Die vorliegende Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit dem Verhalten auf Produktmärkten, welche durch eine asymmetrisch verteilte Information zwischen Anbietern und Nachfragern über die Qualität gekennzeichnet sind. Die Arbeit untersucht experimentell, ob Werbeausgaben als Qualitätssignal und Reputation als Anreizmechanismus auf solchen Märkten verstanden werden. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit werden dazu zwei Experimente durchgeführt, mit deren Hilfe untersucht wird, ob das Problem adverser Selektion mit Hilfe von Werbeausgaben als Qualitätssignal überwunden werden kann. Die Ergebnisse der beiden Experimente, welche sich durch ein unterschiedliches Design auszeichnen, unterscheiden sich stark. Während bei direkter Interaktion Werbeausgaben nicht als Qualitätssignal verstanden werden, werden bei indirekter Interaktion Werbeausgaben von einem Teil der Probanden als Qualitätssignal verstanden. Die Ergebnisse des zweiten Experiments zeigen darüber hinaus, dass von ein Verhalten, welches von dem theoretisch vorhergesagten abweicht, oftmals mit Hilfe der Erwartungen der Probanden über das Verhalten der anderen Marktseite erklärt werden kann. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit wird untersucht, ob erkannt wird, dass die Höhe des drohenden Reputationsverlusts einen kritischen Anreiz auf das Verhalten der Anbieter hat, wenn diese unbeobachtet von den Käufern die Qualität wählen können. Die Ergebnisse des Experiments zeigen, dass mit Hilfe von potentiellen Reputationsinvestitionen nicht, wie theoretisch vorhergesagt, das Problem des moralischen Risikos überwunden werden kann. Allgemein wird ein zu hohes Vertrauen der Käufer beobachtet, welches dazu führt, dass die Anbieter keinen Anreiz haben, Reputationsinvestitionen zu tätigen. / The dissertation studies individual behavior in product markets, in which information about product quality is asymmetrically distributed between sellers and buyers. It is studied experimentally, whether individuals understand advertising spending as quality signal and reputation as incentive mechanism. In the first part, two experiments are conducted in order to study whether the problem of adverse selection can be overcome with advertising spending as quality signal. The results of the experiments which differ in the experimental design are very different. While in case of direct interaction between sellers and buyers individuals do not understand advertising spending as quality signal, they do in case of indirect interaction. Furthermore, the results of the second experiment show, that behavior not in line with the theoretical expectations can be explained with individuals' expectations about the other market side's behavior. In the second part it is studied whether individuals recognize that sellers' behavior in situations with endogenous quality depends critically on the amount of reputation loss at risk. The experimental results show that contrary to the theoretical expectations moral hazard problems are not solved by investments into reputation. In general, it is observed that there is too much trust on the buyer side. As a result of this behavior sellers have no incentive to invest into reputation.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:48:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Eisenhower Farias.pdf: 721147 bytes, checksum: bbdac49c9e74cb536cbc1eb10d5b90b0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-25 / Access to small credit is becoming increasingly difficult to get and one of the most important reasons to this is the absence of guarantees offered to the financial institution by the borrower. Microcredit has arisen as a solution to the hindrance of credit access through the use of the co-signers mechanism, in which a group takes responsibility over paying the obtained funding. In Brazil, the main source of funds of the national program of productive microcredit (PNMPO) comes partly from demand deposits of commercial banks which provide credit operations requiring some kind of collateral to solve the problem of conflicting information. What we see in the microcredit program of the country is that a significant amount of the resources which should be addressed to the microcredit is found idle. Thus, the primal aim of this study is to identify and discuss ways of improving guarantees which could be used in the microcredit program of Brazil. To investigate the proposed theme, a bibliographical research was conducted revising the main concepts of the microfinance theory and the guarantee systems. A research on experiences in microcredit programs was also developed, as well as the types of guarantees used in these places, mainly in Latin America and the Caribbean. This study also includes the experiences of some countries which make use of mutualist guarantee systems, with its origin in Europe. Through this study we have identified that we have few guarantee programs in Brazil, instead of a national system of guarantees, as in other