<p>This paper establishes the life-cycle dynamics of Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) to explore the information acquisition role of CVC investment in the process of corporate innovation. I exploit an identification strategy that allows me to isolate exogenous shocks to a firm's ability to innovate. Using this strategy, I first find that the CVC life cycle typically begins following a period of deteriorated corporate innovation and increasingly valuable external information, lending support to the hypothesis that firms conduct CVC investment to acquire information and innovation knowledge from startups. Building on this analysis, I show that CVCs acquire information by investing in companies with similar technological focus but have a different knowledge base. Following CVC investment, parent firms internalize the newly acquired knowledge into internal R&D and external acquisition decisions. Human capital renewal, such as hiring inventors who can integrate new innovation knowledge, is integral in this step. The CVC life cycle lasts about four years, terminating as innovation in the parent firm rebounds. These findings shed new light on discussions about firm boundaries, managing innovation, and corporate information choices.</p> / Dissertation

<div> <p>In this dissertation, I investigate how entrepreneurial ventures and industry incumbents enter into interorganizational relationships in the context of corporate venture capital (CVC) investments. In Essay 1, drawing from the literature on employee mobility and entrepreneurship, I investigate how the competitive tension between spinouts and their parent firms with regard to potential knowledge diffusion influences other industry incumbents’ decisions to invest in spinouts. Specifically, I suggest that a high level of technological overlap between a spinout and its parent firm deters other industry incumbents from investing in the spinout due to anticipated hostile actions by the parent firm. Moreover, such negative effects can be amplified when the parent firm has a strong litigiousness to claim its intellectual property rights. I also consider that the negative effects can be mitigated when industry incumbents expect to benefit from gaining indirect access to parent firms’ technological knowledge through investing in spinouts.</p><p><br></p> <p>In Essay 2, I focus on academic hybrid entrepreneurs—defined as individuals who found their own ventures while working at academic institutions (e.g., professors, scientists)—and investigate how their intended exit strategy influences their decisions regarding CVC financing. Specifically, I first propose that academic hybrid entrepreneurs may have strong preferences for acquisitions over initial public offerings as an exit strategy for their ventures because of the high level of opportunity/switching costs associated with transitioning between their academic roles and entrepreneurial activities. Drawing from the literature on mergers and acquisitions, I then suggest that compared to other ventures, those founded by academic hybrid entrepreneurs are more likely to receive funding from CVC investors to effectively disclose the quality of their resources and knowledge to potential acquirers.</p><p><br></p> <p>In Essay 3, I examine how the industry incumbents’ relative positions in technology domains vis-à-vis other firms influence their CVC investment activities. Drawing upon the literature on factor market, I conceptualize CVC investments as external knowledge acquisition activities in knowledge factor markets consisting of several different technology domains. Building on this conceptualization, I emphasize that industry incumbents’ choices of investment areas are dependent on their positions vis-à-vis their rival investors in a given technology domain. This is because a firm’s technology position in a given domain can simultaneously influence the opportunities and incentives that jointly determine the likelihood of CVC investments in the domain. The theoretical arguments and empirical results suggest that firms with intermediate technology positions (i.e., technology intermediates) with moderate levels of opportunities and incentives are more likely to make CVC investments than are technology laggards and leaders with the lowest levels of opportunities and incentives, respectively.</p></div>

Entrepreneur is the destructor of present mechanism, but entrepreneur also can be the value creator of company. If company can make good use of the energy of the entrepreneur, entrepreneur will create enormous value for the company. So how to manipulate the power of entrepreneur becomes an important issue. This article discusses this issue from a perspective of Corporate Venture Capital. According to the independent-unit characteristic of CVC, start-up can avoid rigid bureaucracy and culture. The whole value creation process is as follows: Through CVC, parent company supports entrepreneur to build up business, and parent company will receive strategic value when start-up succeeds. There are two kinds of strategic value; one is the purpose of investment plan, another one is the activation of Corporate Entrepreneurship. As we know, when the core element of investment plan is entrepreneur, the plan is basically different from other plans. The essence of the investment plan which is based on the power of entrepreneur is Corporate Entrepreneurship. The definition of CE in this article is the process in which company makes use of individual entrepreneurship under the common vision to do innovative activities to create strategic value for the organization. In other words, from CVC perspective, the managing model of CE is the new venture growth model. CVC can follow the new venture growth model to support entrepreneur to build up business, and the success of start-up can return strategic value to parent company and promote the Corporate Entrepreneurship of parent company. After the discussion of the ecosystem, culture and investment cases of IC design industry in Taiwan, we interview three professional in CVC area to get further details. Then we build the new venture growth model for company to make good use of the power of entrepreneurs.

