Este estudo faz uma análise teórica e empírica dos processos de licitação e contratação de obras e reformas de prédios públicos em uma Universidade Pública Federal, utilizando a Teoria da Informação Assimétrica e dos Contratos. O período da pesquisa foi entre 2010 a 2013, na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, sendo que foram analisados 127 processos licitatórios e contratos. As análises revelaram diversas ocorrências em licitações e nas contratações de obras e reformas. Na etapa licitatória, anterior à contratação (ex ante), a sessão para lances das licitações de obras e reformas, em alguns casos, estiveram desertas. Na contratação e execução de obras e reformas (ex post), foram constatados diversos pedidos de prorrogação de prazos e de reequilíbrio econômico financeiro, e na fiscalização das obras e reformas foram constatadas 31 ocorrências nos serviços finalizados pelas Empreiteiras. Os resultados também indicaram que, do total dos processos analisados no período de 2010 – 2013, cerca de 30% das obras e reformas ainda não foram finalizadas ou estão suspensas, o que demonstra deficiências na fiscalização e na gestão dos contratos. Além disso, o tempo médio entre a abertura do processo e a conclusão dos serviços gira em torno de três anos, sendo que grande parte deste tempo foi despendido com procedimentos internos da UFRGS. Tais fatos indicam problemas de seleção adversa e assimetria de informações, além do Hold up problem, em que o Principal é tomado como refém pelo Agente e do problema do Risco moral (Moral Hazard), em que o Agente passa a agir de modo não apropriado ou não aprovado pelo Principal, com a ocorrência dos custos de transação. / This study makes a theoretical and empirical analysis of the processes of bidding and contracting works and reforms of public buildings in a Federal Public University, using Asymmetric Information Theory and Contracts. The period analyzed was between 2010 and 2013, at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, being that 127 bidding processes and contracts were analyzed. The analyses revealed several occurrences in tenders and hiring of work and restoration. In the bidding phase, prior to hiring (ex ante), the bidding session for work and renovations, in some cases, was deserted. There were several requests for deadline extension, and economic-financial adjustment in the work and restoration hiring and execution (ex post), while in the inspection of work and restoration it could be noticed 31 occurrences in services finalized by the contractors. The results also indicated that, of the total number of processes analyzed in the period 2010-2013, about 30% either have not been completed or are suspended, which shows deficiencies in the supervision and management of the contracts. In addition, the average time between the opening of the process and the conclusion of services is about three years, and much of this time was spent with internal procedures of UFRGS. These facts indicate problems of adverse selection and information asymmetry , in addition to the "Hold up problem", in which the Principal is taken hostage by the Agent besides the problem of Moral Hazard, when the Agent begins to act inappropriately or in a way which is disapproved by the Principal, together with the incidence of transaction costs.

En dépit des réformes visant à faciliter l’accès aux marchés, les grandes firmes françaises s’endettent en majeure partie auprès des banques. Cette thèse tente donc de comprendre les décisions d’endettement des entreprises, et plus particulièrement leur choix entre dettes directes et/ou indirectes. Ce choix a un impact sur la valeur boursière à court terme des grandes sociétés françaises. En effet, les résultats de l’étude d’événements indiquent que le marché réagit positivement aux annonces d’emprunts bancaires, mais ne réagit pas aux annonces d’emprunts obligataires. L’effet de signal positif est d’autant plus important lorsque les annonces concernent le renouvellement de dettes bancaires, des échéances relativement courtes et des emprunts bancaires syndiqués. La structure d’endettement des grandes firmes dépend en fait de certaines de leurs caractéristiques. Ce sont essentiellement les plus grandes sociétés françaises, celles qui bénéficient d’une certaine notoriété, qui ont le plus de chance d’émettre des emprunts directs. Toutefois, un certain nombre d’entre-elles tirent avantage de leur envergure pour accéder à la dette de marché, alors qu’elles présentent un risque de crédit relativement élevé. Ces firmes continuent donc à se financer en majeure partie auprès des banques afin de bénéficier d’une plus grande flexibilité. Par ailleurs, les entreprises innovantes optent pour une structure d’endettement mixte, qui leur permet de choisir leur source de dette en fonction de la confidentialité des projets à financer. Les variables de gouvernance jouent également un rôle dans les choix d’endettement des firmes. Au final, les deux types de dettes sont plus complémentaires que substituts. / In spite of public market deregulation in the 1980s, large French companies continue borrowing predominantly from commercial banks. To understand corporate debt decisions, this thesis examines the choice between arm’s-length debt obtained in public market and/or monitored debt supplied by banks. This choice has an impact on firms’ common stock prices. Bank loan announcements convey information to the capital market and generate positive share price effects, while bond debt announcements do not. Market reaction is even more important when announcements are related to bank credit renewals, to shorter maturities and to syndicated loans. In fact, corporate debt ownership structure depends on several firm characteristics. Results indicate that largest and oldest firms are most likely to issue public debts. However, some of them draw advantage from their scale to reach bond markets, whereas they have a relatively high credit risk. These firms continue borrowing from banks to benefit by a greater flexibility. Moreover, firms with sensitive information have a mixed structure of debt, since they choose their debt source according to the confidentiality of the projects to be financed. Corporate governance variables also play a part in the corporate debt choices. Finally, the two types of debts are more complementary than substitute.