countries, such as Chile, where the guarantee fund FOGAPE provides guarantees to financial institutions upon part of the credit operations made by these institutions, including microcredit operations / O acesso ao crédito de pequeno porte enfrenta enormes dificuldades, e uma das mais importantes é a ausência de garantias oferecidas para a instituição financeira por parte do tomador dos recursos. O microcrédito surgiu como uma solução para resolver o entrave na obtenção do crédito através da utilização do mecanismo do aval solidário onde o grupo formado se responsabiliza pelo pagamento do financiamento obtido. No Brasil, a principal fonte de recursos do programa nacional de microcrédito produtivo orientado (PNMPO) tem como origem parte dos depósitos à vista de bancos comerciais que realizam operações de crédito solicitando algum tipo de colateral para solucionar o problema da assimetria da informação. O que se verifica no programa de microcrédito do país é que parte significativa dos recursos que deveriam ser direcionados ao microcrédito encontra-se ociosa. Assim, o objetivo central do estudo é discutir e identificar mecanismos de aperfeiçoamento de garantias que poderiam ser utilizadas dentro do programa de microcrédito no Brasil. Para investigar o tema proposto foi realizada uma pesquisa bibliográfica revisando os principais conceitos da teoria das microfinanças e de sistemas de garantia, bem como, pesquisas de experiências de programas de microcrédito e os tipos de garantia utilizada nestes locais, sobretudo em países da América Latina e Caribe. Inclui-se também nesta pesquisa as experiências de alguns países que possuem sistemas de garantia do tipo mutualista que teve origem na Europa. Identificamos com o estudo que no Brasil temos poucos programas de garantia e não um sistema nacional de garantias como em outros países. É o caso do Chile onde o fundo de garantia FOGAPE fornece garantia a instituições financeiras para parte de operações de crédito realizada por estas instituições, inclusive em operações de microcrédito

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:48:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Henrique de Mendonca.pdf: 648601 bytes, checksum: 65cf6cc99fbe5f4d508f0c8760990e40 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-21 / The main aim of this study is to analyze the new legislation adopted in Brazil (Law nº 12,414/2011), which regulates the functioning of the credit positive information sharing market in the light of the asymmetric information theory and the international experience, highlighting similarities and differences as well as their possible impact on performance of the bank loans local market. For this, it was performed an intensive bibliography review on the literature existent about asymmetric information, with special attention to the role played by sharing data on individuals and companies, and the role of credit bureaus as a tool developed to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems. A presentation of the international experience is used as a way of highlighting the empirical aspect of the theory as well as serve as a comparison model to analyze the main points of the new Brazilian legislation in the light of the results already measurable in other economies. Special attention is given to the experience of Hong Kong, whose the creation of an effective information sharing framework is considered a recent international benchmarking. One of the main conclusions is that the implementation of this mechanism is an important step forward in structuring the national financial system, but its impact in reducing interest rates, reducing delinquency rates and increasing of the credit amount available must occur in the medium and long term / O objetivo principal do presente trabalho é analisar a nova legislação aprovada no Brasil (Lei nº 12.414/2011) que regulamenta o funcionamento do mercado de compartilhamento de informações positivas de crédito à luz da teoria sobre assimetria de informações e da experiência internacional, destacando similaridades e diferenças, bem como seus possíveis impactos no desempenho do mercado de empréstimos bancários local. Para isso, foi realizada uma pesquisa bibliográfica intensa sobre a literatura existente que trata da assimetria de informações, com especial atenção ao papel desempenhado pelo compartilhamento de dados sobre pessoas físicas e jurídicas, e a atuação dos birôs de crédito como instrumentos desenvolvidos para reduzir os problemas de seleção adversa e risco moral. Uma apresentação da experiência internacional é utilizada como forma de ressaltar o aspecto empírico da teoria, bem como servir de modelo de comparação para analisar os principais pontos da nova legislação brasileira à luz de resultados já mensuráveis em outras economias. É dada uma especial atenção na experiência de Hong Kong por ser considerado benchmarking internacional recente na criação de uma estrutura de compartilhamento de informações eficiente. Uma das principias conclusões diz respeito ao fato de que a implantação desse mecanismo é um avanço estruturante importante dentro do sistema financeiro nacional, porém, seus impactos na redução das taxas de juros, na redução da inadimplência e no aumento do volume de crédito disponível devem ocorrer no médio e longo prazo

