This dissertation explores the problem of violent ethnic conflict in ethnically polarized developing countries using the concept of social capital. Ethnically polarized developing countries typically have high levels of intra-ethnic social capital (social capital existing within groups) but low levels of inter-ethnic social capital (social capital existing between groups). Violent conflict can be averted by cultivating higher levels of inter-ethnic social capital. High levels of inter-ethnic social capital create incentives for elites to adopt moderate strategies. A civic compact emerges when the general population internalizes the norms of inter-ethnic social capital (the rule of law; the right to participation; and the right to continued physical and cultural existence). The civic compact is associated with a general expectation that elites will not pursue extra-institutional strategies such as violence to advance their interests. Peace processes that originate in “hurting stalemates” afford fragile opportunities to begin to cultivate inter-ethnic social capital. At such moments, elite incentive structures align in such a way as to overcome barriers to reform associated with path dependence. The cultivation of inter-ethnic social capital is initiated by integrating the norms of inter-ethnic social capital into the structure of the peace process, although eventually state institutions (which must incorporate these norms into their design) will also re-enforce these norms. Elites begin to internalize the norms of inter-ethnic social capital by repeatedly engaging with each other during the peace process in a manner that actualizes these norms into their experiences. I explore how the norms of inter-ethnic social capital can be integrated meaningfully into the peace process so that elites begin to absorb these norms and so that the institutions that emerge from the process are perceived to be legitimate. Inter-ethnic social capital is developed among the masses primarily through the interactions that the masses have with state institutions. The peace process must focus on rehabilitating the relationship between the masses and the state. This dissertation assesses how this relationship may be rehabilitated and how the norms of inter-ethnic social capital can be integrated into the process of rehabilitating this relationship so that the masses can begin to internalize these norms.

This thesis considers Michael Ignatieff’s theory regarding ethnic conflict and applies Afghanistan as a case study. Ignatieff correlates the outbreak of ethnic violence to the breakdown of state government which creates societal anarchy and war. Ignatieff argues that ethnic relations can improve through the creation of democratic institutions. Afghanistan represents a model empirical case study to explore the central tenets of the Ignatieff thesis. Ignatieff’s argument is critically analyzed by assessing the viability of transplanting democratic institutions into Afghanistan. According to democratic theory a successful democracy requires a strong economy, a vibrant civil society, an advantageous institutional history and a positive security and geopolitical environment. Based on these five key variables it is reasonable to conclude that Afghanistan is not predisposed to pluralistic governance. Such analysis highlights the limitations of Ignatieff’s thesis as his theory is only relevant to those post-conflict societies that possess the requisite preconditions for democracy. / February 2007

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Civil Military Relations))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Donald Abenheim. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-67). Also available online.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Ashland Theological Seminary, 2007. / Abstract . Description based on microfiche version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 138, 143-148).

Master's thesis. / Database: Nordic Web Publications. Format: PDF.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 420-450).

Decentralisation and federalism are often said to mitigate conflict by better meeting the preferences of a heterogeneous population and demands for limited autonomy. But it is argued in this thesis that this perspective does not sufficiently address the ways in which conflict-ridden relations entangle processes across different scales ‒ local, regional as well as national. The aim of this thesis is to explain how it is that while decentralisation may contribute to national stability, it may simultaneously generate local conflict. This problem is analysed through a conflict in Kaduna State in north-central Nigeria where there have been outbreaks of violence between Hausa-Fulani Muslims and Christians of different ethnicities since the 1980s. Christian ethnic groups claim to be excluded from state benefits, while Muslim groups claim that Christians have undue influence over the state bureaucracy. The conflict feeds off ethnic and religious mobilisation. Expanded local political space further fuelled the conflict following the decentralisation that came with the shift from military to civilian rule in 1999. Decentralisation in Nigeria implies that the authorities should be associated with the majority ethnicity or religion in a specific territory. A localisation of politics accordingly raises the stakes in identity-based conflicts, especially as control of local institutions is necessary for inclusion in wider political processes. In Kaduna, this has led to demands for separating the state on a religious and ethnic basis. Actors make use of “scalar politics” to conform to or challenge boundaries set by the state. Social relations are associated with different boundaries.  Accordingly, decentralisation triggers conflicts on an identity basis, involving contestation over the hierarchy of scales. While national struggles between ethnic and religious groups may be subdued, conflicts play out locally as decentralisation in Nigeria makes religion and ethnicity a powerful tool for political mobilisation. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following paper was unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Manuscript.</p>

