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Questa tesi studia un mercato assicurativo competitivo in cui gli assicurati possiedono informazione privata riguardo la loro rischiosità, e al contempo gli assicuratori, in ragione della loro superiore esperienza, hanno una maggiore abilità a valutare il rischio. Nel caso in cui il rischio sia perfettamente stimabile dagli assicuratori e tale stima rappresenti la loro informazione privata, una perfetta rivelazione dell'informazione può non avvenire ed equilibri profittevoli sono possibili, nonostante il contesto competitivo. Inoltre, l'aumento della pressione competitiva può rivelarsi inefficace ai fini di una riduzione dei prezzi assicurativi, in quanto può semplicemente comportare una riduzione dei profitti dei singoli assicuratori. Tuttavia, Il vantaggio informativo degli assicuratori può permettere soluzioni caratterizzate da una maggiore efficienza. La presenza di doppia asimmetria informativa permette anche di spiegare l'esistenza di una correlazione negativa tra rischio e copertura assicurativa in mercati competitivi. Inoltre, se la stima del rischio da parte degli assicuratori è affetta da incertezza, così che gli assicuratori differiscono gli uni dagli altri per quanto riguarda la stima del rischio, profitti nulli non sono consentiti. / This dissertation studies a competitive insurance market in which a policyholder owns private information about her own riskiness and at the same time insurers (through their higher expertise) are better able to estimate it. If insurers’ estimations are private and identical, we find that, despite the presence of competition, perfect revelation of information is not necessarily achieved and profitable outcomes are possible. Adding competitive pressure may be ineffective in driving the insurance prices downward, as it simply reduces the individual insurer’s profits. The insurers’ informative advantage, however, allows more efficient outcomes. The presence of a bilateral asymmetry can also explain why, in dispersed markets, low risk policyholders may be more insured than high risk ones. Moreover, if insurers’ private estimations are heterogeneous and suffer of some degree of uncertainty, we find that, in addition to the previous results, actuarially fair outcomes for all policyholders are never allowed, despite the presence of competition.

A cyber-security problem is a conflict-resolution scenario that typically consists of a security system and at least two decision makers (e.g. attacker and defender) that can each have competing objectives. In this thesis, we are interested in cyber-security problems where one decision maker has superior or better information. Game theory is a well-established mathematical tool that can be used to analyze such problems and will be our tool of choice. In particular, we will formulate cyber-security problems as stochastic games with asymmetric information, where game-theoretic methods can then be applied to the problems to derive optimal policies for each decision maker. A severe limitation of considering optimal policies is that these policies are computationally prohibitive. We address the complexity issues by introducing methods, based on the ideas of model predictive control, to compute suboptimal polices. Specifically, we first prove that the methods generate suboptimal policies that have tight performance bounds. We then show that the suboptimal polices can be computed by solving a linear program online, and the complexity of the linear program remains constant with respect to the game length. Finally, we demonstrate how the suboptimal policy methods can be applied to cyber-security problems to reduce the computational complexity of forecasting cyber-attacks.

