No description available.

Participants (N = 73) in the present research were assigned to play a violent videogame (Super Smash Brothers) with either a supportive or an ambivalent friend. Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants were assigned to play the game either competitively or cooperatively. Subsequent aggression toward their friend was assessed by measuring participants' competitive or cooperative behavior in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. Results revealed no differences in aggression as a function of friendship type or game strategy, although means were in predicted directions. The influence of context on exposure to violent media is discussed, as are issues of power and sample type as possible reasons for the nonsignificant findings.

No description available.

This essay purports to be a “negative” defense of acquaintance foundationalism. It is “negative” in that I do not do much in the way of advancing novel argument for the position, nor do I extend the position very much. Rather, I focus on demonstrating that the position has the resources to overcome objections that have been proposed to it. In particular, I argue that it can overcome the dilemma proposed by Wilfrid Sellars and developed by Laurence BonJour against foundationalism, as well as dilemmas proposed by Jack Lyons and Michael Bergmann targeting internalism. Acquaintance foundationalism is what I will call any theory of justification that is internalist in what may justify us, foundationalist in the structure of justification, and relies on the concept of acquaintance in justifying our basic beliefs. Internalism requires that what justifies us improves the belief from the perspective of the believing subject. Foundationalism states that the justification for all beliefs depends ultimately on basic beliefs. Finally, acquaintance is a relation between a person and other things such that these other things are before the “mind’s eye” of the subject. The general idea behind each of these dilemmas, so I will argue, is to claim that acquaintance foundationalism cannot provide epistemic reasons for basic beliefs, where epistemic reason means something that contributes to justification from the subject’s perspective. Each dilemma will ask whether the alleged justifier has some feature x. However, each dilemma contends that, whether the alleged has the feature x or not, it cannot serve as an epistemic reason. For example, BonJour will ask whether our allegedly basic beliefs are cognitive or not. He argues that if they are cognitive, they need justification (and so cannot be basic), but if they are not cognitive, they cannot provide justification. Thus, no allegedly basic belief can serve as an epistemic reason. I argue that the notion of acquaintance allows us to escape such dilemmas because our states of acquaintance allow us to justify our basic beliefs without requiring justification themselves. I do so by borrowing, in part, Richard Fumerton’s theory of non-inferential justification, plus adding on a few epicycles to allow us to base our basic beliefs on our acquaintances. The first chapter sets up the issues of the dissertation: it gives context to the project, defines acquaintance foundationalism and epistemic reason, and discusses our dilemmas in broad outline. It also summarizes the rest of the essay. I use epistemic reasons in a specialized sense in the dissertation, which necessitates an extended discussion. This is the focus of chapter two. I argue that an epistemic reason is a mental complex that consists of Fumertonian acquaintances. When we have an epistemic reason, we have a mental complex that is related in the appropriate way to a belief. This is just what provides justification for the belief. This chapter explicates this notion. It includes an extended discussion of Richard Fumerton’s theory of non-inferential justification, which I follow in outline but diverge from in detail. This discussion focuses on his notion of acquaintance, and the items with which we may be acquainted. I then move to a discussion of the metaphysics of epistemic reasons, explaining how they consist of these acquaintances. I also discuss the relationship between epistemic reasons and epistemic justification. The third chapter is historical in focus. I examine Sellars’s famous dilemma for foundationalism, and contend that it can be best understood as an attempt to deny the foundationalist epistemic reasons for his beliefs. I also examine Laurence BonJour’s later formulation of the Sellarsian dilemma, and again argue that it is best understood as denying epistemic reasons to foundationalists. I then review the options that an acquaintance foundationalist has to respond to these dilemmas, as these responses will allow us to see where our more recent dilemmas go wrong. Chapter four address Jack Lyons’s dilemma. I consider what Lyons says about his dilemma at some length. I then argue that it is structurally similar to the Sellarsian dilemma, and tries to undermine the internalist’s (including the acquaintance foundationalist’s) ability to offer epistemic reasons for his beliefs. I then argue that Lyons’s dilemma only seems persuasive because he misunderstands what is required for experience to provide us with an epistemic reason. When properly understood, his dilemma fails to tell against the acquaintance foundationalism. I also argue that Lyons’s version of externalism is much more radical than it might initially appear, helping to motivate acquaintance foundationalism. The fifth chapter focuses on Michael Bergmann. I give his dilemma an extended discussion, which I follow up by reframing it in terms of epistemic reasons. I argue that his dilemma, while seemingly persuasive, fails to trouble the acquaintance foundationalism. I argue that we may be strongly aware (a Bergmannian technical notion) of our epistemic reasons without starting a regress, which vitiates his dilemma. I conclude with some short remarks on possibility of skepticism.

