / opportunity to enter the international trade arena on an equal platform with traders from other nations. </p>

No description available.

<p>This research paper pays particular attention to the EAC because of its unique composition of four LDCs46 and 1 DC47 and the fact that three of these countries are landlocked least developed countries (LLDCs).48 The EAC was notified as a RTA to the WTO under the Enabling Clause on 9 October 2000 and registered as a Custom Union49 under WT/COMTD/N/14.50 The notification of the EAC under the Enabling Clause is due to the nature of composition of members therein and to the fact that the Enabling Clause does not require regional trading arrangements to cover substantially all trade, or to achieve free trade in the bloc within ten years after notification. Additionally, it provides an avenue for giving special consideration to the LDCs through making concessions and contributions,51 allows automatic exemptions from MFN (non-discrimination) treatment in favour of DCs,52 and thus allows other WTO members to accord more favourable treatment to DCs in many cases without according the same treatment to other WTO members.53.</p>

No description available.

<p>The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) seeks to provide a standard uniform law for international sales contracts. This research paper analyses the rationale behind South Africa&rsquo / s delay in deciding whether to ratify the CISG, and its possible effect on trade with other nations. The CISG drafters hoped that uniformity would&nbsp / remove barriers to international sales thereby facilitating international trade. Ratification of the convention is only the beginning of uniformity / uniformity must then be extended to its application&nbsp / and interpretation. Not all countries have ratified the Convention yet they engage in international trade in goods: this state of affairs presents challenges since traders have to choose a national&nbsp / law that applies to their contract where CISG does not apply. This takes traders back to the undesirable pre-CISG era. On the other hand, those States that have ratified the convention face&nbsp / different challenges, the biggest one being a lack of uniformity in its interpretation. The problem of differing interpretations arises because some CISG Articles are vague leading to varied&nbsp / interpretations by national courts. Further, the CISG is still largely misunderstood and some traders from States that have ratified CISG exclude it from application. South Africa can only ratify an&nbsp / international instrument such as the CISG, after it has been tabled before Parliament, and debated upon in accordance with the Constitution. CISG&rsquo / s shortcomings, particularly regarding&nbsp / interpretation, make it far from certain that CISG would pass the rigorous&nbsp / legislative process. Nonetheless, the Constitution of South Africa requires the South African courts and legislature to promote principles of international law. The paper, therefore, examines, whether the Legislature has a constitutional obligation to ratify CISG. South Africa&rsquo / s membership of the WTO requires&nbsp / that it promote international trade by removing trade barriers. It is, therefore, vital for South Africa to be seen to be actively facilitating international trade. Even though the trade benefits which&nbsp / flow from ratification are not always visible in States that have ratified the CISG, there is some doubt whether South Africa can sustain its trade relations without ratifying the CISG. The paper shows that the formation&nbsp / of contracts under the South African common law is very similar to formation as set out under Part II of the CISG and if the CISG were to be adopted in South Africa, no major changes would be&nbsp / needed in this regard. International commercial&nbsp / principles as an alternative to the CISG still require a domestic law to govern the contract and would, therefore, leave South African traders in the&nbsp / same position they are in currently, where their trading relations are often governed by foreign laws. Ratifying CISG would certainly simplify contract negotiations particularly with regard to&nbsp / governing law provisions. Overall the advantages of ratification for South Africa far outweigh the shortcomings of the CISG, and ratification will assist in ensuring that South African traders get an&nbsp / opportunity to enter the international trade arena on an equal platform with traders from other nations. </p>

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Η συμφωνία TRIPS, υπό την ομπρέλα του Παγκόσμιου Οργανισμού Εμπορίου και εξυπηρετώντας τα συμφέροντα που την εμπνεύστηκαν και την επέβαλαν, συνέδεσε για πρώτη φορά την πνευματική ιδιοκτησία με το εμπόριο και έθεσε τα ελάχιστα επίπεδα για την προστασία της, συμπεριλαμβανομένου του τομέα των πατεντών στα φαρμακευτικά προϊόντα και τις διαδικασίες παραγωγής τους. Στην παρούσα εργασία, αφού αναλυθούν τα βασικότερα άρθρα που αφορούν στην προστασία των πατεντών και των αποτελεσμάτων δοκιμών, οι «TRIPS flexibilities», οι προσπάθειες περιορισμού του πεδίου εφαρμογής τους, σκιαγραφείται η νέα τάξη πραγμάτων που διαμορφώνεται κάτω από τις πιέσεις των κυρίαρχων συμφερόντων για πιο επεκτατική και αυστηρή προστασία της πνευματικής ιδιοκτησίας. Οι επιπτώσεις της TRIPS και των διμερών και περιφερειακών TRIPS-plus συμφωνιών στην πρόσβαση στα φάρμακα, περιγράφονται υπό το πρίσμα της διαμόρφωσης των τιμών τους και της αδυναμίας να καλυφθεί το χάσμα χρηματοδότησης R&D για ασθένειες που πλήττουν το 90% του παγκόσμιου πληθυσμού (10/90 gap), παρά τις προς του αντιθέτου υποσχέσεις του ανεπτυγμένου κόσμου. Συμπεραίνουμε ότι το μοντέλο “one-size-fits-all” για την προστασία της πνευματικής ιδιοκτησίας, παραβλέπει τις διαφορετικές ανάγκες και δομές κάθε κοινωνίας και ενισχύει τις ανισότητες του πλανήτη. Οι προτάσεις μας συντείνουν στην αναγκαιότητα ανάληψης συντονισμένων δράσεων εκ μέρους των κυβερνήσεων των κρατών, των διεθνών οργανισμών, της επιστημονικής κοινότητας και των πολιτών ώστε το αναπαλλοτρίωτο ανθρώπινο δικαίωμα στη ζωή και την υγεία, να τύχει του σεβασμού που του αξίζει. / --