Orientador: Maria Suzana de Stefano Menin / Banca: Alessandra de Morais Shimizu / Banca: Raul Aragão Martins / Resumo: Esta pesquisa investigou as representações sociais e os julgamentos morais sobre injustiças que alunos(as) de escolas particulares e públicas do município de Presidente Prudente (SP) fizeram em situações escolares verificando a influência, nessas cognições, de diferentes pertinências sociais (idade, sexo, escolas particulares ou públicas). Para análise teórica, foram utilizadas as abordagens da Psicologia do Desenvolvimento Moral de Piaget, Kohlberg e Gilligan e das Representações Sociais criada por Moscovici. Como procedimentos metodológicos, foram realizadas observações em salas de quinta série do ensino fundamental e primeira do ensino médio e foi aplicado um questionário que continha várias indagações sobre injustiças na escola. Como resultados das observações, verificou-se que queixas espontâneas de injustiças que ocorrem no interior da escola foram freqüentes tanto em meninos quanto em meninas. Considerando como “queixas de injustiças” aquelas queixas dos alunos que se incluíam nos diferentes tipos de injustiças apontados por Piaget, quais sejam, injustiça legal, retributiva, distributiva e social, verificamos que na escola particular na 5ª. série as queixas identificadas foram, em primeiro lugar, do tipo distributiva e, em menor proporção, queixas do tipo retributiva. Na escola pública foram comuns queixas do tipo distributiva. Na escola particular, na 1ª. série do ensino médio, foram freqüentes queixas do tipo distributivo, e, em menor proporção, queixas do tipo retributiva. Na escola pública, nesta série, não foram identificadas queixas de injustiças que se enquadrassem nas categorias de injustiças propostas por Piaget e Kohlberg. Apareceram, também, queixas, tanto em escolas particulares quanto na pública, que apontaram o descontentamento dos(as) alunos(as) em relação aos aspectos pedagógicos. / Abstract: This research investigated the social representations and the moral judgements about injustices that private and public schools students (boys and girls) of the municipal district of Presidente Prudente (SP) did in school situations, verifying the influence, in those cognitions, of different social pertinences (age, sex, private or public schools). For theoretical analysis, it were utilized the approaches of the Moral Development Psychology of Piaget, Kohlberg and Gilligan, and of the Social Representations created by Moscovici. As methodological procedures, observations were accomplished at rooms from 5th grade of the fundamental school and first of the high school, and it was applied a questionnaire that contained several inquiries about injustices at school. As results of the observations, it was verified that spontaneous complaints of injustice that happen inside the school were frequent both in boys and in girls. Considering as “injustice complaints” those students complaints that included in the differents injustices types indicated by Piaget, which are, legal injustice, retributive, distributive and social, verified at private school on the 5th grade the complaints identified were, in first place, distributive and, in smaller proportion, complaints of the retributive type. At public school were usual complaints of the distributive type. At private school, on the 1 th grade of the high school, were frequent complaints of the distributive type, and, in smaller proportion, complaints of the retributive type. At public school, in on this grade, were not identified injustice complaints that framed in the injustice categories proposed by Piaget and Kohlberg. Appeared, also, complaints, both at private schools and at public school, that indicated the students dissatisfaction in relation to the pedagogic aspects. / Mestre

This dissertation came as a response of the outcome of the author's Master's thesis in which female Pastors in the North West Province, in the Republic of South Africa lamented that their male subordinates destruct them from doing their ministerial work properly. The relevant methodology to address this problem was found to be; fusion of Feminist Liberation Theology, Shepherding and Quantitative methods in the light of Practical Theology. The research has been conducted in the three Provinces of the Republic of South Africa, namely; Gauteng, Free State and Limpopo, with four female Pastors from each Province. These interviewees from twelve different denominations answered a questionnaire marked appendix A, which comprises of biblical and general questions. The outcome of these three Provinces was that generally female leaders are dehumanised by being marginalised, undermined, silenced and crushed by their male subordinates and counterparts, to a point that these female leaders use respect