This dissertation contains three essays on environmental economics and on credit market imperfections. The literature on carbon tax incidence generally finds that carbon taxes have a regressive impact on the distribution of income. The main reason for that finding stems from the fact that poor households spend a larger share of their total expenditure on energy products than the rich households do. This literature, however, has ignored the impact of carbon taxes on income stemming from changes in relative factor prices. Yet, changes in household welfare depend not only on variations in commodity prices, but also on changes in income. Chapter 1 provides a comprehensive analysis of the distributional impact of carbon taxes on inequality by considering both demand-side and supply-side channels. We use a multi-sector, multi-household general equilibrium model to analyze the distributional impact of carbon taxes on inequality. Using equivalent income as the household welfare metric, we apply the Shapley value and concentration index approaches to decomposing household inequality. Our simulation results suggest that carbon taxes exert a larger negative impact on the income of the rich than that of the poor, and are thereby progressive. On the other hand, when assessed from the use side alone (i.e., commodity prices alone), our results confirm previous findings, whereas carbon taxes are regressive. However, due to the stronger incidence of carbon taxes on inequality from the income side, our results suggest that the carbon tax tends to reduce inequality. These findings further suggest that the traditional approach of assessing the impact of carbon taxes on inequality through changes in commodity prices alone may be misleading. Chapter 2 investigates the economic impacts of creating an emissions bubble between Canada and the US in a context of subglobal participation in efforts to reduce pollution with market based-instruments. One of the advantages of an emissions bubble is that it can be beneficial to countries that differ in their production and consumption patterns. To address the competitiveness issue that arises from the free-rider problem in the area of climate-change mitigation, we consider the imposition of a border tax adjustment (BTA) - a commonly suggested solution in the literature. We develop a detailed multisector and multi-regional general equilibrium model to analyze the welfare, aggregate, sectoral and trade impacts of the formation of an emissions bubble between Canada and the US with and without BTA. Our simulation results suggest that, in the absence of BTA, the creation of the bubble would make both countries better off through a positive terms-of-trade effect, and more importantly, through a significant reduction in Canada’s marginal abatement cost. The benefits of these positive effects would spill over to the non-participating countries, leading them to increase their trade shares in non-emissions-intensive goods. Moreover, the simulation results also indicate that a unilateral implementation of a BTA by any one of the two countries is welfare deteriorating in the imposing country and welfare improving in the other. In contrast, a joint implementation of a BTA by the two countries would make Canada better off and the US worse off. Chapter 3 shows that learning by lending is a potential channel of understanding the business cycle fluctuation under an imperfect credit market. An endogenous link among the learning parameter, lending rates, and the size of investment makes it possible to generate an internal propagation even due to a temporary shock. The main finding of this chapter is the explanation of how ex post non-financial factors such as information losses by individual agents in a credit market may account for a persistence in real indicators such as capital stock and output.

Este estudo faz uma análise teórica e empírica dos processos de licitação e contratação de obras e reformas de prédios públicos em uma Universidade Pública Federal, utilizando a Teoria da Informação Assimétrica e dos Contratos. O período da pesquisa foi entre 2010 a 2013, na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, sendo que foram analisados 127 processos licitatórios e contratos. As análises revelaram diversas ocorrências em licitações e nas contratações de obras e reformas. Na etapa licitatória, anterior à contratação (ex ante), a sessão para lances das licitações de obras e reformas, em alguns casos, estiveram desertas. Na contratação e execução de obras e reformas (ex post), foram constatados diversos pedidos de prorrogação de prazos e de reequilíbrio econômico financeiro, e na fiscalização das obras e reformas foram constatadas 31 ocorrências nos serviços finalizados pelas Empreiteiras. Os resultados também indicaram que, do total dos processos analisados no período de 2010 – 2013, cerca de 30% das obras e reformas ainda não foram finalizadas ou estão suspensas, o que demonstra deficiências na fiscalização e na gestão dos contratos. Além disso, o tempo médio entre a abertura do processo e a conclusão dos serviços gira em torno de três anos, sendo que grande parte deste tempo foi despendido com procedimentos internos da UFRGS. Tais fatos indicam problemas de seleção adversa e assimetria de informações, além do Hold up problem, em que o Principal é tomado como refém pelo Agente e do problema do Risco moral (Moral Hazard), em que o Agente passa a agir de modo não apropriado ou não aprovado pelo Principal, com a ocorrência dos custos de transação. / This study makes a theoretical and empirical analysis of the processes of bidding and contracting works and reforms of public buildings in a Federal Public University, using Asymmetric Information Theory and Contracts. The period analyzed was between 2010 and 2013, at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, being that 127 bidding processes and contracts were analyzed. The analyses revealed several occurrences in tenders and hiring of work and restoration. In the bidding phase, prior to hiring (ex ante), the bidding session for work and renovations, in some cases, was deserted. There were several requests for deadline extension, and economic-financial adjustment in the work and restoration hiring and execution (ex post), while in the inspection of work and restoration it could be noticed 31 occurrences in services finalized by the contractors. The results also indicated that, of the total number of processes analyzed in the period 2010-2013, about 30% either have not been completed or are suspended, which shows deficiencies in the supervision and management of the contracts. In addition, the average time between the opening of the process and the conclusion of services is about three years, and much of this time was spent with internal procedures of UFRGS. These facts indicate problems of adverse selection and information asymmetry , in addition to the "Hold up problem", in which the Principal is taken hostage by the Agent besides the problem of Moral Hazard, when the Agent begins to act inappropriately or in a way which is disapproved by the Principal, together with the incidence of transaction costs.

