The early Husserl wants to know what logic is, or what we should call ‘logic.’ He poses the question in a way that knowingly encompasses both what the 19th century (after Kant but before Frege) and the 20th century (since Frege) call ‘logic.’ But that he asks the question, and with such scope, has yet to be widely recognized. In particular, Husserl scholars still lack an overview of how Husserl’s early, explicitly logical inquiries, driven more by this single question than any worry about doctrinal consistency, does at least two things at once: probe what will later be called ‘pure phenomenology’ or ‘transcendental logic,’ and delimit logic as a positive yet mathematical discipline. With the aim of providing the neglected overview of this project, this dissertation takes the measure of Husserl’s two-volume Logical Investigations (1900-01) in four studies. Chapter I argues that the first volume, the Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900), intends at once to resolve a 19th-century conflict and to establish logic’s possibility as its own discipline, all by means of demonstrating the confusion of psychologism (the view that empirical psychology could set the terms for logic as a discipline). Chapter II then contends that most of the Prolegomena’s first chapter falls outside this intention, departing from the book’s Bolzano-inspired argumentative framework yet thereby anticipating Husserl’s later ‘transcendental logic.’ Chapter III presents Frege and Husserl as two images of indecision as to how it falls to logic to know truth’s laws. Chapter IV concludes by expounding Husserl’s conception of logic as noetics, the self-clarification of knowing, thus completing the picture of Husserl’s indecision, while also laying groundwork to track the development of his thinking after the Logical Investigations.

Ce travail s’interroge sur le projet, commun à Fichte et à Hegel, de réaliser la philosophie comme système. Pour eux, la philosophie doit se résigner à n’être qu’une curiosité, ou devenir une science. Faut-il pour cela qu’elle imite les mathématiques, les sciences expérimentales ? Ou peut-on faire l’hypothèse qu’il existe un objet qui par nature échappe au savoir des sciences, et en conséquence, un autre savoir que celui des sciences particulières ? Pour Fichte comme pour Hegel, la philosophie a pour tâche d’explorer ce que les sciences ne peuvent pas connaître, d’être une science des « évidences » ou des « préjugés » qui demeurent présupposés dans les autres domaines du savoir. Mais une science absolue est un savoir qui ne présuppose rien, qui ne s’appuie sur aucun fait donné, qui ne tient aucun objet pour assuré. Que reste-t-il alors ? Pour Fichte, rien d’autre que ce qu’il appelle le Moi, c’est-à-dire la pensée ou la conscience en tant qu’activité libre, autonome, activité qui, dans le savoir philosophique, doit se démontrer comme étant la source créatrice du monde objectif qui nous entoure et que nous considérons spontanément comme indépendant de notre conscience. Voilà l’objet ou le savoir « absolu » dont s’occupe en particulier la Doctrine de la science. C’est pourquoi l’exigence d’absoluité de la philosophie ne peut être satisfaite que dans la figure d’un savoir circulaire, qui reprend et justifie à la fin ce qui semblait n’être à son début qu’un présupposé arbitraire. Pourtant, le système de Fichte a ceci de particulier qu’aussi impeccable que soit la chaîne de ses déductions, il débute par une fêlure qui, loin de se résorber dans la suite, est si bien assumée et travaillée, qu’elle prend finalement la forme d’une contradiction fondamentale qui est à la source de toute notre vie consciente : l’activité libre, qui doit se démontrer comme productrice d’objectivité, est en même temps ce qui par essence est le plus impossible à objectiver… / This work examines the project, common to Fichte and Hegel, to establish philosophy as a system. For them, philosophy must either resign itself to being a mere curiosity, or become a science. Should it then imitate mathematics, experimental sciences? Or can we make the assumption that there is an object that by nature remains beyond the realm of scientific knowledge, and consequently, another knowledge than that of particular sciences? For Fichte as for Hegel, philosophy has the task of exploring what science cannot know, to be a science of “truisms” or “preconceptions” that remain assumed in other areas of knowledge. But an absolute science is a knowledge that assumes nothing, that is not based on any particular fact, that does not regard any object as certain. What is left, then? For Fichte, nothing but what he calls the Ego, that is to say, thought or consciousness as a free, autonomous activity, which in philosophy must be proven as the creative source of the objective world that surrounds us and that we spontaneously consider as independent of our consciousness. That is the object or the “absolute” knowledge that the Doctrine of Science specifically deals with. Therefore the requirement of philosophical absoluteness can only be satisfied through the figure of a circular knowledge, which reproduces and in the end justifies what initially appeared to be nothing more than an arbitrary assumption. However, Fichte’s system is unique in that, as flawless as its chain of deductions can be, it starts with a crack which, far from disappearing thereafter, is so completely accepted and elaborated, that it finally takes the form of a fundamental contradiction which is at the source of our entire conscious life: free activity, which has to be proven as a producer of objectivity, is at the same time, by essence, that which is most impossible to objectify…