Drivers' mistakes in making immediate decision facing yellow signal interval to stop or go through the intersection is one of main factors contributing to intersection's safety. Incorrect decision might lead to a red light running and a right-angle Collison when passing through the intersection or a rear-end collision when failing to stop safely.Improperly timed traffic signal intervals result in the inability of the drivers to make the right decision and can place them in the dilemma zone. Advance warning systems (AWS) have been used to provide information about the downstream traffic signal change prior to approaching the intersection. On the other hand, advance warning systems increase drivers approach speed according to the literature. However, effect of AWS on dilemma zone has not been studied before. The goal of this thesis is to minimize the number of vehicles caught in dilemma zone by determining more precise boundaries for dilemma zone and to reduce the number of red light violations by predicting the red light runners before arriving to the intersection. Here, dilemma zone boundaries at the presence of AWS has been reexamined with the aid of a large dataset (more than 1870 hours of data for two different intersections). Upper dilemma zone boundaries found to be higher for the intersections with AWS. This is due to vehicles' increasing the speed at the flashing yellow sings to escape the dilemma zone.Moreover, an algorithm for predicting red light runners and distinguishing them from right turners is presented. / Master of Science

Syftet med studien är att beskriva vilka etiska dilemman sjuksköterskor inom den palliativa vården ställs inför i sitt dagliga arbete samt hur de hanterar dessa. För att besvara syftet intervjuades sex sjuksköterskor med minst två års arbetslivserfarenhet från den palliativa vården. Metoden som användes var kvalitativ intervjuer med öppna frågor användes. Resultatet av studien visar att etiska dilemman som identifierades ofta är kopplat till situationer där patientens självbestämmanderätt ställs mot sjuksköterskornas pliktetik, när anhörigas vilja skiljs från patientens vilja är en annan vanlig orsak samt resursbrist i form av personalbrist och tidsbrist. Resultatet av studien visar även skillnaden i hur sjuksköterskorna hanterar etiska dilemman som de möter i sitt dagliga arbete inom den palliativa vården. Ett flertal sjuksköterskor i studien handlar utan att göra etiska reflektioner. De funderar istället vilka handlingsalternativ det finns och väljer oftast det alternativet som ligger närmast de rådande lagar och plikter utan att reflektera kring etiken. Det framkommer även att några sjuksköterskor i studien använder etiska reflektioner för att identifiera etiskt dilemma och försöka komma fram till ett svar. Konsekvensetiken samt ”att göra gott principen” används ofta av dessa sjuksköterskor som utgångspunkt i hur de hanterar etiska dilemman. / The aim with the study is to describe what ethical dilemmas nurses face in palliative care and how they manage to deal with these dilemmas. To answer the question, six nurses with at least two years of experience in palliative care were interviewed. The method that was used was qualitative interviews with open questions. The result of the study shows that ethical dilemmas that were identified often are connected to situations where the patient's right to determine on his or her own goes against the nurses' ethical duty. When the relatives' will is different from the patient's will is another common reason and lack of resources in form of lack of staff and the lack of time. The result of the study also shows the differences in how the nurses deal with ethical dilemmas that they encounter in their daily work in the palliative care. Several nurses in the study act without doing ethical reflections. Instead they think of what options they have and they often choose the alternatives that are within current laws and obligations without reflecting on the ethics. It also occurs that some nurses in the study use ethical reflections to identify ethical dilemmas and try to obtain an answer. The ethic of consequence and the to "do good principle" are often used by these nurses as starting point in how they deal with ethical dilemmas.