[pt] Com base na regressão numérica de séries históricas associadas à produção de quatro produtos destacados no ranking mundial de produção (cimento, aço, pneus e carroceria de ônibus), a presente pesquisa de mestrado avalia os impactos econômicos decorrentes do processo da certificação. Considerada instrumento econômico de mercado que permite diferenciar produtos e fornecer incentivos para consumidores e produtores, o processo de certificação é um mecanismo formal que assegura qualidade e conformidade do produto a especificações técnicas previamente estabelecidas, permitindo disponibilizar um certificado que efetivamente denota conformidade do produto e sua adequação ao uso, criando condições mercadológicas favoráveis para facilitar sua comercialização em mercados externos mais competitivos. Como contribuição do trabalho são também analisadas as interfaces da certificação com a metrologia, com a normalização e com a avaliação da conformidade, entendidas como funções complementares da tecnologia industrial, a serviço do desenvolvimento da competitividade e da melhoria contínua de serviços e produtos, da redução do desperdício, da agregação de maior eficácia técnica e econômica e da redução de barreiras técnicas ao comércio, assim preconizando a máxima um único ensaio, baseado numa única norma, documentada por um único certificado, de credibilidade e aceitação mundial. Tendo em vista a abundante evidência teórica que considera a certificação uma ferramenta de competitividade e de intercâmbio tecnológico no nível macroeconômico da produção, o estudo empírico conduzido, beneficiando-se de um método estatístico de regressão processado pelo clássico programa econométrico EViews, inclui a certificação como uma variável dummy no processo de regressão, permitindo a mensuração dos impactos econômicos desejados. Foi demonstrado que a certificação possui influência positiva na produção, permitindo-se assegurar, com um nível de significância de 0,05, ou seja, com uma probabilidade de 95 por cento, que o processo de certificação no Brasil impactou: (i) 41,6 por cento na produção de cimento (de 1970 a 2002, tendo a certificação sido implementada em junho/1994), (ii) 15,2 por cento na produção de aço (de 1980 a 2002, tendo a certificação sido implementada em janeiro/1997); (iii) 20,8 por cento na produção de pneus (de 1970 a 2002, tendo a certificação sido implementada em maio/1996); (iv) 31,4 por cento na produção de carrocerias de ônibus (de 1980 a 2002, tendo a certificação sido implementada em janeiro/1993); e assim ficando demonstrado o impacto da certificação avaliada pelo método estatístico de regressão, que também caracteriza o desempenho dos produtos investigados. / [en] Based on a numerical regression of time series associated to the production of four products highly ranked in the production world market (steel, cement, bus shell and tires), the present Master research evaluates the economic impacts associated with the process of certification. Considered an effective economic instrument, useful to differentiate products and to provide incentives to consumers and producers, the certification process is a formal instrument that assures quality and conformity of the product to technical specifications previously established, making available a certificate that effectively denote conformity of the product and its adequacy to the use, creating favorable marketing conditions and facilitating its commercialization in more competitive external markets. As an indirect contribution, the thesis also analyze the interfaces of the certification with metrology, documentary standarization and with conformity assessment, understood as complementary functions of the basic industrial technology, serving the development of the competitiveness and the continuous improvement of services and products, the reduction of wastefulness, the aggregation of greater technical and economic effectiveness and of the reduction of technical barriers to trade, thus underpinning the well accepted principle a single test, based on a single documentary standard, documented in a single certificate, internationally accepted. In view of the abundant theoretical evidence that considers the certification a tool of competitiveness and technological interchange in the macroeconomic level of the production, the lead empirical study, benefiting itself of a statistical method of regression processed for the classic econometrical program EViews, it includes the certification as an variable dummy in the regression process, allowing the quantitative evaluation of the desired economic impacts. It was demonstrated that the