The idea that humans are prone to widespread and systematic biases has dominated the psychological study of thinking and decision-making. The conclusion that has often been drawn is that people are irrational. In recent decades, however, a number of psychologists have started to call into question key claims and findings in research on human biases. In particular, a body of research has come together under the heading of adaptive rationality (henceforth AR). AR theorists argue that people should not be assessed against formal principles of rationality but rather against the goals they entertain. Moreover, AR theorists maintain that the conclusion that people are irrational is unsupported: people are often remarkably successful once assessed against their goals and given the cognitive and external constraints imposed by the environment. The growth of literature around AR is what motivates the present investigation, and assessing the plausibility of the AR challenge to research on human biases is the goal of this thesis. My enquiry analyses several aspects of this suggested turn in the empirical study of rationality and provides one of the first philosophically-informed appraisals of the prospects of AR. First and foremost, my thesis seeks to provide a qualified defence of the AR project. On the one hand, I agree with AR theorists that there is room for a conceptual revolution in the study of thinking and decision-making: while it is commonly argued that behaviour and cognition should be assessed against formal principles of rationality, I stress the importance of assessing behaviour against the goals that people entertain. However, I also contend that AR theorists have hitherto failed to provide compelling evidence in support of their most ambitious and optimistic theses about people’s rationality. In particular, I present a great deal of evidence suggesting that people are often unsuccessful at achieving prudential and epistemic goals and I argue that AR theorists have not made clear how, in light of this evidence, optimistic claims about human rationality could be defended.

Patients with dementia due to Alzheimer's disease (AD) tend to exhibit impairments in in their episodic memory. In yes-no tests of recognition memory, patients with AD often display liberal response bias, a stronger tendency to recognize unstudied items as already-studied "old" items. Such tendency is believed to be related to false memory, which can decrease the quality of life in many AD patients. In this study, we analyzed the effect of different instructional manipulations within yes-no recognition memory task on response bias. Younger healthy adults, older healthy adults and one AD patient were evaluated for recognition memory performance and response bias in three different conditions of instructional manipulation. In each session separated by a week-long interval, participants were shown 120 words to study and 240 words, half of which were studied items, to be tested for recognition memory. Instructional manipulation was added in the testing phase of each condition. In one session, the participants were asked if the words were old, studied items; in another session, they were asked if the words were new, unstudied items; finally in the third session, participants were asked to identify if the words were either old or new. Our findings corroborated previous studies by observing liberal response bias in AD and moderately conservative response bias in health adults. We found that the instructional manipulations did not have a significant effect on response bias in either control group while the effect in the AD patient was inconclusive.

Pain is an integral part of the life experience. Furthermore, the factors that influence the experience of pain are dynamic. Of the various influencing factors, ethnicity has a growing literature that is revealing how an individual’s subjectivity that stems from ancestral and geographic origins is affecting this process of pain perception. The actual perception of pain has been shown to be quite different among different ethnicities. Ethnically motivated dispositions, in terms of coping, has also led to more questions on how effectively patients can be treated for pain when medicine often attempts to mandate objectivity. Moreover, the interaction and feedback that patients and providers give to each other is a powerful indicator of how pain is experienced and how successful the outcomes of treatment will be.

Attentional bias is commonly associated with emotional disorders. However, potential transdiagnostic mediators of attentional bias, such as repetitive negative thinking (RNT) have been overlooked. The current study examined attentional biases associated with three forms of RNT and tested a proposed mediation model. Participants (N = 249) completed self-report measures, a repetitive thought induction, and an emotional face dot-probe measure of attentional bias. I hypothesized that RNT would be associated with attentional bias to angry, sad, and disgust faces, worry with angry faces, and rumination with sad faces after a negative thought induction. I also hypothesized that attentional bias scores would mediate the association between negative affect and RNT. Overall study hypotheses were not supported. Clinical worry was associated with slower reaction times to sad faces in the negative induction. RNT, worry, and rumination were not associated with attentional bias scores to emotional faces, and the mediation model was not supported.

An attentional bias to threatening stimuli is associated with greater anxiety in children (see Puliafico & Kendall, 2006 for a full review). Attentional control is one factor that may influence the relationship between attentional bias and anxiety in children (Susa, Pitică, Benga, & Miclea, 2012). This current study focused on further exploring the relationship between attentional bias, attentional control, and anxiety. Participants (N = 46) completed a self-report measure of attentional control and anxiety, and an attentional bias task (i.e., the Emotional Go/No-Go). Two models were examined. First, attentional control was examined as a potential moderator in the relationship between attentional bias and anxiety. Second, attentional bias was examined as a potential mediator of the relationship between attentional control and anxiety. The moderation model was significant. However, the findings were not consistent with the literature, as results indicated attentional bias was associated with anxiety only for children with higher attentional control abilities. The moderation model was further examined with different dimensions of anxiety and attentional control. The mediation model was not significant. Explanation of the findings and future directions are discussed.

The potential for advertising bias forming a conflict of interest with editorial content is a problem for any publication, and those with a gaming focus are no exception. Reviews in these publications can make or break a game and in some cases — a developer. The purpose of this content analysis of three gaming magazines is to examine whether publications in which developers purchase advertising are biased in favor of those developers’ games. The magazines chosen were: Game Informer, GamesTM, and Edge. The working definition of bias used is the financial pressure that advertisers exert on the editorial content of publications through the purchasing of advertising space. Video game magazines were chosen for this study due to readers’ reliance on reviews to make purchase decisions. No overt advertising bias was found. There was no significant link between the coverage of games and ads for those games in the same issue. A more subtle case for bias was found, however, when the entire sample of each magazine was looked at. For example, games reviewed anywhere in the sample in a given magazine tended to more often have an advertisement and for it to be larger, and this was especially true if the game received positive coverage. Other interesting results showed that magazines had a largely varying spread in the tone of reviews and that the majority of ads were for non-games, though game ads were larger on average.