Hochsch. für Unternehmensführung, Diss.--Vallendar, 2002.

米国のICT業界において、コーポレートベンチャーキャピタル(CVC)を活用したベンチャー企業との資本提携や、ベンチャー企業の買収によるR&Dの外部化は、事業開発上の標準的な手法として定着している。日本に於いても、近年大手企業によるCVCの設立が続くが、未だ米国程の成功を収めることのできた事例は少ない。本稿では、米国の先行研究を基にCVCの成功要因を抽出すると共に、日本のCVCの組織とパフォーマンスに関する実態調査を行い、米国CVCの成功要因が日本でも有効であるかどうかについて、分析を行った。 / In the US, IT companies used Open Innovation through Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) and M&A as a standard practice of corporate development to remain at the forefront of innovation. However in Japan, the number of successful CVC practices continues to be limited despite growing number of Japanese corporations launching a CVC practice. To explain this difference, this thesis first performed comprehensive review of US past researches regarding US CVC and sort out key success factors. Then, conducted a survey of Japanese CVC's organization profile and investment performance and undertook a statistical analysis to investigate whether US CVC's key success factors works in Japan. / 博士(技術・革新的経営) / Doctor of Philosophy in Technology and Innovative Management / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University

Há um crescente interesse das grandes empresas em se aproximarem das startups como forma de desenvolver inovação aberta. Entre as 500 maiores empresas do ranking Forbes Global 500, 262 já têm iniciativas de engajamento com startups de alguma maneira: seja investindo, seja acelerando, incubando, realizando eventos ou buscando outros tipos de relacionamento. Nessa relação, a grande corporação pode se beneficiar da estrutura leve, da propensão a tomar riscos, da velocidade de operação e de tomada de decisão das startups, enquanto as startups podem se aproveitar do acesso à grande base de consumidores, do capital, da credibilidade e da estrutura voltada à eficiência da grande corporação, gerando ganhos mútuos. Para que uma grande empresa tenha sucesso nesse relacionamento, ela precisa saber quais são os seus objetivos, os seus resultados esperados, escolher a melhor forma de engajamento e criar uma operação equilibrada e integrada ao ecossistema empreendedor. Ter clareza de como cumprir essas etapas não é uma tarefa fácil. No mercado brasileiro, o desafio é ainda maior. O tema é recente e não há uma fonte de dados que consolide e analise as principais iniciativas de relacionamento entre startups e grandes empresas e as melhores práticas no país. Por meio de pesquisas exploratórias com dados secundários, este estudo identificou, mapeou e categorizou 137 programas de engajamento entre grandes corporações e startups no país. As informações encontradas foram confrontadas com o levantamento teórico e enriquecidas com informações coletadas em entrevistas com executivos responsáveis por algumas das principais iniciativas existentes no Brasil. Desta forma foi possível construir uma visão do mercado brasileiro e entender o nível de maturidade nessa área. Foi possível também identificar os objetivos das corporações, os modelos de relacionamento praticados, o perfil de interesse em startups, as formas como selecionam esse tipo de negócios, como operam os programas, os riscos envolvidos e as formas de mensuração de resultados. / There is increasing interest from the big companies to be closer to the startups as a way of fostering the open innovation. Among the 500 major companies of the Forbes Global 500 ranking, 262 are already running startup engagement programs in any way: investing, accelerating, incubating, running events or any other kind of relationship. In this relationship, the big company can benefit from the innovation focus, the willingness to take risks, the speed of operation and decision taking of the startups, meanwhile the startups can benefit from the access to the big consumer base, the capital, the credibility and the efficiency of the big corporations. To be successful in this journey the big company have to be clear about what are their objectives, the expected results and chose the best model of engagement to create a program that has to be balanced and integrated with the startup ecosystem. Being clear about how to achieve that can be challenging. The topic is recent and there is little literature about that. In Brazil, the challenge is even greater. There is no data source with consolidated data and information about the main startup engagement programs and its best practices. Trough exploratory research with open data this paper have sourced and categorized 137 startup and big companies engagement programs in the country. The gathered data was analyzed taking in consideration the related bibliography and enriched with information collected from interviews with executives responsible for some of the main initiatives in Brazil. This way it was possible to build a consolidated view of the market and its level of maturity. It was also possible to identify the main objectives of the big companies, the engagement models adopted, the startup target profile, the way they select the startups and run the programs, the risks and how they measure the results