certification possess positive influence in the production, allowing itself to assure with a level of significance of 0,05, that is, with a 95 percent probability, that the process of certification in Brazil has impacted: (i) 15.2 percent in the steel production (since 1980 to 2002, having the certification been implemented in January/1997); (ii) 20.8 percent in the production of tires (since 1970 to 2002, having the certification been implemented in May/1996); (iii) 31.4 percent in the production of bus shells (since 1980 to 2002, having the certification been implemented in January/1993); e (iv) 41.6 percent in the cement production (since 1970 to 2002, having the certification been implemented in June/1994), thus being demonstrated the impact of the certification evaluated by the regression method used, characterizing the performance of the investigated products.

資訊不對稱為經濟普遍存在之現象，舉凡勞動市場、保險市場與借貸信用市場皆會發生類似主問題。而本文將就資訊不對稱下之借貸信用市場討論效率問題。 　　眾所皆知，當借貸市場存在資訊不對稱時會發生二大問題：道德危險、逆選擇問題，又因此三大問題會導致貸款者對特定契約之供給減少使借貸市場發生超額需求產生信用分配之現象。故可知，市場均衡因資訊不對稱現象之存在可能無法滿足柏拉圖最適。因此本文將借用四個理論模型說明：借貸信用市場之效率問題。 　　理論模型一：逆選擇下之借貸市場效率一最適放款利率與擔保品之決定 　　理論模型二：逆選擇下之借貸市場效率一最適投資水準之決定 　　理論模型三：逆選擇與道德危險下之信用分配效率 　　理論模型四：償還機率訊息不對稱下之資金配置與金融崩潰 　　透過此四個理論模型之分析可歸納出以下之結論： 　　1.借貸市場存在穩定均衡且均衡滿足市場效率時，政府無須干預借貸市場。 　　2.借貸市場存在穩定均衡且無信用分配現象但均衡未滿足市場效率時，政府就應採行自由放任之態度，透過金融中介機構之借貸行為達成社會效率。 　　3.借貸市場存在穩定均衡且存在信用分配現象但均衡未滿足市場效率時，政府就應採行交叉補貼政策干預市場，但並非所有的干預政策皆能使借貸市場之效率提升，其中尤以“補貼低品質借貸契約”之政策為最佳方案，但因為此政策須政府能夠完全區分借款者之品質型態才可採行，因此，若政府無法加以區分借款者之品質型態時，僅好退而求其次採行次佳方案“信用保証政策”。 　　4.借貸市場若不存在均衡，發生金融性崩潰時，政府應擔任最後貸款者之角色，干預借貸市場以降低私人部間之風險。

本文係應用序列談判(Sequential Bargain)模型，來制定出銀行最適放款 利率報價。在放款談判之中，由於談判雙方訊息不對稱（Asymmetric Information)，銀行對於客戶的真實報償，並沒完全的訊息，因此在談判 初期，銀行僅能藉由已知的客戶報償分配與決策法則，來制定出利率報償 。然而隨著談判期的逐漸增加，客戶的回應，會將其真實報償的訊息給釋 放出來，而銀行在接收此訊息並認知到客戶的真實報償，產生所謂的學習 效果( Learning Effect)之後，即可據此訂定出各期最適的放款利率報價 了。當談判期限由一期放寬為兩期時，對於客戶來說，因為可以以較低的 利率貸得資金，因此會樂於接受銀行這樣的安排。至於銀行方面，則因為 談判期限放寬以後，對客戶有了進一步的了解，使得放款利率報價更趨於 合理化，銀行本身的期望報償提高，因此銀行也會樂於將談判結構做這樣 的安排。

在充滿不確定性之交易市場中，每位交易者會盡量利用所擁有之資訊，在市場有干擾（如，風險性資產供給之不確定性、個人偏好不同、個人面對之稅負環境不同等）之情形下，市場會顯露出部份私人訊息，故交易者亦會經由對價格和交易量之觀察習得訊息；擁有私人訊息之交易者稱為消息靈通者(Informed)，未擁有私人訊息而只能經由觀察價格而習(learn )得 訊息之交易者稱為消息不靈通者(Uninformed)，他們二者之差異在於他們是否願花成本或資源以購買訊息。本文係在干擾理性預期模型下，利用所設定之特殊效用函數--絕對風險規避效用函數及假設隨機變數為多元常態分配，探討市場有干擾情形下，在第一期有私人訊息而在第二期有公開訊息揭露之不對稱訊息模型中價格之資訊性，分別分析了公告訊息和私人訊 息之干擾程度、風險性資產供給之不確定及購買訊息人數對二期價格資訊性之影響。在所設定的模型有解下，本文利用這些影響因素對公告訊息和私人訊息在總合需求計劃部位 (Position)的彈性說明二期價格資訊性。同時文中亦探討購買訊息人數之內生決定，顯示了公告訊息之揭露會修正交易者之看法而減少私人蒐集訊息之誘因。

This dissertation consists of three essays on private landowners' response to incentives for carbon sequestration in forests. The first essay examines private landowner response to incentives for carbon sequestration through various combinations of intermediate management practices. The second essay focuses on agricultural landowners' willingness to participate in an incentive program for carbon sequestration through afforestation, and estimates the potential for carbon sequestration from afforestation, as well as its cost. The third study examines relative performances of incentive targeting strategies for forest carbon sequestration under asymmetric information given spatially heterogeneous land types. The first essay uses an econometric approach to analyze the factors affecting non-industrial private forest landowners' choice of forest management practices, and examines how these choices might change in response to the use of incentives for carbon sequestration. I use estimated parameters to simulate the carbon sequestration potential for different combinations of management practices, and compare the effectiveness and costs of performance-based and practice-based incentive payment schemes in the Western U.S. The results suggest that incentive payments can increase the probability that desirable combinations of management practices are adopted, and particularly that incentives targeting increased fertilization yield the highest carbon sequestration potential. I also find that a performance-based payment scheme produces higher carbon sequestration than a practice-based payments scheme. However, the annual sequestration potential of intermediate forest management in response to incentive payment is not as large as the sequestration potential of afforestation. The second essay uses a survey-based stated preference approach to predict landowners' willingness to participate in a tree planting program for carbon sequestration as a function of various factors affecting landowners' decision making and different levels of incentive payments. The estimation results show that the annual payment for carbon sequestration significantly and positively affects