Submitted by Érica Diniz (ericadiniz@gmail.com) on 2015-01-12T19:03:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 versaodigital_tesedoutorado_EricaDiniz.pdf: 3599824 bytes, checksum: b9f58b1c27e6f83606dfd16d6c2e165d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2015-01-15T11:48:49Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 versaodigital_tesedoutorado_EricaDiniz.pdf: 3599824 bytes, checksum: b9f58b1c27e6f83606dfd16d6c2e165d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2015-02-05T12:01:45Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 versaodigital_tesedoutorado_EricaDiniz.pdf: 3599824 bytes, checksum: b9f58b1c27e6f83606dfd16d6c2e165d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-05T12:02:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 versaodigital_tesedoutorado_EricaDiniz.pdf: 3599824 bytes, checksum: b9f58b1c27e6f83606dfd16d6c2e165d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-10-28 / Essa tese é constituída por três artigos: 'Tax Filing Choices for the Household', 'Optimal Tax for the Household: Collective and Unitary Approaches' e 'Vertical Differentiation and Heterogeneous Firms'.

Submitted by Daniella Santos (daniella.santos@fgv.br) on 2010-03-23T12:06:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Erica_Diniz.pdf: 328909 bytes, checksum: 1fb57ef9f720ee93e22f116f1b459033 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Virginio Machado(andrea.machado@fgv.br) on 2010-03-23T12:37:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Erica_Diniz.pdf: 328909 bytes, checksum: 1fb57ef9f720ee93e22f116f1b459033 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-03-24T13:37:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Erica_Diniz.pdf: 328909 bytes, checksum: 1fb57ef9f720ee93e22f116f1b459033 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-11-21 / This paper presents a duopolist model with heterogeneous firms (different marginal costs) and assimetric information about the vertical preferences of the consumers. We find that the asymmetry of information on the vertical dimension and the difference in costs greatly influences the pricing and the structures for market equilibrium. An important result arising from these two aspects is the existence of a mass of consumers that can buy from both firms. It is also observed that the greater the heterogeneity of costs, the greater the market power of the most efficient firm. / O trabalho apresenta um modelo de competição duopolista, com firmas heterogêneas (custos marginais diferentes), produtos espacialmente diferenciados quanto a dimensão vertical e horizontal, e informação privada sobre as preferências por qualidade dos consumidores. Identifica-se que a assimetria de informação sobre a dimensão vertical e a diferença de custos exercem grande relevância sobre a decisão de apreçamento das firmas e sobre as estruturas de mercado de equilíbrio. Um resultado relevante decorrente desses dois aspectos é a existência de uma massa de consumidores que, em equilíbrio, pode demandar de qualquer uma das firmas, sendo essa decisão pautada sobre o real parâmetro de preferência por qualidade de cada consumidor. Observa-se também que quanto maior a heterogeneidade dos custos, maior é o poder de mercado da firma de menor custo.