as a bait to harmonise the situation. The outcome of the North West Province which necessitated this research was then confirmed that female Pastors are generally denigrated by their male subordinates and as result they become destructed from doing their duties well. And because of that they are labelled incompetent. Regardless the negation of female leadership as based on the above indicated factors, the research has managed to prove that females had been part of leadership from time immemorial to date. Liberation Now, as Russell has mentioned, is the heartbeat of this study, therefore recommendations are that the biblical interpretation, masculine language (gender sensitive) and the negative Setswana idioms and proverbs that are oppressive to females especially those in leadership be replaced by the positive or constructive ones. Interpretation should be rapidly emancipative, just like Jesus did by overriding the Law of Purity, Defilement and Sabbath by that of Liberation and Justice. As God he understood that justice delayed is justice denied, see Mark 5: 23- 42 and Luke 13: 10- 16. Scripture must be allowed to interpret itself, especially on issues of serious controversy such as the topic in question. A line should also be drawn between the Word of God and the words of people that are found in the Bible, e.g. thus says the LORD and I, Paul, say. This does not discredit God’s inspiration upon His Word, but acknowledges the honesty in recording people’s thoughts that are both good and evil. Egalitarian male senior Pastors (Bishops) with their authority of ordaining Pastors should spearhead the liberation and affirmation of female leadership, through counselling and intense teaching to all stake holders, as to avert this warp concept of denigrating females in the name of God. The reason for recommending them is because females could not counsel themselves, nor by their subjugators, however egalitarian male senior Pastors would have to create a rapport that is deemed as a key to this endeavour, since females may perceive them as subjugators and male subordinates as sell-outs. Concomitantly theological training should be a prerequisite to church ministry. The monitoring tool had been developed in accordance with concerns and recommendations of the outcome of the research, in order for the church top leadership to track the situation at local churches, and respond timeously to the matters that may affect the church negatively. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Practical Theology / unrestricted

In a country cumbered with a legacy of strife, authoritarianism, repression and injustice, the right to be vindicated and assert your rights is extremely important. Karl Klare described our constitution as a transformative one which has the potential to ensure social change for the benefit of those previously advantaged if a purposive approach to its interpretation is adopted. Under our constitutional democracy all are equal under the law and further are inherently imbued with the rights to dignity and freedom (from violence). However, despite the constitutional guarantee of amongst others access to justice, in the wide sense, exercised mainly through the courts, it is a truism that in South Africa this right remains inaccessible to most especially those in the rural areas. One particularly vulnerable group I submit is rural women. In post-apartheid South Africa they are burdened with the legacy of discrimination on the basis of race, sex and class. In the face of an already exclusive legal culture these factors combine together to ensure that accessing the constitutional promises remains particularly difficult. Issues such as language, proximity to the courts, poverty and complex procedures persist to the detriment of rural women. I submit that our adversarial and retributive justice system is foreign, formal and thus inaccessible to rural women and there is a need, in light of our constitutions promises to make justice more accessible. I argue therefore that we need to be conscious of the manner in which our privilege excludes certain groups from the full enjoyment of the law. We need to learn to listen to the voice of the unfamiliar other if law is ever to move from the ideological to the practical realm in the lives of these women. I argue further that this is possible through the use of narratives as a tool of critique and a vehicle for consciousness. Copyright / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Jurisprudence / unrestricted

