This thesis is composed of four chapters and addresses the contracting issue under strategic experimentation. The first chapter presents an overview of the thesis and introduces the strategic bandit model, which is commonly adopted in the other three chapters. The chapter also previews the main results and implications of the thesis. The second chapter discusses the contracting issue between a principal and a team of agents where the actions of agents are unobservable to the principal. The main contribution of this chapter is to fill the gap of strategic experimentation literature by introducing the free-rider problem in teamwork. The chapter first deals with the optimal hiring choice of the principal under perfect information. Since the belief of the state being good decreases if no one succeeds over time, the paper shows that the principal tends to hire fewer agents in response to the downward-adjusted posterior belief. When the principal can neither monitor the agents' actions nor distinguish the agents who succeed, this chapter shows the optimal incentivising contract consists of an upfront payment from the agents to the principal, a bonus to every agent conditioning on success and a stopping time. Under this contract, the principal can implement first-best experimentation and incentivise all agents to work until the optimal stopping time. The third and fourth chapters discuss the financial contracting issue in innovation where an innovator requires external funding from an investor. The third chapter adopts a \bad news" exponential bandit to study the financial contracting under adverse selection between the innovator and the investor. The innovator, owns the innovation project, is privately informed of either a high or low prior belief of the good state but seeks a large amount of external investment from the less-informed investor. Experimentation is conducted by the innovator using internal funding before the external investment. The posterior belief about the good state increases in the amount of internal funding if no bad news arrives during experimentation, but the project will be abandoned as long as bad news arrives. The chapter shows that the amount of internal funding can be used by the investor to separate the agents with different priors. Under the unique least-costly separating equilibrium, the high-prior innovator spends even more than the low-prior first-best internal funding in order to deter the low-prior one from mimicking, and the low-prior one remains at his first-best. This chapter enriches the financial experimentation literature by proposing internal funding as a novel signalling tool and establishing a Pareto dominating separating equilibrium. The fourth chapter studies a multi-stage innovation financing problem between an agent and an investor with asymmetric information on the progress of the project. The innovation is comprised of two stages where the agent needs to complete the first development stage in order to proceed to the second experiment stage. The model assumes that the completion of the first stage can be early or late following a binary distribution, and the arrival of success in the experimentation stage follows a "good news" exponential bandit. Each period, a fixed amount of investment is needed from the investor. However, the investor can not observe nor verify the project progress. The chapter shows that the optimal incentive-compatible contract consists of differential maximum funding periods in the event of early and late completion of the first stage respectively and subsequent bonuses to the investor conditioning on a success in the second stage. We prove that the first-best experimentation time is attainable as long as the bonus of the late completion exceeds that of the early completion, and the difference between the two bonuses should be confined within a certain range. In the extension, we consider the case when the first stage completion time is informative such that an early completion indicates a higher prior in the good state than the late completion. Under imperfect information, the agent has a stronger incentive to mimic the early completion if the first stage is completed late as a longer experimentation time will be granted according the first-best contract. The chapter proves that the first-best is still achievable under a similar bonus contract but the difference between the two bonuses becomes smaller. This chapter contributes to the experimentation financing literature including the information imperfectness on project progress and multi-stage spillover effects.

The technical progress have contributed to increased information availability on many markets. However, the progress has not reached the commercial real estate market. To reduce the seller’s information acquisition in commercial real estate transactions, a special inspection process is used by the sales object, called Due Diligence. The purpose is to analyze the efficiency of a Due Diligence in a transaction with commercial real estate in Sweden, to illustrate the problems of handling asymmetric information. The study is mainly based on a qualitative method, but also on a quantitative method. The qualitative method is based on 9 semistructured interviews with people working with Due Diligence and on the market for commercial real estate. The quantitative method is based on a literature study with publications from real estate companies and previous studies on the field. To measure efficiency, we compare benefits with costs through an economics perspective. In addition, theories regarding asymmetric information are applied on the subject, which are principalagent, moral hazard, adverse selection and transaction costs. The results show that Due Diligence contributes to reduced information asymmetry for the seller on the market, because of sharing information and also being cooperative during the process. The benefits of Due Diligence is to gain understanding of the property, to avoid risks and to identify possibilities. The benefits can be measured through price reductions, improved contract terms and through the alternative cost of the benefit. The transaction costs are relatively higher at lower prices of purchases than at higher prices of purchases. There is a fixed cost for Due Diligence, but also a variable part depending on the price, size of transaction, complexity, information transparency and seller experience. The main principles for managing asymmetric information are 1) that sellers and buyers work together to fill information gaps and 2) that new discoveries are addressed through negotiations. Suggestions for markets that can follow the principles may be secondary markets for boats, cars and machines. Finally, Due Diligence can be stated to be an effective process.