L'objectif de cette thèse est d’étudier la définition de paiements incitatifs pour la conservation de la biodiversité d’un point de vue empirique et théorique. Dans ce travail, nous visons également à intégrer de façon pertinente les processus écologiques spatiaux et dynamiques inhérents à la biodiversité terrestre dans les modèles économiques que nous développons.Dans le premier chapitre de cette thèse, nous évaluons empiriquement la coût-efficacité des paiements pour contrats Natura 2000 mis en place en forêt en France par le biais d'une approche ex ante. Le caractère insuffisant de la définition de ces paiements et leur mauvaise calibration montre la nécessité de repenser la définition de ces dispositifs d’incitations. Dans le deuxième et troisième chapitre de cette thèse, nous étudions donc la définition de paiements incitatifs efficients et coût-efficaces de façon théorique et conceptuelle, tout en prenant en compte les principaux enjeux posés par la définition de paiements incitatifs pour la conservation de la biodiversité terrestre. Le chapitre 2, par le biais d'un modèle principal-agent à valeur commune, étudie la possibilité de définir des paiements incitatifs différenciés à destinations des propriétaires privés lorsque les coûts et bénéfices de conservation sont hétérogènes et inobservables pour l’agence de conservation. Ce chapitre s’intéresse donc à l’impact de l’asymétrie d’information -- en particulier du phénomène d’anti-sélection -- sur la définition des paiements. Dans le chapitre 3, nous nous intéressons principalement à l’impact du changement climatique sur la définition de paiements incitatifs coût-efficaces. Dans ce chapitre, nous développons un modèle écologique-économique intégré, dynamique et spatialement explicite, nous permettant d’étudier la coût-efficacité relative de différents types de design, impliquant différents degrés de ciblage et de différentiation des paiements de conservation. Le travail réalisé dans l'ensemble de cette thèse nous permet de formuler des recommandations concernant le ciblage et le design de paiements incitatifs pour la conservation de la biodiversité. / The objective of this thesis is to study the definition of incentive payments for biodiversity conservation from an empirical and theoretical perspective. In this work, we also aim to account, in a relevant way, for spatial and dynamic ecological processes inherent to terrestrial biodiversity in the economic models that we develop. In the first chapter of this thesis, we empirically assess the cost effectiveness of incentive payments for biodiversity conservation implemented in French forests, namely Natura 2000 contracts, by undertaking an ex ante approach. Our results underline the inadequacy of the current definition of payments for Natura 2000 contracts and their poor calibration. This calls for a rethinking of the definition of conservation incentives. In the second and third chapter of this thesis we leave the framework of Natura 2000 contracts. We study the definition of efficient and cost-effective incentive payments in a theoretical and conceptual way, while taking into account the main challenges posed by the definition of incentive payments for biodiversity conservation. Chapter 2 explores, through a principal-agent common-value model, the possibility of differentiating conservation payments for private landowners when both conservation costs and benefits are heterogeneous and unobservable to the conservation planner. This chapter focuses on the impact of asymmetric information - especially of adverse selection - on the definition of payments. In Chapter 3, we investigate the impact of climate change on the definition of cost-effective incentive payments. In this chapter, we develop an integrated, dynamic and spatially explicit ecological-economic model, and study the relative cost-effectiveness of various payment design options, involving different levels of targeting and differentiation of conservation payments. The work done throughout this thesis allows us to formulate recommendations regarding the targeting and design of incentive payments for biodiversity conservation.

[pt] Adequação e validação de métodos econométricos para quantificar o impacto da padronização (normalização) de produtos no consumo e no bem estar dos consumidores. Três são os objetivos centrais da presente pesquisa: (i) caracterização do impacto da implementação da padronização na produção de açúcar, (ii) desenvolvimento de metodologia para a quantificação do impacto da implementação da padronização (normalização de pré-medidos) sobre o nível de produção e, portanto, sobre o bem-estar dos consumidores e (iii) análise do acervo de normas e regulamentação técnica aplicável ao setor açucareiro. Como motivação o trabalho mostra que funções da tecnologia industrial básica constituem de fato instrumentos de redução da assimetria da informação. O trabalho se desenvolveu no recente contexto de implementação de políticas públicas sociais que visam à melhoria do bem-estar de consumidores de baixa renda. O trabalho se desenvolveu em conformidade aos seguintes preceitos metodológicos: (i) revisão da literatura relacionada à assimetria da informação com o propósito de comprovar a hipótese de que a padronização de produtos pode de fato reduzir a assimetria informação; (ii) análise econométrica das sérias históricas da produção brasileira de açúcar. Os resultados do trabalho mostraram que a padronização do açúcar (normalização de pré-medidos), se devidamente implementada, pode implicar na melhoria no bem estar dos consumidores. Uma análise contra-factual clássica dos resultados