No description available.

The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate the relationship between rumination and selective attention, in particular, whether the tendency to ruminate is associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative information. It is well-established that the tendency to ruminate in response to negative mood is a key vulnerability factor in the development of depression (Nolen-Hoekseman, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Watkins, 2008), but attempts to understand the underlying processes contributing to heightened ruminative disposition have been relatively limited. Recently, a number of researchers have suggested that rumination may be characterised by biased attentional processing of negative information, particularly that individuals with high levels of ruminative disposition may have difficulty disengaging their attention from negative information (e.g., Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). Studies One and Two each investigated the relationship between individual differences in ruminative disposition and selective attention for negative information, using a modified dot-probe task designed by Grafton, Watkins, and MacLeod (2012) to enable the discrete assessment of biases in attentional engagement and disengagement. Study One found that heightened levels of dispositional ruminative brooding, as assessed by both the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and an in-vivo assessment of ruminative disposition, were associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative relative to positive information. Similarly, Study Two also found that heightened levels of ruminative disposition were associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative information, particularly for depression relevant stimuli presented for 1000ms. Study Three sought to extend these findings using an eye-tracking assessment of selective attention to measure the spontaneous allocation of attention between stimuli. However, ruminative disposition was not significantly associated with any index of attentional bias during the eye-tracking assessment, neither with biased attentional disengagement, nor with biased attentional engagement or maintenance of attention. Study Four then sought to replicate findings from Study Two using a selected sample of individuals with high and low levels of ruminative disposition. Participants in the high rumination group demonstrated greater attentional bias for depression relevant negative stimuli presented for 1000ms in comparison to those in the low rumination group. However, this between group difference reflected a general attentional preference for negative relative to positive stimuli (i.e., composite of attentional engagement and disengagement bias), but no specific difference in attentional disengagement bias or attentional engagement bias was observed. Finally, Study Five took a first step towards investigate the causal relationship between rumination and selective attention by investigating the causal effect of rumination on attentional bias. Although there no main effect of induced rumination on attentional bias was observed, the effect of induced rumination on attentional bias was found to be moderated by ruminative disposition. However, contrary to hypotheses, individuals with low levels of ruminative disposition demonstrated an attentional bias for valence-incongruent stimuli, which shifted to a bias for valence-congruent stimuli as ruminative disposition increased. Overall, there was support across the studies for the primary hypothesis that heightened ruminative disposition is associated with impaired attentional disengagement from negative information. However, the findings do not suggest that ruminative disposition is exclusively associated with attentional disengagement bias, but instead indicate that facilitated attentional engagement may also be involved under some circumstances.

This study extends previous research by exploring perceptions of healthiness in the international food marketplace. To this end, it aims to fill an important gap by shedding light on the role of country of origin in shaping perceptions of healthiness. The authors provide evidence that domestic and foreign food products elicit different perceptions of healthiness. Consumers choose domestic products because they perceive them as healthier and more natural. The effect holds across different samples and product categories (apples, tomatoes, bread, and yogurt). However, this healthiness bias vanishes when products are presented as posing health risks and when products are introduced with a dual identity (i.e., both foreign and domestic). Researching these health-related effects helps provide a better understanding of consumer attitudes toward domestic- versus foreign-made food products.

Perception of abilities plays an important role in informing one’s decisions at times and often in forming one’s self perception. The Dunning-Kruger effect is a fascinating and empirically observable bias in which top performers tend to make more accurate estimations of their ability than bottom performers. The current theory states that the effect is caused by top performers possessing greater metacognitive ability than bottom performers. There have been many alternative theories and explanations proposed to explain the observed Dunning-Kruger effect. The current study is the first to test whether top and bottom performers base their predictions on inflated preconceived notions of ability, rather than their metacognitive ability. This theory proposes that if top and bottom performers both based their predictions of performance on their preconceived notions of ability it would create a Dunning-Kruger effect. This presupposes that that both top and bottom performers make above average estimates of performance as they hold preconceived notions of above average ability. Thus, top performers’ predictions of performance would be most accurate as their performance would be above average, whereas bottom performers would most overestimate their performance as their performance would be below average. The intention of this study was, thus, to assess whether either top or bottom performers based their predictions of performance on preconceived notions of ability or using metacognitive ability. A total of 97 university students were divided into two groups and given an identical test, one group containing 49 participants were told the test measured Logical Thinking and the remaining 48 participants were told the test measured Computational Mathematics. After completing the test, which was a 23 item preparatory test for the LSAT, participants were asked to estimate their ability in the domain being assessed, their performance relative to their peers and their score out of 23. A t-test was used to compare the two groups and it was found that the Logical Thinking and Computational Mathematical group made significantly different predictions of ability and therefore held significantly different preconceived notions of ability. Further t-tests were used to compare the estimates of ability and predictions of performance of the two groups of top and bottom performers. A significant difference was found between the two groups of top performers’ prediction of ability. However, there was no significant difference between any of the other scores of the two groups of top and bottom performers. Therefore, the alternative theory that top and bottom performers base their predictions of performance on preconceived notions of ability was found to be invalid. Therefore, the current theory which states that top performers’ superior metacognitive ability allow them to make more accurate estimates of performance than bottom performers is still the best account for the Dunning-Kruger effect. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria,2015. / Psychology / Unrestricted