Uppsatsen undersöker om institutionella investerare nettosäljer innan meddelande om inställd utdelning och om detta beror på asymmetrisk information. Urvalet för studien är företag på Nasdaq OMX Stockholms huvudlistor som har ställt in kontantutdelning under perioden 2004–2018. Studien finner att institutionella investerare nettosäljer under två kvartal innan informationen om inställd utdelning offentliggjorts och att detta troligen beror på asymmetrisk information. Studien visar även att företagsvärdet för de observerade företagen minskar innan meddelande om inställd utdelning. / The paper examines if institutional investors are net sellers prior to dividend omission announcements and if this is due to asymmetric information. By studying companies listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm’s main list during the period 2004-2018, we find that institutional investors are net sellers during two quarters prior to dividend omission announcements and that this is likely due to asymmetric information. The study also shows that the market value of the observed companies decreases prior to dividend omission announcements.

信用市場發生資訊不對稱時，貸款申請人對自己的型態瞭若指掌，而銀行 卻因對貸款申請人資訊相對不足而必須承受倒帳的風險。銀行若欲保障利 潤而提高擔保品或利率，反而易引起道德危機與逆選擇的問題，造成銀行 利潤下降。多數文獻常以信用分配、自我選擇機能、信號機能來探討銀行 面臨資訊不對稱所發生的狀況，本文就是以信號賽局來探討資訊不對稱下 的銀行放款決策。在以信號機能分析銀行放款市場的文獻中，Milde & Riley (1988)以貸款額為信號變數，分別用乘法與加法形式利潤函數探討 不對稱資訊下的銀行放款決策。薛舜仁(1993)則以擔保品為信號變數，運 用乘法形式利潤函數來探討。本文則延續薛舜仁的分析方法，在貸款額固 定下，利用貸款申請人型態、擔保品、計劃報酬隨機性形成利潤函數，惟 此利潤函數，呈現的是Milde & Riley 的加法形式利潤函數。透過貸款申 請人無異曲線斜率不同所隱含邊際替代率不同的特性，分析出不對稱資訊 下的均衡契約。由於本文結果與 Milde & Riley 及薛舜仁的結果不同， 所以我們將各結果列出比較，發現在資訊不對稱時，以債權安全目標設計 契約時，債信高的申請人會選擇高貸款額或低擔保品但放款利率高的契約 。當銀行為防止高風險者因擔保品負擔過重退出市場，而以風險角度設計 契約時，則均衡時，高債信者會選擇低貸款額或高擔保品，但放款利率低 的契約。

<p>Since the year 2005 listed companies are supposed to use international accounting standards when they set up their group accountancy. One thing that has changed with the new standards is the accounting of goodwill and long-lived intangible assets. Earlier companies were supposed to write of their goodwill during the years they had expected the extra profit to arise. According to the new regulation, an impairment test shall be done annually, as well as when there is an indication of decreased value. According to IAS 36 point 134, the company shall provide information in their accountancy about the impairment test.</p><p>The aim of this study is to find out if some companies may be willing to reveal less information in their accountancy, and if there are any factors that affect this. We will investigate if there is any relation between how much the three largest owners in each company hold both in equity- and vote share and how much information that is provided in the accountancy. We will also investigate if there is any relation between the expectations of returns from the market and how much information that is provided. The first hypothesis is: If companies are expected to get a high future cash flow, which implies a high market value in relation to book value of equity, then the company will reveal less information conveying much knowledge about the market to their competitors. The second hypothesis claim that if the three largest owners together holds a large equity- vote share, where small asymmetric information exists, then the company should want to disclose less information in their accountancy.</p><p>In this research we analyse the accountancy of each company listed at the OMX exchange by 31 Dec 2005. To see how much information that is disclosed in the accountancy, we have chosen to analyse how and if the companies accomplish their accounting according to IAS 36 point 134. To be able to compare how much information the companies provided about this, we have created a score structure. Furthermore we have used SPSS to make a regression analysis, which should show if there are any relations. Our results however show that there is no relation between how much information that is given and how large the market value compared to book value of equity is. Neither did we find any relation between how large the three largest owners where and how much information that was provided. Our results differ from earlier studies. One cause for that might be that we only picked three variables, while their studies could have included a lot more variables. Our study only focuses on a small part of the accountancy; if we had analyzed the entire accountancy we might have arrived to a different result. The year 2005 was furthermore the first year that the companies were obliged to follow the standard, which also could have had a certain impact on the result.</p>