Este trabalho apresenta três extensões ao modelo de reputação proposto por Shapiro (1983). A primeira torna o modelo original mais adequado para avaliar o problema de informação assimétrica de bens de busca e bens credenciais, a segunda permite identificar o ganho de eficiência gerado pela inclusão de um sistema de informação adicional e, a terceira mostra que a provisão de um volume maior de informação pode gerar efeitos adversos quando o produto em questão possui vários atributos. Em seguida, os desenvolvimentos teóricos são utilizados para avaliar os efeitos da introdução do Exame Nacional de Cursos sobre o mercado de cursos superiores do Brasil. Algumas das predições do modelo são testadas empiricamente, fornecendo indicações de que este Exame possui um papel relevante para mitigar o problema de informação identificado neste mercado. / This essay presents three extensions to the model first proposed by Shapiro (1983) regarding reputation. The first extension adjusts Shapiro’s original model in order to make it more suitable in dealing with the problem of asymmetric information of search goods and credence goods. The second one allows the identification of the efficiency gains obtained after the inclusion of an additional information system, while the third extension demonstrates that additional information could generate adverse effects when the good under consideration has several attributes. These theoretical extensions are then applied to evaluate the effects of the Brazilian experience regarding the introduction of the Courses National Exam - Exame Nacional de Cursos – on Brazil’s market of undergraduate school courses. Some of the theoretical predictions of the model are empirically tested, offering indications that such exam plays a relevant role while diminishing the informational problem that characterizes this market.

A sucessão na empresa familiar tem sido considerada por seus estudiosos como o mais importante desafio a ser enfrentado por aquelas companhias na luta por sua perpetuação. Os processos de transição do controle da família enfrentam várias dificuldades típicas de qualquer transição gerencial ou de propriedade na firma, mas são complicados por fatores subjetivos presentes na interação das dinâmicas empresarial e familiar. Nas sucessões familiares os conflitos emergem, frequentemente, da indiscriminação entre os papéis sociais na família e na empresa. Tais conflitos envolvem questões ligadas à propriedade do negócio, à sua administração e aos interesses da família. A Nova Economia das Instituições adicionou ao corpo teórico das finanças corporativas uma série de variáveis comportamentais desconsideradas pela Economia Neoclássica com o objetivo de imprimir maior realismo às análises teóricas. O presente trabalho investiga as proposições da Teoria Econômica de Finanças para o comportamento dos administradores quanto à escolha da Estrutura de Capital na firma e sua utilidade para os Processos Sucessórios como elemento atenuante de conflitos. As conclusões apontam para uma interdependência entre decisões de Estrutura de Capital e Processo Sucessório, e para uma grande importância da forma de financiamento no longo prazo para o sucesso da Sucessão na Empresa Familiar, além de sugerirem pesquisas mais avançadas no sentido de compreender melhor esse contexto. / Experts consider the process of succession in the family business as the most important challenge in their fight for perpetuation. The transition processes encounter various difficulties common to managerial transitions, yet they are made more complicated due to subjective factors present in both the family and management arenas. During succession processes, conflicts often arise out of a difficulty to differentiate between social and business roles in the family. Such conflicts involve issues such as ownership, management styles and family interests. The New Institutional Economics added a series of behavior variables to the theoretical body of corporate finance. Such variables, previously not considered by the Neoclassic Economics, were added so as to bring a higher level of realism to the theoretical analysis. This dissertation investigates the propositions put forward by the Economic Theory of Finance regarding the behavior of managers as far as their choice of Capital Structure for the business and its validity as conflict attenuation in the process of Succession. The conclusions put forward here point toward an interdependency between decisions regarding Capital Structure and Succession in the Family Business. In addition to that, they highlight the importance of long term financing for a successful process, and suggest further investigation that could support and illustrate the conclusions.