landowners' stated level of enrollment in a tree planting program. I use the estimated parameters to conduct regional level simulations of carbon sequestration in response to incentive payments. These simulations show that the carbon supply function in the Pacific Northwest region is steeper than in the Southeast region because of the lower adoption rate and less available lands. The national level carbon supply functions derived from this study are steeper than those obtained from bottom-up engineering approaches and optimization models, and are in the same range as those from revealed preference approach studies. The third essay uses both a conceptual analysis and a numerical analysis to examine the relative performances of incentive programs for carbon sequestration using alternative targeting criteria in the presence of asymmetric information and heterogeneity in costs and benefits. The results show that in the presence of asymmetric information, the combination of high cost-high benefit variability and negative correlation, which is the combination that achieves the greatest benefit gains under perfect information, can result in the greatest benefit losses. Additionally, a comparison of two targeting schemes shows that if cost variability is greater than benefit variability with negative correlation, the benefit achieved under benefit-cost ratio targeting can be lower than that under acreage targeting, so that an optimal targeting strategy under perfect information may no longer be optimal under asymmetric information. / Graduation date: 2013

This dissertation contains three essays on environmental economics and on credit market imperfections. The literature on carbon tax incidence generally finds that carbon taxes have a regressive impact on the distribution of income. The main reason for that finding stems from the fact that poor households spend a larger share of their total expenditure on energy products than the rich households do. This literature, however, has ignored the impact of carbon taxes on income stemming from changes in relative factor prices. Yet, changes in household welfare depend not only on variations in commodity prices, but also on changes in income. Chapter 1 provides a comprehensive analysis of the distributional impact of carbon taxes on inequality by considering both demand-side and supply-side channels. We use a multi-sector, multi-household general equilibrium model to analyze the distributional impact of carbon taxes on inequality. Using equivalent income as the household welfare metric, we apply the Shapley value and concentration index approaches to decomposing household inequality. Our simulation results suggest that carbon taxes exert a larger negative impact on the income of the rich than that of the poor, and are thereby progressive. On the other hand, when assessed from the use side alone (i.e., commodity prices alone), our results confirm previous findings, whereas carbon taxes are regressive. However, due to the stronger incidence of carbon taxes on inequality from the income side, our results suggest that the carbon tax tends to reduce inequality. These findings further suggest that the traditional approach of assessing the impact of carbon taxes on inequality through changes in commodity prices alone may be misleading. Chapter 2 investigates the economic impacts of creating an emissions bubble between Canada and the US in a context of subglobal participation in efforts to reduce pollution with market based-instruments. One of the advantages of an emissions bubble is that it can be beneficial to countries that differ in their production and consumption patterns. To address the competitiveness issue that arises from the free-rider problem in the area of climate-change mitigation, we consider the imposition of a border tax adjustment (BTA) - a commonly suggested solution in the literature. We develop a detailed multisector and multi-regional general equilibrium model to analyze the welfare, aggregate, sectoral and trade impacts of the formation of an emissions bubble between Canada and the US with and without BTA. Our simulation results suggest that, in the absence of BTA, the creation of the bubble would make both countries better off through a positive terms-of-trade effect, and more importantly, through a significant reduction in Canada’s marginal abatement cost. The benefits of these positive effects would spill over to the non-participating countries, leading them to increase their trade shares in non-emissions-intensive goods. Moreover, the simulation results also indicate that a unilateral implementation of a BTA by any one