Since the year 2005 listed companies are supposed to use international accounting standards when they set up their group accountancy. One thing that has changed with the new standards is the accounting of goodwill and long-lived intangible assets. Earlier companies were supposed to write of their goodwill during the years they had expected the extra profit to arise. According to the new regulation, an impairment test shall be done annually, as well as when there is an indication of decreased value. According to IAS 36 point 134, the company shall provide information in their accountancy about the impairment test. The aim of this study is to find out if some companies may be willing to reveal less information in their accountancy, and if there are any factors that affect this. We will investigate if there is any relation between how much the three largest owners in each company hold both in equity- and vote share and how much information that is provided in the accountancy. We will also investigate if there is any relation between the expectations of returns from the market and how much information that is provided. The first hypothesis is: If companies are expected to get a high future cash flow, which implies a high market value in relation to book value of equity, then the company will reveal less information conveying much knowledge about the market to their competitors. The second hypothesis claim that if the three largest owners together holds a large equity- vote share, where small asymmetric information exists, then the company should want to disclose less information in their accountancy. In this research we analyse the accountancy of each company listed at the OMX exchange by 31 Dec 2005. To see how much information that is disclosed in the accountancy, we have chosen to analyse how and if the companies accomplish their accounting according to IAS 36 point 134. To be able to compare how much information the companies provided about this, we have created a score structure. Furthermore we have used SPSS to make a regression analysis, which should show if there are any relations. Our results however show that there is no relation between how much information that is given and how large the market value compared to book value of equity is. Neither did we find any relation between how large the three largest owners where and how much information that was provided. Our results differ from earlier studies. One cause for that might be that we only picked three variables, while their studies could have included a lot more variables. Our study only focuses on a small part of the accountancy; if we had analyzed the entire accountancy we might have arrived to a different result. The year 2005 was furthermore the first year that the companies were obliged to follow the standard, which also could have had a certain impact on the result.

This work presents a systematic investigation of two topics. One is in stochastic dynamic general equilibrium. It incorporates private information into dynamic general equilibrium framework. An existence of competitive equilibrium is established. Quantitative analysis is provided for health insurance problem. The other topic is in decision problems under ambiguity. Lack of precise information regarding a decision problem is represented by a set of probabilities. Descriptive richness of the set of probabilities is defi ned. It is used to generalize Skorohod's theorem to sets of probabilities. The latter is used to show the constancy of the coefficient in alpha-maximin multiple prior preferences. Examples illustrate: the implications of this representation; and the restrictions arising from the failure of descriptive richness. / text

The paper is concerned with the impact of market research prior to integration, on the structures of noncompetitive industries in integrated economy. The analysis focuses on separated, single commodity, monopolistic markets with stochastic demand. Monopolistic firms are considered in dynamic multiperiod model, where intertemporal links are determined by expenditures on market research in a present period and benefits from this activity (i.e., smaller variance of the prediction error) in the future. Assuming that each firm maximizes its total discounted expected utility from profit in indefinite time, we show that the optimal market research strategy is stationary and depends on market size. Consequently, in the period following integration firms operating prior to integration in small markets (such as Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary or Estonia) are expected to have much less information about the integrated market than their competitors operating before integration on European market. This informational asymmetry may affect the structure of the industry in integrated economy. In the extreme case, the firm operating before integration in the small market can be ruled out from the integrated market. (authors' abstract)

This dissertation comprises three essays revisiting the classical topic of quality provision in a duopoly. Two essays consider a situation in which consumers cannot identify the origin of an individual product but observe or infer the average quality of the units brought to the market: Chapter 2 studies the case where the two producers bargain over a minimum quality standard before deciding about their own quality level, while Chapter 3 deals with the case where qualities are (exogenously) fixed and producers have to decide about the quantity they will offer for sale. The final essay (Chapter 4) switches to a perfect-information environment and asks whether the producer of an inferior variety is able to deter the entry of a superior product by having retailers sign onto exclusivity contracts. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006

