萊維納斯是二十一世紀最重要的哲學家之一。他早期的哲學著作聚焦在現象學的知識論與方法論的問題上。由於曾師事海德格，所以他也展現了如何將胡賽爾的著作視為一種存有學。但這不意味著他的哲學是一種胡賽爾現象學或海德格存有學。如同海德格一般，他穿梭於現象學中，但以某種方式同時靠近、同時遠離海德格的學說。他堅持必須超克的不只是現象學，還有存有學，而這最徹底的層次便是倫理，或他所稱的 「異於存有」。但這種 「異於」如何可能？而萊維納斯的倫理與胡賽爾的現象學、海德格的存有學之間的關係又為何？意識概念便是其中的關鍵。而這也是這本博士論文的主要任務。
這份探詢分三個部分，第一部分帶出現象學對自然哲學的批判，並處理萊維納斯對胡賽爾的理解與批判，例如意識不再是一個封閉的、不變的實體，而是具有朝向外在世界的可能。這朝向外在的可能，作為ㄧ種超越，來自意識結構本身。 「意識總是某物的意識」說明了意識本身的結構，這結構以能思-所思 (noesis-noema) 這樣的方式呈現。在這種運作方式，解讀為將外在化為內在的過程，所有被納入意識的事物都變成一種以 「現在」為優位的表象(representation)。
第二部分說明何為萊維納斯所謂的 「意識」。而這個論述是從理論態度進入到實踐的態度開始，同時這也是萊維納斯與海德格的關係。在此我們將看到萊維納斯如何抗拒海德格的基礎存有學，並確立 「實顯」作為意識的定位。在定位之後才開始有欲望、營養與家園等將他者化為同一的活動。另在第二部分結尾說明萊維納斯將 「意識」一詞區分為兩的向度，意向性與非意向性，同時這也是存有學與倫理的的區別。
第三部分著重在非意向性，亦即倫理的層次。在這裡說明如何從存有學層次的欲望、營養與家園轉變為責任、鄰近性與替代。非意向性意識所能建構的不是以自我為核心的帝國，而是以他人為優先的整個宇宙。在這之中，問題不在是存有或非存有，而是我的存有是否正當？我們可以發現，非意向性意識的功能不在於對反、摧毀意向性意識的功能，而只是打斷其安於現狀的安全感。正因不斷擾動、不斷質問，意識總是可以活躍的運作，而不只是陷入某個固定的迴圈。這種非意向性意識是強烈的，但它不是一種貪婪，或許可以說它是一種獻身的大愛。 / Emmanuel Levians, internationally renowed as one of the gtreat philosophers in the twentith century. In his early philosophical writings he focused on the epistemological and methodological problems of phenomenology. Having studied with Heidegger, he also showed how Husserl's work can be read as an ontology. But that does not means that his Philosophy is a sort of Husserlian phenomonology or Heideggerian ontology. Like Heidegger, he passed through phenomenology, but in a way simultaneously close and very foreign to that of Heidegger. An insistence on the necessity of overcoming not noly phenomenology but also ontology, and this most radical sphere is ethic, or what Levinas calls "byomd Being". But how can this beyond be possible, and what is the relation between Levinas's ethic with Husserlian phenomenology or heideggerian ontology? The Key point is the concept of consciousness. And this is the central task of this dissertion.
This inquiry is divided into three parts. The first part brings out the phenomenology of natural philosophy and handles Levinas' understanding and criticism of Hussail. For example, consciousness is no longer a closed and unchanged entity, It is possible toward the outside world. This possibility, as a transcendence, comes from the structure of consciousness itself. "Consciousness is always the consciousness of something" illustrates the structure of consciousness itself, which is presented in such a way as noesis-noema. In this mode of operation, interpreted as the process of externalization into an internal process, all things that are incorporated into consciousness become a representation of the present.
The second part explains what Levinas called "consciousness." And this discourse begins with the theoretical attitude into practical attitude, and this is also the relationship between Levinas and Heidegger. Here we will see how Levinas resisted Heidegger's fundamental ontology and established the "hypostasis" as the location of consciousness. Only after the positioning of consciousness, then, it begin the the movement that absorb the other to the Same by desire, nutrition and at home. At the end of the second section, another chapter shows Levinas's division of the word "consciousness" into two dimensions, intentionality and non-intentionality. At the same time, this is the difference between ontology and ethics.
The third part focuses on non-intentionality, that is, ethical level. Here we show how we can shift the desire, nutrition and at home from the ontology leve to responsibility, proximity and substitution. The non-intentional consciousness can construct not the self-centered empire, but the entire universe, which is prioritized by others. Among them, the question is not to be or not to be, but is my existence right to be? We can see that the function of non-intentional awareness lies not in the function of opposing and destroying intentional awareness, but only in disrupting the security of the status quo. It is precisely because of constant disturbance, constant questioning, consciousness can always be active operation, not just fall into a fixed loop. This non-intentional awareness is strong, but it is not a kind of greed, perhaps it can be said that it is a devoted love.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/G0981545041 |
| Creators | 劉澤佳, Liu, Tze Chia |
| Publisher | 國立政治大學 |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Language | 中文 |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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