of the two countries is welfare deteriorating in the imposing country and welfare improving in the other. In contrast, a joint implementation of a BTA by the two countries would make Canada better off and the US worse off. Chapter 3 shows that learning by lending is a potential channel of understanding the business cycle fluctuation under an imperfect credit market. An endogenous link among the learning parameter, lending rates, and the size of investment makes it possible to generate an internal propagation even due to a temporary shock. The main finding of this chapter is the explanation of how ex post non-financial factors such as information losses by individual agents in a credit market may account for a persistence in real indicators such as capital stock and output.

This dissertation contains three essays on environmental economics and on credit market imperfections. The literature on carbon tax incidence generally finds that carbon taxes have a regressive impact on the distribution of income. The main reason for that finding stems from the fact that poor households spend a larger share of their total expenditure on energy products than the rich households do. This literature, however, has ignored the impact of carbon taxes on income stemming from changes in relative factor prices. Yet, changes in household welfare depend not only on variations in commodity prices, but also on changes in income. Chapter 1 provides a comprehensive analysis of the distributional impact of carbon taxes on inequality by considering both demand-side and supply-side channels. We use a multi-sector, multi-household general equilibrium model to analyze the distributional impact of carbon taxes on inequality. Using equivalent income as the household welfare metric, we apply the Shapley value and concentration index approaches to decomposing household inequality. Our simulation results suggest that carbon taxes exert a larger negative impact on the income of the rich than that of the poor, and are thereby progressive. On the other hand, when assessed from the use side alone (i.e., commodity prices alone), our results confirm previous findings, whereas carbon taxes are regressive. However, due to the stronger incidence of carbon taxes on inequality from the income side, our results suggest that the carbon tax tends to reduce inequality. These findings further suggest that the traditional approach of assessing the impact of carbon taxes on inequality through changes in commodity prices alone may be misleading. Chapter 2 investigates the economic impacts of creating an emissions bubble between Canada and the US in a context of subglobal participation in efforts to reduce pollution with market based-instruments. One of the advantages of an emissions bubble is that it can be beneficial to countries that differ in their production and consumption patterns. To address the competitiveness issue that arises from the free-rider problem in the area of climate-change mitigation, we consider the imposition of a border tax adjustment (BTA) - a commonly suggested solution in the literature. We develop a detailed multisector and multi-regional general equilibrium model to analyze the welfare, aggregate, sectoral and trade impacts of the formation of an emissions bubble between Canada and the US with and without BTA. Our simulation results suggest that, in the absence of BTA, the creation of the bubble would make both countries better off through a positive terms-of-trade effect, and more importantly, through a significant reduction in Canada’s marginal abatement cost. The benefits of these positive effects would spill over to the non-participating countries, leading them to increase their trade shares in non-emissions-intensive goods. Moreover, the simulation results also indicate that a unilateral implementation of a BTA by any one of the two countries is welfare deteriorating in the imposing country and welfare improving in the other. In contrast, a joint implementation of a BTA by the two countries would make Canada better off and the US worse off. Chapter 3 shows that learning by lending is a potential channel of understanding the business cycle fluctuation under an imperfect credit market. An endogenous link among the learning parameter, lending rates, and the size of investment makes it possible to generate an internal propagation even due to a temporary shock. The main finding of this chapter is the explanation of how ex post non-financial factors such as information losses by individual agents in a credit market may account for a persistence in real indicators such as capital stock and output.