published_or_final_version / Asian Studies / Master / Master of Arts

The Prisoner's Dilemma is a two player game where playing rationally leads to a suboptimal outcome for both players. The game is simple to analyze, but when it is played repeatedly, complex dynamics emerge. Recent research has shown the existence of extortionate strategies, which allow one player to win at least as much as the other. When one player plays such a strategy, the other must either decide to take a low payoff, or accede to the extortion, where they earn higher payoff, but their opponent receives a larger share. We investigate what happens when one player uses this strategy against an ``evolutionary'' player, who makes small changes to her strategy over time to increase her score, and show that there are cases where such a player will not evolve towards the optimal strategy of giving in to extortion.

Paranoia is increasingly considered to be a common phenomenon in the general population and is not just a symptom of diagnosable psychiatric disorders. Recently, Ellett, Allen-Crooks, Stevens, Wildschut & Chadwick (2013) argued that distrust-based competition in the Prisoners Dilemma Game (PDG) is a novel behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia. The present study sought to replicate the finding of Ellett et al. (2013) and to extend their research by looking to the social psychology literature on human values as additional potential motivations for competition in the PDG. Additionally, the study sought to examine relationships between paranoia in the nonclinical population and human values, and offer support for a recently refined theory of human values (Schwartz et al., 2012). Consistent with prediction, higher trait paranoia was associated with valuing face, that is, holding a commitment to security and power through maintaining one's public image and avoiding humiliation, and lower trait paranoia was associated with valuing universalism-tolerance, that is, showing acceptance and understanding for others. Secondly, and consistent with prediction, the current findings replicated that of Ellett et al. (2013) to show that distrust-based PDG competition is a behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia. Thirdly, the present research offered a secondary behavioural marker for nonclinical paranoia based on a commitment to valuing power. Lastly, the study offered support for the circular structure of values in Schwartz's (2012) refined theory. Collectively, the current findings provided further evidence for the role of the PDG in the measurement and investigation of nonclinical paranoia, and more specifically provided a foundation for further research into the role that values could play in furthering this understanding.

Introduktion: Mötet med personer med demens utgör en utmaning på flera nivåer för sjuksköterskor och i och med en ökande äldre befolkning kommer även antalet personer med demens öka. Syftet med litteraturstudien var att belysa etiska utmaningar som vårdpersonal möter i vård av patienter med demens Metod: Litteraturstudie. Sökord valdes ut och användes i två databaser. Artiklar som framkom i sökningen valdes ut och granskades. Totalt granskades tio artiklar, nio från databassökning och en artikel från en manuell sökning. Dataanalys: Artiklarna granskades och 3 kategorier framkom: Tvångsåtgärder, kommunikation och tolkningssvårigheter. Resultat: I de valda artiklarna beskrev vårdpersonal olika situationer och etiska utmaningar inom vården av patienter med demens. Situationerna handlade om kommunikationsproblem, etiska värderingar och kränkning av patientens rättigheter. Slutsats: Det fanns många etiska utmaningar för vårdpersonal i mötet med patienter med demens. Vårdpersonalens berättelser visade att svårigheten var att ta beslut åt patienten och genomföra en god omvårdnad utan att kränka patientens rättigheter. Personalen var ofta medvetna om felen som uppstod inom vården och det var en etisk utmaning att hitta en lösning som gjorde att alla delaktiga blev nöjda med vårdarbetet.