The Royal Commission on Japanese Claims (1947-1951), known as the “Bird Commission,” investigated and offered compensation to Japanese Canadians for their losses of property during the 1940s. It is largely remembered for what it was not: that is, it was not a just resolution to the devastating material losses of the 1940s. Community histories bitterly describe the Commission as destined to failure, with narrow terms of reference that only addressed a fraction of what was taken. Similarly, other historians have portrayed the Commission as a defensive mechanism, intended by the government to limit financial compensation and to avoid the admission of greater injustice. Yet scholars have never fully investigated the internal workings of the Commission. Despite its failings, Japanese Canadians used the Bird Commission in their struggle to hold the state accountable. Hundreds of Japanese Canadians presented claims. Their testimonies are preserved in thousands of pages of archival documents. The Bird Commission was a troubling, flawed, but nonetheless important historical process. This thesis examines government documents, claimants’ case files, and oral histories to nuance previous accounts of the Bird Commission. I draw from ‘productive’ understandings of Royal Commissions to argue that the Liberal government, cognizant of how such mechanisms could influence public opinion, designed the Bird Commission to provide closure to the internment-era and to mark the start of the postwar period. Their particular definition of loss was integral to this project. As Japanese Canadians sought to expand this definition to address their losses, the proceedings became a record of contest over the meaning of property loss and the legacy of the dispossession. Navigating a web of constraints, Japanese Canadians participated in a broader debate over the meaning justice in a society that sought to distance itself from a legacy of racialized discrimination. This contest, captured in the Commission proceedings, provides a pathway into the complex history of the postwar years as Canadians grappled with the racism of Second World War, including Canada’s own race-based policies, and looked towards new approaches to pluralism. / Graduate / 2018-12-22

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Many advanced cancer patients struggle with distress including depressive symptoms, anxiety, anger about cancer, and anger toward God. Cancer patients may perceive their illness as an injustice (i.e., appraise their illness as unfair, severe, and irreparable or blame others for their illness), and this may be a risk factor for distress. To date, illness-related perceptions of injustice have not been examined in cancer patients. Based on prior research and theory (i.e., Just World Theory, Park’s Meaning Making Model, and Loneliness Theory), there are multiple ways to conceptualize the relationship between perceived injustice related to the cancer experience and distress. The purpose of this project was to compare two theory-based conceptualizations of the relationships between perceived injustice and distress symptoms in advanced lung and prostate cancer patients. Aims were to (1) examine the direct effects of perceived injustice on distress symptoms; (2) examine the indirect effects of perceived injustice on distress symptoms through meaning making and acceptance of cancer (my conceptual model), examine the indirect effects of perceived injustice on psychological outcomes (i.e., distress symptoms and acceptance of cancer) through meaning making (Park’s Meaning Making Model), and compare the two models; (3) examine loneliness as a potential moderator of the mediations based on my conceptual model; and (4) explore whether the associations based on my conceptual model differed between advanced lung and prostate cancer patients. Cross-sectional data from advanced lung (n = 102) and prostate (n = 99) cancer patients were examined. Seven models were tested using path analyses. Results partially supported my conceptual model; perceived injustice was directly and indirectly associated with distress symptoms through acceptance of cancer but not through meaning making. Findings did not support Park’s Meaning Making Model, as meaning making did not help account for the associations between perceived injustice and psychological outcomes. Path analyses also indicated that loneliness was not a significant moderator of the mediations based on my conceptual model. Furthermore, associations based on my conceptual model did not differ between advanced lung and prostate cancer patients. Given mixed support for my conceptual model, supplemental path analyses were conducted that included loneliness as an exploratory mediator of associations between perceived injustice and distress symptoms. Findings suggested that perceived injustice was indirectly associated with distress symptoms through loneliness and acceptance of cancer. Findings support testing acceptance-based interventions to address distress related to perceived injustice in advanced cancer patients.