Cette thèse étudie la façon dont l’atteinte ou non des objectifs et la gouvernance influencent la direction du changement organisationnel – en termes d’exploration et d’exploitation - et analyse l’impact de ces effets sur la performance de l’entreprise au fil du temps. Dans un premier temps, je procède à une analyse détaillée de la littérature sur le Corporate Venture Capital afin de positionner mon propre travail de recherche dans le champs considéré et confirmer l’originalité de mes contributions. Ensuite, dans la première étude, j’examine comment la non-atteinte des objectifs fixés influe sur la direction du changement organisationnel mis en oeuvre dans l'entreprise, et étudie la façon dont ces changements sont influencés par la place qu’occupent les actionnaires stables ou passagers dans le capital de l’entreprise. Dans la seconde étude, je vérifie empiriquement la validité des propositions formulées en examinant les investissements de corporate venture capital (CVC) réalisés par un échantillon d’entreprises ayant une forte activité CVC. Enfin, l'équilibre entre exploration et exploitation au fil du temps, ainsi que les caractéristiques des oscillations entre ces deux types d’activités sont examinés dans la troisième étude constituant cette thèse. Les analyses empiriques portent sur les investissements de CVC effectués par 286 entreprises des États-Unis sur la période 1993-2013. Cette thèse contribue à la théorie comportementale de l’entreprise (Behavioral Theory of the Firm) en examinant la façon dont la structure du capital et l’actionnariat influe sur la prise de décisions en matière d’innovation et de changement. En étudiant la façon dont l'inertie organisationnelle et les phases de changement affectent les activités d'exploitation et d'exploration, cette thèse contribue aussi à la recherche sur l’ambidextrie organisationnelle. Pour finir, ce travail participe à la recherche sur le corporate venture capital au travers de l’étude des antécédents et des conséquences des activités d'exploration et d’exploitation dans le cadre de l’investissement CVC. / This dissertation addresses unexplored issues on the antecedents, management, and outcomes of corporate venture capital (CVC). More specifically, I examine how negative performance feedback and corporate governance influence the direction of organizational change ˗ in terms of exploration and exploitation ˗ and how balancing such change over time influences firm performance in the CVC context. I first review the extant literature on CVC and lay out the unique contributions of my research. Then, in the first essay, I theorize on how poor firm performance influences the resource allocation decisions on exploration and exploitation and how such decisions are affected by the concentration of dedicated and transient shareholders and by the board of directors' monitoring and advising intensities. In the second essay, I empirically examine how the resource allocation decisions on exploration and exploitation are influenced by dedicated and transient shareholders in the context of CVC investing. In the third essay, I examine how balancing exploration and exploitation over time and the characteristics of oscillation impact firm performance. The empirical analysis in the latter two essays is based on CVC investments made by 286 U.S. companies during 1993-2013. This dissertation contributes to the Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance research by introducing how shareholders and boards influence managerial decision-making in search and change, Ambidexterity research by studying how continuous change and organizational inertia impact temporal spillover between exploration and exploitation, and CVC research by examining the antecedents and consequences of explorative and exploitative initiatives in CVC investing.

