京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(文学) / 甲第24958号 / 文博第928号 / 新制||文||735(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院文学研究科思想文化学専攻 / (主査)教授 津田 謙治, 教授 周藤 多紀, 准教授 伊原木 大祐 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Letters / Kyoto University / DGAM

本論文旨在論述：是否可能在亞里斯多德的思想中討論關於「意志」的概念？在因為沒有「意志」此詞彙因而缺乏「意志」概念的古希臘時期，能否恰當地解釋「明知故意」的行為是如何發生？人如何在擁有關於行動的理性知識時，卻跟隨著「欲望」或「情感」而行？但人也可能在對於某事物有追求的「欲望」時，卻依循著理性知識的指導而行動。依此，理性知識和「欲望」對於行動的發生都不是必然的，但也都與行動的發生有關。因此，將先處理：人是如何展現行動。 人的功能是靈魂中包含理性原則的部份，在行動上良好地展現功能就是一個符合德行的行動，是善的。因此，善的、符合德行的行動，就是良好地展現了靈魂中包含理性原則的部份，這可從兩方面談：「理智」與「欲望」。「理智」是嚴格意義的理性魂，而「欲望」則是就其有聽從理性魂的可能而稱之為與理性原則有關，更恰當地說，是當靈魂中的「欲望」面聽從「理智」面的指導，就是靈魂中理性原則的良好展現其功能，符合德行的行動就在於此。行動因而是與靈魂中的「理智」與「欲望」有關。「欲望」設定目的，「理智」對於方法做計算推理的思維並得出關於如何行動的命令，此命令卻會因為不同形式的「欲望」的影響，或許取得「指定力」而將「理智」的思維結果落實於行動中，展現符合理性知識的行動，這是「欲望」與靈魂中的理性原則一致的結果；「理智」的思維結果也或許沒有取得「指定力」，因而展現的行動並不符合理性知識，因為「欲望」與靈魂中的理性原則不一致。因此，行動是「理智」與「欲望」互動的結果。 在說明因「欲望」與靈魂中的理性原則不一致所導致的ἀκρασία是如何發生時，亞里斯多德因為缺乏關於「意志」的概念而將ἀκρασία的發生歸因於理性知識在某一刻的缺陷，所以無法確切地解釋這種類似於「意志薄弱」的情況。要想在亞里斯多德的思想中討論無法以某個可對應的詞彙表達的「意志」概念，就從其他與「意志」的運用相關的概念著手，嘗試突顯出一個可能的、也許只是某種類似於「意志」的概念，亦即：不同形式的「欲望」對於「理智」的回應。如果在亞里斯多德的思想中隱含著「意志」的概念，那麼，對於這種概念做討論的可能性，就僅能從某種類似於「意志」的方式表達。