Bakgrund: Det finns idag ett stort utbud av banker på den svenska marknaden och den allmänna diskussionen påvisar att intresset för att välja en hållbar bank ökar från samhället. I dagsläget har merparten av bankerna i det svenska samhället implementerat sin egen hållbarhetspolicy, med egna riktlinjer och kravställningar de skall följa, samt en beskrivning om vilka principer de sägs stå bakom. I och med att begreppet hållbarhet inte är reglerat i lagstiftningen leder detta till att begreppet tolkas på olika sätt och kan innebära svårigheter för kunder, eftersom det kan finnas skillnader i hållbara bankers inriktning när det gäller investeringar och utlåningar. Därmed kan det ifrågasättas om kunden är medveten om vad den investerar i. Med utgångspunkt utifrån detta finns det ett intresse att analysera och belysa hur de olika aktörerna på banksektorn själva definierar begreppet för att sedan komma fram till en mer konkret förklaring av vad som menas med begreppet för att underlätta för kunderna. Syfte: Uppsatsen syftar till att analysera och belysa hur den svenska banksektorn tolkar och implementerar hållbarhetsaspekten i dess verksamhet och hur den rådande mångtydiga definitionen av begreppet hållbarhet påverkar sektorn och dess aktörer. Metod: För att besvara studiens syfte har ett kvalitativt tillvägagångssätt använts. Efter att ha studerat relevant litteratur samt analyserat hur den svenska banksektorns hållbarhetsarbete så har en egenkonstruerad analysmodell utvecklats. Denna analysmodell ligger till grund för referensramen, utformandet av intervjumallen samt analys av den insamlade datan. Sammanlagt har nio semistrukturerade intervjuer genomförts med banker, externa oberoendegranskningsparter och kunder. Slutsats: En hållbar bank är en bank som aktivt arbetar för att minimera dess negativa påverkan på människa, samhälle och miljö, såväl som aktivt tar till vara på de möjligheter de har för att främja hållbar utveckling. Bristen på transparens och tydlighet i kombination med en banksekretess ger utrymme för opportunistiskt beteende hos bankerna. Lemonsproblematiken råder inte för banker generellt i dagsläget men det finns tendenser inom mindre verksamhetsgrenar såsom fondförvaltning. Slutligen är dagens regelverk och övervakning inte tillräckliga för att reducera informationsasymmetrier och opportunistiskt beteende. Externa oberoende granskningsaktörer synar opportunistiskt beteende men kanäven ge upphov till opportunistiskt beteende i form av vitmålning. / Background: Today, there is a wide range of banks on the Swedish market and the general discussion shows that interest in choosing a sustainable bank is increasing from the society. At the moment, most of the Swedish banks have implemented their own policies, guidelines and requirements regarding sustainability, which they are following, as well as a description of the international principles they are said to stand behind. As the concept of sustainability is not regulated in the legislation, this means that the term is interpreted in different ways and may cause difficulties for the customers, as there may be differences in the focus of sustainable banks in terms of financing and investing. Therefore, it can be questioned if the customer is aware of what they invest in. Based on this, it is found interesting to analyse and enlighten how the different actors, in the banking sector, define the term sustainability, in order to clarify and explain what the definition of sustainability means, within the banking sector, to facilitate for the customers. Purpose: The purpose of the thesis is to analyse and illustrate how the Swedish banking sector interprets and implements the sustainability aspect in their organisation and how the current ambiguous definition of sustainability affects the sector and its agents. Method: In order to answer the purpose of the study, a qualitative approach has been used. A unique analysis model has been developed. This after studying relevant literature and analysing how the Swedish banking sector works regarding sustainability. This analysis model forms the basis for the theory, the design of the interview template and the analysis of the collected data. In total, nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with banks, external independent auditors and customers. Conclusion: A sustainable bank is a bank that actively works to minimize its negative impact on humans, society and environment, as well as actively embracing the opportunities they have for promoting sustainable development. The lack of transparency and clarity in combination with bank secrecy creates a space for opportunistic behaviour from the banks. The Markets for “Lemons” do not exist at the moment in the banking sector, as a whole, but there are tendencies in specific operation groups, such as fund management. Today's regulatory and monitoring is not enough to reduce information asymmetries and opportunistic behaviour. External independent auditors bring opportunistic behaviour to the surface but can also cause opportunistic behaviour in terms of whitewashing.