[pt] A indústria de Capital de Risco tem recebido atenção significativa de formuladores de políticas, investidores e empreendedores em todo o mundo devido à sua história de sucesso em mercados desenvolvidos, especialmente nos Estados Unidos. No entanto, sua implementação em países em desenvolvimento enfrenta desafios que levam os investidores a se adaptar, especialmente nos estágios iniciais e mais arriscados. Nesses segmentos, outros investidores, como Anjos, Aceleradoras e Corporate Venture Capital (CVC), tornam o ambiente mais competitivo, fornecendo mais opções para empreendedores que buscam capital. No entanto, a literatura ainda não aborda os efeitos que esses investidores de diferentes perfis têm em suas startups investidas. O paradigma da escada financeira, que implica que os IVCs atuam apenas em estágios avançados, ainda está presente, mas isso tem mudado na última década nos Estados Unidos e mais recentemente no Brasil. Nesta tese, examinamos os efeitos de diferentes investidores em startups em estágios iniciais nos Estados Unidos e no Brasil por meio de três artigos de pesquisa relacionados. No primeiro artigo, realizamos uma revisão sistemática da literatura de CVC de 2005 a 2019, identificando mecanismos impulsionadores e efeitos em empreendimentos investidos. Isso fornece uma compreensão mais ampla dos múltiplos fatores que influenciam a relação entre investidores e empreendimentos, as diferenças nos perfis e incentivos de diferentes tipos de investidores de VC e como eles influenciam os empreendimentos. Este artigo também revela tendências e lacunas na literatura que orientam os artigos seguintes. No segundo artigo, investigamos os efeitos comparativos e conjuntos dos principais tipos de investidores de VC (IVC, CVC, Grupo de anjos e Aceleradoras) em 13.098 empreendimentos em estágios iniciais que receberam sua primeira rodada de investimento nos Estados Unidos de 2005 a 2016. Os resultados mostram que empreendimentos em estágios iniciais apoiados por IVCs alcançaram melhores resultados do que seus pares em todos os objetivos de estágios iniciais, contradizendo o efeito de marco esperado de investidores como Grupos de anjos e Aceleradoras e levantando questões sobre a validade de alguns aspectos do paradigma da escada financeira. No terceiro artigo, focamos nos resultados de 1.937 empreendimentos de estágio inicial que receberam seu primeiro investimento no Brasil entre 2000 e setembro de 2022. Examinamos empreendimentos apoiados por IVCs, CVCs, Anjos e Aceleradoras, e os resultados indicam diferenças significativas em relação aos EUA. No Brasil, os IVCs não apresentaram presença tão marcante como nos EUA, e o desempenho positivo esperado foi observado apenas em empreendimentos apoiados por IVCs altamente experientes. Além disso, os Anjos apresentaram o melhor desempenho para objetivos específicos de estágio inicial. No geral, nossa análise dos dois mercados demonstra diferenças significativas nos efeitos dos investidores de VC sobre o desempenho de empreendimentos de estágio inicial. O modelo de investidor IVC demonstra superioridade em relação aos seus pares no mercado americano, enquanto no Brasil, outros investidores também se destacam, especialmente Anjos. Essas diferenças podem ser devido a fatores no ambiente econômico local, moldando os perfis dos investidores e influenciando a maneira como eles operam no país. / [en] The Venture Capital industry has gained widespread attention from policymakers, investors, and entrepreneurs worldwide due to its success history in developed markets, particularly in the United States. How ever, its implementation in developing countries faces challenges that drive investors to adapt, particularly in the earliest and riskiest stages. In these segments, other investors, such as Angels, Accelerators, and Corporate Venture Capital (CVC), make the environment more competitive, providing more options to entrepreneurs seeking capital. Nevertheless, the literature still fails to address the effects these investors of different profiles have on their invested startups. The finance escalator paradigm, implying that IVCs only act in advanced stages, is still present, but this has been changing in the last decade in the US and more recently in Brazil. In this thesis, we examine the effects of different investors on early-stage startups in the US and Brazil through three related research articles. In the first article, we conduct a systematic review of the CVC literature from 2005 to 2019, identifying driving mechanisms and effects on invested ventures. This provides a broader understanding of the multiple factors influencing the relationship between investors and ventures, the differences in profiles and incentives of distinct types of VC investors, and how they influence ventures. This article also reveals trends and gaps in the literature that guide the following articles. In the second article, we investigate the comparative and joint effects of the main VC investor types (IVC, CVC, Angel Group, and Accelerator) on 13,098 early-stage ventures that received their first investment round in the US from 2005 to 2016. The results show that early-stage ventures backed by IVCs achieved better results than their peers in all early-stage goals, contradicting the milestone effect expected from investors like Angel Groups and Accelerators and raising questions on the validity of some aspects of the finance escalator paradigm. In the third article, we focus on outcomes for 1,937 early-stage ventures that received their first investment round in Brazil between 2000 and September 2022. We examine ventures backed by IVCs, CVCs, Angels, and Accelerators, and the results indicate significant differences from the US. In Brazil, IVCs have not shown a pervasive presence as in the US, and the expected positive performance was only true for ventures backed by highly experienced IVCs. Additionally, Angels revealed the best performance for specific early-stage goals. Overall, our analysis of the two markets demonstrates significant differences in the effects VC investors have on the performance of early-stage ventures. The IVC model investor demonstrates superiority over its peers in the American market, while in Brazil, other investors also stand out, especially Angels. These differences may be due to factors in the local economic environment, shaping investors profiles and influencing the way they operate in the country.