This thesis considers the extent to which decentralisation in the Republic of Macedonia between 2005 and 2012 has been effective in reducing ethnic inequalities that exacerbate social divisions and can lead to conflict. Guided by the concept of horizontal inequalities, it identifies the factors which influenced the decision to devolve responsibilities to the municipalities after 2001. It examines the particular institutional design that Macedonian decentralisation took, and demonstrates how its use of local power-sharing mechanisms was intended to address the concerns of the Albanian and Macedonian communities simultaneously. This thesis takes an integrative approach to studying the political, administrative, and fiscal dimensions of decentralisation's implementation, and considers whether the reform has indeed contributed to the reduction of inequalities between Macedonia's ethnic groups. Where decentralisation's potential has not been reached, obstacles to its successful implementation are identified. While decentralisation alone may be unable to address all of the grievances raised by the Albanian community prior to 2001, this thesis argues that the reform has the potential to address many of the horizontal inequalities that were responsible for raising inter-ethnic tensions during the 1990s. However, decentralisation in Macedonia between 2005 and 2012 has only been partial, and advances in the administrative and political aspects of the reform have been undermined by limited progress in its fiscal dimension. Attempts to solve self-determination conflicts through decentralisation will fail if local self-governance exists only in form but not in substance.

Thus thesis focuses on the roles of social work (on the part of governments and NGOs) in dealing with Indonesia's Ambon conflict (1999 to date). The research seeks to map the roots of the conflict and the interventions made by both level of government and NGOs and to examine the strengths and weaknesses of their social work efforts in conflict resolution. Based on an analysis of these efforts of these institutions, this thesis offers some suggestions as to an enhanced role for social work in dealing with future reconciliation in Ambon especially and in Indonesia generally.

Since the commencement of the 4th Republic in Nigeria in May 1999, one relatively permanent characterisation of the country’s political landscape has been belligerent ethno-nationalism or ethnic militancy. The activities of ethnic militias exacerbated insecurity; confronted the status of the state as the sole legitimate monopolist of the instruments of force and violence; exposed the weak loyalty and allegiance of the populace to the Nigerian nation-state project; and threatened its continued existence as a corporate entity. Decades of marginalisation and injustice foisted on the Niger Delta people by the Nigerian state in tandem with major Multinational Oil Corporations (MNOCs), precipitated the nasty experience of frustration and deprivation, which triggered a section of the youth in the region to embark on the formation of militia groups as an extra-constitutional method for negotiation, and redressing the political cum socio-economic dehumanising conditions of the region. Thus, there is a historically established case of grievance instigated by environmental degradation and despoliation, neglect, poverty, political exclusion and intensified military repression of the Delta people by the Nigerian state in collaboration with the MNOCs. However, though there are ethnic militias in other parts of the country, its rampant proliferation and seeming sustainability in the region -- in the face of organised state violence -- is unprecedented and deserves scholarly investigation. This study, therefore, investigates the extent to which the quest for opportunism and predation by the ethnic militias has led to the escalation of armed conflicts in the Niger Delta region during the timeline of this research. It seeks to establish a linkage between economic gains (through hostage taking for huge sums of money and illegal trading in petroleum products) and the intensification of armed conflicts by ethnic militias in the region. Further, the study systematically interrogates the extent to which international commercial collaborators boosted the violent activities of ethnic militias in the Delta geopolitical landscape. Using the qualitative research approach and data from both primary and secondary sources, the study establishes a correlation between economic opportunism, the proliferation of militias and the escalation of armed conflict in the region during the timeline of this research. Several young people also became highly attracted to belligerent ethno-nationalism in the region as a result of the greed to corner resources from illegal oil bunkering, kidnapping, outright patronage from the political elite and the MNOCs. There was rampant multiplicity and mutation of militias and armed gangs whose main purpose appears to be their involvement in the highly lucrative criminal business of hostage-taking for ransom rather than a principled struggle for resource control and socio-economic justice. Clearly, several people and groups have used such injustices as a rationale for justifying what otherwise would be criminal activities: oil theft, armed robbery and hostage taking for ransom. The quest for various forms of gains therefore motivated the ‘democratisation’ of ethnic militancy purportedly fighting for the Delta region; while in reality, criminality was being deployed as a veritable instrument for illegal resource exploitation, political patronage and primitive accumulation. The phenomenal attraction of people to militancy in the region reached alarming proportion in 2006 when kidnapping for ransom became a strategic weapon popularised by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Generally speaking, it has been estimated that militias may not have been more than 20,000 persons in the region during the pre-kidnapping years. But by January 2009, field studies revealed that no fewer than 50,000 people were involved in militant activities -- a figure that represents more than 50 % of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Further, this research also establishes a linkage between the activities of ethnic militias, illegal oil bunkering, foreign opportunistic traders and the sustainability of conflict in the region during the study period. The purchase of stolen crude oil by opportunistic international commercial traders from various countries of the world was the major source of sustainability of militia movements until 2005. It provided the much-needed arms and money for the cycle of violence and conflict and, thus, became a source of attraction to more militias. With the improved performances of security forces in the region and the consequent diversification of the militias into hostage taking, however, the level of conflict sustenance through oil theft and foreign networks reduced drastically between 2006 and 2009 in comparison with the pre-kidnapping years of 1999 to 2005. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.