Despite reform efforts to broaden historically underrepresented populations across STEM disciplines, the data continues to highlight gaps of achievement across racial demographics. In an effort to address educational inequity, current reform efforts have touted the implementation of learning progressions as a promising strategy that can produce equality of outcomes across racial groups in STEM. Despite this promising effort, few studies have examined how to integrate practices of equity within learning progressions for groups such as African Americans that have been traditionally excluded from science and STEM. This study argues that an equity oriented learning progression should be responsive to sociohistorical factors of epistemic injustice that dissociated African Americans identities from being producers of knowledge. This study argues that the construction of a learning progression to advance the epistemic participation of African American students is aligned with goals of social justice related to diversifying STEM. The aims of this study explored how African American students progressed toward epistemic agency as STEM learners as a result of identity transformation through the engagement of the epistemic practices of engineering. This study used qualitative methodology to explore how student participants demonstrate epistemic development in their artifacts and discourse when engaging in engineering activities across a learning progression designed to develop epistemic agency. The findings from this study contribute to a broader understanding of how equity-oriented learning progressions can be designed to promote epistemic justice, how sociocultural positionings influence epistemic communities, and how students can become epistemic agents to raise STEM awareness within their local community. Advancing students epistemic practices of engineering and epistemic agency as STEM learners is key to creating meaningful pathways into STEM for students in K-12. / Doctor of Philosophy / National imperatives to broaden the STEM participation of underrepresented groups remains a prominent priority across educational research. Due to marginal effectiveness associated with racialized minorities, researchers continue to explore equity oriented initiatives. In an effort to address educational inequity, current reform efforts have touted the implementation of learning progressions as a promising strategy that can produce equality of outcomes across racial groups in science and STEM. Educational inequity prevents underrepresented populations, such as African Americans, from having the types of educational experiences that position them as significant contributors in STEM and more specifically engineering. This study argues that the construction of a learning progression to advance the epistemic participation and agency of African American students in STEM is a sociohistorical response to a legacy of epistemic injustice. Qualitative methodology was used to explore how African American students progressed toward epistemic agency as STEM learners as a result of identity transformation through the engagement of the epistemic practices of engineering. The findings indicated that the engineering design activities within the curriculum positively influenced students' identity, self-efficacy, and demonstration of epistemic agency across the learning progression. Additionally, the findings indicated the effectiveness of using the epistemic practices of engineering to facilitate the cognitive development of the engineering habits of mind. Lastly, the findings indicated the significance of using the epistemic practices of engineering to reposition African American students' identities as epistemic contributors both within the classroom and within their local community.

While there is an abundance of philosophical literature on justice, there is far less literature within political philosophy on the topic of injustice. I think one common assumption these approaches share is that injustice is simply the absence of justice; call this the absence thesis. This assumption becomes more peculiar juxtaposed to social and political struggle for justice, which quite commonly begins with cries of injustice. Injustice is an importantly distinct philosophical notion from justice – it can explain how justice fails to be realized in interesting and sophisticated ways, and, I argue, track our efforts to realize just social worlds, in ways that paradigmatically ideal and nonideal approaches to justice by themselves cannot. In this essay, I focus specifically on the question of how theories of justice can guide action in social worlds with systematic oppression. I ultimately argue that action-guiding theories of justice that evaluate worlds with systematic oppression must represent features of injustice. If a theory fails to represent features of injustice, it will fail to guide action in these worlds. That representation of such features is necessary gives us reason to think, in certain circumstances, that the absence thesis is false. / Master of Arts