<div>Entrepreneurial ventures face a trade-off when receiving corporate venture capital (CVC) financing. They need to give sufficient control rights to motivate and enable corporate investors to provide exclusive resources. However, giving control rights to CVCs whose strategic goals could cause a conflict of interest and lead to opportunism also puts the ventures at risk. This dissertation shows that third-party involvement with the design of passive control rights can be a solution to the trade-off.</div><div><br></div><div><div>By examining venture capital financing contracts in high-tech industries, Essay 1 found that veto power, a prevailing passive control right, of the third party can protect the vulnerable side in the cooperation without hurting the other side’s incentive to contribute. Moreover, two types of veto rights are identified and found to have diverse responses to conflict-of-interest factors in CVC-entrepreneur relationships. The effects of knowledge overlap, CVC parents’ research and development capability, and ventures’ technological quality on the liable third party’s veto power are studied. With a focus on the function of passive control rights, Essay 2 and Essay 3 maintain that allocating control rights can significantly affect the innovation of both CVC corporate parents and CVC-backed ventures under difference contingencies. In particular, as the aforementioned dilemma increases when CVCs’ corporate parents and portfolio firms are competing in product markets, Essay 2 shows that ventures’ innovation performance can benefit from granting CVCs strong active control rights in the condition of low product market overlap and from granting CVCs strong passive control rights within a high product market overlap.</div></div><div><br></div><div><div>On the other hand, Essay 3 shows that CVCs’ control rights will moderate the inverted Ushaped relationship between knowledge overlap and the innovation performance of the corporate parents such that the positive effect of knowledge overlap on CVC parents’ innovation at lower levels of knowledge similarity will be less positive, and the negative effect of knowledge overlap on CVC parents’ innovation at higher levels of knowledge similarity will be less negative, for CVCs with greater control power over their portfolio ventures. Moreover, the moderating effect of active control right is stronger than the moderating effect of passive control right under high degree of technological knowledge overlap between a CVC parent and the CVC’s portfolio ventures. Meanwhile, the moderating effect of passive control rights is stronger than the moderating effect of active control right under high degree of technological knowledge overlap between a CVC parent and the CVC’s portfolio ventures.</div></div>

After the 2008 global financial tsunami, the global economy has been undergoing a ¡§great recession¡¨, and it has a tremendous impact on Taiwan's venture capital industry. Not only overall investment, but also financing is descending rapidly. Although Taiwan has always performed well in the field of venture capital, it encounters many setbacks nowadays, such as ¡§Hard to find the target.¡¨,¡¨ Recession of capital market.¡¨, ¡§Narrowest Cash-out. ¡¨ and "Major innovations take longer and more resources." etc. These problems are difficult to overcome. Therefore, to spend money on the cutting edge, investing in professional fields is the best policy of venture capital, and it requires of venture capital institutions substantial accumulation of professional knowledge in the specific fields as well as industrial integration capabilities. Scholars have put forth the view that corporate venture capital and independent venture capital must learn from each other. How to dominate the standards of investment industry , how to make the global positioning strategy, whether corporate venture capital needs to meet the overall strategy, and venture capital strategy , organizing, management methods. These are key issues for corporate venture capital. Intel capital is the world's largest science and technology intensive venture capital. This study will draw on its experience of successful and unique investment, combined with the concept of open innovation¡Asuggesting that corporate venture capital in Taiwan take "innovation intermediary" mode which will not only reduce investment risk and but also investment cost.