consolidados mostrou que a padronização brasileira do açúcar reduziu a assimetria da informação presenciada nesse mercado, impactando num aumento de cerca de 8 porcento na produção de açúcar em 2006 devido `a padronização do produto implementada em 1992. Como conclusão a análise econométrica permitiu mostrar que a padronização de produtos constitui-se numa ferramenta estratégica a serviço do Estado promover a competitividade e como instrumento de redução de assimetria da informação em benefício do consumidor e de redução de distorções de mercados. / [en] There are two objetives in this Master dissertation in Metrology: (i) characterization of the impact of the implementation of the standardization in the production of sugar and (ii) development of methodology for quantifying the impact of the implementation of the standardization on the production level and, therefore, on the welfare of consumers. The work was motivated by the use of functions of basic industrial technology to reduce the asymmetric information as market failure is able to generate deficiencies. The investigation was developed in the recent context characterized by the implementation of social public policies aimed to improve the low income consumer s welfare. The work was developed in accordance to the following methodological precepts: (i) review of the literature on asymmetric information in order to verify the hypothesis that the products standardization can reduce the asymmetric information, generating an improvement in the consumer s welfare; (ii) econometric analysis of the Brazilian sugar production time series. As a result, the research shows that the sugar standardization, if correctly implemented, induces consumer s welfare. A contra-factual analysis of the consolidated results has shown that the Brazilian sugar standardization reduced the asymmetric information in this market. The impact of this policy was an increase in roughly 8 percent in the sugar production in 2006 due to the product standardization implemented in 1992. As a conclusion, the econometric analysis developed show that the standardization of products can be considered a powerful strategic tool. Not only to promote specific sector competitiveness, but also as an instrument to reduce the asymmetric information to the benefit of consumers.

Este estudo faz uma análise teórica e empírica dos processos de licitação e contratação de obras e reformas de prédios públicos em uma Universidade Pública Federal, utilizando a Teoria da Informação Assimétrica e dos Contratos. O período da pesquisa foi entre 2010 a 2013, na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, sendo que foram analisados 127 processos licitatórios e contratos. As análises revelaram diversas ocorrências em licitações e nas contratações de obras e reformas. Na etapa licitatória, anterior à contratação (ex ante), a sessão para lances das licitações de obras e reformas, em alguns casos, estiveram desertas. Na contratação e execução de obras e reformas (ex post), foram constatados diversos pedidos de prorrogação de prazos e de reequilíbrio econômico financeiro, e na fiscalização das obras e reformas foram constatadas 31 ocorrências nos serviços finalizados pelas Empreiteiras. Os resultados também indicaram que, do total dos processos analisados no período de 2010 – 2013, cerca de 30% das obras e reformas ainda não foram finalizadas ou estão suspensas, o que demonstra deficiências na fiscalização e na gestão dos contratos. Além disso, o tempo médio entre a abertura do processo e a conclusão dos serviços gira em torno de três anos, sendo que grande parte deste tempo foi despendido com procedimentos internos da UFRGS. Tais fatos indicam problemas de seleção adversa e assimetria de informações, além do Hold up problem, em que o Principal é tomado como refém pelo Agente e do problema do Risco moral (Moral Hazard), em que o Agente passa a agir de modo não apropriado ou não aprovado pelo Principal, com a ocorrência dos custos de transação. / This study makes a theoretical and empirical analysis of the processes of bidding and contracting works and reforms of public buildings in a Federal Public University, using Asymmetric Information Theory and Contracts. The period analyzed was between 2010 and 2013, at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, being that 127 bidding processes and contracts were analyzed. The analyses revealed several occurrences in tenders and hiring of work and restoration. In the bidding phase, prior to hiring (ex ante), the bidding session for work and renovations, in some cases, was deserted. There were several requests for deadline extension, and economic-financial adjustment in the work and restoration hiring and execution (ex post), while in the inspection of work and restoration it could be noticed 31 occurrences in services finalized by the contractors. The results also indicated that, of the total number of processes analyzed in the period 2010-2013, about 30% either have not been completed or are suspended, which shows deficiencies in the supervision and management of the contracts. In addition, the average time between the opening of the process and the conclusion of services is about three years, and much of this time was spent with internal procedures of UFRGS. These facts indicate problems of adverse selection and information asymmetry , in addition to the "Hold up problem", in which the Principal is taken hostage by the Agent besides the problem of Moral Hazard, when the Agent begins to act inappropriately or in a way which is disapproved by the Principal, together with the incidence of transaction costs.