Moral encroachment theses (MET) operate like pragmatic encroachment theses. When the stakes of belief are high, so are the standards for evidence. This means that evidence which is sufficient in a low stakes-of-belief scenario may be insufficient when the stakes are raised. Simply, METs aim to appeal to the varying moral intuitions that one may have in cases with different moral stakes and build an epistemological difference out of that moral distinction. For example, one might think that in cases of racial profiling, because the moral stakes of belief are high, what would otherwise constitute good evidence for belief is insufficient. However, most METs assume that the probabilistic evidence on which one relies to form their belief is good evidence. Instead of examining the reliability of statistical generalizations, like those used in cases of racial profiling, the moral encroacher focuses on the moral facts of the circumstance of belief formation to explain why the subsequent belief is wrong epistemically. I will focus on Sarah Moss's account because she focuses on cases in which one forms an opinion on the basis of probabilistic evidence. I use Moss's version of the MET as a target to illustrate the challenges METs face in general. Broadly, Moss holds that a judgment's moral risk bears on its epistemic status. In Section 1, I briefly outline Sarah Moss's MET and explain why it fails to identify which cases produce epistemically problematic judgments and fails to explain why those judgments are epistemically problematic. In Section 2, I offer an alternative account, which explains why statistical generalizations about marginalized social groups are likely unreliable as evidence. Thus, use of this kind of evidence leads to epistemically problematic beliefs. I conclude by introducing epistemic risk as an explanation for why the inference made in Shopper is epistemically problematic while the inference made in Fraternity Member is not. / Master of Arts / Imagine a shopkeeper who has just realized something was stolen from his shop. There are two possible suspects: a young white man and a young Black man. He did not see the shoplifting occur, and the only evidence he has is the statistical evidence that young Black men are 70% more likely to shoplift than young white men. By all accounts, he is not racially biased, this is simply a statistical fact that he is aware of. Based on this evidence, he forms the judgment that the young Black man is the likely culprit. Let's call this case Shopper. Now imagine a student on a college campus whose friend has been assaulted. There are two possible suspects: a young man who is not a fraternity member and a young man who is in a fraternity. The only evidence that the student has is the statistical evidence that men involved in fraternities are 70% more likely to have committed sexual violence than average. By all accounts she is not anti-fraternity, she is simply aware of this statistical evidence. Based on this evidence, she forms the judgment that the fraternity member is the likely assailant. Let's call this case Fraternity Member. I think there's a difference between these two cases. Specifically, I think it's okay to make the inference in the latter case, but not in the former. Even if you don't quite share my intuition, you might still think that however 'icky' it feels to draw the above sort of inference in Fraternity Member, it feels ickier still to draw it in Shopper. Either way, I don't think these intuitions are merely responsive to the moral facts of the cases: I think there's something different about the evidence relied upon in these cases. Specifically, we have reason to thinks that the processes with which we produce the evidence relied upon in Shopper are biased.

Epistemologists and those involved in feminist philosophy have expanded philosophical analyses of epistemic injustices and its subparts over the last decade. In doing so, such authors have thoroughly discussed the role of credibility deficits and the harms they cause for those receiving the deficits. In this literature, however, credibility excesses have not received as much attention owing to their tendency to be socially advantageous for those receiving them. In this paper, I show that epistemic justice relies in part on taking these excesses into account. More specifically, I illustrate how adjusting only credibility deficits leads to a two-fold problem. On the one hand, it leads to an epistemic harm insofar as not taking the excesses into account can cause us to draw the wrong conclusion from furnished testimonies. If one persons testimonial excess is still greater than another's corrected deficit in a certain way, then the person with the excess will be favored over the other person even once the deficit is corrected. On the other hand, it can also lead to a moral harm that wrongs the person who received the eventually corrected deficit in their capacity as a knower. It does so in instances when it undermines the person's self-trust. As such, if we are willing to adjust credibility deficits up in the project of epistemic justice we also have to be willing to adjust credibility excesses down in at least some cases. / Master of Arts / Think of a time when someone did not believe you. For some persons holding historically marginalized identities, it is a fairly common occurrence to not be believed just because one is, or is perceived to be a woman, a person of color, queer, and immigrant etc. In philosophy, epistemologists have discussed these testimonial deficits and furnished solutions that call for adjusting such deficits up in the project of justice. However, testimonial deficits are not the only instances when a person may receive a non-proportional amount of credibility. For other persons holding historically majoritized identities, it may also be fairly common to be believed just because one holds or is perceived to hold an identity such as man, white, straight, etc. The presence of credibility excesses is not as discussed in philosophical literature and what, exactly, we ought to do about these excesses is an open question. In this paper, I argue that adjusting credibility deficits up is not sufficient for reaching a just state if or when we leave the excesses unadjusted in certain circumstances. While adjusting the credibility deficits up is part of the picture, we also have to be willing to adjust the credibility excesses down in at least some cases.