就現階段的企業經營型態而言，專業人才的良窳以及培育訓練可能遠勝於公司有形資產的多寡，這種情形在高科技產業尤其明顯。企業為了留住優秀人才，必須提供許多激勵措施。就我國企業而言，最普遍的激勵措施是員工分紅配股制度。然而，在此制度下，容易產生員工短視近利的缺失。歐美等國較常採行所謂的股票選擇權制度，由於此種制度具有激勵未來的特性，屬於「長期的激勵因子」，更能使員工與股東的利益趨於一致。因此，財政部為順應高科技產業的需求，於民國八十九年准許上市公司實施員工股票選擇權制度，此制度開放後，勢必影響到我國企業對於員工長短期激勵誘因的最適決策。 　本文的主要目的在於利用訊息理論中的「代理模型」，探討股東與員工雙方在「訊息不對稱」下，股東如何設計最適的員工激勵契約。站在股東極大化期望財富的立場，建構一套綜合現金、股票以及股票選擇權的理論模型，並經由模型運算推演，試圖達到下列的研究目的：(1) 在長短期激勵誘因契約下，分別推導出最適員工誘因強度、最適基本薪資以及最適員工努力水準；(2) 比較長短期激勵誘因的最適員工努力水準，驗證股票選擇權制度是否具有提高員工努力程度的激勵效果；(3) 站在股東與員工各自追求期望財富極大化的立場，探討雙方對長短期誘因制度的偏好。 　經由模型分析，可得到以下幾點結論：(1) 員工努力程度不受長短期激勵誘因的影響，股票選擇權的作用或許只在於留住人才以及加深員工對公司的忠誠度；(2) 股東在擬定最適長短期激勵誘因強度時，必須考量公司股本大小、員工對風險的趨避態度、努力投入的成本係數以及景氣波動對公司未來收益的影響；(3) 影響員工最適認股權證比率的大小，除了上述提到的因素外，還包括認股權證的避險比率，股東可以藉由觀察公司股價的高低，以協助長短期激勵誘因的決策擬定；(4) 股東與員工基於期望財富極大化的立場，對於長短期誘因契約的偏好會產生利益不一致的現象，雙方面臨的是一場無法達到雙贏局面的零合遊戲。

過去處理勞資雙方工資談判的文獻，多數假設勞資雙方的訊息是對稱的， 或採合作談判解，或採非合作談判解，他們得到結果多為工資協議往往非 常順利，不會有不合議的事件發生。但事實上勞資雙方談判時，公司的經 營能力或策略、工人之生產力往往是談判雙方互不了解的，也就是現實工 資談判中普遍存有訊息不對稱的情況。本文擬在訊息不對稱的情形下，假 設談判的一方訊息不完全--工會不了解公司的經營能力，設定一個兩期工 資談判模型，僅由工會提議工資，公司之反提議僅為接受或拒絕工會之提 議工資。探討模型之承諾均衡與完全貝氏均衡，並對影響完全貝氏均衡之 因素做進一步之探討。

Social dilemmas constitute a broad class of quandaries, including, for example, common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas and public good (PG) dilemmas. CPR's are characterized by non-excludability and rivalry and are often associated with overexploitation. Through similar arguments, the features non-excludability and non-rivalry give rise to under-provision of PG's. The prevalence and inefficiencies often associated with CPR's have given rise to an extensive literature and the role of resource uncertainty has not been ignored. Uncertainty combined with rivalry is often said to augment users' incentive to overexploit. However, underlying most of the theoretical research is an explicit or implicit assumption of symmetric information, or a symmetric lack of information. In reality, people generally have access to different sources of information and they may differ in their abilities to process information. In the first two papers of this thesis, the assumption of symmetry is relaxed and both papers demonstrate that from a welfare perspective, the distribution of uncertainty is also of importance. Many CPR's and PG's are natural, which can complicate the situation. In the traditional resource management literature, the exploited resource is often assumed to be properly characterized by some concave growth function. Today, there is extensive empirical evidence suggesting that many ecosystems have more complex, often non-linear dynamics. Management of such resources can be quite challenging as the non-linear dynamics can make the ecosystem flip between alternate stable states, and even marginal changes can cause radical transformations of such ecosystems. Most of the CPR models assume the shared resource to be of fixed size or to be able to generate a constant flow of services. In the third paper we aim at providing a more complete picture of the overexploitation of a common resource, by combining the institutional structure with complex ecological dynamics. We manage to raise questions and doubts about the standard assumptions. Another feature of convex-concave resources is that a state can become highly robust and sometimes an ecosystem change may even be irreversible. This is problematic if, for example, we wish to restore a degraded ecosystem. The aim of the fourth paper is to empirically analyze this question, by eliciting peoples' preferences through a hypothetical referendum on the issue. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2005