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In this thesis I propose an interpretation of Plato's middle period dialectic. I contend that the method of such dialectic has two components, the doctrine of recollection and the method of hypothesis, and that the two are intimately related. In contrast to the orthodox interpretation, which ignores recollection and sees the method of hypothesis as essentially deductive, I suggest that the discovery of knowledge occurs from the recollection of a pre-natal vision of reality (the world of forms), where such recollection is stimulated by dialectical questioning. Recollection is gradual and uncertain. The direction of the dialectical questioning is itself guided by one's intuition, or (incomplete) recollection of reality at the time, thus providing a progressive interaction between recollection and the method of dialectical questioning, reasoning by hypothesis. In this way, one builds a provisional picture of reality, where the prime relation between hypotheses about such reality is one of coherence. The true dialectician will not only develop a complete and coherent picture of reality, but will ultimately verify the accuracy of this picture upon apprehension of the unhypothetical first principle, the form of the good. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

The problem of this thesis concerns itself with the questions: Why did Emma Smith oppose the men who were in the leading council of the Church and who were the closest friends of her husband? What was her attitude towards the Church her husband founded? What kind of woman was she, and what effect did she have upon her husband and the Church he organized?It will be the purpose of this thesis to point out some significant facts pertaining to these questions, garthered in the main, from primary sources such as the Journal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, news clippings from newspapers published in Illinois, Iowa and Missouri at the time Emma Hale was living and from the Woman's Exponent of the same time. A gleaning of material has also been made from the six volume History of the Church and the Comprehensive History of the Church, Mormon source books, and the one volume, Story of the Church and from the four volumes of the History of the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, source materials of the Reorganized church.The more personal details in the life of Emma Smith as recorded in this thesis are statements made by her mother-in-law, by a grand-daughter, and by her husband.

In this thesis prominent teachings of the apostles and prophets were examined on the subject of the divine nature of God. These teachings indicate that among the elements of the divine nature of God is his Holy Spirit, his glory or the light which emanates from his person. God's glory, spirit and light were compared and analyzed to determine their relationship to each other. It was found that they perform the same roles and functions and are often used synonymously. Other aspects of the divine nature were examined, such as life, love, truth and goodness. The terms omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence were studied in light of statements made by the apostles and prophets. They show that God is omnipotent in the sense that he has all the power that it is possible to have, and that he is omniscient in that he knows the past, present and future. Even though God has an organized, glorified and spiritual body of flesh and bone, he is nevertheless omnipresent through the ubiquity of his divine nature and is in and through all things.

The purpose of this study was to determine whether the individual's bases for moral behavior and his major field of study are related to his moral judgement. Previous studies have indicated that the effect of certain moral education programs was either negligible or detrimental to the accomplishment of their objectives. Because of the emphasis by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints upon fundamental principles as determinants of moral behavior, it seems appropriate to examine the effects of these concepts upon the individual.

This study has shown that there is a textual relationship between the Doctrine and Covenants and the King James Version of the Bible in that out of 1240 of the 1999 verses examined in Sections 65-133 of the Doctrine and Covenants there were found two paralleled Biblical phrases or clauses. Varying in subject matter, these clauses and phrases were either similar or verbatim parallels in vocabulary, syntax or meanings (denotations and connotations) and, many times, in concept.In analyzing the location of the sources of the textual parallels, it was found that the New Testament is much more similar in subject matter and wording to the Doctrine and Covenants than is the Old Testament. However, paralleled passages referring to the latter days are particularly abundant in Isaiah, Joel, Zephaniah and Malachi.

The purpose of this study was to determine the contributions of latter-day revelation to an understanding of the atonement of Christ in addition to that which is taught in the Bible. It is generally acknowledged among Christians that the primary purpose of Christ's mission was to redeem mankind. The doctrine of the atonement contains the foundation principles of Chirstian faith and, yet the creeds of the several churches are in serious disagreement on many vital principles involved. If the widely differing views are due to insufficient information in the bible, the question naturally follows - how does modern revelation clarify the problem?