This dissertation explores the issues of mixed oligopoly, restructuring, and M&A that occurs in turn on the stages of policy set-up, preparation, and performing when the government attempt to privatize the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). On the policy set-up stage, private firms in domestic market are not necessary confined to originate at home country. Foreign private firms may establish an oversea subsidiary and create a mixed oligopoly market structure at home country. In addition, those foreign private firms may not passively accept all the trade policies that came from the government decision of home country. Mixed oligopoly competition between one domestic public firm and one subsidiary of foreign private firm is been formulated to investigate the following questions: (1) how the agents compete under the cases that home country government adopts policies such as corporate tax rate, repatriation tax rate, and partial offering public stocks; and the foreign private firm implements strategies such as vertical integration and transfer pricing; (2) the impact on social welfare and the decision of optimal public stock-offering ratio while home country government¡¦s policies and foreign private firm¡¦s strategies have changed. New findings include (1) Home country government can not maximize social welfare by simply adopting strategic policies; (2) For home country government, the best strategy for privatizing SOEs maybe partial privatization; (3) For home country government, ¡§mass privatization¡¨ should be avoided as the means of manipulating domestic market shares. On the preparation stage, an incentive scheme model is designed to analyze the governance mechanism for improving SOEs¡¦ situation. First, different types of SOEs are classified according to their own ability and the employees¡¦ attitude for privatization. By offering a sound device of incentive scheme, the government is able to strengthen the SOEs¡¦ ability and employees¡¦ desirability. Within a one-stage symmetric information game framwork, it proves that SOEs with high ability and their employees with high privatization desirability can implement the highest amount of public stock offering ratio. Next, it utilizes a two-stage asymmetric game model for discussing how to improve the SOEs¡¦ ability and how to encourage the employees to support privatization. By providing an incentive contract, the government not only can coerce the SOEs but also can inspire their employees to reveal their true information. The due process of public stock offering is able to strengthen the abilities of SOEs via ¡§restructuring¡¨ on the one hand, and to facilitate the issue of ¡§training subsidies¡¨ for hatching the entrepreneurship of employees on the other hand. Finally, it investigates the impact on public stock offering ratio for the amount of specific grants, and found that the more generosity of incentive contract, the higher the public stock offering ratio. On the performing stage, it adopts the incentive theorem to analyze the outcome of SOEs¡¦ privatization by inviting a named firm. The named firm takes over the SOEs through M&A for the purpose of long-term operation. In order to encourage the employees of the privatized company working more aggressively, the named firm comes up incentive schemes including bonus-sharing and Employees Stock Ownership Plan, ESOP. It found that whether there exists information asymmetry or not between the named firm and the employees of the privatized company will affect the following decision-makings: the level of the employees¡¦ effort, the willingness of the employees¡¦ stock-holding, and the achievement of the named firm¡¦s profit maximizing objective. In particular, it shows that the change of the contents of the incentive schemes will affect the bargaining outcomes between the named firm and the trade union of the SOEs on the issue of working conditions after privatization.