Det här är en kvantitativ studie av hur kreditpreferenser hos mikrobolag med en årsomsättning om mindre än 10 miljoner SEK beror av branschtillhörighet och företagsstorlek. Mikrobolag är små bolag med mindre än 10 personer anställda och en årsomsättning på mindre än 2 miljoner euro. Det teoretiska ramverket utgår från asymmetrisk informationsteori och mer specifikt från pecking order theory, POT samt trade off-teorin. Kreditpreferenserna mäts genom två olika parametrar, dels genom mikrobolagens avsättning till periodiseringsfonder vilket kan ses som ett mellanting mellan extern och intern finansiering, dels genom förekomsten av externa lån från kreditinstitut. Branscherna som undersöks är tillverkning samt tjänster vilka anses skilja sig åt vad gäller kreditpreferenser. Tillverkningsbranschen har större anläggningstillgångar vilket anses göra det lättare för dem att få extern kredit enligt trade off-teorin. Tjänstebranschen däremot, med mer immateriella tillgångar skulle då föredra periodiseringsfonder eftersom enligt POT så föredrar mindre företag internt genererat kapital. Ett antal hypoteser ställs upp som sedan testas med chi-två. Resultatet motsäger delvis teorierna. Från studien framgår dock att de undersökta företagen i tjänstebranschen har större preferenser för användning av periodiseringsfond än tillverkningsbranschen. En slutsats från studien är alltså att branschtillhörighet har betydelse för kreditpreferenserna. För företagsstorlek går inte att dra några säkra slutsatser.

This thesis is about the economic aspects of public procurement of services through auctionsin Sweden. It focuses on two different institutions, auctions used to find foste r-parents forboarded out children in the 19th century, and auctions of cleaning service contracts in the 20 thcentury. I n both cases, the contracting entity is the municipality or its representative, thelowest bidder wins the auction, and is paid in accordance with his/her bid.In the child auctions, c hildren were allotted to foster-parents by means of an open biddingprocess, the descending English auction, where the bids were given continuously to theauctioneer. In modern public procurement sealed bids ar e used in accordance with the firstprice,sealed bid auction. The first part of this thesis is about price formation in the childauctions and a study is made of the children who were auctioned several times, indicatingasymmetric information among bidders or adverse selection in this market. These subjects arestudied using field data on 601 child auctions held in Northern Sweden during the period 1863to 1889. The empirical findings in the first paper suggest that the foster-parents had a cleareconomic motive in these auctions. The child characteristics significantly affect the amount ofcompensation paid to the foster-parent. There is also evidence that farmers preferred older,more productive children. The second paper studies whether a re-auctioned child commandeda higher or lower price than a child that was not re-auctioned. The results indicate some formof asymmetric information because foster-parents demanded a higher level of compensationfor a re-auctioned child. The results also suggest that the probability that a child was reauctionedincreased if he/she was not healthy.The third paper in the thesis discusses a kind of "paradox". Although there is a competitiveeffect on the bids in the auction of cleaning service contracts, the contracting entity has anoption, given by law, to restrict the number of bidders. In th is paper, an implementation costis introduced fo r the contracting entity to justify such a restriction. The results, based onSwedish municipality data, indicate that contract and municipality characteristics, assumed toaffect the implementation cost, affect the volume of the procurement, and the number ofbidders, but not necessarily the choice of allocation mechanism. The final paper studiesregional differences in bids, costs, and competition in municipal procurement using the samedata as in paper [3]. The results show higher estimated costs for completing the contract, butlower estimated mean bids in the major city area of Stockholm compared with the res t of thecountry. This is explained by lower profit margins and higher operational costs in the majorcity area. An analysis is also carried out of why the lowest bidder is not always the contractedbidder. / <p>Härtill 4 delar.</p> / digitalisering@umu