萊維納斯是二十一世紀最重要的哲學家之一。他早期的哲學著作聚焦在現象學的知識論與方法論的問題上。由於曾師事海德格，所以他也展現了如何將胡賽爾的著作視為一種存有學。但這不意味著他的哲學是一種胡賽爾現象學或海德格存有學。如同海德格一般，他穿梭於現象學中，但以某種方式同時靠近、同時遠離海德格的學說。他堅持必須超克的不只是現象學，還有存有學，而這最徹底的層次便是倫理，或他所稱的 「異於存有」。但這種 「異於」如何可能？而萊維納斯的倫理與胡賽爾的現象學、海德格的存有學之間的關係又為何？意識概念便是其中的關鍵。而這也是這本博士論文的主要任務。 這份探詢分三個部分，第一部分帶出現象學對自然哲學的批判，並處理萊維納斯對胡賽爾的理解與批判，例如意識不再是一個封閉的、不變的實體，而是具有朝向外在世界的可能。這朝向外在的可能，作為ㄧ種超越，來自意識結構本身。 「意識總是某物的意識」說明了意識本身的結構，這結構以能思-所思 (noesis-noema) 這樣的方式呈現。在這種運作方式，解讀為將外在化為內在的過程，所有被納入意識的事物都變成一種以 「現在」為優位的表象(representation)。 第二部分說明何為萊維納斯所謂的 「意識」。而這個論述是從理論態度進入到實踐的態度開始，同時這也是萊維納斯與海德格的關係。在此我們將看到萊維納斯如何抗拒海德格的基礎存有學，並確立 「實顯」作為意識的定位。在定位之後才開始有欲望、營養與家園等將他者化為同一的活動。另在第二部分結尾說明萊維納斯將 「意識」一詞區分為兩的向度，意向性與非意向性，同時這也是存有學與倫理的的區別。 第三部分著重在非意向性，亦即倫理的層次。在這裡說明如何從存有學層次的欲望、營養與家園轉變為責任、鄰近性與替代。非意向性意識所能建構的不是以自我為核心的帝國，而是以他人為優先的整個宇宙。在這之中，問題不在是存有或非存有，而是我的存有是否正當？我們可以發現，非意向性意識的功能不在於對反、摧毀意向性意識的功能，而只是打斷其安於現狀的安全感。正因不斷擾動、不斷質問，意識總是可以活躍的運作，而不只是陷入某個固定的迴圈。這種非意向性意識是強烈的，但它不是一種貪婪，或許可以說它是一種獻身的大愛。 / Emmanuel Levians, internationally renowed as one of the gtreat philosophers in the twentith century. In his early philosophical writings he focused on the epistemological and methodological problems of phenomenology. Having studied with Heidegger, he also showed how Husserl's work can be read as an ontology. But that does not means that his Philosophy is a sort of Husserlian phenomonology or Heideggerian ontology. Like Heidegger, he passed through phenomenology, but in a way simultaneously close and very foreign to that of Heidegger. An insistence on the necessity of overcoming not noly phenomenology but also ontology, and this most radical sphere is ethic, or what Levinas calls "byomd Being". But how can this beyond be possible, and what is the relation between Levinas's ethic with Husserlian phenomenology or heideggerian ontology? The Key point is the concept of consciousness. And this is the central task of this dissertion. This inquiry is divided into three parts. The first part brings out the phenomenology of natural philosophy and handles Levinas' understanding and criticism of Hussail. For example, consciousness is no longer a closed and unchanged entity, It is possible toward the outside world. This possibility, as a transcendence, comes from the structure of consciousness itself. "Consciousness is always the consciousness of something" illustrates the structure of consciousness itself, which is presented in such a way as noesis-noema. In this mode of operation, interpreted as the process of externalization into an internal process, all things that are incorporated into consciousness become a representation of the present. The second part explains what Levinas called "consciousness." And this discourse begins with the theoretical attitude into practical attitude, and this is also the relationship between Levinas and Heidegger. Here we will see how Levinas resisted Heidegger's fundamental ontology and established the "hypostasis" as the location of consciousness. Only after the positioning of consciousness, then, it begin the the movement that absorb the other to the Same by desire, nutrition and at home. At the end of the second section, another chapter shows Levinas's division of the word "consciousness" into two dimensions, intentionality and non-intentionality. At the same time, this is the difference between ontology and ethics. The third part focuses on non-intentionality, that is, ethical level. Here we show how we can shift the desire, nutrition and at home from the ontology leve to responsibility, proximity and substitution. The non-intentional consciousness can construct not the self-centered empire, but the entire universe, which is prioritized by others. Among them, the question is not to be or not to be, but is my existence right to be? We can see that the function of non-intentional awareness lies not in the function of opposing and destroying intentional awareness, but only in disrupting the security of the status quo. It is precisely because of constant disturbance, constant questioning, consciousness can always be active operation, not just fall into a fixed loop. This non-intentional awareness is strong, but it is not a kind of greed, perhaps it can be said that it is a devoted love.

As a product of the western feminist movement, feminist films have become an important tool for displaying feminist connotations and reflecting femalec onsciousness. With the advancement of society and the awakening of female consciousness, feminist film theory, criticism and practice have gradually taken a place in the film system dominated by male discourse power, and have constantly tried to speak for women on the big screen. After China's reform and opening up, feminism took root in China. In the 1980s, under the influence of western feminist film theory and practice, Chinese female filmmakers also began to try to express the situation and demands of Chinese women through films. After more than 40 years of drastic changes in reform and opening up, major changes have taken place in alllevels of current Chinese society. Chinese feminism and feminist films have also changed in accordance with the trend of the times. When the next generation of feminist filmmakers stand on the shoulders of their predecessors, they incorporate the spirit of the new era for the expression of feminism. This article selects two representative Chinese feminist films, which are "Woman Demon Human" and "Send Me to the Clouds". Through the comparison and analysis of the thematic contents, narrative styles and lens languages of the two films, the differences between the two are revealed in three aspects of feminist connotation,which include the subjective consciousness, female desires and gender differences. / 作为西方女性主义运动的产物，女性主义电影成为了展现女性主义内涵和反映女性意识的重要工具。随着社会的进步和女性意识的觉醒，女性主义电影理论、批评与实践在以男性话语权为主导电影体系中渐渐占据了一席之地，并不断尝试在大荧幕上为女性发声。中国改革开放后，西方女性主义思潮进一步影响中国。八十年代中国的女性电影人在西方女性主义电影理论与实践的影响下，也开始尝试通过电影来表达中国女性的处境和诉求。在经历改革开放四十多年的剧变后，当下的中国社会各个层面都发生重大变革。中国的女性主义以及女性主义电影也顺应时代的潮流而改变。下一代的女性主义电影人站在前辈们的肩膀上，为女性主义的表达融入了新时代的精神。 本文从上世纪八十年代和近十年的中国影坛选取两部具有代表性的女性主义电影——《人鬼情》和《送我上青云》，并通过对两部电影在主题内容、叙事方式和镜头语言上的分析，发现两部电影在呈现女性意识的三个不同方面——主体性意识、女性欲望和性别差异上的表达呈现出不同的侧重点。由此，从而以小见大，从局部来窥见两个时代的女性主义电影所反映的女性主义的时代性内涵。