Dans cette thèse, nous nous penchons sur les effets que peut avoir la discrimination sociale sur le bien-être des personnes qui en sont victimes, et en particulier, sur les stratégies psychologiques que ces dernières mettent en œuvre pour s'en protéger. Parmi les cognitions qui susceptibles de faire office de « tampon », certaines sont liées directement à l'appartenance groupale et donc potentiellement spécifiques à l'expérience de discrimination. Dans une première partie théorique, nous nous attardons sur une définition précise des concepts qui nous intéressent et décrivons en détail la littérature pertinente à notre sujet. Le premier chapitre traite de la notion de discrimination en elle-même, et de ses différences avec des concepts voisins, tels la stigmatisation, le bas statut et la privation relative. L'objectif de cette première section est de préciser notre objet d'étude. Dans un second chapitre, nous abordons la multitude de données existant sur les liens entre discrimination et bien-être, ainsi que les modèles correspondants, notamment ceux de rejet-identification (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002), de « discounting » (Crocker & Major, 1989) et du stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Cette section nous permet de conclure que l'impact de la discrimination sur le bien-être est loin d'être simple et direct, et met en lumière la résilience des individus qui sont victimes de traitements injustes dus à leur appartenance groupale. Parmi les facteurs de protection à la disposition des personnes discriminées, un certain nombre dépendent directement de ce groupe vilipendé. Nous nous y intéressons dans le troisième et dernier chapitre de l'introduction théorique, en passant en revue les éléments qui permettent de penser que l'identification, l'entitativité, la perception de support social et/ou de discrimination groupale et le soutien à l'action collective puissent être des cognitions protectrices du bien-être. La partie empirique de la thèse vise à investiguer plus avant ces effets protecteurs. En nous intéressant à des groupes discriminés réels (immigrés africains, femmes, infirmiers) ou manipulés (étudiants de l'UCL), nous tentons de cerner plus précisément les relations entre discrimination, cognitions groupales et bien-être. Au travers d'études de laboratoire (chapitres 1 et 2), de terrain (chapitres 3 et 4) et longitudinales (chapitre 5), nous mettons en évidence l'existence d'effets qui semblent spécifiques à certains des groupes étudiés. Notamment, la discrimination groupale a un effet protecteur sur le bien-être dans deux grandes catégories sociales (femmes et immigrés africains), ce qui ne semble pas être le cas dans un groupe professionnel (infirmiers/ères). D'autre part, l'identification au groupe se révèle un concept multidimensionnel dont les différentes facettes ont des effets parfois opposés. Notre conclusion invite le lecteur à la circonspection quant à l'applicabilité de modèles universels à la problématique de la discrimination. Ainsi, si les cognitions groupales peuvent être protectrices du bien-être, c'est sous certaines conditions, dans certains groupes, et non pas comme une panacée valable pour tous. Nous insistons également sur l'importance de distinguer discrimination groupale et personnelle, ainsi que différentes facettes du concept d'identification. Enfin, les études de terrain et les expériences de laboratoire semblent constituer des investigations complémentaires à mener idéalement de concert. / This thesis deals with the cognitive strategies that discriminated individuals use to shield themselves from the aversive effects of social discrimination. More especially, we are interested in group-linked cognitions which are specific to the experience of discrimination, namely identification, perception of group discrimination, entitativity, social support (or solidarity) and the belief in collective action. In the theoretical part, we spend some time defining our concepts. We first distinguish personal discrimination from other related concepts, like relative deprivation, status in social identity theory or stigmatization. We then review the broad literature on the relationship between perceived personal discrimination and well-being. To conclude this first part, we underline the evidence that links group cognitions (identification, group discrimination, entitativity…), perceived personal discrimination and well-being. This first part is only available in French. In the empirical part (in English), we present five studies that gather evidence for the protective properties of group cognitions, with different social categories, among them women, African immigrants and junior nurses, in laboratory (chapters 1 and 2) or natural settings (chapters 3, 4 & 5). We also contrast cross-sectional (chapter 4) and longitudinal data (chapter 5) in order to investigate causality concerns. We conclude our work by stressing the importance of considering group cognitions in relationship to specific groups, and not as a panacea that would be applicable and protective for every single discriminated individual in the same way. We further emphasize the necessity of treating group and personal discrimination as two distinct phenomena, as well as the importance of considering identification as a multi-facetted construct.